PERSONAL MEMOIRS 



OF 



U. S. GRANT 




*:^1^....^ .^^t::^:^^ 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS 



.1)1 



O^ 



Ui'S. GRANT 



YOLUME TWO 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1917 



Copyright, 1885, by 
Ulysses 8. Grant. 

Copyright, 1895, by 
JvLix D. Grant. 






i^^-- -^ 



t- ^ *■ ^ 






o 



y 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



Vol. II 

FAOB 

Chapter I. Preparations for Battle — Thoivias 

CARRIES THE FiRST LiNE OP THE EnEMY — SHER- 
MAN CARRIES Missionary Ridge — Battle of 
Lookout Mountain — General Hooker's Fight 1 

Chapter II, Battle of Chattanooga — A Gallant 
Charge — Coiviplete Rout of the Enemy — Pur- 
suit OF THE Confederates — General Bragg — 
Remarks on Chattanooga 12 

Chapter III. The Relief of Knoxville — Head- 
quarters moved to Nashville — Visiting Knox- 
ville — Cipher Despatches — Withholding Or- 
ders 24 

Chapter IV. Operations in Mississippi — Long- 
street in East Tennessee — Commissioned Lieu- 
tenant-General — Commanding the Armies of 
the United States — First Interview with Pres- 
ident Lincoln 39 

Chapter V. The Military Situation — Plans for 
the Campaign — Sheridan assigned to Command 
OF the Cavalry — Flank Movements — Forrest 
at Fort Pillow — General Banks's Expedition 
— Colonel Mosby — An Incident of the Wil- 
derness Campaign 53 

vii 



VIU TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Chapter VI. Commencement of the G-rand Cajvi- 
PAiGN — General Butler's Position — Sheridan's 
First Raid 71 

Chapter VII. Sherman's Cajvipaign in Georgia — 
Siege op Atlanta — Death of General McPher- 
SON — Attempt to Capture Andersonville — 
Capture of Atlanta . • 81 

Chapter VIII. Grand Movement of the Army of 
the Potomac — Crossing the Rapidan — Enter- 
ing THE Wilderness — Battle of the Wilder- 
ness 95 

Chapter IX. After the Battle — Telegraph and 
Signal Service — Movement by the Left Flank 116 

Chapter X. Battle of Spottsylvania — Hancock's 
Position — Assault of Warren's and Wright's 
Corps — Upton promoted on the Field — Good 
News from Butler and Sheridan . . . 126 

Chapter XL Hancock's Assault — Losses of the 
Confederates — Promotions recommended — 
Discomfiture of the Eneimy — E well's Attack 
— Reducing the Artillery . . . .134 

Chapter XII. Movement by the Left Flank — 
Battle of North Anna — An Incident of the 
March — Moving on Richmond — South of the 
Pamunkey — Position of the National Army . 146 

Chapter XIII. Advance on Cold Harbor — An An- 
ecdote OF the War — Battle of Cold Harbor 
— Correspondence with Lee — Retrospective . 162 

Chapter XIV. Left-flank Movement across the 
Chickahominy and James — General Lee — Visit 



TABLE OF CONTENTS IX 

PAGE 

TO Butler — The Movement on Petersburg — 
The Investiment of Petersburg .... 174 

Chapter XV. Raid on the Virginia Central Rail- 
road — Raid on the Weldon Railroad — Early's 

MOVEJIENT upon WASHINGTON — MiNING THE 

Works before Petersburg — Explosion of the 
Mine before Petersburg — Campaign in the 
Shenandoah Valley — Capture of the Weldon 
Railroad 192 

Chapter XVI. Sheridan's Advance — Visit to 
Sheridan — Sheridan's Victory in the Shenan- 
doah — Sheridan's Ride to Winchester — Close 
OF THE Campaign for the Winter . . . 213 

Chapter XVII. The Cajmpaign in Georgia — Sher- 
man's March to the Sea — War Anecdotes — 
The March on Savannah — Investjient of Sa- 
vannah — Capture of Savannah . . . 227 

Chapter XVIII. The Battle op Franklin — The 
Battle of Nashville 254 

Chapter XIX, Expedition against Fort Fisher — 
Attack on the Fort — Failure op the Expedi- 
tion — Second Expedition against the Fort — 
Capture of Fort Fisher 261 

Chapter XX. Sherman's March N6rth — Sheridan 
ordered to Lynchburg — Canby ordered to 
move against Mobile — Movements of Scho- 
field and ThomasI — Capture of Columbia, South 
Carolina — Sherman in the Carolinas ". .271 

Chapter XXI. Arrival of the Peace CoivonssiON- 
ERS — Lincoln and the Peace Commissioners — 
An Anecdote of Lincoln — The Winter before 



X TABLE OF CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Petersburg — Sheridan destroys the Railroad 
— Gordon carries the Picket-line — Parke re- 
captures the Line — The Battle of White Oak 
Road 287 

Chapter XXII. Interview with Sheridan — Grand 
Movement op the Army of the Potomac — Sher- 
idan's Advance on Five Forks — Battle of Five 
Forks — Parke and Wright storm the Enemy's 
Lines — Battles before Petersburg . . .300 

Chapter XXIII. The Capture of Petersburg — 
Meeting President Lincoln in Petersburg — 
The Capture of Richiviond — Pursuing the Ene- 
my — Visit to Sheridan and Meade . . . 314 

Chapter XXIV. Battle of Sailor's Creek — 
Engagement at Farmville — Correspondence 
with General Lee — Sheridan intercepts the 
Enemy . 328 

Chapter XXV. Negotiations at Appoiviattox — 
Interview with Lee at McLean's House — The 
Terms op Surrender — Lee's Surrender — In- 
terview with Lee after the Surrender . . 337 

Chapter XXVI. Morale of the Two Armies — Rel- 
ative Conditions of the North and South — 
President Lincoln visits Richmond — Arrival 
AT Washington — President Lincoln's Assassi- 
nation — President Johnson's Policy . . 350 

Chapter XXVII. Sherman and Johnston — Johns- 
ton's Surrender to Sherman — Capture of Mo- 
bile — Wilson's Expedition — Capture of Jef- 
ferson Davis — General Thomas's Qualities — 
Estimate of General Canby .... 362 



TABLE OF CONTENTS XL 

PAGE 

Chapter XXVIII. The End of the War — The 
March to Washington — One of Lincoln's Anec- 
dotes — Grand Review at Washington — Char- 
acteristics OF Lincoln and Stanton — Estimate 
OF THE Different Corps Coimimanders . . 373 

Conclusion 386 

Appendix 397 

Index . . . « , . , . 461 



i.^ 



^ 









l^ 



LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 

U. S. Gbant, General Retired Frontispiece 

Facing page 

Map op the Battle-field of Chattanooga 4 

Map of Operations in Mississippi 42 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant 56 

Facsimile of Lincoln's "God-speed" to Grant 64 

Map op Operations at Drewry's Bluff, Bermuda Hundred, 

AND Deep Bottom 72 

Map of the Atlanta Campaign 84 

Map illustrating the Siege of Atlanta, Georgia 92 

From the Rapidan to Richmond 96 

Map of the Wilderness 104 

Map op the Country between the "Wilderness and Spott- 

SYLVANiA Court House 120 

Map op Spottsylvania Court House 128 "^ 

Map op the Virginia Campaigns of 1864-65 136' 

Map of North Anna 150 

Field of Operations between the Pamunkey and James 

Rivers 156 ' 

Map of the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren and Sheridan Raids .. 161'^ 

Map of Cold Harbor 164 ' 

General Grant and Staff at Bethesda Church 168 "-" 

General Grant at Headquarters during the Virginla. Cam- 

PAIGN 184 

Map of Richmond 200 ^ 

Map of the Shenandoah Valley Campaign 216 ^ 

General Grant, Mrs. Grant, and Master Jesse at Head- 
quarters at City Point 224 -'- 

From Atlanta to Savannah 240 

■snii 



u^ 



XIV LIST OF MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS 

Facing page . 

Map of Franklin and Nashville 258 

Sketch op Vicinity of Fort Fisher 262 ^ 

Map of Sherman's Route through the Carolinas 276 

Map op Petersburg and Five Forks 304'^ 

Map of the Petersburg and Appomattox Campaigns 316 '^ 

Map of Jetersville and Sailor's Creek 328 

Map op High Bridge and Farmville 332 ^ 

McLean's House, Appomattox Court House 338 

Map op Appomattox Court House 340 

The Surrender at Appomattox 344 

Facsimile of General Grant's Despatch announcing the 

Surrender of General Lee 348 

Right Profile of General Grant, 1875 368 

Left Profile of General Grant, 1875 384 

Important Battles op the Civil War 396 ^ 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS 



OF 



U. S. GRANT 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS 



OF 



U. S. GKANT 



CHAPTEE I 

PREPARATIONS FOR BATTLE — THOMAS CARRIES THE 
FIRST LINE OF THE ENEMY — SHERMAN CARRIES 
MISSIONARY RIDGE — BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUN- 
TAIN — GENERAL HOOKER'S FIGHT 

ON the 20th, when so much was occurring to dis- chap, i 
courage, — rains falHng so heavily as to delay Nov. ises 
the passage of troops over the river at Brown's ferry, 
and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge ; 
news coming of a battle raging at Knoxville, and ^-^jfo™ 
of Willcox being threatened by a force from the 
east, — a letter was received from Bragg which con- 
tained these words : " As there may still be some ^•^2)'|™ 
non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to 
notify you that prudence would dictate their early 
withdrawal." Of course I understood that this was 
a device intended to deceive; but I did not know 
what the intended deception was. On the 22d, 
however, a deserter came in who informed me that 
Vol. II.— 1 1 



2 PERSONAL MEMOrRS OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. I Bragg was leaving our front, and on that day 
Buckner's division was sent to reinforce Longstreet 
at Knoxville, and another division started to fol- 
low, but was recalled. The object of Bragg's letter, 
no doubt, was in some way to detain me until 
Knoxville could be captured and his troops there 
be returned to Chattanooga. 

Nov. 1863 During the night of the 21st the rest of the pon- 
toon-boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in 
all, were carried up to and placed in the North 
Chickamauga. The material for the roadway over 
these was deposited out of view of the enemy within 
a few hundred yards of the bank of the Tennessee, 
where the north end of the bridge was to rest. 

Hearing nothing from Burnside, and hearing 
much of the distress in Washington on his account, 
I could no longer defer operations for his relief. I 
determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the 
Army of the Cumberland, what had been intended 
to be done on the 24th. 

The position occupied by the Army of the Cum- 
berland had been made very strong for defense 
during the months it had been besieged. The line 
was about a mile from the town, and extended from 
Citico Creek — a small stream running near the 
base of Missionary Eidge and emptying into the 
Tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the 
South Chickamauga — on the left to Chattanooga 
Creek on the right. All commanding points on the 
line were well fortified and well equipped with 
artillery. The important elevations within the line 
had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a 
proper armament. Among the elevations so forti- 

Fortwood fied was one to the east of the town, named Fort 



THOMAS CAREIES THE FIKST LINE 3 

Wood. It owed its importance chiefly to the fact chap, i 
that it lay between the town and Missionary Ridge, 
where most of the strength of the enemy was. 
Fort Wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, 
most of which would reach the nearer points of the 
enemy's line. On the morning of the 23d, Thomas, ^"^aj^g^^^ 
according to instructions, moved Granger's corps 
of two divisions, Sheridan and T. J. Wood com- w.p.'mi-ii'; 
manding, to the foot of Fort Wood, and formed ^te-is- 
them into line as if going on parade, Sheridan on vois^oct.ii, 
the right, Wood to the left, extending to or near Ge11.jan.27, 
Citico Creek. Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth 
Corps, held that part of our line facing south and 
southwest. He supported Sheridan with one divi- 
sion (Baird's), while his other division, under John- B^ird^w^p 
son, remained in the trenches, under arms, ready BriS^n. 
to be moved to any point. Howard's corps was ^^seljfBvt^' 
moved in rear of the center. The picket-lines were sept."i,i86i 
within a few hundred yards of each other. At two 
o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. 
By this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy 
could see from his elevated position all that was 
going on. The signal for advance was given by ]^lna"w'B 
a booming of cannon from Fort Wood and other ^^^^ <2> ^^ 
points on the line. The rebel pickets were soon 
driven back upon the main guards, which occupied 
minor and detached heights between the main ridge 
and our lines. These, too, were carried before 
halting, and before the enemy had time to rein- 
force their advance guards. But it was not with- 
out loss on both sides. This movement secured to 
us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we 
occupied in the morning, and the one which the 
enemy had occupied up to this time. The fortifi- 



4 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP. I cations were rapidly turned to face the other way. 
During the following night they were made strong. 
We lost in this preliminary action about eleven 
hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy 
probably lost quite as heavily, including the pris- 
oners that were captured. With the exception of 
the firing of artillery, kept up from Missionary 
Eidge and Fort Wood until night closed in, this 
ended the fighting for the first day. 

The advantage was greatly on our side now, and 
if I could only have been assured that Burnside 
could hold out ten days longer I should have rested 
more easily. But we were doing the best we could 
for him and the cause. 
w.R.xxxi By the ni2:ht of the 23d Sherman's command was 

(2) 572 JO 

in a position to move, though one division (Oster- 
haus's) had not yet crossed the river at Brown's 
ferry. The continuous rise in the Tennessee had 
rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that 
point in condition for troops to cross ; but I was 
determined to move that night even without this 

Ibid. 598 division. Orders were sent to Osterhaus, accord- 
ingly, to report to Hooker if he could not cross by 
eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. Because 
of the break in the bridge, Hooker's orders were 
again changed, but this time only back to those 
first given to him. 

General W. F. Smith had been assigned to duty 
as Chief Engineer of the Military Division. To him 

Ibid. 73 were given the general direction of moving troops 
by the boats from the North Chickamauga, laying 
the bridge after they reached their position, and 
generally all the duties pertaining to his office of 
chief engineer. During the night G-eneral Morgan 



MAP OF THE 

BATTLE-FIELD 

OF 

CHATTANOOGA. 



^ ca7e orMt!< 




UNITED. STATES FORCES 
CONrEDERATE •"• 



J 



CROSSING THE TENNESSEE 

L. Smith's division was marched to the point where chap, i 
the pontoons were, and the brigade of Griles A. coihthMS: 
Smith was selected for the deUcate duty of manning ^Brls^-Gen! 

,1 Vols.Julyie, 

the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the 1862 
south bank of the river. During this night, also, 
General J. M. Brannan, chief of artillery, moved -Jia^w'T 
forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the Army of Mexico, 
the Cumberland, and placed them on the north side Brig.-Geu. 
of the river so as to command the ground opposite, 28;i86i 
to aid in protecting the approach to the point where 
the south end of the bridge was to rest. He had 
to use Sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, ^-^2)^^^ 
Thomas having none. 

At two o'clock in the morning, November 24th, 
Giles A. Smith pushed out from the North Chicka- ibid. 73 
mauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, 
each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. 
The boats with their precious freight dropped down 
quietly with the current to avoid attracting the 
attention of any one who could convey information 
to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of the 
South Chickamauga. Here a few boats were landed, 
the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon 
the picket-guard known to be at that point. The 
guard were surprised and twenty of their number 
captured. The remainder of the troops effected a 
landing at the point where the bridge was to start, 
with equally good results. The work of ferrying 
over Sherman's command from the north side of 
the Tennessee was at once commenced, using the 
pontoons for the purpose. A steamer was also 
brought up from the town to assist. The rest of Jof^s^th^iS: 
M. L. Smith's division came first, then the division "^BSGln.' 

' , - - Vols. Nov. 

of John E. Smith. The troops as they landed were 29,1862 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.i put to work intrencliing their position. By day- 
light the two entire divisions were over and well 
covered by the works they had built. 

The work of laying the bridge on which to cross 
the artillery and cavalry was now begun. The 

■^2)^?'^^ ferrying over the infantry was continued with the 
steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, 
however, as fast as they were wanted to put in 
their place in the bridge. By a little past noon the 
bridge was completed, as well as one over the South 
Chickamauga, connecting the troops left on that 
side with their comrades below, and all the infantry 
and artillery were on the south bank of the Ten- 
nessee. 

Ibid. 573 Sherman at once formed his troops for assault 
on Missionary Eidge. By one o'clock he started 
with M. L. Smith on his left, keeping nearly the 

Ibid. 643 course of Chickamauga Eiver; J. E. Smith next to 
the right and a little to the rear ; and Ewing still 
farther to the right and also a little to the rear of 
J. E. Smith's command, in column, ready to deploy 
to the right if an enemy should come from that 
direction. A good skirmish-line preceded each 
of these columns. Soon the foot of the hill was 
reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, fol- 
lowed closely by their supports. By half-past three 
Sherman was in possession of the height without 
having sustained much loss. A brigade from each 

Ibid. 631 division was now brought up, and artillery was 
dragged to the top of the hill by hand. The enemy 
did not seem to be aware of this movement until 
the top of the hill was gained. There had been a 
drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were 
so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Mis- 



JUNCTION OF HOWARD AND SHERMAN 7 

sionary Ridge were obscured from the view of per- chap, i 
sons in the valley. But now the enemy opened fire 
upon their assailants, and made several attempts 
with their skirmishers to drive them away, but 
without avail. Later in the day a more determined 
attack was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman 
was left to fortify what he had gained. 

Sherman's cavahy took up its line of march soon 
after the bridge was completed, and by half-past 
three the whole of it was over both bridges and on 
its way to strike the enemy's communications at 
Chickamauga station. All of Sherman's command 
was now south of the Tennessee. During the after- 
noon General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded captft^Mo! 
and carried from the field. BriL'-S 

Thomas having done on the 23d what was ex- ^*'*'\^2^'*' 
pected of him on the 24tli, there was nothing for 
him to do this day except to strengthen his position. 
Howard, however, effected a crossing of Citico Creek ^JmfS' 
and a junction with Sherman, and was directed to 
report to himo With two or three regiments of his 
command he moved in the morning along the banks 
of the Teimessee, and reached the point where the 
bridge was being laid. He went out on the bridge 
as far as it was completed from the south end, and 
saw Sherman superintending the work from the 
north side and moving himself south as fast as an 
additional boat was put in and the roadway put 
upon it. Howard reported to his new chief across 
the chasm between them, which was now narrow 
and in a few minutes closed. 

While these operations were going on to the east 
of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the west. iwd. au 
He had three divisions: Osterhaus's, of the Fif- 



8 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. I 

Chas. Cruft, 
Col.31st Ind. 

July, 1861 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 
Vols.Jiilyie, 

1862; Maj.- 

Gen. Mar. 5, 

1865 



C.L. Steven- 
son, Miij.- 
Geu. C. 8.A. 



Lookout 
Mountain 



Nov. 1863 

W.R. XXXI 

(2) 3.15 



Wm. Grose, 
Col.36tbIncl. 

Aug. 1861 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vol8.July30, 

1864 



teenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; Geary's, 
Twelfth Corps, Army of the Potomac ; and Cruft's, 
Fourteenth Corps, Army of the Cumberland. Geary 
was on the right at Wauhatchie, Cruft at the cen- 
ter, and Osterhaus near Brown's ferry. These 
troops were all west of Lookout Creek. The enemy 
had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed 
and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the 
rear to reinforce them if attacked. These brigades 
occupied the summit of the mountain. General 
Carter L. Stevenson was in command of the whole. 
Why any troops, except artillery with a small in- 
fantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top I do 
not see. A hundred men could have held the sum- 
mit — which is a palisade for more than thirty feet 
down — against the assault of any number of men 
from the position Hooker occupied. 

The side of Lookout Mountain confronting Hook- 
er's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and 
full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with 
troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. 
Farther up the ground becomes more even and 
level, and was in cultivation. On the east side the 
slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon- 
road zigzagging up it connects the town of Chatta- 
nooga with the summit. 

Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved 
Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, 
up Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The re- 
mainder of Cruft's division was to seize the bridge 
over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. 
Osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross 
it. The bridge was seized by Grose's brigade after 
a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. 



BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN if 

This attracted the enemy, so that Geary's move- chap.i 
ment farther up was not observed. A heavy mist 
obscured him from the view of the troops on the 
top of the mountain. He crossed the creek almost ^'■^2)f9?'^^ 
unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty 
men on guard near by. He then commenced as- 
cending the mountain directly in his front. By 
this time the enemy was seen coming down from 
his camps on the mountain slope and filing into 
his rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. 
By eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. Oster- 
haus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the 
enemy was driven away with considerable loss in 
killed and captured. 

While the operations at the bridge were progress- rad. 392 
ing, Greary was pushing up the hill over great ob- 
stacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, 
and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. 
The enemy, seeing his left flank and rear menaced, 
gave way, and was followed by Cruft and Oster- 
haus. Soon these were up abreast of G-eary, and 
the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the 
enemy in advance. By noon Geary had gained the 
open ground on the north slope of the mountain, 
with his right close up to the base of the upper 
palisade ; but there were strong fortifications in his 
front. The rest of the command coming up, a line 
was formed from the base of the upper palisade to 
the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. 

Thomas and I were on the top of Orchard Knob. 
Hooker's advance now made our fine a continu- 
ous one. It was in full view, extending from the 
Tennessee River, where Sherman had crossed, up 
Chickamauga River to the base of Missionary Ridge, 



10 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT 

Chap. I over the top of the north end of the ridge to Chat- 
tanooga Valley, then along parallel to the ridge 
a mile or more, across the valley to the month of 
Chattanooga Creek, thence up the slope of Lookout 
Mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. The 
day was hazy, so that Hooker's operations were not 
visible to us except at moments when the clouds 
would rise, but the sound of his artillery and mus- 
ketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his 
front was partially fortified, but was soon driven 
out of his works. During the afternoon the clouds, 
which had so obscured the top of Lookout all day 
as to hide whatever was going on from the view 
of those below, settled down and made it so dark 

W.E.XXX1 where Hooker was as to stop operations for the 
time. At four o'clock Hooker reported his position 
as impregnable. By a little after five direct com- 
munication was established, and a brigade of troops 
was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce him. These 
troops had to cross Chattanooga Creek, and met 
with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and 

w.p.cariin. bv nisfht tlic commaudcr, General Carlin, reported 

W.P.1846-50; J ^ ' 1 

inL Mar*^2. ^^ Hookcr and was assigned to his left. I now tel- 
AugaMswi egraphed to Washington : " The fight to-day pro- 
voiInov; gressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of 
Missionary Ridge, and his right is now at the tun- 
nel, and his left at Chickamauga Creek. Troops 
W.B.XXXI from Lookout Valley carried the point of the 
mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a 
point high up. Hooker reports two thousand pris- 
oners taken, besides which a small number have 
fallen into our hands from Missionary Ridge." The 
■ Ibid. 26 next day the President replied: "Your despatches 
as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday are here. 



DAVIS'S POSITION 11 

Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burn- chap, i 
side." And Halleck also telegraphed : " I congrat- 
ulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I 
fear that General Burnside is hard pushed, and that 
any further delay may prove fatal. I know that you 
will do all in your power to relieve him." 

The division of Jefferson C. Davis, Army of the ^'^aS^^ 
Cumberland, had been sent to the North Chicka- 
mauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited 
in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of 
citizens. On the night of the 24th his division, 
having crossed with Sherman, occupied our extreme 
left from the upper bridge over the plain to the 
north base of Missionary Ridge. Firing continued 
to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected 
with an assault at any point. 



CHAPTER II 

BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA — A GALLANT CHARGE — 
COMPLETE EOUT OF THE ENEMY — PURSUIT OF 
THE CONFEDERATES — GENERAL BRAGG — REMARKS 
ON CHATTANOOGA 

CHAP. II AT twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, 

-^^ I began to give orders for the next day, and 

w.B. XXXI sent a despatch to Willcox to encourage Burnside. 

(3)240 ^ 

w.R. XXXI Sherman was directed to attack at daylight. Hooker 
^^^*^ was ordered to move at the same hour, and en- 
deavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still 
remained ; if he had gone, then to move directly to 
Rossville and operate against the left and rear of 
the force on Missionary Ridge. Thomas was not to 
move until Hooker had reached Missionary Ridge. 
As I was with him on Orchard Knob, he would not 
move without further orders from me. 
Nov., 1863 The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, 
and the whole field was in full view from the top 
of Orchard Knob. It remained so all day. Bragg's 
headquarters were in full view, and officers — pre- 
sumably staff-officers — could be seen coming and 
going constantly. 

The point of ground which Sherman had carried 
on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main 
ridge occupied by the enemy. A low pass, over 

12 



BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA 13 

whicli there is a wagon-road crossing the hill, and chap, it 
near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes 
between the two hills. The problem now was to 
get to the main ridge. The enemy was fortified on 
the point ; and back farther, where the ground was 
still higher, was a second fortification commanding 
the first. Sherman was out as soon as it was light |^™%^ 
enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in ^ xi(2)574 
motion. Three brigades held the hill already gained. 
Morgan L. Smith moved along the east base of 
Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base, m*i8x^'oi.26th 
supported by two brigades of John E. Smith's divi- mi';iomd?. 
sion ; and Corse with his brigade was between the div. isfh a.- 
two, moving directly toward the hill to be captured. 
The ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east 
side, where M. L. Smith's troops were advancing, 
but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the 
west side. The troops advanced rapidly and carried 
the extreme end of the rebel works. Morgan L. 
Smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off 
from the railroad-bridge and the means of bringing 
up supplies by rail from Chickamauga station, 
where the main depot was located. The enemy |ep"w^°R. 
made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our ^^^i'^)^''^ 
troops from the position we had gained, but with- 
out success. The contest lasted for two hours. 
Corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly corse! Maj. 
wounded in this assault. Sherman now threatened jfuynjsei; 
both Bragg's flank and his stores, and made it voif; Aug.' 
necessary for him to weaken other points of his Apr. 27,1893 
line to strengthen his right. From the position I 
occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's 
forces moving against Sherman. Every Confeder- 
ate gun that could be brought to bear upon the 



14: PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. II Union forces was concentrated upon him. J. E. 
J^E. Smith's Smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side 
XXXI (2)644 ^£ ^j^g ridge to the support of Corse's command, 
over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of 
both artillery and musketry, and reached the very 
parapet of the enemy. He lay here for a time, but 
the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his 
right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed 
by the foe. A few hundred yards brought Smith's 
troops into a wood, where they were speedily re- 
formed, when they charged and drove the attacking 
party back to his intrenchments. 

Seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance 
of J. E. Smith from the position I occupied, I 
directed Thomas to send a division to reinforce 
w R^xlfi hi^- Baird's division was accordingly sent from 
^^^'"^ the right of Orchard Knob. It had to march a 
considerable distance directly under the eyes of the 
enemy to reach its position. Bragg at once com- 
menced massing in the same direction. This was 
what I wanted. But it had now got to be late in 
the afternoon, and I had expected before this to see 
Hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of 
Rossville and compelling Bragg to mass in that 
direction also. 
Bragg'8 The enemy had evacuated Lookout Mountain 

Rep. W. E. '' 

xxxi(2)666 (iiii-ing the night, as I expected he would. In cross- 
ing the valley he burned the bridge over Chatta- 
nooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the 
roads behind him. Hooker was off bright and 
early, with no obstructions in his front but distance 
rIp°w''r. and the destruction above named. He was detained 
xxxi(2)3i8 £^^^, hours crossing Chattanooga Creek, and thus 
was lost the immediate advantage I expected from 



A GALLANT CHARGE 



15 



his forces. His reaching Bragg's flank and extend- 
ing across it was to be the signal for Thomas's 
assault of the ridge. But Sherman's condition was 
getting so critical that the assault for his relief 
could not be delayed any longer. 

Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been Ijiiig 
under arms from early morning, ready to move the 
instant the signal was given. I now directed 
Thomas to order the charge at once.^ I watched 
eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at 
last that there was no indication of any charge 
being made. The center of the line which was to 
make the charge was near where Thomas and I 
stood, but concealed from view by an intervening 
forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused 
the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, 
one of the division commanders who was to make 
the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to 
General Wood, asking him why he did not charge 
as ordered an hour before. He replied very 
promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, 
but that he had been ready all day to move at a 
moment's notice. I told him to make the charge 
at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incred- 
ibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and 
Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before 
them toward Missionary Ridge. The Confederates 
were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge 
in front of us, and had a second line half-way down 
and another at the base. Our men drove the troops 
in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and 



Chap. II 



Sheridan's 

aud Wood's 

Rep. W. R. 

XXXI (2) 

189, 257.— 

Sheridan, 

Memoirs, I, 

308 



1 In this order authority was pits, preparatory to carrying the 
given for the troops to reform ridge. — U. S. G. 
after taking the first line of rifle- 



16 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT 

Chap, ii followed tliem SO closely, that rebel caiid Union 
troops went over the first line of works almost at 
the same time. Many rebels were captured and 
sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends 
higher up the hill. Those that were not captured 
retreated, and were pursued. The retreating hordes 
being between friends and pursuers caused the 
enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. 
In fact, on that occasion the Union soldier nearest 
the enemy was in the safest position. Without 
awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on 
our troops went to the second line of works ; over 
that and on for the crest — thus effectually carrying 
A«te,^i, 518 out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 
24th^ for this charge. 

I watched their progress with intense interest. 
The fire along the rebel line was terrific. Cannon- 
and musket-balls filled the air; but the damage 
done was in small proportion to the ammunition 
expended. The pursuit continued until the crest 
was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing 
over the Confederate barriers at different points in 
front of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The 
retreat of the enemy along most of his line was 

1 Chattanooga, Nov. 24, 1863. either carry the rifle-pits and ridge 

W.R. XXXI Maj.-Gen. Geo. H.Thomas, directly in front of them, or move 

^^) ** Chattanooga : to the left, as the presence of the 

General Sherman carried Mis- enemy may require. If Hooker's 

sionary Ridge as far as the timnel position on the mountain [cannot 

with only slight skirmishing. His be maintained] with a small force, 

right now rests at the tunnel and and it is found impracticable to 

on top of the hill, his left at carry the top from where he is, it 

Chickamauga Creek. I have in- would be advisable for him to 

structed General Sherman to ad- move up the valley with all the 

vance as soon as it is light in the force he can spare, and ascend by 

morning, and your attack, which the first practicable road, 

will be simultaneous, will be in U. S. Grant, 

cooperation. Your command will Major-General 



XXXI (2) 191 



COMPLETE EOUT OF THE ENEMY 17 

precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and chap, n 
his officers lost all control over their men. Many 
were captured, and thousands threw away their 
arms in their flight. 

Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Jegw^R. 
Chickamauga River at a point above where the 
enemy crossed. He met some resistance from 
troops occupying a second hill in rear of Mission- 
ary Ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the 
main body and of the artillery and trains. It was 
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting 
on that account, pushed his men forward up this 
second hill slowly and without attracting the atten- 
tion of the men placed to defend it, while he de- 
tached to the right and left to surround the position. 
The enemy discovered the movement before these 
dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, 
leaving artillery, wagon-trains, and many prisoners 
in our hands. To Sheridan's prompt movement 
the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation, are 
indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, 
artillery, and small arms that day. Except for his 
prompt pursuit so much in this way would not 
have been accomplished. 

While the advance up Missionary Ridge was 
going forward. General Thomas with staff. General 
Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making 
the assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard 
Knob, from which the entire field could be observed, 
i'he moment the troops were seen going over the 
last line of rebel defenses I ordered Granger to join 
his command, and mounting my horse I rode to the 
front. General Thomas left about the same time. 
Sheridan, on the extreme right, was already in pur- 

voL. n.— 2 



18 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP. II suit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who 
commanded the division to the left of Sheridan, 
accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, 
but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the 
left, in Baird's front, where Bragg's troops had 
massed against Sherman, the resistance was more 
stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered 
Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, 
but he was so much excited, and kept up such a 
roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had 
taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the 
enemy had got well out of the way. The enemy 
confronting Sherman, now seeing everything to 
their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, 
was not aware of the extent of our success until 
after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue 
at daylight in the morning. 

As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy 

Sherman's j^^d left his frout he directed his reserves, Davis's 

Rep. W. R. 1 T 1 

XXXI (2)576 (division of the Army of the Cumberland, to push 
over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chicka- 
mauga, and to move forward to Chickamauga 
station. He ordered Howard to move up the 
stream some two miles to where there was an old 
bridge, repair it during the night, and follow Davis 
at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L. Smith 
was ordered to reconnoiter the tunnel to see if that 
was still held. Nothing was found there but dead 
bodies of men of both armies. The rest of Sher- 
man's command was directed to follow Howard at 
daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad 
toward Graysville. 
Hooker'8 Hookcr, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga 

&uA Creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. 



PUKSUIT OF THE CONFEDERATES 19 

He got his troops over, with the exception of the chap, ir 
artillery, by fording the stream at a little after 
three o'clock. Leaving his artillery to follow when 
the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on 
with the remainder of his command. At Rossville 
he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, 
which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. 
This threw them on Palmer. They could make 
but little resistance in the position they were caught 
in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. 
Many, however, were captured. Hooker's position 
during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, Nov., isea 
extending east of the ridge. Palmer was on his 
left, on the road to Graysville. 

During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that 
Bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief 
would be sent to Burn side if he could hold out ; to 
Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and ^"^2)^?'^^ 
informed him that forces would be sent up the val- 
ley to relieve Burn side. 

Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had 
taken measures for the relief of Burnside the 
moment the way should be clear. Thomas was ^•^•)f2'2'^^ 
directed to have the little steamer that had been 
built at Chattanooga loaded to its capacity with 
rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was to 
move by the south bank of the Tennessee River 
to the mouth of the Holston, and up that to Knox- 
ville, accompanied by the boat. In addition to 
the supplies transported by boat the men were 
to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their 
cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haver- 
sacks. 

In the battle of Chattanooga troops from the 



20 PEESONAl, MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. II Army of the Potomac, from the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland 
participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of 
the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the Tennes- 
MuigiiDg^of gg(3 River so mingled the troops that the organiza- 
chattenoo- ^j^jjg wcre uot kept together, under their respective 
commanders, during the battle. Hooker, on the 
right, had Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps, 
Army of the Potomac ; Osterhaus's division of the 
Fifteenth Corps, Army of the Tennessee; and 
Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland. 
Sherman had three divisions of his own army, 
Howard's corps from the Army of the Potomac, 
and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the Army of 
the Cumberland. There was no jealousy — hardly 
rivalry. Indeed, I doubt whether officers or men 
took any note at the time of the fact of this inter- 
mingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe sur- 
rounding them, and took it for granted that every 
move was intended to dislodge liim, and it made no 
difference where the troops came from so that the 
end was accomplished. 

The victory at Chattanooga was won against 
great odds, considering the advantage the enemy 
had of position, and was accomplished more easily 
BraJi'smis- ^^^'^^ ^^^ cxpcctcd, by rcasou of Bragg's making 
takes several grave mistakes : first, in sending away his 
ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand 
troops ; second, in sending away a division of troops 
on the eve of battle ; third, in placing so much of 
a force on the plain in front of his impregnable 
position. 

It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited 
Bragg on Missionary Ridge a short time before my 



character 



GENEEAL BEAGG 21 

reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and be- chap, ii 
lieved that he had come out to reconcile a serious 
difference between Bragg and Longstreet, and find- 
ing this difficult to do, planned the campaign against 
Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. 
I had known both Bragg and Longstreet before Bigg's 
the war, the latter very well. We had been three 
years at West Point together, and, after my gradu- 
ation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we 
served together in the Mexican war. I had known 
Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally subse- 
quently. I could well understand how there might 
be an irreconcilable difference between them. 

Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-in- 
formed man, professionally and otherwise. He was 
also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of 
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. 
A man of the highest moral character and the most 
correct habits, yet in the old army he was in fre- 
quent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on 
the lookout to catch his commanding officer infring- 
ing his prerogatives ; as a post commander he was 
equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even 
of the most trivial order. 

I have heard in the old army an anecdote very 
characteristic of Bragg. On one occasion, when 
stationed at a post of several companies commanded 
by a field-officer, he was himself commanding one 
of the companies and at the same time acting as 
post quartermaster and commissary. He was first 
lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached 
on other duty. As commander of the company he 
made a requisition upon the quartermaster — him- 
self — for something he wanted. As quartermaster 



22 



PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. II 



Gen. Long 
street 



he declined to fill the requisition, and indorsed on 
the back of it his reasons for so doing. As com- 
pany commander he responded to this, urging that 
his requisition called for nothing but what he was 
entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quarter- 
master to fill it. As quartermaster he still persisted 
that he was right. In this condition of affairs 
Bragg referred the whole matter to the command- 
ing officer of the post. The latter, when he saw 
the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed, " My 
God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarreled with every 
officer in the army, and now you are quarreling 
with yourself ! " 

Longstreet was an entirely different man. He 
was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, 
subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his 
subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which 
he had the courage to maintain. He was never on 
the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon 
as anybody when intentionally given. 

It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knox- 
ville for the reason stated, but because Mr. Davis 
had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, 
and thought he saw a chance of " killing two birds 
with one stone." On several occasions during the 
war he came to the relief of the Union army by 
means of his superior military genius. 

I speak advisedly when I say Mr. Davis prided 
himself on his military capacity. He says so him- 
F^irGso geif^ virtually, in his answer to the notice of his 
nomination to the Confederate Presidency. Some 
of his generals have said so in their writings since 
the downfall of the Confederacy. 

My recollection is that my first orders for the 



Cf. Davis, 
Kise and 



PLAN OF THE BATTLE 23 

battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman chap, ii 
was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did ; Hooker 
to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as 
he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley, and get 
across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. 
When Hooker had secured that position the Army 
of the Cumberland was to assault in the center. 
Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so 
changed as that Hooker was directed to" come to 
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee 
River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy 
rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's ferry 
could not be maintained in a condition to be used 
in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hook- 
er's orders were changed by telegraph back to what 
they were originally. 

Note. — From this point on after his great illness in April, 

this volume was wTitten (with the and the present arrangement of 

exception of the campaign in the the subject-matter was made by 

Wilderness, which had been pre- him between the 10th and 18th of 

viously written) by General Grant July, 1885. — F. D. G. 



Knoxville 



CHAPTER III 

THE EELIEF OF KNOXVILLE — HEADQUAETEES MOVED 
TO NASHVILLE — VISITING KNOXVILLE — CIPHEE 
DESPATCHES — WITHHOLDING OEDEES 

CHAP. Ill /^HATTANOOG-A now being secure to the Na- 
V-^* tional troops beyond any doubt, I inimedi- 

to reiSvf <^iately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, 
about the situation of which the President, in par- 
ticular, was very anxious. Prior to the battles I 
had made preparations for sending troops to the 
relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after 
securing Chattanooga. We had there two little 
steamers which had been built and fitted up from 
the remains of old boats and put in condition to 
run. Greneral Thomas was directed to have one of 
these boats loaded with rations and ammunition, 
and move up the Tennessee River to the mouth of 
the Holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast 
of the troops. General Granger, with the Fourth 
Corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, 
was to start the moment Missionary Ridge was 
carried, and under no circumstances were the troops 
to return to their old camps. With the provisions 
carried, and the little that could be got in the coun- 
try, it was supposed he could hold out until Long- 
street was driven away, after which event East 

24 



THE BELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 25 

Tennessee would furnish abundance of food for chap, in 
Burnside's army and Ms own also. 

While following the enemy on the 26th, and again Nov., isea 
on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the 
road to Einggold, I directed Thomas, verbally, not 
to start Granger until he received further orders 
from me; advising him that I was going to the 
front to more fully see the situation. I was not 
right sure but that Bragg's troops might be over 
their stampede by the time they reached Dalton, 
In that case Bragg might think it well to take the 
road back to Cleveland, move thence toward Knox- 
ville, and, uniting with Longstreet, make a sudden 
dash upon Burn side. 

When I arrived at Ringgold, however, on the ^'^^^lY' 
27th, I saw that the retreat was most earnest. The ^ragg'srout 
enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons, and 
small arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, 
seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with 
the exception of Cleburne's division, which was p. R. cie- 

^ ' burne, Maj.- 

acting as rear-guard to coVer the retreat. Dec' ml' i' 

When Hooker moved from Rossville toward n^?3o/^ 
Ringgold, Palmer's division took the road to Grays- 
ville, and Sherman moved by the way of Chicka- 
mauga station toward the same point. As soon as 
I saw the situation at Ringgold I sent a staff-officer 
back to Chattanooga to advise Thomas of the con- 
dition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to ^•■^2m?'^^ 
start Granger at once. Feeling now that the troops 
were already on the march for the relief of Burn- 
side, I was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at 
Ringgold through the day to prepare for the return 
of our troops. 

Ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated 



26 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. Ill between East Chickamauga Creek and Taylor's 
Ridge, and about twenty miles southeast from 
Chattanooga. I arrived just as the artillery that 
Hooker had left behind at Chattanooga Creek got 

j^°°w^R up. His men were attacking Cleburne's division, 

XXXI (2) 320 ^i^icii had taken a strong position in the adjacent 
hills, so as to cover the retreat of the Confederate 
army through a narrow gorge which presents itself 
at that point. Just beyond the gorge the valley is 
narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be 
crossed a great many times in the course of the first 
mile. This attack was unfortunate, and cost us 
some men unnecessarily. Hooker captured, how- 
ever, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 
130 rebel dead were left upon the field. 

I directed General Hooker to collect the flour and 
wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the 
troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other 
property that could be of use to the enemy, but 
not to make any wanton destruction. 

MemoTr^t At this poiut Sliermau came up, having reached 
Graysville with his troops, where he found Palmer 
had preceded him. Palmer had picked up many 
prisoners and much abandoned property on the 
route. I went back in the evening to Graysville 
with Sherman, remained there overnight, and did 
not return to Chattanooga until the following night, 
the 29th. I then found that Thomas had not yet 
started Granger, thus having lost a full day, which 
I deemed of so much importance in determining 
the fate of Knoxville. Thomas and Granger were 
aware that on the 23d of the month Burnside had 
telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or 
twelve days, and during that time he could hold 



365 



THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 27 

out against Longstreet, but if not relieved within chap, iii 
the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender 
or attempt to retreat. To effect a retreat would 
have been an impossibility. He was already very 
low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he 
would not have been able to gather supplies. 

Finding that Granger had not only not started, 
but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for 
himself that it was a very bad move to make, I 
sent word to General Sherman of the situation, and ^'^anf •'^^ 
directed him to march to the relief of Knoxville. I 
also gave him the problem that we had to solve — 
that Burnside had now but four to six days' sup- 
plies left, and that he must be relieved within that 
time. 

Sherman, fortunately, had not started on his re- 
turn from Graysville, having sent out detachments 
on the railroad which runs from Dalton to Cleve- 
land and Knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, 
and these troops had not yet returned to camp. I 
was very loath to send Sherman, because his men MemofrM, 
needed rest after their long march from Memphis 
and hard fighting at Chattanooga. But I had be- 
come satisfied tliat Burnside would not be rescued 
if his relief depended upon General Granger's move- 
ments. 

Sherman had left his camp on the north side 
of the Tennessee River, near Chattanooga, on the 
night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked 
rations in their haversacks. Expecting to be back 
in their tents by that time, and to be engaged in 
battle while out, they took with them neither over- 
coats nor blankets. The weather was already cold, 
and at night they must have suffered more or less. 



367 



28 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap, hi The two days' rations had already lasted them five 
days ; and they were now to go through a country 
which had been run over so much by Confederate 
troops that there was but little probability of find- 

Rep^ w!°R. iiig much food. They did, however, succeed in 

xxxi(2)577 (^apturing some flour. They also found a good deal 
of bran in some of the mills, which the men made 
up into bread; and in this and other ways they 
eked out an existence until they could reach Knox- 
ville. 

I was so very anxious that Burnside should get 
news of the steps being taken for his relief, and 
thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it be- 
came necessary, that I determined to send a mes- 
sage to him. I therefore sent a member of my 
Ibid. staff. Colonel J. H. Wilson, to get into Knoxville if 
he could, report to Burnside the situation fully, 
and give him all the encouragement possible. Mr. 
Charles A. Dana was at Chattanooga during the 
battle, and had been there even before I assumed 
command. Mr. Dana volunteered to accompany 
Colonel Wilson, and did accompany him. I put 
the information of what was being done for the 
relief of Knoxville into writing, and directed that 
in some way or other it must be secretly managed 
so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of 

^wson's*^ General Longstreet. They made the trip safely; 

^xxi'a^' General Longstreet did learn of Sherman's coming 
in advance of his reaching there, and Burnside was 
prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it 
had been necessary. 

Burnside had stretched a boom across the Hols- 
ton Eiver to catch scows and flats as they floated 
down. On these, by previous arrangements with 



262, 430. 



THE BELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 29 

the loyal people of East Tennessee, were placed CHAP.ni 
flour and corn, with forage and provisions gener- r^p°w*?r! 
ally, and were thus secured for the use of the Union ^^^^(I'^Te 
troops. They also drove cattle into Knoxville by 
the east side, which was not covered by the enemy ; 
so that when relief arrived Burnside had more pro- 
visions on hand than when he had last reported. 

Our total loss (not including Burnside's) in all xxxY(2f8o- 
these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4529 ^^ 
wounded, and 330 missing. We captured 6142 
prisoners — al^out fifty per cent, more than the 
enemy reported for their total loss — 40 pieces of 
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 
over 7000 stands of small arms. The enemy's loss 
in arms was probably much greater than here re- 
ported, because we picked up a great many that 
were found abandoned. 

I had at Chattanooga, in round numbers, about 
sixty thousand men. Bragg had about half this 
number, but his position was supposed to be im- 
pregnable. It was his own fault that he did not wSers 
have more men present. He had sent Longstreet 
away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up 
to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his 
own force more than one third, and depriving him- 
self of the presence of the ablest general of his 
command. He did this, too, after our troops had 
opened a line of communication by way of Brown's 
and Kelly's ferries with Bridgeport, thus securing 
full rations and supplies of every kind; and also 
when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. 
Knoxville was of no earthly use to him while Chat- 
tanooga was in our hands. If he should capture 
Chattanooga, Knoxville with its garrison would 



30 PEllSONAL MEMOmS OP U. S. GKANT 

CHAP, in have fallen into liis hands without a struggle. I 
have never been able to see the wisdom of this 
move. 

Then, too, after Sherman had arrived, and when 
Bragg knew that he was on the north side of the 
Tennessee River, he sent Buekner's division to 
reinforce Longstreet. He also started another divi- 
sion a day later ; but our attack having commenced 
before it reached Knoxville, Bragg ordered it back. 
It had got so far, however, that it could not return 
to Chattanooga in time to be of service there. It 
is possible this latter blunder may have been made 
by Bragg having become confused as to what was 
Ante, 1, 52i going on on our side. Sherman had, as already 
stated, crossed to the north side of the Tennessee 
River at Brown's ferry, in full view of Bragg's 
troops from Lookout Mountain, a few days before 
the attack. They then disappeared behind foot- 
hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on 
Missionary Ridge until they met their assault. 
Bragg knew it was Sherman's troops that had 
crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may 
have supposed that they had gone up the north 
bank of the Tennessee River to the relief of Knox- 
ville, and that Longstreet was therefore in danger. 
But the first great blunder, detaching Longstreet, 
cannot be accounted for in any way I know of. 
If he had captured Chattanooga, East Tennessee 
would have fallen without a struggle. It would 
have been a victory for us to have got our army 
away from Chattanooga safely. It was a manifold 
greater victory to drive away the besieging army ; 
a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen 
ground and nearly annihilate it. 



THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE 31 

The probabilities are that our loss in killed was chap, m 
the heavier, as we were the attacking party. The 
enemy reported his loss in killed at 361 ; but as he ^""osser*^ 
reported his missing at 4146, while we held over 
6000 of them as prisoners, and there must have 
been hundreds, if not thousands, who deserted, l)ut 
little reliance can be placed on this report. There 
was certainly great dissatisfaction with Bragg on 
the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of 
them, and a disposition to get away if they could. 
Then, too, Chattanooga following in the same half- 
year with Gettysburg in the East and Vicksburg in 
the West, there was much the same feeling in the 
South at this time that there had been in the North 
the fall and winter before. If the same license had 
been allowed the people and press in the South 
that was allowed in the North, Chattanooga would 
probably have been the last battle fought for the 
preservation of the Union. 

General William F. Smith's services in these bat- "^roinot'e'd^ 
ties had been such that I thought him eminently 
entitled to promotion. I was aware that he had 
previously been named by the President for pro- 
motion to the grade of major-general, but that the 
Senate had rejected the nomination. I was not 
aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore 
strongly recommended him for a major-gen eralcy. 
My recommendation was heeded and the appoint- 
ment made. 

Upon the raising of the siege of Knoxville, I, of 
course, informed the authorities at Washington — 
the President and Secretary of War — of the fact, 
which caused great rejoicing there. The President 
especially was rejoiced that Knoxville had been 



32 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. Ill relieved ^ without further bloodshed. The safety 

of Burnside's army and the loyal people of East 

Tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to 

the President for several monthr during which 

time he was doing all he could to elieve the situa- 

w.p.ml-fei ^^^^^ — sending a new commanded with a few tliou- 

¥m^8; sand troops by the way of Cumberland Gap, and 

Y(Aioit^3, telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to " remem- 

Gen.jiiiyi8, ber Bumsidc," " do something for Burnside," and 

1862 ' . ° ' 

other appeals of like tenor. He saw no escape for 
East Tennessee until after our victory at Chatta- 
nooga. Even then he was afraid that Burnside 
might be out of ammunition, in a starving condi- 
tion, or overpowered; and his anxiety was still 
intense until he heard that Longstreet had been 
driven from tlie field. 

Burnside followed Longstreet only to Strawberry 
Plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then 
stopped, believing that Longstreet would leave the 
State. The latter did not do so, however, but 
stopped only a short distance farther on, and sub- 
sisted his army for the entire winter off East Ten- 
siierraan nessec. Fostcr uow relieved Burnside. Sherman 

Memoirs, I, 

^^^ made disposition of his troops along the Tennessee 
River in accordance with instructions. I left 
Thomas in command at Chattanooga, and, about 
the 20th of December, moved my headquarters to 
Nashville, Tennessee. 

W.R. XXXI 1 Washington, D. C, — my prof oundest gratitude — for 

(2)51 Decembers, 1863, 10: 2 a.m. the skill, courage, and persever- 

Maj.-Gen. U. S. Grant: ance with which you and they. 

Understanding that your lodg- over so great difficulties, have 

ment at Knoxville and at Chat- effected that important object, 

tauooga is now secure, I wish to Grod bless you all. 
tender you, and all under your A. Lincoln, 

command, my more than thanks President U. S, 



HEADQUAETERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE 



33 



ville 



1864 



Nashville was the most central point from which chap, hi 
to communicate with my entire military division, tStatlS- 
and also with the authorities at Washington. While 
remaining at Chattanooga I was liable to have my 
telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me 
out of communication with both my command and 
Washington. 

Nothing occurred at Nashville worthy of mention 
during the winter;^ so I set myself to the task of 
having troops in positions from which they could 
move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary 
supplies, so as to be ready to claim a due share of 
the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the 
first good weather in the spring. I expected to re- thSriifot 
tain the command I then had, and prepared myself 
for the campaign against Atlanta. I also had great 
hopes of having a campaign made against Mobile 
from the Gulf. I expected after Atlanta fell to 
occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's 
army from the West by way of the road running 
through Augusta to Atlanta and thence southwest. 
I was preparing to hold Atlanta with a small gar- 
rison, and it was my expectation to push through 
to Mobile if that city was in our possession ; if not, 
to Savannah ; and in this manner to get possession 
of the only east-and-west railroad that would then 

1 During this winter the citizens of the battles in which General 

of Jo Daviess County, Illinois, Grant had participated, 

subscribed for and had a dia- Congress also gave him a vote 

mond-hilted sword made for Gen- of thanks for the victories at 

eral Grant, which was always Chattanooga, and voted him a 

known as the Chattanooga sword, gold medal for Vicksburg and 

Theseabbardwasof gold, and was Chattanooga. All such things 

ornamented with a scroll running are now in the possession of 

nearly its entire length, display- the government at Washington, 

ing in engraved letters the names — F. D. G. 

Vol. II.— 3 



34 



PEESONAL, MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. Ill be left to the enemy. But the spring campaign 
against Mobile was not made. 

The Army of the Ohio had been getting supplies 
over Cumberland Gap until their animals had 
nearly all starved. I now determined to go myself 
to see if there was any possible chance of using 
that route in the spring, and if not, to abandon it. 
Accordingly I left Nashville in the latter part of 
December by rail for Chattanooga. From Chatta- 
Ante, 1, 500 uooga I took ouc of the little steamers previously 
spoken of as having been built there, and, putting 
my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the 
Clinch with the Tennessee. From that point the 
railroad had been repaired up to Knoxville and out 
east to Strawberry Plains. I went by rail, there- 
fore, to Knoxville, where I remained for several 
days. General John G. Foster was then command- 
ing the Department of the Ohio. It was an in- 
tensely cold winter, the thermometer being down 
as low as zero every morning for more than a week 
while I was at Knoxville and on my way from 
there on horseback to Lexington, Kentucky, the 
first point where I could reach rail to carry me back 
to my headquarters at Nashville. 

The road over Cumberland Gap, and back of it, 
was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead 
animals, much as I had found it on my first trip to 
Chattanooga over Waldron's Ridge. The road had 
been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by 
mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; 
so that the ride of six days from Strawberry Plains 
to Lexington over these holes and knobs in the road 
was a very cheerless one and very disagreeable. 

I found a great many people at home along that 



Winter 
travel 



THE CIPHER CODE 



35 



route, both in Tennessee and Kentucky, and, almost 
universally, intensely loyal. They would collect in 
little places where we would stop of evenings to 
see me, generally hearing of my approach before 
we arrived. The people naturally expected to see 
the commanding general the oldest person in the 
party. I was then forty-one years of age, while my 
medical director was gray-haired and probably 
twelve or more years my senior. The crowds would 
generally swarm around him, and thus give me an 
opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting 
into the house. It also gave me an opportunity of 
hearing passing remarks from one spectator to an- 
other about their general. Those remarks were apt 
to be more complimentary to the cause than to the 
appearance of the supposed general, owing to his 
being muffled up, and also owing to the travel- worn 
condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. I 
was back in Nashville by the 13th of January, 186-1. 
When I started on this trip it was necessary for 
me to have some person along who could turn des- 
patches into cipher, and who could also read the 
cipher despatches which I was liable to receive 
daily and almost hourly. Under the rules of the 
War Department at that time, Mr. Stanton had 
taken entire control of the matter of regulating the 
telegraph and determining how it should be used, 
and of saying who, and who alone, should have the 
ciphers. The operators possessed of the ciphers, 
as well as the ciphers used, were practically inde- 
pendent of the commanders whom they were serv- 
ing immediately under, and had to report to the 
War Department through General Stager all the 
despatches which they received or forwarded. 



Chap. Ill 

Loyalty in 
TennesBee 
and Ken- 
tucky 



See Corresp. 

W. R. 
XXXII (2) 
150, 159, 161, 
172, 323, 361 



Anson Stag- 
er, Col. A. A. 
D.C. Feb. 26, 
1862 



36 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. Ill I was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator 
back at Nashville, because that was the point at 
which all despatches to me would come, to be for- 
warded from there. As I have said, it was neces- 
sary for me also to have an operator during this 
inspection who had possession of this cipher, to 
enable me to telegraph to my division and to the 
War Department without my despatches being read 
by all the operators along the line of wires over 
which they were transmitted. Accordingly I or- 
dered the cipher operator to turn over the key to 
l^t^tSff!' Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, of the Corps of En- 
"^"lI-coi!**' gineers, whom I had selected as a wise and discreet 
to Gen. in' mau wlio Certainly could be trusted with the cipher 

Ch Mar 29 

'1864' ■' if the operator at my headquarters could. 

The operator refused point-blank to turn over 
the key to Captain Comstock as directed by me, 
stating that his orders from the War Department 
were not to give it to anybody — the commanding 
general or any one else. I told him I would see 
whether he would or not. He said that if he did 
he would be punished. I told him if he did not he 
most certainly would be punished. Finally, seeing 
that punishment was certain if he refused longer to 
obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even 
if he was not protected altogether from the conse- 
quences of his disobedience to his orders) from the 
War Department, he yielded. When I returned 
from Knoxville I found quite a commotion. The 
operator had been reprimanded very severely and 
^ith^teif- ordered to be relieved. I informed the Secretary 
ton of War, or his assistant secretary in charge of the 
telegraph, Stager, that the man could not be re- 
lieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. It was 



THE SECEETARY OF WAR 



37 



absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and 
the man would most certainly have been punished 
if he had not delivered it ; that they would have to 
punish me if they punished anybody, or words to 
that effect. 

This was about the only thing approaching a dis- 
agreeable difference between the Secretary of War 
and myself that occurred until the war was over, 
when we had another little spat. Owing to his 
natural disposition to assume all power and control 
in all matters that he had anything whatever to do 
with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, 
wliile issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited 
any order from me going out of the adjutant-gen- 
eral's office until he had approved it. This was 
done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any 
orders that came from me to be issued from the 
adjutant-general's office until he had examined 
them and given his approval. He never disturbed 
himself, either, in examining my orders until it 
was entirely convenient for him; so that orders 
which I had prepared would often lie there three 
or four days before he would sanction them. I re- 
monstrated against this in writing, and the Secre- 
tary apologetically restored me to my rightful 
position of General-in-chief of the Army. But he 
soon lapsed again and took control much as before. 

After the relief of Knoxville, Sherman had pro- 
posed to Burnside that he should go with him to 
drive Longstreet out of Tennessee; but Burnside 
assured him that with the troops which had been 
brought by Granger, and which were to be left, he 
would be amply prepared to dispose of Longstreet 
without availing himself of this offer. As before 



Chap. TTI 



Stanton's 
character- 
istics 



Sherman's 

Rep. W. R. 

XXXI (2) 

579 



38 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. Ill Stated, Sliei'man's command had left their camps 
Ante,n,27 north of tlie Tennessee, near Chattanooga, with 
two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats 
or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting 
to return to their camps by the end of that time. 
The weather was now cold and they were suffering, 
but still they were ready to make the further sacri- 
fice, had it been required, for the good of the cause 
which had brought them into service. Sherman, 
having accomplished the object for which he was 
sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the 
Tennessee River. 



i 

^ 



CHAPTER IV 

OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI — LONGSTREET IN EAST TEN- 
NESSEE — COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL — 
COMMANDING THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
— FIRST INTER\aE\V WITH PRESIDENT LINCOLN 

SOON after his return from Kuoxville I ordered chap, iv 
Sherman to distribute his forces from Ste- 
venson to Decatur and thence north to Nashville. MemoTrM, 
Sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back ^^^^ ^ 
to Mississippi, to the limits of his own department 
and where most of his army still remained, for the 
purpose of clearing out what Confederates might 
still be left on the east bank of the Mississippi 
River to impede its navigation by our boats. He 
expected also to have the cooperation of Banks to 
do the same thing on the west shore. Of course 
I approved heartily. 

About the 10th of January Sherman was back in ibid. 389 
Memphis, where Hurlbut commanded, and got to- 
gether his Memphis men, or ordered them collected 
and sent to Vicksburg. He then went to Vicksburg 
and out to where McPherson was in command, and ^ ^ „ „, ^ 

' , L.Polk,W.P. 

had him organize his surplus troops so as to give BiSls-ei; 

him about twenty thousand men in all. ^^■'A!^f8^i? 

Sherman knew that General (Bishop) Polk was octV.iMiJ; 

occupying Meridian with his headquarters, and had jiiue u, isoi 

39 



40 PEESONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. IV two divisions of infantry with a considerable force 
of cavalry scattered west of him. He determined, 
therefore, to move directly upon Meridian. 
mSS-m, I liad sent some twenty-five hundred cavahy 
^^^ under General Sooy Smith to Sherman's depart- 
ment, and they had mostly arrived before Sherman 
got to Memphis. Hurll3ut had seven thousand 
cavalry, and Sherman ordered him to reinforce 
W.R1849-53;' Smith SO as to give the latter a force of about 

Ohio, June seven thousand with which to go against Forrest, 

Brig.-Gen. wlio was thcu kuowii to bc southcast from Mem- 
i862 ■ ""' 2)his. Smith was ordered to move about the 1st of 
February. 

ibjd. 390 While Sherman was waiting at Vicksburg for the 
arrival of Hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent 
out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of 
the enemy and to bring back all the information 
they could gather. When these scouts returned it 
was through them that he got the information of 
General Polk's being at Meridian, and of the 
strength and disposition of his command. 

^c^S Forrest had about four thousand cavalry with 
him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, 
who under so able a leader were very effective. 
Smith's command was nearly double that of For- 
rest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a 
successful experience such as Forrest's men had 
had. The fact is, troops who have fought a few 
battles and won, and followed up their victories, 
improve upon what they were before to an extent 
that can hardly be counted by percentage. The 
difference in result is often decisive victory instead 
of inglorious defeat. This same difference, too, is 
often due to the way troops are officered, and for 



OPERATIONS IN MISSISSIPPI 



41 



the particular kind of warfare which Forrest had 
carried on neither army could present a more 
effective officer than he was. 

Sherman got off on the 3d of February and 
moved out on his expedition, meeting with no op- 
position whatever until he crossed the Big Black, 
and with no great deal of opposition after that 
until he reached Jackson, Mississippi. This latter 
place he reached on the 6th or 7th, Brandon on the 
8th, and Morton on the 9th. Up to this time he 
moved in two columns to enable him to get a good 
supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. 
Here, however, there were indications of the con- 
centration of Confederate infantry, and he was 
obliged to keep his army close together. He had 
no serious engagement; but he met some of the 
enemy, who destroyed a few of his wagons, about 
Decatur, Mississippi, where, by the way, Sherman 
himself came near being picked up. 

He entered Meridian on the 14th of the month, 
the enemy having retreated toward Demopolis, 
Alabama. He spent several days in Meridian in 
thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and 
south, and also for the purpose of hearing from 
Sooy Smith, who, he supposed, had met Forrest be- 
fore this time, and, he hoped, had gained a decisive 
victory because of a superiority of numbers. Hear- 
ing nothing of him, however, he started on his 
return trip to Vicksburg. There he learned that 
Smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had 
been ice-bound in the Ohio River, instead of getting 
off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 
11th. Smith did meet Forrest, but the result was 
decidedly in Forrest's favor. 



Chap. IV 



Sherman's 

Rep. W. E. 

XXXII (1) 

173 et seq. 



Sherman, 

Memoirs, I, 

391 

W. R. 
XX XII (1) 

176 



Smith's 
Rep. W. R. 

xxxn (1) 

252, 253 



42 PERSONAL MEMOrRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. IV Sherman had written a letter to Banks, propos- 

x^n(2) i^S ^ cooperative movement with him against 
"^ Shreveport, subject to my approval, I disapproved 
of Sherman's going himself, because I had other 
important work for him to do, but consented that 
he might send a few troops to the aid of Banks, 
though their time to remain absent must be limited. 
We must have them for the spring campaign. The 
trans-Mississippi movement proved abortive. 
F. D. Grant My cldcst SOU, wlio had accompanied me on the 
Vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there 
contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had 
grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of Janu- 
ary I obtained permission to go to St. Louis, where 
he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly ex- 
pecting to find him alive on my arrival. While I 
was permitted to go, I was not permitted to turn 
over my command to any one else, but was directed 
to keep the headquarters with me and to commu- 
nicate regularly with all parts of my division and 
with Washington, just as though I had remained 
at Nashville. 

When I obtained this leave I was at Chattanooga, 
having gone there again to make preparations to 
have the troops of Thomas in the southern part of 
Tennessee cooperate with Sherman's movement in 

x:^n (2) Mississippi. I directed Thomas and Logan, who was 
193, 198 ^^ Scottsborough, Alabama, to keep up a threaten- 
ing movement to the south against J. E. Johnston, 
who had again relieved Bragg, for the purpose of 
making him keep as many trooj)s as possible there. 

Ibid. 198 I learned through Confederate sources that Johns- 
ton had already sent two divisions in the direction 
of Mobile, presumably to operate against Sherman, 



CD 



-55- 






CO 

9 



^ 




90 

to 




^ 



■^ 



CS 

■ o 



r^= 



i-\i 



,?;-•, 



Ul: 



?J 



i ■'*,=■' 



36 



'\?^ 



~ar- 



"iS" 



LONGSTEEET IN EAST TENNESSEE 



43 



W. R. 

XXXII (2) 

337 



Ibid. 367 



and two more divisions to Longstreet in East Ten- chap, iv 
nessee. Seeing that Johnston had depleted in this 
way, I directed Thomas to send at least ten thou- 
sand men, besides Stanley's division, which was 
already to the east, into East Tennessee, and noti- 
fied Schofield, who was now in command in East 
Tennessee, of this movement of troops into his 
department, and also of the reinforcements Long- 
street had received. My object was to drive Long- 
street out of East Tennessee as a part of the prep- 
arations for my spring campaign. 

About this time General Foster, who had been 
in command of the Department of the Ohio after 
Burnside until Schofield relieved him,^ advised me 
that he thought it would be a good thing to keep 
Longstreet just where he was; that he was per- 
fectly quiet in East Tennessee, and if he was forced 
to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would 
be free to go to any place where it could effect the 
most for their cause. I thought the advice was 
good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the ibid. 374, sss 
orders for pursuit of Longstreet. 

On the 12th of February I ordered Thomas to 
take Dalton and hold it, if possible ; and I directed 
him to move without delay. Finding that he had 
not moved, on the 17th I urged him again to start, 
telling him how important it was, that the object 
of the movement was to cooperate with Sherman, 



Ibid. 373 



Ibid. 414 



1 Washington, D. C, 

December 29, 1863. 
Maj. -General U. S. Grant : 

General Foster has asked to be 
relieved from bis command on 
accoiint of disability from old 
wounds. Should his request be 



granted, who would you like as 
his successor? It is possible that 
Schofield will be sent to your 
command. 

H. W. Halleck, 
General-in-Chief. 

lOfficiaQ 



44 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. IV who was moving eastward and might be in danger. 

xxxn(2) Then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, 

**^ I asked him if he could not start the next day. He 

finally got off on the 22d or 23d. The enemy fell 

back from his front without a battle, but took a 

new position quite as strong and farther to the 

Ibid. 480,482 rear. Thomas reported that he could not go any 
farther, because it was impossible with his poor 
teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the 
railroads were repaired. He soon fell back. 

Ibid. 464. 472 Schofield also had to return for the same reason. 
He could not carry supplies with him, and Long- 
street was between him and the supplies still left 
in the country. Longstreet, in his retreat, would 
be moving toward his supplies, while our forces, 
following, would be receding from theirs. On the 
2d of March, however, I learned of Sherman's suc- 
cess, which eased my mind very much. The next 
day, the 3d, I was ordered to Washington. 

iS'^^Lifetf ^^^ ^^^^^ restoring the grade of Lieutenant-Gen- 

¥111,^334 et ®i"^l ^^ the Army had passed through Congress and 
^®'^' became a law on the 26th of February. My nomi- 
nation had been sent to the Senate on the 1st of 
March and confirmed the next day (the 2d). I was 

x:^n(3) ordered to Washington on the 3d to receive my 
^^'^^ commission, and started the day following that. 
The commission was handed to me on the 9th. It 
was delivered to me at the Executive Mansion by 
President Lincoln in the presence of his Cabinet, 
my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me, 
and a few other visitors. 

^oinrvni!' The President in presenting my commission read 

34oet8eQ. fpQjjj ^ paper — stating, however, as a preliminary, 
and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn 



COMMISSIONED LIEUTENANT-GENERAL 45 

that up ou paper, kuowing my disinclination to chap, iv 
speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance 
so that I might prepare a few lines of reply. The 
President said : 

" General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what gSte^i^ 
you have done, and its reliance upon you for what ^®^^' ' *^^ 
remains to be done, in the existing great struggle, 
are now presented, with this commission constitut- 
ing you Lieutenant-General in the Army of the 
United States. With this high honor devolves 
upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As 
the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it 
will sustain you. I scarcely need to add that, with 
what I here speak for the nation, goes my own 
hearty personal concurrence." 

To this I replied : " Mr. President, I accept the ibid, 
commission, with gratitude for the high honor con- 
ferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have 
fought in so many fields for our common country, 
it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint 
your expectations. I feel the full weight of the 
responsibilities now devolving on me ; and I know 
that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, 
and, above all, to the favor of that Providence which 
leads both nations and men." 

On the 10th I visited the headquarters of the Mar. i864 
Army of the Potomac at Brandy station ; then re- 
turned to Washington, and pushed west at once to 
make my arrangements for turning over the com- 
mands there and giving general directions for the 
preparations to be made for the spring campaign. 

It had been my intention before this to remain Pi^"^^"?^^^^" 
in the West, even if I was made lieutenant-general ; *'°° 
but when I got to Washington and saw the situa- 



46 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. IV tion it was plain that here was the point for the 
commanding general to be. No one else could, 
probably, resist the pressure that would be brought 
to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and 
pursue others. I determined, therefore, before I 
started back, to have Sherman advanced to my late 
position, McPherson to Sherman's in command of 
the department, and Logan to the command of 
McPherson's corps. These changes were all made 
on my recommendation and without hesitation. 
My commission as lieutenant-general was given to 
me on the 9th of March, 1864. On the following 

G-G.Meade, ^j^y, as already stated, I visited General Meade, 
fste^!?.; ' commanding the Army of the Potomac, at his head- 

ESMlyi7, quarters at Brandy station, north of the Rapidan. 
Gen.voil:" I had kuowu General Meade slightly in the Mexi- 

Aug.31,1861; , _ , , , T . . ±•^ J.1 ' • •!. 

Maj.-Gen. can War, but had not met him smce until this visit. 

U.S.A. Aug. ■ n 1 -r» j_ 

NoY.Ti8?2 I was a stranger to most of the Army of the Poto- 
mac, I might say to all except the officers of the 
regular army who had served in the Mexican war. 
There had been some changes ordered in the 
organization of that army before my promotion. 
One was the consolidation of five corps into three, 
thus throwing some officers of rank out of impor- 
tant commands. Meade evidently thought that I 
might want to make still one more change not yet 
ordered. He said to me that I might want an 
officer who had served with me in the West, men- 
tioning Sherman specially, to take his place. If 
so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the 

Meadgs^a- change. He urged that the work before us was of 
such vast importance to the whole nation that the 
feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in 
the way of selecting the right men for all positions. 



GENEKAL MEADE 



47 



For himself, he would serve to the best of his abil- chai-. iv 
ity wherever placed. I assured him that I had no 
thought of substituting any one for him. As to 
Sherman, he could not be spared from the West. 

This incident gave me even a more favorable 
opinion of Meade than did his great victory at 
Gettysburg the July before. It is men who wait to 
be selected, and not those who seek, from whom 
we may always expect the most efficient service. 

Meade's position afterward proved embarrassing 
to me, if not to him. He was commanding an 
army, and, for nearly a year previous to my taking 
command of all the armies, was in supreme com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac — except from 
the authorities at "Washington. All other general 
officers occupying similar positions were indepen- 
dent in their commands so far as any one present 
with them was concerned. I tried to make General 
Meade's position as nearly as possible what it would 
have been if I had been in Washington or any 
other place away from his command. I therefore 
gave all orders for the movements of the Army of 
the Potomac to Meade to have them executed. To 
avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, 
I established my headquarters near his, unless there 
were reasons for locating them elsewhere. This 
sometimes happened, and I had on occasions to 
give orders direct to the troops affected. On the 
11th I returned to Washington, and on the day 
after orders were published by the War Department xxxn(3)68 
placing me in command of all the armies. I had 
left Washington the night before to return to my 
old command in the West and to meet Sherman, 
whom I had telegraphed to join me in Nashville, 



48 



PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



CeAP. IV 

W. R. 

XXXII (3) 87 



Sherman, 

Memoirs, I, 

400-402; II, 

6,7 



W. R. 
XXXII (2) 

40-42 



Ibid. 99-101 



Sherman assumed command of the Military Di- 
vision of the Mississippi on the 18th of March, and 
we left Nashville together for Cincinnati. I had 
Sherman accompany me that far on my way back 
to Washington so that we could talk over the mat- 
ters about which I wanted to see him without losing 
any more time from my new command than was 
necessary. The first point which I wished to dis- 
cuss was particularly about the cooperation of his 
command with mine when the spring campaign 
should commence. There were also other and 
minor points, minor as compared with the great 
importance of the question to be decided by sangui- 
nary war — the restoration to duty of officers who 
had been relieved from important commands, 
namely, McClellan, Burnside, and Fremont in the 
East, and Buell, McCook, Negley, and Crittenden 
in the West. 

Some time in the winter of 1863-64 I had been 
invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of 
the campaign I thought advisable for the command 
under me — now Sherman's. Greneral J. E. Johnston 
was defending Atlanta and the interior of Georgia 
with an army, the largest part of which was sta- 
tioned at Dalton, about thirty-eight miles south of 
Chattanooga. Dalton is at the junction of the rail- 
road from Cleveland with the one from Chattanooga 
to Atlanta. 

There could have been no difference of opinion as 
to the first duty of the armies of the Military Divi- 
sion of the Mississippi. Johnston's army was the 
first objective, and that important railroad center, 
Atlanta, the second. At the time I wrote General 
Halleck giving my views of the approaching cam- 



REORGANIZATION 49 

paign, and at the time I met General Sherman, it chap, iv 
was expected that General Banks would be through 
with the campaign which he had been ordered upon 
before my appointment to the command of all the 
armies, and would be ready to cooperate with the 
armies east of the Mississippi, his part in the pro- 
gramme being to move upon Mobile by land while x:^iv' (i) 
the navy would close the harbor and assist to the " 
best of its ability.^ The plan, therefore, was for 
Sherman to attack Johnston and destroy his army Sherman's 
if possible, to capture Atlanta and hold it, and with ^^"^p^f^*^™' 
his troops and those of Banks to hold a line through 
to Mobile, or at least to hold Atlanta and command 
the railroad running east and west, and the troops 
from one or other of the armies to hold important 
points on the southern road, the only east-and-west 
road that would be left in the possession of the 
enemy. This would cut the Confederacy in two 
again, as our gaining possession of the Mississippi 
River had done before. Banks was not ready in 
time for the part assigned to hun, and circum- 
stances that could not be foreseen determined the 
campaign which was afterward made, the success 
and grandeur of which has resounded throughout 
all lands. 

In regard to restoring officers who had been re- 
lieved from important commands to duty again, I 
left Sherman to look after those who had been re- 
moved in the West while I looked out for the rest. 
I directed, however, that he should make no assign- M^emoSs.n, 
ment until I could speak to the Secretary of War 
about the matter. I shortly after recommended to 

1 See letter to Banks, iu Gen- and in the Official Records as cited 
eral Grant's report, Appendix, in the margin. — F. D. G. 

Vol. II.— 4 



6,7 



50 



PERSONAL. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAP. IV 



First meet- 
ing with 
Lincoln 



Lincoln's 

military 

policy 



the Secretary the assignment of General Buell to 
duty. I received the assurance that duty would be 
offered to him; and afterward the Secretary told 
me that he had offered Buell an assignment and 
that the latter had declined it, saying that it would 
be degradation to accept the assignment offered. I 
understood afterward that he refused to serve under 
either Sherman or Canby because he had ranked 
them both. Both graduated before him and ranked 
him in the old army. Sherman ranked him as a 
brigadier-general. All of them ranked me in the 
old army, and Sherman and Buell did as brigadiers. 
The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining 
service is that he once ranked the commander he is 
ordered to report to. 

On the 23d of March I was back in Washington, 
and on the 26th took up my headquarters at Cul- 
peper Court House, a few miles south of the head- 
quarters of the Army of the Potomac. 

Although hailing from Illinois myself, the State 
of the President, I never met Mr.' Lincoln until 
called to the capital to receive my commission as 
lieutenant-general. I knew him, however, very well 
and favorably from the accounts given by officers 
under me at the West who had known him all their 
lives. I had also read the remarkable series of de- 
bates between Lincoln and Douglas a few years be- 
fore, when they were rival candidates for the United 
States Senate. I was then a resident of Missouri, 
and by no means a " Lincoln man " in that contest ; 
but I recognized then his great ability. 

In my first interview with Mr. Lincoln alone he 
stated to me that he had never professed to be a 
military man or to know how campaigns should be 



FIEST INTERVIEW WITH THE PRESIDENT 51 

conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them ; chap, iv 
but that procrastination on the part of commanders, 
and the pressure from the people at the North and 
Congress, ivliicli tvas always ivitli him, forced him 
into issuing his series of "Military Orders" — one, 
two, three, etc. He did not know but they were 
all wi*ong, and did know that some of them were. 
All he wanted or had ever wanted was some one 
who would take the responsibility and act, and call 
on him for all the assistance needed, pledging him- 
self to use all the power of the government in ren- 
dering such assistance. Assuring him that I would 
do the best I could with the means at hand, and 
avoid as far as possible annoying him or the War 
Department, our first interview ended. 

The Secretary of War I had met once before 
only, but felt that I knew him better. 

While 'Commanding in West Tennessee we had 
occasionally held conversations over the wires, at 
night, when they were not being otherwise used. 
He and General Halleck both cautioned me against 
giving the President my plans of campaign, saying 
that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing 
anything asked of him, that some friend would be 
sure to get from him all he knew. I should have 
said that in our interview the President told me he 
did not want to know what I proposed to do. But 
he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which 
he wanted me to hear and then do as I pleased 
about. He brought out a map of Virginia on which 
he had evidently marked every position occupied 
by the Federal and Confederate armies up to that 
time. He pointed out on the map two streams which The Presi- 
empty into the Potomac, and suggested that the egy 



52 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. IV army might be moved ou boats and landed between 
the mouths of these streams. We would then have 
the Potomac to bring our supplies, and the tribu- 
taries would protect our flanks while we moved 
out. I listened respectfully, but did not suggest 
that the same streams would protect Lee's flanks 
while he was shutting us up. 

I did not communicate my plans to the Presi- 
dent, nor did I to the Secretary of War or to Gen- 
eral Halleck. 
1864 March the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, 

at Culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early 
campaign commenced. 



March, 1864 



CHAPTER V 

THE MELITAEY SITUATION — PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN 
— SHERIDAN ASSIGNED TO COMMAND OF THE CAV- 
ALRY — FLANK MOVEMENTS — FORREST AT FORT PIL- 
LOW — GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION — COLONEL 
MOSBY — AN INCIDENT OF THE WILDERNESS CAM- 
PAIGN 

WHEN I assumed command of all the armies chap, v 
the situation was about this : The Mississippi 
River was guarded from St. Louis to its mouth, '^tfon 17' 
The line of the Arkansas was held, thus giving us 
all the Northwest north of that river. A few points 
in Louisiana not remote from the river were held 
by the Federal troops, as was also the mouth of the 
Rio Grande. East of the Mississippi we held sub- 
stantially all north of the Memphis and Charleston 
railroad as far east as Chattanooga, thence along 
the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, tak- 
ing in nearly all of the State of Tennessee. West 
Virginia was in our hands ; and that part of old 
Virginia north of the Rapidan and east of the Blue 
Ridge we also held. On the sea-coast we had Fort- 
ress Monroe and Norfolk in Virginia; Plymouth, 
Washington, and New Berne in North Carolina; 
Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, 
Port Royal, and Fort Pulaski in South CaroUna and 

53 



54 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. V 



Greorgia ; Fernaudina, St. Augustine, Key West, and 
Pensacola in Florida. The balance of the Southern 
territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands 
of the enemy. 

In tbe West Sherman, who had succeeded me in the com- 
mand of the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
commanded all the troops in the territory west of 
the AUeghanies and north of Natchez, with a large 
movable force about Chattanooga. His command 
was subdivided into four departments, but the com- 
Thomas*^' ^^^^^^I's all reported to Sherman and were subject 

^''steeir^' *^ ^i^ orders. This arrangement, however, insured 
the better protection of all lines of communication 
through the acquired territory, for the reason that 
these different department commanders could act 
promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid 
within their respective jurisdictions without await- 
ing the orders of the division commander. 

In the East lu the East the opposing forces stood in substan- 
tially the same relations toward each other as three 
years before, or when the war began; they were 
both between the Federal and Confederate capitals. 
It is true, footholds had been secured by us on the 
sea-coast, in Virginia and North Carolina ; but, be- 
yond that, no substantial advantage had been gained 
by either side. Battles had been fought of as great 
severity as had ever been known in war, over 
ground from the James Eiver and Chickahominy, 
near Richmond, to Gettysburg and Chambersburg, 
in Pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes 
favorable to the National army, sometimes to the 
Confederate army •, but in every instance, I believe, 
claimed as victories for the South by the South- 
ern press, if not by the Southern generals. The 



THE MILITARY SITUATION 55 

Northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these chai«. v 
claims ; a portion of it always magnified rebel suc- 
cess and belittled ours, while another portion, most 
sincerely earnest in their desire for the preserva- 
tion of the Union and the overwhelming success of 
the Federal armies, would nevertheless generally ex- 
press dissatisfaction with whatever victories were 
gained because they were not more complete. 

That portion of the Army of the Potomac not in Virginia 
engaged in guarding lines of communication was 
on the northern bank of the Rapidan. The Army 
of Northern Virginia, confronting it on the opposite 
bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched 
and commanded by the acknowledged ablest gen- R.E.Lee,w. 

Jr. lo25~jy ^ 

eral in the Confederate army. The country back ia4^_*'4f.*'coi. 
to the James River is cut up with many streams, JeS'S 
generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except isei-^i.^ct! 

12 1870 

where bridged. The region is heavily timbered, and 
the roads narrow and very bad after the least rain. 
Such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared 
with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals 
all the way back to Richmond, so that when driven 
from one fortified i:)Osition he would always have 
another farther to the rear to fall back into. 

To provision an army, campaigning against so 
formidable a foe through such a country, from 
wagons alone seemed almost impossible. System 
and discipline were both essential to its accom- 
plishment. 

The Union armies were now divided into nineteen Reorganiz- 

lug the 

departments, though four of them in the West had armies 
been concentrated into a single military division. 
The Army of the Potomac was a separate com- 
mand and had no territorial limits. There were 



56 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. V thus Seventeen distinct commanders. Before this 

time these various armies had acted separately and 

independently of one another, giving the enemy an 

opportunity often of depleting one command, not 

pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. 

I determined to stop this. To this end I regarded 

the Army of the Potomac as the center, and all 

west to Memphis along the line described as our 

position at the time, and north of it, the right wing ; 

■^ifi^GeD!^' ^^^® Army of the James, under General Butler, as 

i86iti^Yan! ti^6 left wing; and all the troops south as a force 

11,1893 ^^ j,g^^ ^£ ^^^ enemy. Some of these latter were 

occupying positions from which they could not 
render service proportionate to their numerical 
strength. All such were depleted to the minimum 
necessary to hold their positions as a guard against 
blockade-runners; where they could not do this 
their positions were abandoned altogether. In this 
way ten thousand men were added to the Army of 
im>"rt.w!"p. ^^^® James from South Carolina alone, with General 
ciptEng. Gillmore in command. It was not contemplated 
^rfgt'Gen.' that Gcucral Gillmore should leave his department ; 
1862'; Mfij.-' but as most of his troops were taken, presumably 
1863 tor active service, he asked to accompany them and 
was permitted to do so. Officers and soldiers on 
furlough, of whom there were many thousands, 
were ordered to their proper commands; concen- 
tration was the order of the day, and to have it 
accomplished in time to advance at the earliest 
moment the roads would permit was the problem. 
.Sy^joros ^^ ^ reinforcement to the Army of the Potomac, 
or to act in support of it, the Ninth Army-corps, 
over twenty thousand strong, under General Burn- 
side, had been rendezvoused at Annapolis, Mary- 



^f»"T^^ir'7-^-»K-' -"W^J* 



M,. 








(engraved by T. JOHNSON FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN 1864, OWNED BY THE UNION LEAGUE CLUB, 

NEW YORK CITY.) 



PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN 57 

land. This was an admirable position for such a chap, v 
reinforcement. The corps could be brought at the 
last moment as a reinforcement to the Army of the 
Potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, 
south of Norfolk, in Virginia or North Carolina, to 
operate against Richmond from that direction. In 
fact, Burnside and the War Department both 
thought the Ninth Corps was intended for such an 
expedition up to the last moment. 

My general plan now was to concentrate all the pi^jf°,f ^J,e- 
force possible against the Confederate armies in the '■''*''*°^ 
field. There were but two such, as we have seen, 
east of the Mississippi River and facing north. The 
Army of Northern Virginia, General Robert E. Lee 
commanding, was on the south bank of the Rapidan, 
confronting the Army of the Potomac ; the second, 
under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Dalton, 
Georgia, opposed to Sherman, who was still at Chat- 
tanooga. Besides these main armies the Confeder- 
ates had to guard the Shenandoah Valley, a great 
storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line 
of communications from Richmond to Tennessee. 
Forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was 
in the West with a large force, making a larger 
command necessary to hold what we had gained in 
Middle and West Tennessee. We could not abandon 
any territory north of the line held by the enemy, 
because it would lay the Northern States open to 
invasion. But as the Army of the Potomac was the 
principal garrison for the protection of Washington 
even while it was moving on Lee, so all the forces 
to the west, and the Army of the James, guarded 
their special trusts when advancing from them as 
well as when remaining at them. Better, indeed, 



58 



PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



Cum: V 



Geo. Crook, 
W.P.1848-52; 
Capt.4thlnf. 
May 14, Col. 

36th Ohio, 
Sept. 12,1861; 

Brig.-Gen. 
Vols. Sept. 7, 

1862; Maj.- 

Gen. July 18, 

1864 



W. R. 
XXXII (3) 

245 



for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines 
and resources at a greater distance from ours, and 
with. a greater force. Little expeditions could not 
so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a 
few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or 
inflict other little annoyances. Accordingly I ar- 
ranged for a simultaneous movement all along the 
line. Sherman was to move from Chattanooga, 
Johnston's army and Atlanta being his objective 
points.^ Crook, commanding in West Virginia, was 



1 [Private and Confidential.'] 

Headquarters, Armies of 
THE United States, 

Washington, D. C, 
April 4, 1864. 

Maj.-Gen. W. T. Sherman, 

Commanding Military Division of 

the Mississippi. 

General : It is my design, if 
the enemy keep quiet and allow 
me to take the initiative in the 
spring campaign, to work all 
parts of the army together, and 
somewhat toward a common cen- 
ter. For your information I now 
write you my progi-amme, as at 
present determined upon. 

I have sent orders to Banks, by 
private messenger, to finish up 
his present expedition against 
Shreveport with all despatch ; to 
turn over the defense of Red River 
to General Steele and the navy, 
and to return your troops to you 
and his own to New Orleans ; to 
abandon all of Texas, except the 
Rio Grande, and to hold that with 
not to exceed four thousand men ; 
to reduce the number of troops on 
the Mississippi to the lowest num- 
ber necessary to hold it ; and to 
collect from his command not less 
than twenty-five thousand men. 



To tliis I will add five thousand 
men- from Missouri. With this 
force he is to commence opera- 
tions against Mobile as soon as 
he can. It will be impossible for 
him to commence too early. 

Gillmore joins Butler with ten 
thousand men, and the two oper- 
ate against Richmond from the 
south side of the James River. 
This will give Butler thirty-three 
thousand men to operate with, 
W. F. Smith commanding the 
right wing of his forces and Gill- 
more the left wing. I will stay 
with the Army of the Potomac, 
increased by Burnside's corps of 
not less than twenty-five tliousand 
effective men, and operate directly 
against Lee's army wherever it 
may be found. 

Sigel collects all his available 
force in two columns, one, under 
Ord and Averell, to start from 
Beverly, Virginia, and the other, 
under Crook, to start from Charles- 
ton on the Kanawha, to move 
against the Virginia and Tennes- 
see railroad. 

Crook will have all cavalry, 
and will endeavor to get in about 
Saltville, and move east from 
there to join Ord. His force will 
be all cavalry, while Ord will have 



PLANS FOR THE CAMPAIGN 



59 



to move from the mouth of the Gaiiley River with 
a cavahy force and some artillery, the Virejinia and 
Tennessee railroad to be his objective. Either the 
enemy would have to keep a large force to protect 
his communications, or see them destroyed, and 
a large amount of forage and provision, which he 
so much needed, fall into our hands. Sigel was in 
command in the Valley of Virginia. He was to 
advance up the valley, covering the North from an 
invasion through that channel as well while advanc- 
ing as by remaining near Harper's Ferry. Every 
mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores 
on which Lee relied. Butler was to advance by the 
James River, having Richmond and Petersburg as 
his objective. 



fi'om ten to twelve thousand men 
of all arms. 

You I propose to move against 
Johnston's army, to break it up 
and to get into the interior of the 
enemy's country as far as you can, 
intiicting all the damage you can 
against their war resources. 

I do not propose to lay down for 
you a plan of campaign, but sim- 
ply lay down the work it is desira- 
ble to have done, and leave you 
free to execute it in your own 
way. Submit to me, however, 
as early as you can, your plan of 
operations. 

As stated, Banks is ordered to 
commence operations as soon as 
he can. Gillmore is ordered to 
report at Fortress Monroe by the 
18th inst., or as soon thereafter 
as practicable. Sigel is concen- 
trating now. None will move 
from their places of rendezvous 
until I direct, except Banks. I 
want to be ready to move by the 
25th inst., if possible. But all I 



can now direct is that you get 
ready as soon as jjossible. I 
know you will have difficulties to 
encounter in getting through the 
mountains to where supplies are 
abundant, but I believe you will 
accomplish it. 

From the expedition from the 
Department of West Virginia I do 
not calculate on very great re- 
sults ; but it is the only way I can 
take troops from there. With the 
long line of railroad Sigel has to 
protect, he can spare no troops 
except to move directly to his 
front. In this way he must get 
through to inflict gi-eat damage 
on the enemy, or the enemy must 
detach from one of his armies a 
large force to prevent it. In 
other words, if Sigel can't skin 
himself he can hold a leg while 
some one else skins. 

I am, general, very respect- 
fully, your obedient servant, 
U. S. Grant, 
Lieu tena n t- General. 



Chap. V 



Grant to 
8is«'l, \V. R. 
XXX1II,765 



Franz Sisel, 
Col. 3d Mo. 
Inf. May i, 
Brig.-Gen. 

Vols.MavlT, 

1861; Mty.- 

Gen.Mar.21, 

1862 



60 



PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. V 



Grant to 

Butler, W. 

R. XXXIII 

794 



W. R. 
XXXIII, 

861, 916 



W. R. 

XXXII (3) 

268 



Before the advance commenced I visited Butler 
at Fort Monroe. This was the first time I had ever 
met him. Before giving him any order as to the 
part he was to play in the approaching campaign I 
invited his views. They were very much such as I 
intended to direct, and as I did direct,^ in writing, 
before leaving. 

General W. F. Smith, who had been promoted to 
the rank of major-general shortly after the battle 
of Chattanooga on my recommendation, had not 
yet been confirmed. I found a decided prejudice 
against his confirmation by a majority of the Senate, 
but I insisted that his services had been such that 
he should be rewarded. My wishes were now re- 
luctantly complied with, and I assigned him to the 
command of one of the corps under Greneral Butler. 
I was not long in finding out that the objections to 
Smith's promotion were well founded. 

In one of my early interviews with the President 
I expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that 
had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the 
war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplish- 
ing much more than it had done if under a thorough 
leader. I said I wanted the very best man in the 
army for that command. Halleck was present and 
spoke up, saying, " How would Sheridan do I " I 
replied, "The very man I want." The President 
said I could have anybody I wanted. Sheridan 
was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival 
was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps 
with the Army of the Potomac. This relieved Gen- 
eral Alfred Pleasonton. It was not a reflection on 



1 See instructions to Butler, in dix, and in the Official Records as 
General Grant's report, Appen- cited in the margin. — F. D. G. 



SCHEME OF BANKS'S CAMPAIGN 



61 



that of&cer, however, for I did not know but that 
he had been as efficient as any other cavahy com- 
mander. 

Banks in the Department of the Gulf was ordered 
to assemble all the troops he had at New Orleans in 
time to join in the general move, Mobile to be his 
objective. 

At this time I was not entirely decided as to 
whether I should move the Army of the Potomac 
by the right flank of the enemy or by his left. 
Each plan presented advantages.^ If by his right 



Chai'. V 

Nicolay & 

Hay, Life of 

Lincoln, 

Virr,353 

W. R. 
XXXIV (1) 

11 



1 In Field, Culpeper C. H., 
Virginia, 

April 9, 1864. 
Maj.-Gen. George G. Meade, 

Com'd'g Army of the Potomac : 

For information and as instruc- 
tion to govern your preparations 
for the coming campaign, the 
following ip communicated con- 
fidentially for youi- own perusal 
alone. 

So far as practicable all the 
armies are to move together, 
and toward one common center. 
Banks has been instructed to 
turn over the guarding of the Red 
River to General Steele and the 
navy, to abandon Texas with the 
exception of the Rio Grande, and 
to concentrate all the force he can 
— not less than twenty-five thou- 
sand men — to move on Mobile. 
This he is to do without reference 
to other movements. From the 
scattered condition of his com- 
mand, however, he cannot possi- 
bly get it together to leave New 
Orleans before the 1st of May, if 
so soon. Sherman will move at 
the same time you do, or two or 
three days in advance, Joe Johns- 
ton's army being his objective 



point, and the heart of Georgia 
his ultimate aim. If successfid 
he will secure the line from Chat- 
tanooga to Mobile with the aid of 
Banks. 

Sigel cannot spare troops from 
his army to reinforce either of the 
gi-eat armies, but he can aid them 
by moving directly to his front. 
Tliis he has been directed to 
do, and is now making prepara- 
tions for it. Two columns of his 
command will make south at the 
same time with the general move : 
one fi'om Beverly, from ten to 
twelve thousand strong, under 
Major-General Ord ; the other 
from Charleston, Virginia, prin- 
cipally cavalry, imder Brigadier- 
General Crook. The former of- 
these will endeavor to reach the 
Tennessee and Virginia railroad, 
about south of Covington, and if 
found practicable will work east- 
ward to Lynchburg and retiu'n to 
its base by way of the Shenandoah 
Valley, or join you. The other 
will strike at Saltville, Virginia, 
and come eastward to join Ord. 
Tlie cavalry from Ord's command 
will try to force a passage south- 
ward, if they are successful in 



62 



PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAI-. V — my left — the Potomac, Chesapeake Bay, and 
tributaries would furnish us an easy line over 
which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling 
distance of every position the army could occupy 
from the Rapidan to the James River. But Lee 
could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army 
north on a line rather interior to the one I would 
have to take in following. A movement by his 
left — our right — would obviate this; but all that 
was done would have to be done with the supplies 
and ammunition we started with. All idea of 
adopting this latter j)lan was abandoned when the 
limited quantity of supplies possible to take with 
us was considered. The country over which we 
would have to pass was so exhausted of all food 
or forage that we would be obliged to carry every- 
thing with us. 



reaching the Virginia and Ten- 
nessee railroad, to cut the main 
lines of the road connecting Rich- 
mond with all the South and 
Southwest. 

Gillmore will join Butler with 
about ten thousand men from 
South Carolina. Butler can re- 
duce his garrison so as to take 
twenty-three thousand men into 
the field directly to his front. 
The force will be commanded 
by Major-General W. F. Smith. 
With Smith and Gillmore, Butler 
will seize City Point, and operate 
against Richmond from the south 
side of the river. His movement 
will be simultaneous with yours. 

Lee's army will be your objec- 
tive point. Wherever Lee goes 
there you will go also. The only 
point upon which I am now in 
doubt is whether it will be better 



to cross the Rapidan above or 
below him. Each plan presents 
great advantages over the other, 
with corresponding objections. 
By crossing above, Lee is cut off 
from all chance of ignoring Rich- 
mond and going north on a raid. 
But if we take this route all we do 
must be done whilst the rations 
we start with hold out. We sep- 
arate from Butler, so that he can- 
not be directed how to cooperate. 
By the other route Brandy Station 
can be used as a base of supplies 
until another is secured on the 
York or James rivers. 

These advantages and objec- 
tions I will talk over with you 
more fully than I can wi-ite them. 

Burnside, with a force of prob- 
ably twenty-five thousand men, 
will reinforce you. Immediately 
upon his arrival, which will be 



FOKllEST AT FORT PILLOW 



G3 



While these preparations were going on the 
enemy was not entirely idle. In the West, Forrest 
made a raid in West Tennessee up to the northern 
border, capturing the garrison of four or five hun- 
dred men at Union City, and followed it up by an 
attack on Paducah, Kentucky, on the banks of the 
Ohio. While he was able to enter the city, he failed 
to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. On 
the first intelligence of Forrest's raid I telegraphed 
Sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and 
not to let him get out of the trap he had put him- 
self into. Sherman had anticipated me by sending 
troops against him before he got my order. 

Forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked 
the troops at Fort Pillow, a station for the protec- 
tion of the navigation of the Mississippi River. 
The garrison consisted of a regiment of colored 



Chap. V 

Mar. 16 to 
Apr. 14, 1864 



W. R. 
XXXlI(l) 

501-62;!; (3) 
passim 



W. R. 
XXXII (3) 

155 



Apr. 12, 1864 

W. R. 
XXXII (1), 
(3) passim 



shortly after the 20th inst., I will 
give him the defense of the road 
from Bull Run as far south as we 
wish to hold it. This will enable 
you to collect all your strength 
about Brandy Station and to the 
front. 

There will be naval coopera- 
tion on the James River, and 
transports and ferries will be 
provided, so that should Lee fall 
back into his intrenchments at 
Richmond, Butler's force and 
yours will be a unit, or at least 
can be made to act as such. What 
I would direct, then, is that you 
commence at once reducing bag- 
gage to the very lowest possible 
standard. Two wagons to a regi- 
ment of five hundred men is the 
greatest number that should be 
allowed for all baggage, exclu- 
sive of subsistence stores and 



ordnance stores. One wagon to 
brigade and one to division head- 
quarters is sufficient, and about 
two to corps headquarters. 

Should by Lee's right flank be 
our route, you will want to make 
arrangements for having supplies 
of all sorts promptly forwarded to 
White House on tlie Pamunkey. 
Your estimates for this contin- 
gency should be made at once. If 
not wanted there, there is every 
probability they will be wanted 
on the James River or elsewhere. 

If Lee's left is turned, large 
provision will have to be made 
for ordnance stoi'es. I would say 
not much short of five hundred 
rounds of infantry ammunition 
would do. By the other, half the 
amount would be sufficient. 
U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General. 



64 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. V troops, infaiitiy, and a detachment of Tennessee 
cavalry. These troops fought bravely, but were 
overpowered. I will leave Forrest in his des- 
patches to tell what he did with them. 

yyxT^'o) " The river was dyed," he says, " with the blood 
^^" of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. The ap- 
proximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, 
but few of the officers escaping. My loss was 
about twenty killed. It is hoped that these facts 
will demonstrate to the Northern people that negro 
soldiers cannot cope with Southerners." Subse- 
quently Forrest made a report in which he left out 
the part which shocks humanity to read. 

At the East, also, the rebels were busy. I had 
xxxin'947 ^^i^ ^o Halleck that Plymouth and Washington, 
North Carolina, were unnecessary to hold. It 
would be better to have the garrisons engaged 
there added to Butler's command. If success at- 
tended our arms, both places, and others too, would 
fall into our hands naturally. These places had 
been occupied by Federal troops before I took 
command of the armies, and I knew that the Ex- 
ecutive would be reluctant to abandon them, and 
therefore explained my views; but before my 
Apr. 20, 1864 views were carried out the rebels captured the gar- 

xxxiii I'ison at Plymouth. I then ordered the abandon- 
278-305 iiient of Washington, but directed the holding of 
New Berne at all hazards. This was essential be- 
cause New Berne was a port into which blockade- 
runners could enter. 

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the 
Red River long before my promotion to general 
command. I had opposed the movement strenu- 
ously, but acquiesced because it was the order of 



^7-U-t^^^-<^«-t^, ^-^^aJ-^ ^^-e^ Ci-v-&-i^^*<-«_^ (i/ /i-'i^-tr^^ ;Z^^^^«-a^o A-c^^^-^ 
,t^^^j /^>vi/>^v _ a^-7 fP^h.£y\jO A^ ^l/-i*.^,^^t^I<,-»^ /v-Ti-->^,c£*W' A/''A-<-^i-^ /-r A-^CSiC^i 

Lincoln's god-speed to grant, (fac-simile of the original, slightly reduced in scale.) 



[This remarkable letter was re- 
ceived by General Grant on the 1st of 
May, three days before the Wilderness 
campaign began. He was always care- 
less about his papers, and private or 
semi-official ones were often thrust 
into his pockets, where thej^ I'emained 
for months. In some such way Mr. 
Lincoln's beautiful God-speed was 
mislaid. General Grant had forgotten 



its existence, until in 1866 I came 
across it in my researches for my his- 
tory of his campaigns. He was so 
pleased at the discovery, or recovery, 
that he gave me the original letter at 
the time. It is my intention eventually 
to present it either to the government 
or to the family of General Grant. 
Adam Badeau. 
New York, November 10, 1885.] 



GENERAL BANKS'S EXPEDITION 



65 



my superior at the time. By direction of Halleck 
I had reinforced Banks with a corps of about ten 
thousand men from Sherman's command. This 
reinforcement was wanted back badly before the 
forward movement commenced. But Banks had 
got so far that it seemed best that he should take 
Shreveport on the Red River, and turn over the 
line of that river to Steele, who commanded in 
Arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the Arkan- 
sas. Orders were given accordingly, and with the 
expectation that the campaign would be ended in 
time for Banks to return A. J. Smith's command 
to where it belonged and get back to New Orleans 
himself in time to execute his part in the general 
plan. But the expedition was a failure. Banks did 
not get back in time to take part in the programme 
as laid down. Nor was Smith returned until long 
after the movements of May, 1864, had been begun. 
The services of forty thousand veteran troops, over 
and above the number required to hold all that was 
necessary in the Department of the Gulf, were thus 
paralyzed. It is but just to Banks, however, to say 
that his expedition was ordered from Washington, 
and he was in no way responsible except for the 
conduct of it. I make no criticism on this point. 
He opposed the expedition. 

By the 27th of April spring had so far advanced 
as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. 
On that day Burnside left Annapolis to occupy 
Meade's position between Bull Run and the Rap- 
• pahannock. Meade was notified and directed to 
bring his troops forward to his advance. On the 
following day Butler was notified of my intended 
advance on the 4th of May, and he was directed to 
Vol. II.— 5 



Chap. V 

W. R. 
XXXIl (2) 

41, 122 

Sherman, 

Memoirs, II, 

13 



Fed. & Conf . 
Rep. W. R. 
XXXIV (1) 

162-638 



W. R. 
XXXIII, 

955, 994 

Ibid. 992 



Ibid. 1009 



66 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. V movG the night of the same day and get as far up 
the James Eiver as possible by daylight, and push 
on from there to accomplish the task given him. 
He was also notified that reinforcements were be- 
ing collected in Washington City, which would be 
forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into 
M^emoSs,n, the trenches at Richmond. The same day Sherman 
was directed to get his forces up ready to advance 

xxxni ^^^ ^^^® ^^^^- ^ig'sl w^s in Winchester and was noti- 
964, 997 Q^Q^^ ^^ iiiovc lu coujunctiou with the others. 

The criticism has been made l)y writers on the 
campaign from the Rapidan to the James River 
that all the loss of life could have l^een obviated by 
moving the army there on transports. Richmond 
was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one 
man inside to defend was more than equal to five 
outside besieging or assaulting. To get possession 
of Lee's army was the first great object. With the 
capture of his army Richmond would necessarily 
follow. It was better to fight him outside of his 
stronghold than in it. If the Arm}^ of the Potomac 
had been moved bodily to the James River by 
water, Lee could have moved a part of his forces 
back to Richmond, called Beauregard from the 
south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved 
on to Washington. Then, too, I ordered a move, 
simultaneous with that of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, up the James River by a formidable army 
already collected at the mouth of the river. 

While my headquarters were at Culpeper, from 
the 26th of March to the 4th of May, I generally 
visited Washington once a week to confer with the 
Secretary of War and President. On the last oc- 
casion, a few days before moving, a circumstance 



COLONEL MOSBY 67 

occiUTed which came near postponing my part in chap.v 
the campaign altogether. Colonel John S. Mosby S^Pl.^nli?- 
had for a long time been commanding a partizan ^^"ises"^' 
corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of 
the Army of the Potomac. On my return to the 
field on this occasion, as the train approached 
Warrenton Junction, a heavy cloud of dust was 
seen to the east of the road, as if made by a body 
of cavalry on a charge. Arriving at the junction 
the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the 
cause of the dust. There was but one man at the 
station, and he informed us that Mosby had crossed 
a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of 
Federal cavalry. Had he seen our train coming, 
no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to 
capture the train. I was on a special train, if I re- 
member correctly, without any guard. 

Since the close of the war I have come to know Mosby'sper- 
Colonel Mosby personally, and somewhat inti- 
mately. He is a different man entirely from what 
I had supposed. He is slender, not tall, wiry, and 
looks as if he could endure any amount of physical 
exercise. He is able, and thoroughly honest and 
truthful. There were probably but few men in the 
South who could have commanded successfully a 
separate detachment in the rear of an opposing 
army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long 
as he did without losing his entire command. 

On this same visit to Washington I had my last nirLife'^f 
interview with the President before reaching the vnS!348 
James River. He had of course become acquainted 
with the fact that a general movement had been 
ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a 
new feature in war. I explained to him that it was 



68 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U, S. GRANT 

CHAP.v necessary to have a gi-eat number of troops to 
guard and hold the territory we had captured, and 
to prevent incursions into the Northern States. 
These troops could perform this service just as 
well by advancing as by remaining still; and by 
advancing they would compel the enemy to keep 
detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own 
territory open to invasion. His answer was, " Oh 
yes! I see that. As we say out West, if a man 
can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else 
does." 

There was a certain incident connected with the 
Wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of 
place to speak ; and to avoid a digression further on 
I will mention it here. 

A few days before my departure from Culpeper 
the Honorable E. B. Washburne visited me there, 
and remained with my headquarters for some dis- 
tance south, through the battle in the Wilderness, 
and, I think, to Spottsylvania. He was accom- 
wiiiiam panied by a Mr. Swinton, whom he presented as a 
literary gentleman who wished to accompany the 
army with a view of writing a history of the war 
when it was over. He assured me — and I have no 
doubt Swinton gave him the assurance — that he 
was not present as a correspondent of the press. I 
expressed an entire willingness to have him (Swin- 
ton) accompany the army, and would have allowed 
him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, how- 
ever, in the character of the information he could 
give. We received Eichmond papers with about as 
much regularity as if there had been no war, and 
knew that our papers were received with equal 
regularity by the Confederates. It was desirable, 



A MISPLACED HISTORIAN G9 

therefore, that correspondents should not be privi- chap, v 
leged spies of the enemy within our lines. 

Probably Mr. Swinton expected to be an invited 
guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed 
that he was not asked to become so. At all events, 
he was not invited, and soon I found that he was 
corresponding with some paper (I have now for- 
gotten which one), thus violating his word either 
expressed or implied. He knew of the assurance 
Washburne had given as to the character of his 
mission. I never saw the man from the day of our 
introduction to the present that I recollect. He 
accompanied us, however, for a time at least. 

The second night after crossing the Rapidan (the i?oppIu|" 
night of the 5th of May), Colonel W. E. Rowley, of "°S"°" 
my staff, was acting as night-officer at my head- 
quarters. A short time before midnight I gave 
him verbal instructions for the night. Three days 
later I read in a Richmond paper a verbatim report 
of these instructions. 

A few nights still later (after the first, and possibly 
after the second, day's fighting in the Wilderness) 
General Meade came to my tent for consultation, 
bringing with him some of his staff-officers. Both 
his staff' and mine retired to the camp-fire some 
yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversa- 
tion should be private. There was a stump a little 
to one side, and between the front of the tent and 
the camp-fire. One of my staff, Colonel T. S. Bow- Tat LtS' 
ers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the "62^a;pt; 
ground and leaning against the stump, listening to i/isiai M°aj! 
the conversation between Meade and myself. He 'e.ises 
called the attention of Colonel Rowley to it. The lat- 
ter immediately took the man by the shoulder and 



70 PERSONAIi MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. V asked him, in lauguage more forcible than polite, 
what he was doing there. The man proved to be 
Swinton, the " historian," and his replies to the 
question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he 
was warned against further eavesdropping. 

The next I heard of Mr. Swinton was at Cold 
Harbor. General Meade came to my headquarters 
dSedTo be' saying that General Burnside had arrested Swinton, 
who at some previous time had given great offense, 
and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. I 
promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but 
that he must be expelled from the lines of the army, 
not to return again on pain of punishment. 



shot 



CHAPTER VI 

COMMENCEMENT OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN — GENERAL 
butler's position — SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID , 

THE armies were now all ready to move for the chap, vi 
accomplisliment of a single object. They were 
acting as a unit, so far as such a thing was possible 
over such a vast field. Lee, with the capital of the ^ampign® 
Confederacy, was the main end to which all were 
working. Johnston, with Atlanta, was an impor- 
tant obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the 
result aimed at, and was therefore almost an in- 
dependent objective. It was of less importance 
only because the capture of Johnston and his army 

Note. — At this stage of the ferent circumstances ; and the 

work the final decline in General scheme of presenting the final 

Grant's strength became clearly scenesof the war as a panorama of 

manifest, and it was found neces- one vast campaign directed by the 

sary to bring his task to a close central power — the Lieutenant- 

as soon and as easily as possible. General of the Army of the United 

For this reason the notes and States — had to be abandoned, 

memoranda which he had col- Had this plan for the book been 

lected for the purpose of refresh- followed, the separate armies 

ing his memory, and of forming would have been treated as but 

the framework upon which the parts of one, of which the Army of 

narrative might be constructed the Potomac would have formed 

from recollection and from the the center, the troops west and 

manuscript field-records in his east of that army being regarded 

possession, were hastily put to- as wings, and those to the south 

gether with little of the careful of the enemy as an attacking force 

original work which the subject in the rear, 
would have received under dif- Frederick D. Grant. 

71 



72 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. VI would not produce so immediate and decisive a re- 
sult in closing tlie rebellion as would the possession 
of Richmond, Lee, and his army. All other troops 
were employed exclusively in support of these two 
movements. This was the plan; and I will now 
endeavor to give, as concisely as I can^ the method 
of its execution, outlining first the operations of 
minor detached but cooperative columns. 
Ante, IT, 65 As stated before. Banks failed to accomplish 
what he had been sent to do on the Red River, 
and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans 
whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been 
expected — ten thousand with Sherman and thirty 
thousand against Mobile. 

Sigel's record is almost equally brief. He moved 
out, it is true, according to programme; but just 
when I was hoping to hear of good work being 
done in the valley, I received instead the following 
x:^\i (2) announcement from Halleck : " Sigel is in full re- 
^*" treat on Strasburg. He will do nothing but run ; 
May 15, 1864 never did anything else." The enemy had inter- 
cepted him about New Market and handled him 
xxx"^i (1) I'oughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine 
■^^'^^ hundred men out of his six thousand. 

The plan had Ijeen for an advance of Sigel's 

forces in two columns. Though the one under his 

immediate command failed ingloriously, the other 

w.^w. A^ve- pi'oved more fortunate. Under Crook and Averell 

AuS.iseV; liis western column advanced from the Gauley in 

voif:"S: West Virginia at the appointed time, and with 

more happy results. They reached the Virginia 

and Tennessee railroad at Dublin and destroyed a 

w. R. depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles 

8-68 of road and burning the bridge over New River. 




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GENERAL BUTLER'S MOVEMENTS 73 

Having accomplished this, they recrossed the Alle- chap, vi 
ghanies to Meadow Bkiffs and there awaited further 
orders. 

Butler embarked at Fort Monroe with all his com- ^^Jp.^^^^^f- 
mand, except the cavalry and some artillery which ^^^lel *^^ 
moved up the south bank of the James River. 
His steamers moved first up Chesapeake Bay and 
York River as if threatening the rear of Lee's 
army. At midnight they turned back, and Butler 
by daylight was far up the James River. He seized 
City Point and Bermuda Hundred early in the day, 
without loss, and, no doubt, very much to the sur- 
prise of the enemy. 

This was the accomplishment of the first step con- 
templated in my instructions to Butler. He was to 
act from here, looking to Richmond as his objec- Butie°w/R. 
tive point. I had given him to understand that I "fg^.^ioog' 
should aim to fight Lee between the Rapidan and 
Richmond if he would stand; but should Lee fall 
back into Richmond I would follow up and make 
a junction of the armies of the Potomac and the 
James on the James River. He was directed to 
secure a footing as far up the south side of the 
river as he could, at as early a date as possible. 

Butler was in position by the 6th of May and had xxxvi (2) 
begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his "^*S' 
cavalry from Sufi'olk to cut the Weldon railroad. 
He also sent out detachments to destroy the rail- 
road between Petersburg and Richmond, but no 
great success attended these latter efforts. He 
made no great effort to establish himself on that 
road and neglected to attack Petersburg, which was 
almost defenseless. About the 11th he advanced 
slowly until he reached the works at Drury's Bluff, iwd. 



74 



PEESONAIi MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VI 



Butler's po- 
sition 



J. G. Bar- 
nard, W. P. 

1829-33; 

Mexico, 
1840-48; Maj. 
Eug. Dec.13, 
1858; Brig.- 
Gen. Vols. 
Sept. 23, 1861 



W. R. 

XXXVI (3) 
88 



about half-way between Bermuda Hundred and 
Richmond. In the mean time Beauregard had 
been gathering reinforcements. On the 16th he 
attacked Butler with great vigor, and with such 
success as to limit very materially the further use- 
fulness of the Army of the James as a distinct fac- 
tor in the campaign. I afterward ordered a portion 
of it to join the Army of the Potomac, leaving a 
sufficient force with Butler to man his works, hold 
securely the footing he had already gained, and 
maintain a threatening front toward the rear of 
the Confederate capital. 

The position which General Butler had chosen 
between the two rivers, the James and Appomat- 
tox, was one of great natural strength, one where a 
large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed 
by means of a single intrenched line, and that a 
very short one in comparison with the extent of 
territory which it thoroughly protected. His right 
was protected by the James River, his left by the 
Appomattox, and his rear by their junction — the 
two streams uniting near by. The bends of the 
two streams shortened the line that had been 
chosen for intrenchments, while they increased the 
area which the line inclosed. 

Previous to ordering any troops from Butler I 
sent my chief engineer, Greneral Barnard, from the 
Army of the Potomac to that of the James to in- 
spect Butler's position and ascertain whether I 
could again safely make an order for General 
Butler's movement in cooperation with mine, now 
that I was getting so near Richmond; or, if I 
could not, whether his position was strong enough 
to justify me in withdi'awing some of his troops 



GENERAL BUTLER'S POSITION 75 

and having them brought round by water to White chap, vi 
House to join me and reinforce the Army of the 
Potomac. General Barnard reported the position BSfrd*to 
very strong for defensive purposes, and that I ?{!xxx^' 
could do the latter with great security; but that ^'"^*" 
General Butler could not move from where he was, 
in cooperation, to produce any effect. He said that 
the general occupied a place between the James and 
Appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and 
where with an inferior force he could hold it for an 
indefinite length of time against a superior; but 
that he could do nothing offensively. I then asked 
him why Butler could not move out from his lines 
and push across the Richmond and Petersburg 
railroad to the rear and on the south side of Rich- 
mond. He replied that it was impracticable, be- 
cause the enemy had substantially the same line 
across the neck of land that General Butler had. 
He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of 
the locality, remarking that the position was like 
a bottle, and that Butler's line of intrenchments 
across the neck represented the cork; that the 
enemy had built an equally strong line immediately 
in front of him across the neck ; and it was there- 
fore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly 
safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed 
it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a 
small force could hold the cork in its place. This 
struck me as being very expressive of his position, 
particularly^ when I saw the hasty sketch which 
General Barnard had drawn; and in making my 
subsequent report I used that expression without x^S'^^'d) 
adding quotation-marks, never thinking that any- "Appendix" 
thing had been said that would attract attention — 



vices 



76 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GKANT 

Chap. VI as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, 
of General Butler, and, I know, very much to my 
own. I found afterward that this was mentioned in 
^'^■?55*'"' *^® uotes of General Badeau's book, which, when 
they were shown to me, I asked to have stricken 
out ; yet it was retained there, though against my 
wishes. 

I make this statement here because, although I 
have often made it before, it has never been in my 
power until now to place it where it will correct 
history ; and I desire to rectify all injustice that I 
may have done to individuals, particularly to offi- 
cers who were gallantly serving their country dur- 
ing the trying period of the war for the preservation 

?er>?e^-' of the Uniou. General Butler certainly gave his 
very earnest support to the war ; and he gave his 
own best efforts personally to the suppression of 
the rebellion. 

The further operations of the Army of the James 
can best be treated of in connection with those of 
the Army of the Potomac, the two being so in- 
timately associated and connected as to be sub- 
stantially one body in which the individuality of 
the supporting wing is merged. 

Before giving the reader a summary of Sherman's 
great Atlanta camj)aign, which must conclude my 
description of the various cooperative movements 
preparatory to proceeding with that of the opera- 
tions of the center, I will briefly mention Sheri- 
dan's first raid upon Lee's communications, which, 
though an incident of the operations on the main 
line and not specifically marked out in the original 
plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results 
all the proportions of an independent campaign. 



SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAH) 



77 



By thus anticipating, in point of time, I will be 
able to more perfectly observe the continuity of 
events occurring in my immediate front when 
I shall have undertaken to describe our advance 
from the Rapidan. 

On the 8th of May, just after the battle of the 
Wilderness, and when we were moving on Spott- 
sylvania, I directed Sheridan verbally to cut loose 
from the Army of the Potomac, pass around the 
left of Lee's army, and attack his cavalry; to cut 
the two roads — one running west through Gordons- 
ville, Charlottesville, and Lynchburg, the other to 
Richmond — and, when compelled to do so for want 
of forage and rations, to move on to the James 
River and draw these from Butler's supplies. This 
move took him past the entire rear of Lee's army. 
These orders were also given in writing through 
Meade. 

The object of this move was threefold. First, if 
successfully executed — and it was — he would an- 
noy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and 
telegraphic communications, and destroy or get 
for his own use supplies in store in the rear and 
coming up. Second, he would draw the enemy's 
cavalry after him, and thus better protect our 
flanks, rear, and trains than by remaining with 
the army.. Third, his absence would save the 
trains drawing his forage and other supplies from 
Fredericksburg, which had now become our base. 
He started at daylight the next morning, and 
accomplished more than was expected. It was 
sixteen days before he got back to the Army of 
the Potomac. 

The course Sheridan took was directly to Rich- 



Chap. VI 



Sheridan, 

Memoirs, I, 

365 et seq. 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

552 



Sheridan, 

Memoirs, I, 

327 et seq. 



78 



PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VI 

J. E. B. Stu- 
art, W. P. 

1850-54; 

Brig.-Gen. 

C.S.A. Sept. 

24, 1861 ; 

M;)j.-Gen. 

July 25, 18G2 



Slieridan's 
Rep. W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

776, 777 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

777, 778 



May, 1864 



moiid. Before night Stuart, commanding the Con- 
federate cavah'y, came on to the rear of his com- 
mand. But the advance kept on, crossed the North 
Anna, and at Beaver Dam, a station on the Virginia 
Central raih'oad, recaptured four hundred Union 
prisoners on their way to Richmond, destroyed the 
road, and used and destroyed a large amount of 
subsistence and medical stores, 

Stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing to- 
ward Richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the 
morning of the 10th, and, by a detour and an ex- 
hausting march, interjjosed between Sheridan and 
Richmond at Yellow Tavern, only about six miles 
north of the city. Sheridan destroyed the railroad 
and more supplies at Ashland, and on the 11th 
arrived in Stuart's front. A severe engagement 
ensued in which the losses were heavy on both 
sides ; but the rebels were beaten, their leader mor- 
tally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners 
were cai3tured. 

Sheridan passed through the outer defenses of 
Richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through 
the inner ones. But having no supports near, he 
could not have remained. After caring for his 
wounded he struck for the James River below the 
city, to communicate with Butler and to rest his 
men and horses, as well as to get food and forage 
for them. 

He moved first between the Chickahominy and 
the James, but in the morning (the 12th) he was 
stopped by batteries at Mechanicsville. He then 
turned to cross to the north side of the Chicka- 
hominy by Meadow Bridge. He found this barred, 
and the defeated Confederate cavalry, reorganized. 



SHERIDAN'S FIRST RAID 79 

occupying the opposite side. The panic created by chap, vi 
his first entrance within the outer works of Rich- 
mond having subsided, troops were sent out to 
attack his rear. 

He was now in a perilous position, one from 
Avhich but few generals could have extricated them- 
selves. The defenses of Richmond, manned, were 
to the right; the Chickahominy was to the left, 
with no bridge remaining and the opposite baiik 
guarded; to the rear was a force from Richmond. 
This force was attacked and beaten by Wilson's ^^3^,?v..> 
and Gregg's divisions, while Sheridan turned to the ^^*' ^"'^ 
left with the remaining division and hastily built a 
bridge over the Chickahominy under the fire, of the 
enemy, forced a crossing, and soon dispersed the 
Confederates he found there. The enemy was held 
back from the stream by the fire of the troops not 
engaged in bridge-building. 

On the 13th Sheridan was at Bottom's Bridge, 
over the Chickahominy. On the 14th he crossed this ibid. 777, 778 
stream, and on that day went into camp on the James 
River at Haxall's Landing. He at once put himself 
into communication with General Butler, who di- 
rected all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. 

Sheridan had left the Army of the Potomac at 
Spottsylvania, but did not know where either this 
or Lee's army was now. Great caution, therefore, 
had to be exercised in getting back. On the 17th, ibid. 779, 7sc 
after resting his command for three days, he started 
on his return. He moved by the way of White 
House. The bridge over the Pamunkey had been 
burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily 
improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. On 
the 22d he was at Aylett's on the Mattaj^ony, 



80 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. VI where he learned the position of the two armies. 

May, 1864 On the 24th he joined us on the march from North 
Anna to Cold Harbor, in the vicinity of Chester- 
field. 

Sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely 
around Lee's army ; encountered his cavalry in four 
engagements, and defeated them in all ; recaptured 
four hundred Union prisoners and killed and cap- 
tured many of the enemy ; destroyed and used many 
supplies and munitions of war ; destroyed miles of 
railroad and telegrajili ; and freed us from annoy- 
ance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two 
weeks. 



CHAPTER VII 

SHEKMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEOEGIA — SIEGE OF ATLANTA 
— DEATH OF GENEEAL McPHEESON — ATTEMPT TO 
CAPTUEE ANDEESONVILLE — CAPTUEE OF ATLANTA 



AFTER separating from Sherman in Cincinnati 
-^^ I went on to Washington, as ah-eady stated, 
while he returned to Nashville to assume the duties 
of his new command. His military division was 
now composed of four departments and embraced 
all the territory west of the Alleghany Mountains 
and east of the Mississippi River, together with the 
State of Arkansas in the trans-Mississippi. The 
most easterly of these was the Department of the 
Ohio, General Schofield commanding ; the next was 
the Department of the Cumberland, General Thomas 
commanding ; the third the Department of the Ten- 
nessee, General McPherson commanding ; and Gen- 
eral Steele still commanded the trans-Mississippi, 
or Department of Arkansas. The last-named de- 
partment was so far away that Sherman could not 
communicate with it very readily after starting on 
his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon 
transferred from his military division to that of 
the Gulf, where General Canby, who had relieved 
General Banks, was in command. 

The movements of the armies, as I have stated in 
Vol. IL— 6 8i 



Chap. VII 
Ante, II, 48 



Sherman, 

Memoirs, 

11,7 



E. R. 8. Can- 
by, W. P. 

1835-39 ; 

Mexico, 

1847-48 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. Mar. 

31,1862; Maj.- 

Gen. May 7, 

1864 



82 PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. VII a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, I fixing 
Ante, II, 58 ^j^e day to start, when the season should be far 
enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be 
in a condition for the troops to march. 

General Sherman at once set himself to work 
preparing for the task which was assigned him to 
accomplish in the spring campaign. McPherson 
lay at Huntsville with about twenty-four thousand 
men, guarding those points of Tennessee which were 
regarded as most worth holding ; Thomas, with over 
sixty thousand men of the Army of the Cumberland, 
was at Chattanooga ; and Schofield, with about four- 
teen thousand men, was at Knoxville. With these 
three armies, numbering about one hundred thou- 
sand men in all, Sherman was to move on the day 
May 4, 1864 fixed for the general advance, with a view of de- 
stroying Johnston's army and capturing Atlanta, 
Mf!j^oh-8,n, He visited each of these commands to inform him- 
7etseq. g^j^ ^^ ^^ their condition, and it was found to be, 
speaking generally, good. 

One of the first matters to turn his attention to 
was that of getting, before the time arrived for 
starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to 
Chattanooga sufficiently large to warrant a move- 
ment. He found, when he got to that place, that 
the trains over the single-track railroad, which was 
frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, 
were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the 
troops, without bringing forward any surplus of 
any kind. He found, however, that trains were 
being used to transport all the beef-cattle, horses 
for the cavalry, and even teams that were being 
brought to the front. He at once changed all this, 
and required beef-cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and 



SHEEMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 



83 



everything that could travel, even the troops, to be chap, vii 
marched, and used the road exclusively for trans- 
porting supplies. In this way he was able to ac- 
cumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed 
upon for the move, the 4tli of May. 

As I have said already, Johnston was at Dalton, '^p'i^S'^ 
which was nearly one fourth of the way between 
Chattanooga and Atlanta. The country is moun- 
tainous all the way to Atlanta, abounding in moun- 
tain streams, some of them of considerable volume. 
Dalton is on ground where water drains toward 
Atlanta and into one of the main streams rising 
northeast from there and flowing southwest — this 
being the general direction which all the main 
streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries 
entering into tliem. Johnston had been preparing 
himself for this campaign during the entire winter. 
The best positions for defense had been selected all 
the way from Dalton back to Atlanta, and very 
strongly intrenched ; so that, as he might be forced 
to fall back from one position, he would have 
another to fall into in his rear. His position at 
Dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no 
doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold 
Sherman there and prevent him from getting any 
farther. With a less skilful general, and one dis- 
posed to take no risks, I have no doubt that he 
would have succeeded. 

Sherman's plan was to start Schofield, who was 
farthest back, a few days in advance from Knox- 
ville, having him move on the direct road to Dalton. 
Thomas was to move out to Ringgold. It had been 
Sherman's intention to cross McPherson over the 
Tennessee Eiver at Huntsville or Decatur, and 



Sberman's 
plau of cam- 
paign 



84 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap, vn move liim south from there so as to have him come 
into tlie road running from Chattanooga to Atlanta 
a good distance to the rear of the point Johnston 
was occupying; but when that was contemplated 
it was hoped that McPherson alone would have 
troops enough to cope with Johnston, if the latter 
should move against him while unsupported by the 
balance of the army. In this he was disappointed. 
Two of McPherson's veteran divisions had reenlisted 
on the express provision that they were to have a 
furlough. This furlough had not yet expired, and 
they were not back. 

-Sherman, Tlicu, agaiu, Slicrmau had lent Banks two divi- 
Meinoirs.ii, gj^j^g uudcr A. J. Suiith, the winter before, to coop- 
erate with the trans-Mississippi forces, and this with 
the express pledge that they should be back by a 
time specified, so as to be prepared for this very 
campaign. It is hardly necessary to say they were 
not returned. That department continued to ab- 
sorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. 
This left McPherson so weak that the part of the 
plan above indicated had to be changed. He was 
therefore brought up to Chattanooga and moved 
from there on a road to the right of Thomas — the 
two coming together about Dalton. The three 

mS^s n armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on 
I4et8e4. * tij^^e^ 

Sherman soon found that Dalton was so strongly 
fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to 
carry it by assault ; and even to carry it by regular 
Ibid. 32 approaches was impracticable. There was a nar- 
rowing up in the mountain, between the National 
and Confederate armies, through which a stream, 
a wagon-road, and a railroad ran. Besides, the 



ATLANTA 
CAMPAIGN. 






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SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 85 

stream had been dammed so that the valley was chap, vii 
a lake. Through this gorge the troops would have 
to pass. McPhersoii was therefore sent around by xxkviii 
the right, to come out by the way of Snake Creek *^' ^*^"^^ 
Gap into the rear of the enemy. This was a sur- 
prise to Johnston, and about the 13th he decided to 
abandon his position at Daltoii. 

On the loth there was very hard fighting about ^^p.^w.^r!' 
Resaca ; but our cavalry, having been sent around a)^(|^^"- 



sim 



to the right, got near the road in the enemy's rear. 
Again Johnston fell back, our army pursuing. The 
pursuit was continued to Kingston, which was 
reached on the 19th with very little fighting, ex- 
cept that Newton's division overtook the rear of {^Jj"^^®^" 
Johnston's army and engaged it. Sherman was edI^^auS; 
now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up voif;'S'. 

23 1861 ' 

his railroad-trains. He was depending upon the Maj.-Gen. 
railroad for all of his supplies, and as, of course, 
the railroad was wholly destroyed as Johnston fell 
back, it had to be rebuilt. This work was pushed 
forward night and day, and caused much less delay 
than most persons would naturally expect in a 
mountainous country where there were so many 
bridges to be rebuilt. 

The campaign to Atlanta was managed with the 
most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked 
out of one position after another all the way there. 
It is true this was not accomplished without a good 
deal of fighting — some of it very hard fighting, 
rising to the dignity of very important battles — 
neither were single positions gained in a day. On 
the contrary, weeks were spent at some ; and about 
Atlanta more than a month was consumed. 

It was the 23d of May before the road was fin- i864 



^6 



PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap, vn 

Sherman, 

Memoirs, II, 

42 et seq. 



Ibid. 44.— 
W. R. 

xxxvin 

{l)-{i)pas- 
tim 



1864 



W. R. 

xxxvni 

(3) 639 



ished up to the rear of Sherman's army and the 
pursuit renewed. This pursuit brought him up 
to the vicinity of Allatoona. This place was very 
strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible 
position. An assault upon it was not thought of, 
but preparations were made to flank the enemy out 
of it. This was done by sending a large force 
around our right, by the way of Dallas, to reach 
the rear of the enemy. Before reaching there, 
however, they found the enemy fortified in their 
way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a 
week at a place called New Hope Church. On the 
left our troops also were fortified, and as close up 
to the enemy as they could get. They kept work- 
ing still farther around to the left toward the rail- 
road. This was the case more particularly with the 
cavalry. By the 4tli of June Johnston found that 
he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew 
off, and Allatoona was left in our possession. 

Allatoona, being an important place, was strongly 
intrenched for occupation by our troops before ad- 
vancing farther, and made a secondary base of sup- 
plies. The railroad was finished up to that point, 
the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided 
for food, and the army got in readiness for a further 
advance. The rains, however, were falling in such 
torrents that it was impossible to move the army by 
the side roads which they would have to move upon 
in order to turn Johnston out of his new position. 

While Sherman's army lay here. General F. P. 
Blair returned to it, bringing with him the two 
divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. 

Johnston had fallen back to Marietta and Kene- 
saw Mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited 



SHERMAN'S CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 87 

him. At this latter place our troops made an as- chap.vii 
sault upon the enemy's lines after having got their mwhoSh n 
own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining ^letseq. 
considerable loss. But during the progress of the 
battle Schofield was gaining ground to the left; 
and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more 
toward the enemy's rear. These operations were 
completed by the 3d of July, when it was found 
that Johnston had evacuated the place. He was 
pursued at once. Sherman had made every prepa- 
ration to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong 
guard in his intrenchments. He had intended, 
moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty 
of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at 
the Chattahoochee River. Johnston frustrated this 
plan by himself starting back as above stated. This 
time he fell back to the Chattahoochee. 

About the 5th of July he was besieged again, i864 
Sherman getting easy possession of the Chattahoo- 
chee River both above and below him. The enemy 
was again flanked out of his position, or so fright- 
ened by flanking movements that on the night of 
the 9th he fell back across the river. 

Here Johnston made a stand until the 17th, when 
Sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final 
movement toward Atlanta began. Johnston was 
now relieved of the command, and Hood superseded ^ pi^g^g^-. 

"l-iiw-, Capt.Cav.c! 

^J^"^' 8. A. May, 

Johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem g^cu.'mS; 
to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of jum'27,1862; 
the administration at Richmond, or of the people sept. 30,1863 
of that section of the South in which he was com- 
manding. The very fact of a change of comman- 
ders being ordered under such circumstances was 



88 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. VII au indication of a change of policy, and that now 
they would become the aggressors — the very thing 
our troops wanted. 

For my own part, I think that Johnston's tactics 
were right. Anything that could have prolonged 
the war a year beyond the time that it did finally 
close would probably have exhausted the North to 
such an extent that they might then have aban- 
doned the contest and agreed to a separation. 
^^'^lln'tL'^^ Atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way 
around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of 
the city. In addition to this, there were advanced 
^ intrenchnients which had to be taken before a close 
siege could be commenced. 
van^^Horue, Suve ouough, as indicated by the change of com- 
iandrii!'ii2 zanders, the enemy was about to assume the offen- 
et seq. g^^g^ Q^^ ^Yie 20tli he came out and attacked the 
Army of the Cumberland most furiously. Hooker's 
R- w. John- corps and Newton's and Johnson's divisions were the 

sou, \V . p. ■•- 

captli't'h pi'iucipal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted 
^Brigtafn.' niore than an hour ; but the Confederates were then 
\ois.oct.ii, fQj,gg(j ^^ f^Y[ back inside their main lines. The 

losses were quite heavy on both sides. On this day 
^?c?hl3d Ceneral Cresham, since our Postmaster-General, 
1861*^; Mff.- was very badly wounded. During the night Hood 
Aug^n/' abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were ad- 
vanced. The investment had not been relinquished 
for a moment during the day. 

During the night of the 21st Hood moved out 
again, passing by our left flank, which was then in 
motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and 
a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the 
day of the 22d. At first the battle went very much 
in favor of the Confederates, our troops being some- 



1863 



THE SIEGE OF ATLANTA 89 

what surprised. While our troops were advancing chap.vii 
they were struck in flank, and their flank was 
enveloped. But they had become too thorough 
veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion 
by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and 
soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, 
with the advantage now of knowing where their 
antagonist was. The field of battle continued to i.il^'*;""fVT 
expand until it embraced about seven miles of **^ 
ground. Finally, however, and before night, the 
enemy was driven back into the city.^ 

It was during this battle that McPherson, while li^piJersM 
passing from one column to another, was instantly 
killed. In his death the army lost one of its ablest, 
purest, and best generals. 

Garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to ^pfg^f^^f. 
get upon the railroad east of Atlanta and to cut it Feb*2^7j^67; 
in the direction of Angusta. He was successful in voit. jni^ 
this, and returned about the time of the battle. 
Rousseau had also come up from Tennessee with a '^^^^- '^^ 
small division of cavalry, having crossed the Ten- m-ig^^Gen! 
nessee Eiver about Decatur and made a raid into X86i';^aj.^-' 
Alabama. Finally, when hard pressed, he had come '1862 ' 
in, striking the railroad in rear of Sherman, and 
reported to him about this time. 

The battle of the 22d is usually known as the 

^ General Johu A. Logau, iipou first upon and was broken by 
whom devolved the command of his depleted command, remarks : 
the Army of the Tennessee during "The disparity of forces can be 
this battle, in his report gave our seen from the fact that in the 
total loss in killed, wounded, and charge made by mj' two brigades 
missing at 3521, and estimated under Fuller and Mersy they took J. W. Fuller 
that of the enemy to be not less 351 prisoners, representing forty- Aug. Mersy 
than 10,000; and General G. M. nine different regiments, eight 
Dodge, graphically describing to brigades, and three divisions ; 
General Sherman the enemy's at- and brought back eight battle- 
tack, the full weight of which fell flags from the enemy." 



90 



PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT 



Chap. VII 



W. E. 
XXXVIII 

(3)94 



Geo. Stone- 
man, W. P. 
1842-46 ; 
Mexico, 
1846-48 ; 
Brig.-Gen. 
Vols. Aug. 
13, 1861 ; 
Ma j. -Gen. 
Nov. 29, 1862 



Battle of Atlanta, although the city did not fall 
into our hands until the 2d of September. Prep- 
arations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out 
of his position. The work was tedious, and the lines 
that had to be maintained were very long. Our 
troops were gradually worked around to the east 
until they struck the road between Decatur and 
Atlanta. These lines were strongly fortified, as 
were those to the north and west of the city, — all 
as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable, — in 
order to hold them with the smallest possible num- 
ber of men, the design being to detach an army to 
move by our right and try to get upon the raikoad 
down south of Atlanta. 

On the 27th the movement by the right flank 
commenced. On the 28th the enemy struck our 
right flank. General Logan commanding, with great 
vigor. Logan intrenched himself hastily, and by 
that means was enabled to resist all assaults and in- 
flict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. These 
assaults were continued to the middle of the after- 
noon, and resumed once or twice still later in the 
day. The enemy's losses in these unsuccessful as- 
saults were fearful. 

During that evening the enemy in Logan's front 
withdrew into the town. This now left Sherman's 
army close up to the Confederate lines, extending 
from a point directly east of the city around by 
the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten 
miles ; the whole of this line being intrenched, and 
made stronger every day they remained there. 

In the latter part erf July Sherman sent Stoneman 
to destroy the railroads to the south, about Macon. 
He was then to go east, and, if possible, release our 



GENEKAL STONEMAN'S EXPEDITION 91 

prisoners about Andersonville. There were painful chap. vii 
stories current at the time about the great hard- 
ships these prisoners had to endure in the way of 
general bad treatment, in the way in which they 
were housed, and in the way in which they were 
fed. Great sympathy was felt for them ; and it was 
thought that even if they could be turned loose upon 
the country it would be a great relief to them. But 
the attempt proved a failure. McCook, who com- e. m. mo- 

^ ^ ' Ci)ok, 2d Lt. 

manded a small brigade, was first reported to have g^^sef- ms^ 
been captured ; but he got back, having inflicted a llT^J.^'im 
good deal of damage upon the enemy. He had also 
taken some prisoners ; but encountering afterward a 
largely superior force of the enemy, he was obliged 
to drop his prisoners and get back as "best he could 
with what men he had left. He had lost several ^^^k. 
hundred men out of his small command. On the <^> ^^^"^^* 
4th of August Colonel Adams, commanding a little suasAd- 

^ ' ° ams. Col. ist 

brigade of about a thousand men, returned report- ^y- <^''^^- 
ing Stoneman and all but himself as lost. I myself 
had heard around Richmond of the capture of 
Stoneman, and had sent Sherman word, which he 
received. The rumor was confirmed there, also, from 
other sources. A few days after Colonel Adams's 
return Colonel Capron also got in with a small de- Horace ca- 

^ ~ pron, Col. 

tachment and confirmed the report of the capture ^cmMg.^fd' 
of Stoneman with something less than a thousand ^"^^^^'^•^d 
men. 

It seems that Stoneman, finding the escape of all xxxviii 
his force was impossible, had made arrangements ^^^^^^ 
for the escape of two divisions. He covered the 
movement of these divisions to the rear with a 
force of about seven hundi*ed men, and at length 
surrendered himself and this detachment to the 



92 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. VII commanding Confederate. In this raid, however, 
much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by 
the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, 
manufactories of military supplies, etc. 

Aug. 1864 On the 4th and 5th Sherman endeavored to get 
upon the railroad to our right, where Schofield 

sherinan. ^^g j^ commaud, but these attempts failed utterly. 

Memoirs, II, ' ^ 

ggetseq. Qeneral Palmer was charged with being the cause 
of this failure, to a great extent, by both General 
Sherman and General Schofield ; but I am not pre- 
pared to say this, although a question seems to have 
arisen with Palmer as to whether Schofield had any 
right to command him. If he did raise this ques- 
tion while an action was going on, that act alone 
was exceedingly reprehensible. 
Ibid. 103 About the same time Wheeler got upon our rail- 
road north of Resaca and destroyed it nearly up to 
Dalton. This cut Sherman off from communica- 
tion with the North for several days. Sherman 
responded to this attack on his lines of communi- 
cation by directing one upon theirs. 
H.j.Kiipat- Kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of 
coK2d1^.'Y. August to reach the Macon road about Jonesboro'. 
^'862'; Brifff- He succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around 
juueilms the Confederate lines of Atlanta, and w^as back 
xxxviii again in his former position on our left by the 22d. 
(2) 858 Tj^gg^ ]^^^|g affairs, however, contributed but very 
little to the grand result. They annoyed, it is true, 
but any damage thus done to a railroad by a 
cavalry expedition is soon repaired. 

Sherman made preparations for a repetition of his 
tactics ; that is, for a flank movement with as large 
a force as could be got together to some point in 
the enemy's rear. Sherman commenced this last 
















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CAPTURE OF ATLANTA 93 

movement on the 25th of August, and on the 1st of chap, vii 
September was well up toward the railroad twenty- 
miles south of Atlanta. Here he found Hardee in- 
trenched, ready to meet him. A battle ensued, but 
he was unable to drive Hardee away before night 
set in. Under cover of the night, however, Hardee 
left of his own accord. That night Hood blew up i^femoSs.n, 
his military works, such as he thought would be ^"^ 
valuable in our hands, and decamped. 

The next morning at daylight General H. W. cYiiuV ^p 
Slocum, who was commanding north of the city, ^27^1^ n. y!'" 
moved in and took possession of Atlanta, and noti- BrE^ien. 
fied Sherman. Sherman then moved deliberately isei'; Maj.-' 
back, taking three days to reach the city, and occu- i^^^ 
pied a line extending from Decatur on the left to 
Atlanta in the center, with his troops extending 
out of the city for some distance to the right. 

The campaign had lasted about four months, and 
was one of the most memorable in history. There 
was but little, if anything, in the whole campaign, 
now that it is over, to criticize at all, and nothing 
to criticize severely. It was creditable alike to the 
general who commanded and the army which had 
executed it. Sherman had on this campaign some 
bright, wide-awake division and brigade comman- 
ders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency 
of his command. 

The troops now went to work to make them- 
selves comfortable and to enjoy a little rest after 
their arduous campaign. The city of Atlanta was m^Sm'i, 
turned into a military base. The citizens were all i^^^t^*^*- 
compelled to leave. Sherman also very wisely pro- 
hibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and 
traders who always follow in the wake of an army 



94 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. VII in the field, if permitted to do so, for trading with 
the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers 
for articles of but little use to them, and for which 
they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. He 
limited the number of these traders to one for each 
of his three armies. 

Sherman, The ucws of Sherman's success reached the North 

Memoirs, II, 

109, 110 instantaneously and set the country all aglow. This 
was the first great political campaign for the Re- 
publicans in their canvass of 1864. It was followed 
later by Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah 
Valley; and these two campaigns probably had 
more effect in settling the election of the following 
November than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and 
all the parading with banners and bands of music 
in the North. 



CHAPTER VIII 

GRAND MOVEMENT OF THE x\EMY OF THE POTOMAC — 
CEOSSING THE EAPIDAN — ENTEEING THE WILDEE- 
NESS — BATTLE OF THE WILDEENESS 

SOON after midnight, May 3d-4:tli, tlie Army chap.viii 
of the Potomac moved out from its position r^xxxvi 
north of the Rapidan, to start upon that memo- ^^Humph-~ 
rable campaign destined to result in the capture of j,^Sa cam- 
the Confederate capital and the army defending it. e! s'eq! 
This was not to be accomplished, however, without 
as desperate fighting as the world has ever wit- 
nessed ; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a 
month, or a single season. The losses inflicted and 
endured were destined to be severe ; but the armies 
now confronting each other had already been in 
deadly conflict for a period of three years, with 
immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, 
captured and wounded ; and neither had made any 
real progress toward accomplishing the final end. 
It is true the Confederates had, so far, held their 
capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. 
But previously they had boldly proclaimed their 
intention to capture Philadelphia, New York, and 
the National capital, and had made several attempts 
to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near 
making their boast good — too near for complacent 

95 



96 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



W. R. 

XXXVI (2) 

333 



CHAP, vni contemplation l>y the loyal North. They had also 
come near losing their own capital on at least one 
occasion. So here was a stand-off. The campaign 
now begun was destined to result in heavier losses 
to both armies, in a given time, than any previously 
suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a 
single year, and to accomplish all that had been 
anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. 
We had to have hard fighting to achieve this. The 
two armies had been confronting each other so long, 
without any decisive result, that they hardly knew 
which could whij). 

Ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and 
ammunition, Avere taken in wagons. Beef-cattle 
were driven with the trains and butchered as 
wanted. Three days' rations in addition, in haver- 
sacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried 
on the person of each soldier. 

The country over which the army had to oper- 
ate, from the Eapidan to the crossing of the James 
River, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams 
which make their way to the Chesapeake Bay. The 
crossings of these streams l)y the army were gener- 
ally made not far above tide- water, and where they 
formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance 
of troops even when the enemy did not appear in 
oppositi(^n. The country roads were narrow and 
poor. Most of the country is covered with a dense 
forest, in places, like the Wilderness and along the 
Chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for in- 
fantry except along the roads. All l)ridges were 
naturally destroyed before the National troops came- 
to them. 

The Army of the Potomac was composed of three 



Topography 



feM^/«>/4:^|y^ 



>>a4; 



CROSSING THE RAPIDAN 



97 



infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respec- 
tively by Generals W. S. Hancock, G. K. Warren, 
John Sedgwick, and P. H. Sheridan. The artillery 
was commanded by General Henry J. Hunt. This 
arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it 
could not be used to advantage in such a country 
as we were destined to pass through. The surplus 
was much in the way, taking up, as it did, so much 
of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so 
much of the forage and other stores brought up by 
the trains. 

The Fifth Corps, General Warren commanding, 
was in advance on the right, and marched directly 
for Germanna Ford, preceded by one division of 



Chap. VIII 



H. J. Hunt, 

\V.P.1835-a9; 

Mexico, 
18-16-48; Mai. 

5tll Alt. 

May 14,1861; 

Brlg.-Geii. 

Vols. Sept. 

15, 1862 



G. K. War- 
reu, W. P. 

1846-50 ; 
Brig.-Gei). 

Vols. Sei>t. 

26, ISr.'i; 

Maj.-Geii. 

May 3, 1863 



Maj.-Gen. W. S. Hancock, 

commauding 

Second Army-corps. 



UNION AEMY ON THE RAPIDAN, MAY 5, 1864. 

[Compiled.] 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, Commander-iu-Chief. 
Major-General George G. Meade, commanding Army of the 

Potomac. 

First Brigade, Col. 

Nelson A. Miles. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Thomas A. Smyth. 
Third Brigade, Col. 

Paul Frank. 
Fourth Brigade, Col. 

John R. Brooke. 

First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen.Alex.S.Wehb. 

Second Brigade, 

Brig. -Gen. Joshua 
T. Owen. 

Third Brigade, Col. 
Samuel S. Carroll. 

f First Brigade, Brig.- 
I Gen.J. H.H.Ward. 
i Second Brigade, 

I Brig. -Gen. Alex. 
I Hays. 

( First Brigade, Col. 

Robert McAllister. 

Secf)nd Brigade, Col. 

Wm. R. Brewster. 

Artillery Brigade, 
Col. John C. Tidball. 

Vol. n.— 7 



First Division, 

Brig. -Gen. Francis 

C Barlow. 



Second Division, 

Brig.-Gen. John 

Gibbon. 



Third Division. 
Maj.-Gen. David 
B. Birney. | 

I 

Fourth Division. 
Brig.-Gen. Gershom -' 
Mott. 



98 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAP, vm cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson. General Sedg- 
wick followed Warren with the Sixth Corps. Ger- 
manna Ford was nine or ten miles below the right 
of Lee's Une. Hancock, with the Second Corps, 
moved by another road, farther east, directly upon 
Ely's Ford, six miles below Germanna, preceded by 
Gregg's division of cavahy, and followed by the 
DtrtTw."p. artillery. Torbert's division of cavalry was left 
i8tN.j.'8ept: north of the Rapidan, for the time, to picket the 
Bri'g.-Gen. rivcr and prevent the enemy from crossing and 

Vole. Nov. -^. . / r^-, ^ . -. -, 

29,1862 gettmg into our rear. The cavalry seized the two 
crossings before daylight, di'ove the enemy's pickets 
guarding them away, and by 6 a.m. had the pon- 
toons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry 
and artillery. This was undoubtedly a surprise to 
Lee. The fact that the movement was unopposed 
proves this. 



Maj.-Gen. G. K. Warken, 

commanding 

Fifth Army-corps. 



First Division, 
Brig.-Gen. Charles - 
Griffln. 



Second Division, 

Brig.-Gen. John C. . 

Robinson. 



Third Division, 

Brig.-Gen. Samuel 

W. Crawford. 



Fourth Division, 

Brig.-Gen. James 

S. Wadsworth. 



( Fir.st Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Romeyn B. 
Ayres. 

Second Brigade, Col. 
Jacob B. Sweitzer. 

Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. J. J. Bartlett. 

First Brigade, Col. 
Samuel H. Leon- 
ard. 

Second Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. Henry 
Baxter. 

Third Brigade, Col. 
Andrew W. Deni- 
son. 

r First Brigade, Col. 

I Wm. McCandless. 

) Third Brigade, Col. 

l^ Joseph W. Fisher. 

f First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Lysander 
Cutler. 
Second ■ Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen, James 
C. Rice. 
Third Brigade, Col. 

[ Roy Stone. 

Artill'y Brigade, Col. 
C. S. Wainwright. 



CKOSSING THE KAPIDAN 



99 



Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was left back at chap, viii 
Warrenton, guarding the railroad from Bull Run 
forward to preserve control of it in case our cross- 
ing the Eapidan should be long delayed. He was in- 
structed, however, to advance at once on receiving 
notice that the army had crossed; and a despatch x:^vi(2) 
was sent to him a little after 1 p.m. giving the in- ^^° 
formation that our crossing had been successful. 

The country was heavily wooded at all the points Topograpiiy 



Maj.-Gen. John Sedgwick, 

commanding 

Sixth Army-corps. 



Maj.-Gen. P. H. Sheridan, 

commanding 

Cavalry Corps. 



First Division. 

Brig.-Gen. H. G. 

Wright. 



Second Division, 

Brig.-Gen. George 

W. Getty. 



Third Division, 

Brig.-Gen. James 

B. Ricketts. 



First Division, 

Brig.-Gen. A. T. A. 

Torbert. 



Second Division, 
Brig.-Gen. D. 
McM. Gregg. 



Third Division, 

Brig.-Gen. J. H. 

Wilson. 



First Brigade, Col. 
Henry W. Brown. 

Second Brigade, Col. 
Emoiy Upton, 
-i Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. D. A. Russell. 

Fourth Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. Alex- 
ander Shaler. 

' First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Frank Whea- 
ton. 

Second Brigade, Col. 
Lewis A. Grant. 

Third Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen.Thos.H.Neill. 

Fourth Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. Henry 
L. Eustis. 

' First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Wm. H. Mor- 
ris. 
Second Brigade, 

Brig.-Gen. T. Sey- 
mour. 

Artillery Brigade, 
Col. C. H. Tomp- 
kins. 

' First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. G. A. Custer. 

Second Brigade, Col. 
Thos. C. Devin. 

Reserve Brigade, 
Brig.-Gen. Wesley 
Merritt. 

First Brigade, Brig.- 
Gen. Henry E. Da- 
vies, Jr. 

Second Brigade, Col. 
J. Irvin Gregg. 

First Brigade. Col. 

T. M. Bryan, Jr. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Geo. H. Chapman. 



100 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VIII of d'ossing, particularly on the south side of the 
river. The battle-field from the crossing of the 
Rapidan until the final movement from the Wil- 
derness toward Spottsylvania was of the same char- 
acter. There were some clearings and small farms 
within what might be termed the battle-field; but 
generally the country was covered with a dense 
forest. The roads were narrow and bad. All the 
conditions were favorable for defensive operations. 
There are two roads, good for that part of Vir- 
ginia, running from Orange Court House to the 
battle-field. The most southerly of these roads is 
known as the Orange Court House Plank Road, the 



Maj.-Gen. a. E. Burnside, 

commanding 

Ninth Army-corps. 



Brig. -Gen. Henry J. Hunt, 
commanding Artillery. 



First Division, 

Brig.-Gen. T. G. 

Stevenson. 

Second Division, 

Brig.-Gen. Robert 

B. Potter. 

Third Division, 

Brig.-Gen. Orlando 

B. Willcox. 

Fourth Division. 

Brig.-Gen. Edward 

Perrero. 



Reserve 
Col. H. S. Burton. 



General Headquarters. 



First Brigade, Col. 

Sumner C!arruth. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Daniel Leasure. 

First Brigade, Col. 

Zenas R. Bliss. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Simon G. GriflQn. 
First Brigade. Col. 

John F. Hartranft. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Benj. C. Christ. 

First Brigade, Col. 

JoshuaK. Sigfried. 
Second Brigade, Col. 

Henry G. Thomas. 

Provisional Brigade, 
Col. Elisha G. Mar- 
shall. 

( First Brigade, Col. 

J. H. Kitching. 
Second Brigade, Maj. 

J. A. Tompkins. 
First Brigade Horse 

Art., Capt. J. M. 

Robertson. . 
Second Brigade 

Horse Art., Capt. 

D. R. Ransom. 
Third Brigade, Maj. 

R. H. Fitzhugh. 

' ProvostGuard, Brig.- 
Gen. M.R.Patrick. 
■ Volunteer Engi- 

neers, Brig.-Gen. 
H. W. Benham. 



ENTEEING THE WILDERNESS 101 

northern one as the Orange Turnpike. There are chap.viii 
also roads from east of the battle-field running to 
Spottsylvania Court House — one from Chancellors- 
ville, branching at Aldrich's; the western branch 
going by Piney Branch Church, Alsop's, thence by 
the Brock road to Spottsylvania; the east branch 

CONFEDERATE ARMY. 

Organizatiou of the Army of Northern Virginia, Commanded by 

GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE, August 31, 1864. 

First Army-corps : Lieut.-Gen. R. H. Anderson, Commanding. 

{Brig. -Gen. Seth M. Barton's Brigade, (a) 
" M. D. Corse's " 

" Eppa Hunton's " 

" Wm. R. Terry's " 

TiT n r< Tir n , ^>„ r>- • f Brig. -Gen. G. T. Anderson's Brigade. 
Maj.-Gen C. W. Field's Divi- J «,, ^ ^^ Law's {<•) ?' 

s>0'^- ("^ I " John Bratton's 

( Brig.-Gen. W. T. Wofford's Brigade. 
Ma.i.-Gen. J. B. Kershaw's Di- J " B. G. Humphreys's " 

vision. Id) 1 " Goode Bryan's " 

(^ " Kershaw's (Old) " 

Second Army-corps : Maj.-Gen. Jubal A. Early, Commanding. 

r Brig.-Gen. H. T. Hays's Brigade, (e) 
Ma.j.-Gen. John B. Gordon's J " John Pegram's " (/) 

Division. 1 Gordon's " (g) 

[ Brig.-Gen. R. F. Holce's 

( Stonewall Brig. (Brig.-Gen. J. A.Walker). 

Maj.-Gen. Edward Johnson's I Brig.-Gen. J. M. Jones's Brigade, (k) 
Division. ] i-. Geo. H.Stewart's " \h) 

[ " L. A. Statiford's " (e) 

Brig.-Gen. J. Daniel's Brigade, (t) 
Geo. Dole's " (k) 

" S. D. Ramseur's Brigade. 

C. A. Battle's 

" R. D. Johnston's " (/) 

Note. 
(n) Colonel W. R. Aylett was in command August 20th, and probably at 

above date. 
(6) Inspection report of this division shows that it also contained Ben- 

ning's and Gregg's Brigades, 
(c) Commanded by Colonel P. D. Bowles. 

(a) Only two brigadier-generals reported for duty ; names not indicated. 
(e) Constituting York's Brigade. ) 



Maj.-Gen. R. E. Rodes's Divi 
sion. 



(/) In Ramseur's Division. 

(jf) Evan's Brigade, Colonel E. N. Atkinson, 

commanding, and containing Twelfth 

Georgia Battalion. 
(A) The Virginia resiinents constituted Terry's 

Brigade, Gordon's Division. 
(0 Grimes's Brigade, 
(fc) Cook's 



Organization of the Army 
of the Valley District. 



102 PERSONAL MEMOIES OP U. S. GRANT 

Chap. VIII goGs by Gates's, tlieuce to Spottsylvauia. The Brock 
road runs from Germanna Ford through the battle- 
field and on to the Court House. As Spottsylvauia 
is approached the country is cut up with numerous 
roads, some going to the town direct, and others 
crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going 
there. 

Lee's headquarters were at Orange Court House. 
From there to Fredericksburg he had the use of the 
two roads above described running nearly parallel 
to the Wilderness. This gave him unusual facilities, 
for that country, for concentrating his forces to his 
right. These roads strike the road from Germanna 
Ford in the Wilderness. 

Third Army-corps : Lieut.-Gen. A. P. Hill, Commanding. 

C Brig.-Geu. J. C. C. Sanders's Brigade. 
IHaj.-Gen. Wm. Mahone's Divi- „ ^ Mahone's 

aioTi Ih i Brig.-Gen. N. H. Harris s " Im] 

' ^ ' I " A. R. Wright's 

t " Joseph Finegan's " 

{Brig.-Gen. E. L. Thomas's Brigade, {n) 
" James H. Lane's " 

" Sam'l McGowan's " 

Alfred M. Scale's " 

' Brig.-Gen. J. R. Davis's Brigade. 

" John R. Cooke's " 

" D. McRae's " 

" J. J. Archer's " 

H. H. Walker's " 

Unattached : Fifth Alabama BattaUon. 



Maj.-Gbn. H. Heth's Division 

(0) 



Cavalry Corps: Lieut.-Gen. Wade Hampton, Commanding, (p) 

Maj.-Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's Di- 5 Brig.-Gen. W. C. Wickham's Brigade. 

vision. } " L. L. Lomax's " 

Maj.-Gen. M. C. Btftleb's Di- f Brig.-Gen. John Dunovant's Brigade. 

vision. i " P- M. B. Young's " 

t " Thomas L. Rosser's " 

]VIaj.-Gen. W. H. F. Lee's Di- 5 Brig.-Gen. Rnfus Barringer's Brigade, 
vision. ( " J. R. Chambliss's " 

Note. 

(I) Returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indi- 
cated. 

(m) Colouel Joseph M. Jayne, commanding. 

in) Colonel Thoujas J. Simmons, commanding. 

(0) Four brigadier-generals reported present for duty ; names not indicated. 

(p) On face of returns appears to have consisted of Hampton's, Fitz-Lee'e, 
and W. H. F. Lee's Divisions, and Bearing's Brigade, 



ENTERING THE WILDERNESS 



103 



As soon as tlie crossing of the infantry was as- 
sured, the cavahy pushed forward, Wilson's divi- 
sion by Wilderness Tavern to Parker's Store, on the 
Orange plank road ; Gregg to the left toward Chan- 
cellorsville. Warren followed Wilson and reached 
the Wilderness Tavern by noon, took position there, 
and intrenched. Sedgwick followed Warren. He 
was across the river and in camp on the south bank, 
on the right of Warren, by sundown. Hancock, with 
the Second Corps, moved parallel with Warren and 



Chap. VIII 

W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

871 



Ibid. 853 
Ibid. 539 



Artillery Reserve: Bkig.-Gen. W. N. Pendleton, Commanding. 



Bmg.-Gen. 

E. P. 

Alexandek's 

Division.' 



Brig. -Gen. 
A. L. 
Long's Divi- 
sion. 



Cabell's Battalion. 



Haskell's Battalion. 



Huger's Battalion. 



Gibb's Battalion. 



Braxton's Battalion. 



Cutshaw's Battalion. 



Carter's Battalion. 



Nelson's Battalion. 



Brown's Battalion. 



I 



Manly's Battery. 
First Co. Richmond Howitzers. 
Carleton's Battery. 
[ Calloway's " 

Branch's Battery. 
Nelson's '" 
Garden's " 
Rowau " 

' Smith's Battery. 

Moody " 

Woolfolk " 

Parker's ' ' 

Taylor's " 

Fickling's " 

Martin's " 

f Davidson's Battery. 
< Dickenson's " 
I Otey's . " 

{Lee Battery. 
First Maryland Artillery. 
Stafford " 
AUeghany " 

f Charlotte\alle ArtiUery. 
-j Staunton " 

[ Courtney " 

I' Morris ArtiUery. 
Orange " 
Kins William Artillery. 
Jeff Davis 

f Amherst ArtiUery. 
\ MiUedge 
[ Fluvauna " 

' Powhatan Artillery. 

Second Richmond Howitzers. 

Third 

j Rockbridge Artillery. 
(^ Salem Flying " 



1 But one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and 
Alexander's name not on the original. 



104 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKAif T 



CHAP.vm 

W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

318 



The wa^on- 
trains 



R. Tngalls, 

W. P. 1839- 

43; Mexico, 

1846-47; Maj. 

Staff. Q. M. 

Jan. 12, 1862; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. May 

23, 1863 



camped about six miles east of him. Before night 
all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the 
trains of more than four thousand wagons, were 
safely on the south side of the river. 

There never was a corps better organized than 
was the quartermaster's corps with the Army of 
the Potomac in 1864. With a wagon-train that 
would have extended from the Eapidan to Rich- 
mond, stretched along in single file and separated as 
the teams necessarily would be when moving, we 
could still carry only three days' forage and about 
ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of 
ammunition. To overcome all difficulties the chief 
quartermaster, General Rufus Ingalls, had marked 
on each wagon the corps badge with the division 
color and the number of the brigade. At a glance 
the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged 
could be told. The wagons were also marked to 
note the contents : if ammunition, whether for artil- 
lery or infantry ; if forage, whether grain or hay ; 
if rations, whether bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, 
coffee, or whatever it might be. Empty wagons 



Col. R. 1 1. 

Walker's 
Division 



Cutt's Battalion. 



Ross's Battery. 
Patterson's Battery. 
Irwin Artillery. 

C Lewis Artillery. 



Richardson's Battalion. g^Sm UgM ^^"^^ 



Mcintosh's Battalion. 



Pegram's Battalion. 



P'^ague's Battalion, 



t Huger 

{Johnson's Battery. 
Hardaway Artillery. 
Danville " 

Second Rockbridge Artillery. 

' Peedee Artillery. 

Fredericksburg Artillery. 

Letcher " 

Purcell Battery. 
^ Crenshaw's Battery . 

{Madison Artillery. 
Albemarle " 
Brooke " 

Charlotte " 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 105 

were never allowed to follow the army or stay in chap.viii 
camp. As soon as a wagon was empty it would re- 
turn to the base of supply for a load of precisely the 
same article that had been taken from it. Empty 
trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded 
ones. Arriving near the army, they would be parked 
in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. 
Issues, except of ammunition, were made at night 
in all cases. By this system the hauling of forage 
for the supply-trains was almost wholly dispensed 
with. They consumed theirs at the depots. 

I left Culpeper Court House after all the troops 
had been put in motion, and passing rajiidly to the 
front, crossed the Rapidan in advance of Sedg- •'^fpfi'^g^ 
wick's corps, and established headquarters for the ^isiil^vfg.'- 
afternoon and night in a deserted house near the Aug^si.isei; 

Maj.-Gen. 

river. J^iy 4, 1862 ; 

k. Spottsyl- 

Orders had been given, long before this move- '^'^^'^•g^^y 
ment began, to cut down the baggage of officers and 
men to the lowest point possible. Notwithstanding 
this I saw scattered along the road from Culpeper 
to Germanna Ford wagon-loads of new blankets and 
overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten 
their knapsacks — an improvidence I had never wit- 
nessed before. 

Lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have 
discovered at a very early hour on the morning of 
the 4th of May that the Army of the Potomac was 
moving, evidently did not learn until about one 
o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would 
confront his army. This I judge from the fact that 
at 1:15 P.M., an hour and a quarter after Warren 
had reached Old "Wilderness Tavern, our officers 
took off rebel signals which, when translated, were 



106 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VIII 



Virg.Camp. 
p. 22 

A.P.Hill, W. 

P. 1842-47 ; 

Mexico, 

1847-48 ; 

Maii.-Gen.C. 

8. A. May 5, 
1862; Lt.- 

Gen.May20, 

1863 ; k. Pe- 
tersburg, 

Apr. 1, 1865 



W. R. 

XXXVI (2) 
371 



W. E. 
XXXVI (1) 

539 ; (2) 413 



G.W.Getty, 

W.P. 1836-40; 

Mexico, 

1847-48; 

Capt. 5th 

A^rt. May 14, 

1861 ; Brig.- 

Gen. Vols. 

Sept. 25, 1862 



seeu to be an order to his troops to occupy their in- 
trenchments at Mine Run. 

Here at night despatches were received announc- 
ing that Sherman, Butler, and Crook had moved 
according to programme. 

On discovering the advance of the Army of the 
Potomac, Lee ordered Hill, Ewell, and Longstreet, 
each commanding corps, to move to the right to at- 
tack us, Hill on the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet 
to follow on the same road. Longstreet was at this 
time — middle of the afternoon — at Grordonsville, 
twenty or more miles away. Ewell was ordered 
by the Orange Pike. He was near by, and arrived 
some four miles east of Mine Run before bivouack- 
ing for the night. 

My orders were given through General Meade for 
an early advance on the morning of the 5th. War- 
ren was to move to Parker's Store, and Wilson's 
cavahy — then at Parker's Store — to move on to 
Craig's meeting-house. Sedgwick followed Warren, 
closing in on his right. The Arm}^ of the Potomac 
was facing to the west, though our advance was 
made to the south, except when facing the enemy. 
Hancock was to move southwestward to join on 
the left of Warren, his left to reach to Shady Grove 
Church. 

At six o'clock, before reaching Parker's Store, 
Warren discovered the eneniy„ He sent word back 
to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare 
to meet and attack him. Wright, with his division 
of Sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he 
could find, to join on to Warren's right, and Getty, 
with his division, also of Sedgwick's corps, was 
ordered to move rapidly by Warren's rear and get 



BATTLE OF THE WILDEKNESS 107 

on his left. This was the speediest way to reinforce chap, vui 
Warren, who was confronting the enemy on both 
the Orange plank and turnpike roads. 

Burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on re- 
ceiving word that the Army of the Potomac had 
safely crossed the Eapidan. By making a night- 
march, although some of his troops had to march 
forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with 
the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. 

Meade moved his headquarters on to Old Wilder- 
ness Tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon 
as it was light enough to see the road. I remained 
to hasten Burnside's crossing and to put him in posi- 
tion. Burnside at this time was not under Meade's 
command, and was his senior in rank. Getting in- 
formation of the proximity of the enemy, I informed 
Meade, and, without waiting to see Burnside, at once 
moved forward my headquarters to where Meade 
was. 

It was my plan then, as it was on all other occa- 
sions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy 
could be drawn from his intrenchments, if we 
were not intrenched ourselves. Warren had not 
yet reached the point where he was to halt, when 
he discovered the enemy near by. Neither party 
had any advantage of position. Warren was there- 
fore ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare 
for it. At nine o'clock Hancock was ordered to come xxxvi (i) 
up to the support of Getty. He himself arrived at ^^^ 
Getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet 
far in the rear. Getty was directed to hold his posi- 
tion at all hazards until relieved. About this hour 
Warren was ready, and attacked with favorable ibid. 540 
though not decisive results. Getty was somewhat 



108 



PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VHI 



W. R. 

XXXVI (1) 

319 



Ibid. 677 



Ibid. 320 



J. T. Owen, 
Col. 24th Pa. 
May, 18C1; 
Brig.-Gen. 
Vol.'^. Nov. 
2y, 1862 



A. Hays, W. 

P. 1840-44; 

Mexico, 

1846-48 ; 

Col. 63d Pa. 

Auir 2.5,1881; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. Sept. 

29, 1862 



H. Baxter, 
Capt. 7th 
Mich. Aug. 
1861; Brig.- 
Gen. Vols. 
Mar. 12, 1863 



isolated from Warren and was in a precarious con- 
dition for a time, Wilson, with his division of cav- 
alry, was farther south, and was cut off from the 
rest of the army. At two o'clock Hancock's troops 
began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to 
join Getty and attack the enemy. But the heavy 
timber and narrow roads prevented him from get- 
ting into position for attack as promj^tly as he gen- 
erally did when receiving such orders. At four 
o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and 
General Getty received orders from Meade a few 
minutes later to attack whether Hancock was ready 
or not. He met the enemy under Heth within a few 
hundred yards. 

Hancock immediately sent two divisions, com- 
manded by Birney and Mott, and later two bri- 
gades, Carroll's and Owen's, to the support of Getty. 
This was timely and saved Getty. During the bat- 
tle Getty and Carroll were wounded, but remained 
on the field. One of Birney's most gallant brigade 
commanders — ^ Alexander Hays — was killed. 

I had been at West Point with Hays for three 
years, and had served with him through the Mexican 
war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. 
He was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his com- 
mand wherever ordered. With him it was " Come, 
boys," not " Go." 

Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the 
second division were sent to reinforce Hancock and 
Getty, but the density of the intervening forest 
was such that, there being no road to march upon, 
they did not get up with the head of column until 
night, and bivouacked where they were without 
getting into j^osition. 



BATTLE OF THE WILDEKNESS 109 

During the afternoon Sheridan sent Gregg's divi- chap, viii 
sion of cavahy to Todd's Tavern in search of Wilson. 
This was fortunate. He found Wilson engaged with 
a superior force under General Rosser, supported 
by infantry, and falling back before it. Together 
they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the 
enemy and themselves become aggressive. They 
soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond Corbin's xxxvi m 
Bridge. ^76 

Fighting between Hancock and Hill continued 
until night put a close to it. Neither side made 
any special progress. 

After the close of the battle of the 5th of May my ^■''|-.^3|™p- 
orders were given for the following morning. We 
knew Longstreet with twelve thousand men was on 
his way to join Hill's right, near the Brock road, 
and might arrive during the night. I was anxious 
that the rebels should not take the initiative in the 
morning, and therefore ordered Hancock to make 
an assault at 4 : 30 o'clock. Meade asked to have 
the hour changed to six. Deferring to his wishes 



W. R. 



as far as I was willing, the order was modified and xxxvi 



415 



(2) 



five was fixed as the hour to move. 

Hancock had now fully one half of the Army of 
the Potomac. Wadsworth, with his division, which 
had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpen- 
dicular to that held by Hill, and to the right of 
Hancock. He was directed to move at the same 
time, and to attack Hill's left. 

Burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, ^""^.^^""P" 
was directed to get in between Warren and Han- 
cock, and attack as soon as he could get in posi- 
tion to do so. Sedgwick and Warren were to make 
attacks in their front, to detain as many of the 



110 



PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. VIII 



Virg. Camp, 
p. 37 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

320 



F. C. Bar- 
low, Col. 61 8t 
N. Y. Apr. 
1862 ; Brig.- 
Gen. Vols. 
Sept. 19, 
1862 



enemy as they could, atid to take advantage of any 
attempt to reinforce Hill from that quarter. Burn- 
side was ordered, if he should succeed in breaking 
the enemy's center, to swing around to the left and 
envelop the right of Lee's army. Hancock was in- 
formed of all the movements ordered. 

Burnside had three divisions ; but one of them — 
a colored division — was sent to guard the wagon- 
train, and he did not see it again until July. 

Lee was evidently very anxious that there should 
be no battle on his right until Longstreet got up. 
This is evident from the fact that notwithstanding 
the early hour at which I had ordered the assault, 
both for the purpose of being the attacking party 
and to strike before Longstreet got up, Lee was 
ahead in his assault on our right. His purpose was 
evident, but he failed. 

Hancock was ready to advance by the hour 
named, but learning in time that Longstreet was 
moving a part of his corps by the Catharpin road, 
thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of 
infantry, commanded by General Barlow, with all 
his artillery, to cover the approaches by which 
Longstreet was expected. This disposition was 
made in time to attack as ordered. Hancock moved 
by the left of the Orange Plank Eoad, and Wads- 
worth by the right of it. The fighting was desper- 
ate for about an hour, when the enemy began to 
break up in great confusion. 

I believed then, and see no reason to change that 
opinion now, that if the country had been such that 
Hancock and his command could have seen the 
confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it 
would have been taken advantage of so effectually 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 111 

that Lee would not have made another stand out- chap, vm 
side of his Richmond defenses. 

Gibbon commanded Hancock's left, and was or- ^^||%9i^- 
dered to attack, but w^as not able to accomplish if^S 

, 1847-48 ; 

much. . Brig-.-Gen. 

On the mornins; of the 6th Sheridan was sent to i862; Maj.-' 

^ Gen. June 7, 

connect with Hancock's left and attack the enemy's i864 
cavalry, who were trying to get on our left and rear. 
He met. them at the intersection of the Furnace and 
Brock roads and at Todd's Tavern, and defeated 
them at both places. Later he was attacked, and xxxvid) 
again the enemy was repulsed. '^'^^ 

Hancock heard the firing between Sheridan and 
Stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that 
road, still further reinforced his position guarding 
the entrance to the Brock road. Another incident rad. 322 
happened during the day to further induce Hancock 
to weaken his attacking column. Word reached 
him that troops were seen moving toward him 
from the direction of Todd's Tavern, and Brooke's Siarla. 
brigade was detached to meet this new enemy ; but ^Biig^-oen.' 
the troops apj)roaching proved to be several hun- " ^i864 '^ 
dred convalescents coming from Chancellorsville, 
by the road Hancock had advanced upon, to join 
their respective commands. At 6 : 50 a.m., Burnside, 
who had passed Wilderness Tavern at six o'clock, 
was ordered to send a division to the support of 
Hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his 
command in the execution of his previous order. 
The difficulty of making a way through the dense 
forests prevented Burnside from getting up in time 
to be of any service on the forenoon of the 6th. 

Hancock followed Hill's retreating forces, in the 
morning, a mile or more. He maintained this posi- 



112 



PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. Vin 



W.R. 

XXXVI (1) 

323 



J. 8. Wads- 
worth, 
Brig-.-Gen. 
Vols. Aug. 9, 
1861 



Biig.-Gen. 

Micah 

Jenkins 



W. E. 
XXXVI (1) 

323 



tioii until, along in the afternoon, Longstreet came 
upon him. The retreating column of Hill, meeting 
reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, be- 
came encouraged and returned with them. They 
were enabled, from the density of the forest, to ap- 
proach within a few hundred yards of our advance 
before being discovered. Falling upon a brigade of 
Hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept 
it away almost instantly. The enemy followed up 
his advantage and soon came upon Mott's division, 
which fell back in great confusion. Hancock made 
dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after 
holding it for a time fell back into the position that 
he had held in the morning, which was strongly in- 
trenched. In this engagement the intrepid Wads- 
worth, while trying to rally his men, was mortally 
wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. 
The enemy followed up, but made no immediate 
attack. 

The Confederate General Jenkins was killed and 
Longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. 
Longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume 
command for many weeks. His loss was a severe 
one to Lee, and compensated in a great measure for 
the mishap, or misajjprehensions, which had fallen 
to our lot during the day. 

After Longstreet's removal from the field Lee 
took command of his right in person. He was not 
able, however, to rally his men to attack Hancock's 
position, and withdrew from our front for the pur- 
pose of reforming. Hancock sent a brigade to clear 
his front of all remnants that might be left of Long- 
street's or Hill's commands. This brigade, having 
been formed at right angles to the intrenchments 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 113 

held by Hancock's command, swept down the whole chap, viii 
length of them from left to right. A brigade of the 
enemy was encountered in this move ; but it broke 
and disappeared without a contest. 

Firing was continued after this, but with less 
fury, Burnside had not yet been able to get up to 
render any assistance ; but it was now only about 
nine in the morning, and he was getting into posi- 
tion on Hancock's right. 

At 4:15 in the afternoon Lee attacked our left. ^J^,?v,,, 
His line moved uj) to within a hundred yards of ^^* 
ours and opened a heavy fire. This status was 
maintained for about half an hour. Then a part 
of Mott's division and Ward's brigade of Birney's wiid^iN^x- 
di vision gave way and retired in disorder. The coL'mVN. 
enemy under R. H. Anderson took advantage of miYfi'ril;- 
this and pushed through our line, planting their ocT'4,i862 
flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. 
But owing to the efforts of Hancock their success 
was but temporary. Carroll, of Gibbon's division, w pS^se^ 
moved at a double-quick with his brigade and drove DecaKse?;' 
back the enemy, inflicting great loss. Fighting had ^iSiayii 
continued from five in the morning sometimes along 
the whole line, at other times only in places. The 
ground fought over had varied in width, but aver- 
aged three quarters of a mile. The killed and many 
of the severely wounded of both armies lay within 
this belt, where it was impossible to reach them. 
The woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, xxx^' (d 
and the conflagration raged. The wounded who ^^* 
had not strength to move themselves were either 
suffocated or burned to death. Finally the fire com- 
municated with our breastworks in places. Being 
constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. 
Vol. II.— 8 



114 



PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GKANT 



Chap, vni 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

445, 447 



W. R. 

XXXVI (1) 

540, 906 



Virg. Camp, 
pp. 49, 50 



J. A. Early, 

W. P. 1833-37; 

Mexico, 

1847-48 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

C. 8. A. 1863 ; 

Lt-Gen. 

1864 ; d. Mar. 

2, 1894 



But the battle still raged, our men firing through 
the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. 

Lee was now in distress. His men were in confu- 
sion, and his personal efi:orts failed to restore order. 
These facts, however, were learned subsequently, or 
we would have taken advantage of his condition 
and no doubt gained a decisive success. His troops 
were withdrawn now ; but I revoked the order, which 
I had given previously to this assault, for Hancock 
to attack, because his troops had exhausted their 
ammunition and did not have time to replenish 
from the train, which was at some distance. 

Biu'uside, Sedgwick, and Warren had all kept uj) 
an assault during all this time ; but their efforts had 
no other effect than to prevent the enemy from re- 
inforcing his right from the troops in their front. 

I had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the 
Rapidan to be taken up, except one at Grermanna 
Ford. 

The troops on Sedgwick's right had been sent to 
reinforce oui* left. This left our right in, danger of 
being turned, and us of being cut off from all pres- 
ent base of supplies. Sedgwick had refused his 
right and intrenched it for protection against at- 
tack. But late in the afternoon of the 6th Early 
came out from his lines in considerable force and 
got in upon Sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the 
precautions taken, and created considerable confu- 
sion. Early captured several hundred prisoners, 
among them two general officers. The defense, 
however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the 
enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our 
troops, engaged, were. Early says in his " Memoirs " 
that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines 



BATTLE OF THE WILDERNESS 115 

we might have brought fresh troops to his great dis- chap, vm 
comfort. Many officers who had not been attacked 
by Early continued coming to my headquarters 
even after Sedgwick had rectified his Hues a little 
farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully 
impressed with the idea that the enemy was push- 
ing on and would soon be upon me. 

During the night all of Lee's army withdrew 
within theu' intrenchments. On the morning of 
the 7th General Custer drove the enemy's cavalry w.p.S^il 
from Catharpin Furnace to Todd's Tavern. Pickets juuc'^sel; 
and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to voif.june 

. . „ ^ o, j_ r? 29, 1863 ; 

find the position of the enemy, borne went as lar Maj.-Gen; 

^ '' . Apr. 15, 1865 

as a mile and a liaK before finding him. But Lee ■ 
showed no disposition to come out of his works. 
There was no battle during the day, and but little 
firing except in Warren's front, he being directed 
about noon to make a reconnaissance in force. This 
drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt 
on the part of Lee to drive him back. This ended 
the battle of the Wilderness. 



CHAPTER IX 

AFTER THE BATTLE — TELEGRAPH AND SIGNAL SER- 
VICE — MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 

Chap. IX liyTORE desperate fighting has not been wit- 
-L'-"- nessed on this continent than that of the 5th 
and 6th of May. Our victory consisted in having 
successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in 
the face of an enemy, and in getting the army to- 
gether as a unit. We gained an advantage on the 
morning of the 6th which, if it had been followed 
up, must have proven very decisive. In the evening 
the enemy gained an advantage, but was speedily 
repulsed. As we stood at the close the two armies 
were relatively in about the same condition to meet 
each other as when the river divided them. But 
the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. 

unlcmcasu- ^^^' l^^^scs in the Wildemess were very severe. 

x*xx'^(i^' Those of the Confederates must have been even 
more so ; but I have no means of speaking with ac- 
curacy upon this point. The Germanna Ford bridge 
was transferred to Ely's Ford to facilitate the trans- 
portation of the wounded to Washington. 

It may be as well here as elsewhere to state two 
things connected with all movements of the Army 
of the Potomac. First, in every change of position 
or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy 

116 



119-136 



THE FIELD TELEGKAPH 117 

or not, the moment arms were stacked the men in- chap, ix 
trenched themselves. For this purpose they would intrenching 
build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found 
in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt 
forward on the timber. Thus the digging they did 
counted in making a depression to stand in, and 
increased the elevation in front of them. It was 
wonderful how quickly they could in this way con- 
struct defenses of considerable strength. When 
a halt was made with the view of assaulting the 
enemy, or in his presence, these would be strength- 
ened or their positions changed under the direction 
of engineer officers. The second was the use made a^lSi 
of the telegraph and signal corps. Nothing could ''^^^ 
be more complete than the organization and disci- 
pline of this body of brave and intelligent men. In- 
sulated wires — insulated so that they would trans- 
mit messages in a storm, on the ground or under 
water — were wound upon reels, making about two 
hundred pounds' weight of wire to each reel. Two 
men and one mule were detailed to each reel. The 
pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided 
with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the 
saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its 
wire, would revolve freely. There was a wagon 
supplied with a telegraph-operator, battery, and 
telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, 
each army, and one for my headquarters. There 
were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the 
size and length of a waU-tent pole, supplied with an 
iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when 
laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run 
over them. The mules thus loaded were assigned 
to brigades, and always kept with the command 



118 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. IX they were assigned to. The operators were also 
assigned to particular headquarters, and never 
changed except by special orders. 

The moment the troops were put in position to go 
into camp all the men connected with this branch 
of service would proceed to i^ut up their wires. A 
mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the 
rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged 
to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while 
one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil 
it as the mule was led off. When he had walked 
the length of the wire the whole of it would be on 
the ground. This would be done in rear of every 
brigade at the same time. The ends of all the Avii-es 
would then be joined, making a continuous wire in 
the rear of the whole army. The men attached to 
brigades or divisions wouW all commence at once 
raising the wires with their telegi'aph-poles. This 
was done by making a loop in the wire and putting 
it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpen- 
dicular position. At intervals the wu'e would be 
attached to trees, or some other permanent object, 
so that one pole was sufficient at a place. In the 
absence of such a support two poles would have to 
be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold 
the wire firm in its place. While this was being 
done the telegraph-wagons would take their posi- 
tions near where the headquarters they belonged to 
were to be established, and would connect with the 
wire. Thus, in a few minutes' longer time than it 
took a mule to walk the length of its coil, tele- 
graphic communication would be effected between 
all the headquarters of the army. No orders ever 
had to be given to establish the telegraph. 



THE SIGNAL SERVICE 



119 



The signal service was used on the march. The 
men composing this corps were assigned to specified 
commands. When movements were made, they 
would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize 
upon high points of ground giving a commanding 
view of the country if cleared, or would climb tall 
trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would 
denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of 
our own army, and often the movements of the 
enemy. They would also take off the signals of the 
enemy and transmit them. It would sometimes 
take too long a time to make translations of inter- 
cepted despatches for us to receive any benefit from 
them ; but sometimes they gave useful information. 

On the afternoon of the 7tli I received news from 
Washington announcing that Sherman had prob- 
ably attacked Johnston that day, and that Butler 
had reached City Point safely and taken it by sur- 
prise on the 5th. I had given orders for a move- 
ment by the left flank, fearing that Lee might move 
rapidly to Richmond to crush Butler before I could 
get there. 

My order for this movement was as follows : 



Chap. IX 



May, 1864 



Capture of 
City Point 



Headquarters Arivhes of the United States, 

May 7, 1864, 6 : 30 a.m. 
Major-General Meade, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac : 
Make all preparations during the day for a night-marcli 
to take position at Spottsylvania Court House with one 
army-corps, at Todd's Tavern with one, and another near 
the intersection of the Piney Branch and Spottsylvania 
road with the road from Alsop's to Old Court House. If 
this move is made the trains should be thrown forward 
early in the morning to the Ny River. 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

481 



120 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. IX I think it woiild be advisable in making the change to 
leave Hancock where he is nntil Warren passes him. He 
could then follow and become the right of the new line. 
Bnrnside will move to Piney Branch Church. Sedgwick 
can move along the pike to Chancel lorsville and on to his 
destination. Bm-nside will move on the plank road to the 
intersection of it with the Orange and Fredericksburg plank 
road, then follow Sedgwick to his place of destination. 

All vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy 
before the troops move, and then move off quietly. 

It is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for 
a heavy attack on Hancock this afternoon. In case they 
do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any 
success we may gain with our whole force. Such a result 
would necessarily modify these instructions. 

All the hospitals should be moved to-day to Chancellors- 
ville. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General. 



w. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

774, 775 



During the 7tli Sheridan had a fight with the 
rebel cavalry at Todd's Tavern, but routed them, 
thus opening the way for the troops that were to go 
by that route at night. Soon after dark Warren 
withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon 
followed by Sedgwick. Warren's march carried him 
immediately behind the works where Hancock's 
command lay on the Brock road. With my staff 
and a small escort of cavalry I preceded the troops. 
Meade with his staff accompanied me. The great- 
est enthusiasm was manifested by Hancock's men 
as we passed by. No doubt it was inspired by the 
fact that the movement was south. It indicated to 
them that they had passed through the " beginning 
of the end " in the battle just fought. The cheer- 
ing was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it 
for a night-attack. At aU events, it drew from him 




COUNTRY BETWEEN THE WILDERNESS^ 
AND SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE. 

mm^mmmm Cbfi/^Cf era/6 2^<)rC^S.L 



MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 



121 



a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly 
heard, but not felt, by us. 

Meade and I rode in advance. We had passed 
but a little way beyond our left when the road 
forked. We looked to see, if we could, which road 
Sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the 
day. It seemed to be the right-hand one, and ac- 
cordingly we took it. We had not gone far, how- 
ever, when Colonel C. B. Comstock, of my staff, with 
the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were 
on a road that would lead us into the lines of the 
enemy if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at 
a rapid gallop and all alone. In a few minutes he 
returned and reported that Lee was moving, and 
that the road we were on would bring us into his 
lines in a short distance. We returned to the forks 
of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to 
the head of Warren's column when it should come 
up, and continued our journey to Todd's Tavern, 
where we arrived after midnight. 

My object in moving to Spottsylvania was two- 
fold : first, I did not want Lee to get back to Rich- 
mond in time to attempt to crush Butler before I 
could get there; second, I wanted to get between 
his army and Richmond, if possible; and if not, 
to draw him into the open field. But Lee, by acci- 
dent, beat us to Spottsylvania. Our wagon-trains 
had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops 
were to march upon before the movement com- 
menced. Lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of 
the Army of the Potomac to Fredericksburg, and so 
informed his government. Accordingly he ordered 
Longstreet's corps — now commanded by Anderson 
— to move in the morning (the 8th) to Spottsyl- 



Chap. IX 



A narrow 
escape 



W. R. 
XXXVI (y 

970,974 



122 



PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. IX 

E. H.Andei- 

eon, W. P. 

1838-42 ; 

Mexico, 

1846-48 ; 
Brig.-Geu. 
C. 8. A. Mar. 
1861; MaJ.- 
Gen. Aug. 
1862; Lt.- 
Gen. May, 
1864 



Ante, II, 111 



Slieridau, 

Memoirs, I, 

363 et seq. 



Wesley Mer- 
rltt, W. P. 

1855-60 ; 
Brig.-Geii. 
Vols. June 

29, 1863 ; 
Miij.-Geii. 
Apr. 1, 1865 



vania. But the woods being still ou fire, Anderson 
could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on 
to his destination that night. By this accident Lee 
got possession of Spottsylvania. It is impossible to 
say now what would have been the result if Lee's 
orders had l^een obeyed as given ; but it is certain 
that we would have been in Spottsylvania and be- 
tween him and his capital. My belief is that there 
would have been a race between the two armies 
to see which could reach Richmond first, and the 
Army of the Potomac would have had the shorter 
line. Thus twice since crossing the Rapidan we 
came near closing the campaign, so far as battles 
were concerned, from the Rapidan to the James 
River or Richmond. The first failure was caused by 
our not following up the success gained over Hill's 
corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described ; 
the second, when fires caused by that battle di'ove 
Anderson to make a march during the night of the 
7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the 
morning of the 8th. But accident often decides the 
fate of battle. 

Sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting 
during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at Todd's 
Tavern until after night, with the field his at the 
close. He issued the necessary orders for seizing 
Spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the Po 
River, which Lee's troops would have to cross to get 
to Spottsylvania. But Meade changed Sheridan's 
orders to Merritt — who was holding the bridge — on 
his arrival at Todd's Tavern, and thereby left the 
road free for Anderson when he came up. Wilson, 
who was ordered to seize the town, did so with his 
division of cavalry ; but he could not hold it against 



MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 123 

the Confederate corps, which had not been detained chap, ix 
at the crossing of the Po, as it would have been but 
for the unfortunate change in Merritt's orders. Had 
he been permitted to execute the orders Sheridan 
gave him, he would have been guarding with two 
brigades of cavalry the bridge over the Po River 
which Anderson had to cross, and must have de- 
tained him long enough to enable Wai'ren to rein- 
force Wilson and hold the town. 

Anderson soon intrenched himself — if, indeed, HM^Tifui 
the intrenchments were not already made — imme- 
diately across Warren's front. Warren was not 
aware of his presence, but probably supposed it 
was the cavalry which Merritt had engaged earlier 
in the day. He assaulted at once, but was repulsed. 
He soon organized his men, as they were not pur- 
sued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this 
time with his whole corps. This time he succeeded 
in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's ^^ w^ ^aw- 
front, where he intrenched. His right and left Mayufisiii; 
divisions — the former Cra^^ord's, the latter Wads- \^is°A?r.25, 
worth's, now commanded by Cutler — drove the ^ ^^^^^^ 
enemy back some distance. julieSisfiii 

At this time my headquarters had been advanced voif; Nov." 
to Piney Branch Church. I was anxious to crush 
Anderson before Lee could get a force to his sup- 
port. To this end Sedgwick, who was at Piney xxxvi(2) 
Branch Church, was ordered to Warren's support. ^*^ 
Hancock, who was at Todd's Tavern, was notified ibid. 531 
of Warren's engagement, and was directed to be in 
readiness to come up. Burnside, who was with the 
wagon-trains at Aldrich's on our extreme left, re- 
ceived the same instructions. Sedgwick was slow 
in getting up for some reason, — probably unavoid- 



124 



PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. IX 



Warren's 
character- 
istics 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

974 



able, because lie was never at fault when serious 
work was to be done, — so that it was near night 
before the combined forces were ready to attack. 
Even then all of Sedgwick's command did not get 
into the engagement. Warren led the last assault, 
one division at a time, and of course it failed. 

Warren's difficulty was twofold. When he received 
an order to do anything it would at once occur to 
his mind how all the balance of the army should be 
engaged so as properly to cooperate with him. His 
ideas were generally good, but he would forget that 
the person giving him orders had thought of others 
at the time he had of him. In like manner, when he 
did get ready to execute an order, after giving most 
intelligent instructions to division commanders, he 
would go in with one division, holding the others in 
reserve until he could superintend their movements 
in person also, forgetting that division commanders 
could execute an order without his presence. His 
difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. 
He was an officer of superior ability, quick percep- 
tions, and personal courage to accomplish anything 
that could be done with a small command. 

Lee had ordered Hill's corps — now commanded by 
Early — to move by the very road we had marched 
upon. This shows that even early in the morning 
of the 8th Lee had not yet become acquainted with 
my move, but still thought that the Army of the 
Potomac had gone to Fredericksburg. Indeed, he 
informed the authorities at Eichmond that he had 
possession of Spottsylvania and was thus on my 
flank. Anderson was in possession of Spottsyl- 
vania, through no foresight of Lee, however. Early 
only found that he had been following us when he 



viewed 



MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 125 

ran against Hancock at Todd's Tavern. His coming chap, ix 
detained Hancock from the battle-field of Spottsyl- 
vaniafor that day ; but he, in like manner, kept Early 
back and forced him to move by another route. 

Had I ordered the movement for the night of the '^S^^**^.^' 
7th by my left flank, it would have put Hancock in 
the lead. It would also have given us an hour or 
more earlier start. It took all that time for Warren 
to get the head of his column to the left of Hancock 
after he had got his troops out of their line confront- 
ing the enemy. This hour, and Hancock's capacity 
to use his whole force when necessary, would no 
doubt have enabled him to crush Anderson before 
he could be reinforced. But the movement made 
was tactical. It kept the troops in mass against a 
possible assault by the enemy. Our left occupied 
its intrenchments while the two corps to the right 
passed. If an attack had been made by the enemy 
he would have found the Second Corps in position, 
fortified, and, practically, the Fifth and Sixth corps 
in position as reserves, until his entire front was 
passed. By a left flank movement the army would 
have been scattered while still passing the front of 
the enemy, and before the extreme right had got 
by it would have been very much exposed. Then, 
too, I had not yet learned the special qualifications 
of the different corps commanders. At that time 
my judgment was that Warren was the man I would 
suggest to succeed Meade should anything happen 
to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. 
As I have before said, Warren was a gallant soldier, 
an able man ; and he was besides thoroughly imbued 
with the solemnity and importance of the duty he 
had to perform. 



Chap. X 



CHAPTER X 

BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA — HANCOCK'S POSITION — AS- 
SAULT OF warren's and Wright's corps — upton 

PROMOTED ON THE FIELD — GOOD NEWS FROM BUT- 
LER AND SHERIDAN 

THE Mattapony River is formed by the junction 

ofspottsyi- ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^' ^^^ "^^^ ^^® Poj ^^^ *^i® ^y rivers, 

vania ^^^^ jg^g^ beiiig the northernmost of the four. It 

takes its rise about a mile south and a httle east of 

the Wilderness Tavern. The Po rises southwest of 

the same place, but farther away. Spottsylvania 

is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and 

where they are but a few miles apart. The Brock 

road reaches Spottsylvania without crossing either 

of these streams. Lee's army, coming up by the 

Catharpin road, had to cross the Po at Wooden 

Bridge. Warren and Hancock came by the Brock 

road. Sedgwick crossed the Ny at CatharjDin Fur- 

R^>°w^K iiace. Burnside, coining by Aldrich's to Gates's 

House, had to cross the Ny near the enemy. He 

found pickets at the bridge ; but they were , soon 

diiven off by a brigade of Willcox's division, and 

the stream w^as crossed. This brigade was furiously 

attacked ; but the remainder of the division coming 

up, they were enabled to hold their position, and 

soon fortified it. 

126 



XXXVI (1) 

908 



THE MATTAPONY 127 

About the time I received the news of this attack, chap, x 
word came from Hancock that Early had left his xxxvi'(2) 
front. He had been forced over to the Catharpin ^^ 
road, crossing the Po at Corbin's and again at 
Wooden Bridge. These are the bridges Sheridan 
had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, 
while one division should occupy Spottsylvania. 
These movements of the enemy gave me the idea 
that Lee was about to make the attempt to get to, 
or toward, Fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. 
I made arrangements to attack his right and get 
between him and Eichmond* if he should try to exe- 
cute this design. If he had any such intention it 
was abandoned as soon as Burnside was established 
south of the Ny. 

The Po and the Ny are narrow little streams, but 
deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily 
wooded and marshy bottoms, — at the time we were 
there, — and difficult to cross except where bridged. 
The country about was generally hea^dly timbered, 
but with occasional clearings. It was a much better 
country to conduct a defensive campaign in than 
an offensive one. 

By noon of the 9tli the position of the two armies ^i}|*amie°s' 
was as follows : Lee occupied a semicircle facing 
north, northwest, and northeast, inclosing the town. 
Anderson was on his left extending to the Po, Ewell 
came next, then Early. Warren occupied our right, 
covering the Brock and other roads converging at 
Spottsylvania ; Sedgwick was to his left and Burn- 
side on our extreme left. Hancock was yet back at 
Todd's TaA^ern, but as soon as it was known that 
Early had left Hancock's front the latter was ordered 
up to Warren's right. He formed a line with three 



128 PEBSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

ciiAr. X divisions on the hill overlooking the Po early in the 
Gershom. aftemoon, and was ordered to cross the Po and get 

MOtt, MeXl- ' ■,.,, n TT 

u'-coLltii on the enemy's flank. The fourth division of Han- 
mu;1irfg*- cock's coi'ps, Mott Commanding, was left at Todd's 
seyl\\]'imi; when the corps first came up ; but in the afternoon 
May 26^1865 it was brought up and placed to the left of Sedg- 
^ic]i's — now Wright's — Sixth Corps. In the morn- 
ing General Sedgwick had been killed near the right 
of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. His 
,.. ?//-w loss was a severe one to the Army of the Potomac 

A\ right, W. . 

K^Etg! and to the nation. General H. G. Wright succeeded 

Bfig^Gen. Mm iu thc command of his corps. 

"^'i^ifelf • Hancock was now, 9 p.m. of the 9th of May, across 

July iS!862 the left flank of Lee's army, but separated from it, 
and also from the remainder of Meade's army, by 
the Po Eiver. But for the lateness of the hour and 
the darkness of the night he would have attempted to 
cross the river again at Wooden Bridge, thus bring- 
ing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. 
The Po at the points where Hancock's corps 
crossed runs nearly due east. Just below his lower 
crossing — the troops crossed at three points — it 
turns due south, and after passing under Wooden 
Bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. 
During the night this corps built three bridges 
over the Po ; but these were in rear. 

The position assumed by Hancock's corps forced 
Lee to reinforce his left during the night. Accord- 

xA'^'(i) ^^S^y ^^ *^® morning of the 10th, when Hancock 
330,331 renewed his effort to get over the Po to his front, 
he found himself confronted by some of Early's com- 
mand, which had been brought from the extreme 
right of the enemy during the night. He succeeded 
in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, 



BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA 



129 



but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no 
more were crossed. 

Hancock reconnoitered his front on the morning 
of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing if it 
were found that an advantage could be gained. The 
enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high 
ground overlooking the river, and commanding the 
Wooden Bridge with artillery. Anderson's left 
rested on the Po, where it turns south; therefore 
for Hancock to cross over — although it would bring 
him to the same side of the stream with the rest of 
the army — would still further isolate him from it. 
The stream would have to be crossed twice in the 
face of the enemy to unite with the main body. 
The idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. 

Lee had weakened the other parts of his line to 
meet this movement of Hancock's, and I determined 
to take advantage of it. Accordingly in the morn- 
ing orders were issued for an attack in the after- 
noon on the center by Warren's and Wright's corps, 
Hancock to command all the attacking force. Two 
of his divisions were brought to the north side of 
the Po. Gibbon was placed to the right of Warren, 
and Birney in his rear as a reserve. Barlow's divi- 
sion was left south of the stream, and Mott, of the 
same corps, was still to the left of Wright's corps. 
Burnside was ordered to reconnoiter his front in 
force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack 
with vigor. The enemy, seeing Barlow's division 
isolated from the rest of the army, came out and 
attacked with fury. Barlow repulsed the assault 
with great slaughter and with considerable loss to 
himself. But the enemy reorganized and renewed 
the assault. Birney was now moved to the high 
Vol. n.— 9 



Chap. X 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

331 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

604 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

331 

D.B.Biniey, 
Col. 23d Pa. 
Aug. 2, 1861; 

Brig.-Gen. 
Vols. Feb. 3, 

1862; Maj.- 

Gen.May20, 

1863 

W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

610 



130 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. X 



ground overlooking the river crossings built by our 
troops, and covered the crossings. The second as- 
■vir^\^-n. sault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the 

A. A. A. V X (J.) 

^^^ enemy, and Barlow was withdrawn without further 
molestation. General T. Gr. Stevenson was killed in 
this move. 

Between the lines, where Warren's assault was to 
take place, there was a ravine grown up with large 
trees and underbrush, making it almost impene- 
trable by man. The slopes on both sides were also 
covered with a heavy growth of timber. Warren, 
before noon, reconnoitered his front twice, the first 
time with one and the second with two divisions. 
He was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such 
information of the ground as to induce him to re- 
port recommending the assault. 

Wright also reconnoitered his front and gained 
a considerably advanced position from the one he 
started from. He .then organized a storming party, 
consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned Colonel 
w.^1856- Emory Upton, of the One Hundred and Twenty- 
MaTiZ'iii fi^st New York A^olunteers, to the command of it. 
About four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was 
ordered, Warren's and Wright's corps, with Mott's 
division of Hancock's corps, to move simultane- 
rY'^^w'r ously. The movement was prompt, and in a few 
^fgf_^y^> minutes the fiercest of struggles began. The battle- 
field was so densely covered with forests that but 
little could be seen, by any one person, as to the 
progress made. Meade and I occupied the best 
Lt-cof m'h position we could get, in rear of Warren. 
i^RiTMgl- Warren was repulsed with heavy loss, General 
A^il^iSs; J. C. Rice being among the killed. He was not fol- 
■ 1864 ^^' lowed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby en- 



BATTLE OF SPOTTSYLVANIA 131 

abled to reorganize his command as soon as covered chap, x 
from the guns of the enemy. To the left our suc- 
cess was decided, but the advantage was lost by the 
feeble action of Mott. Upton with his assaulting xxx^d) 
party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's in- ^^^"^^^ 
trenchments. Turning to the right and left, he 
captured several guns and some hundreds of prison- 
ers. Mott was ordered to his assistance, but failed 
utterly. So much time was lost in trying to get up 
the troops which wei-e in the right position to re- 
inforce that I ordered Upton to withdraw ; but the 
officers and men of his command were so averse to 
giving up the advantage they had gained that I 
withdrew the order. To relieve them I ordered a 
renewal of the assault. By this time Hancock, who iwd. 333, 334 
had gone with Birney's division to relieve Barlow, 
had returned, bringing the division with him. His 
corps was now joined with Warren's and Wright's 
in this last assault. It was gallantly made, many 
men getting up to, and over, the works of the 
enemy ; but they were not able to hold them. At 
night they were withdrawn. Upton brought his 
prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured 
he was obliged to abandon. Upton had gained an 
important advantage, but a lack in others of the 
spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. Be- 
fore leaving Washington I had been authorized to 
promote officers on the field for special acts of gal- ^^ tSffleid 
lantry. By this authority I conferred the rank of 
brigadier-general upon Upton on the spot, and this 
act was confirmed by the President. Upton had 
been badly wounded in this fight. 

Burnside on the left had got up to within a fe-^,^ 
hundred yards of Spottsylvania Court House, com- 



132 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. X 

W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

909 



Cf. W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

627 



pletely turning Lee's right. He was not aware of 
the importance of the advantage he had gained, 
and I, being with the troops where the heaxj fight- 
ing was, did not know of it at the time. He had 
gained his position with but little fighting, and 
almost without loss. Burnside's position now sep- 
arated him widely from Wright's corps, the corps 
nearest to him. At night he was ordered to join 
on to this. This brought him back about a mile, 
and lost to us an important advantage. I attach no 
blame to Burnside for this, but I do to myself for 
not having had a staif-officer with him to report to 
me his position. 

The enemy had not dared to come out of his line 
at any point to follow up his advantage, except in 
the single instance of his attack on Barlow. Then 
he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he 
had an entire corps against two brigades. Barlow 
took up his bridges in the presence of this force. 

On the 11th there was no battle and but little 
firing ; none except by Mott, who made a reconnais- 
sance to ascertain if there were a weak point in the 
enemy's line. 

I wrote the following letter to General Halleck : 

Near Spottsylvania Court House, 
May 11, 1864, 8 : 30 a.m. 
Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Washington, D. C. : 
We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. 
The result up to this time is much in our favor. But 
our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. 
We have lost to this time eleven general ofdcers killed, 
wounded, and missing, and probably twenty thousand 
men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater— we 



CUTTING SHEKIDAN LOOSE 



133 



having taken over f onr thousand prisoners in battle, whUst 
he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. I 
am now sending back to Belle Plain all my wagons for a 
fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose 
to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. 

The arrival of reinforcements here will be very encou- 
raging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as 
possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having 
them sent to Belle Plain was to use them as an escort to 
our supply-trains. If it is more convenient to send them 
out by train, to march from the raUroad to Belle Plain or 
Fredericksburg, send them so. 

I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only 
kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part 
of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every 
position they take. 

Up to this time there is no indication of any portion of 
Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond. 

U. S. Grant, 
Ideutenant-General. 



Chap. X 



And, also, I received information, through the 
War Department, from General Butler that his 
cavalry under Kautz had cut the railroad south of 
Petersburg, separating Beauregard from Richmond, 
and had whipped Hill, killing, wounding, and cap- 
turing many ; also that he was intrenched and could 
maintain himself. On this same day came news 
from Sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed 
ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between Lee 
and Eichmond, one and a haK million rations, and 
most of the medical stores for his army. 

On the 8th I had directed Sheridan verbally to 
cut loose from the Army of the Potomac and pass 
around the left of Lee's army and attack his cavalry 
and communications, which was successfully exe- 
cuted in the manner I have already described. 



w. R. 

XXXVI (2) 
10 



Ibid. 615 



Ante, II, 
77-80 



CHAPTER XI 

HANCOCK'S ASSAULT — LOSSES OF THE CONFEDEKATES 
— PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED — DISCOMFITURE 
OF THE ENEMY — EWELL'S ATTACK — REDUCING 
THE ARTILLERY 



Chap. XI 

May, 1864 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

635 



Ibid. 629 



IN the reconnaissance made by Mott on the 11th 
a sahent was discovered at the right center. 
I determined that an assault should be made at 
that point.^ Accordingly in the afternoon Han- 
cock was ordered to move his command by the rear 
of Warren and Wright, under cover of night, to 
Wright's left, and there form it for an assault at 
four o'clock the next morning. The night was dark, 
it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that 
it was midnight when he reached the point where 



1 Headquarters Armies U. S., 
May 11, 1864, 3 p.m. 

Major-General Meade, 
Commanding Army of the Po- 
tomac : 

Move three divisions of the 
Second Corps by the rear of the 
Fifth and Sixth corps, under 
cover of night, so as to join the 
Ninth Corps in a vigorous assault 
on the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. 
to-morrow. I will send one or 
two staff-officers over to-night to 
stay with Burnside, and impress 
him with the importance of a 



prompt and vigorous attack. War- 
ren and Wright should hold their 
corps as close to the enemy as 
possible, to take advantage of any 
diversion caused by this attack, 
and to push in if any opportunity 
presents itself. There is but 
little doubt in my mind that the 
assault last evening would have 
proved entirely successful if it 
had commenced one hour earlier 
and had been heartily entered 
into by Mott's division and the 
Ninth Corps. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieu tenan t- General. 



134 



HANCOCK'S ASSAULT 



135 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

643 



he was to halt. It took most of the night to get the chap, xi 
men in position for their advance in the morning. 
The men got but httle rest. Burnside was ordered 
to attack' on the left of the salient at the same 
hour. I sent two of my staff-officers to impress 
upon him the importance of pushing forward vigor- 
ously. Hancock was notified of this. Warren and ibid, es?, ess 
Wright were ordered to hold themselves in readi- 
ness to join in the assault if circumstances made it 
advisable. I occupied a central position most con- 
venient for receiving information from all points. 
Hancock put Barlow on his left, in double column, 
ai\d Birney to his right. Mott followed Birney, and 
Gibbon was held in reserve. 

The morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying 
the start more than half an hour. 

The ground over which Hancock had to pass to 
reach the enemy was ascending and heavily wooded 
to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's 
intrenchments. In front of Birney there was also 
a marsh to cross. But notwithstanding all these 



w. R. 

XXXVI (1) 

334, 335 



1 Headquarters Armies U. S., 

May 11, 1SG4, 4 p.m. 
Major-General A. E. Burnside, 
Oommandiiig Ninth Ariny-eorps : 
Major-General Hancock has 
been ordered to move his corps 
under cover of iiight to join yon 
in a vigorous attack against 
the enemy at 4 o'clock A.M. to- 
morrow. You will move against 
the enemy with your entire force 
promptly and with all possi- 
ble vigor at precisely 4 o'clock 
A.M. to-morrow, the 12th inst. 
Let your preparations for this 
attack be conducted with the ut- 
most secrecy and veiled entirely 
from the enemy. 



I send two of my staff-oflieers — 
Colonels Comstoek and Babcock, 
in whom I have great confidence, 
and who are acquainted with the 
direction the attack is to be made 
from here — to remain with you 
and General Hancock, with in- 
structions to render you every 
assistance in their power. Gen- 
erals Warren and Wright will hold 
their corps as close to the enemy 
as possible, to take advantage of 
any diversion caused by yours 
and Hancock's attack, and will 
push in their whole force if any 
opportunity presents itself. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutcnaut-General. 



136 



PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAP. XI 



Maj.-Gen. 
Edw. John- 
son and 
Brif^.-Oen. 
G. H. Stew- 
art 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

909, 910 

R.B.Potter, 

Lt.-Col. 51st 
N. Y. Oct. 

11, 1861 ; 
Brifj.-Gen. 
Vols. Mar. 

13, 18G3 ; 

Maj.-Gen. 

Sept. 20, 1865 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

336 



difficulties the troops pushed on in quick time with- 
out firing a gun, and v^hen within four or five hun- 
dred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud 
cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the 
breastworks. Barlow and Birney entered almost 
simultaneously. Here a desperate hand-to-hand 
conflict took place. The men of the two sides were 
too close together to fire, but used their guns as 
clubs. The hand-conflict was soon over. Hancock's 
corps captured some four thousand prisoners,— 
among them a division and a brigade commanden', 
— twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, 
and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, 
and many colors. Hancock, as soon as the hand- 
to-hand conflict was over, tm*ned the guns of the 
enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel 
lines. About six o'clock I ordered Warren's corps 
to the support of Hancock's. Burnside, on the 
left, had advanced up east of the salient to the 
very parapet of the enemy. Potter, command- 
ing one of his divisions, got over, but was not 
able to remain there. However, he inflicted a 
heavy loss upon the enemy, but not without loss 
in return. 

This victory was important, and one that Lee 
could not afford to leave us in full possession of. 
He made the most strenuous efforts to regain the 
position he had lost. Troops were brought up from 
his left and attacked Hancock furiously. Hancock 
was forced to fall back ; but he did so slowly, with 
his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, 
until behind the breastworks he had captured. 
These he turned, facing them the other way, and 
continued to hold. Wright was ordered up to re- 




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LOSSES OF THE CONFEDEEATES 



137 



Meade to 
Warren, W. 
R. XXXVI 

(2) 661-666 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

664 



inforce Hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. He chap.xi 
was wounded soon after coming up, but did not re- 
linquish the command of his corps, although the 
fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. 
At eight o'clock Warren was ordered up again, but 
was so slow in making his dispositions that his 
orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. 
At eleven o'clock I gave Meade written orders to re- 
lieve Warren from his command if he failed to move 
promptly. Hancock placed batteries on high ground 
in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing 
over the heads of his own troops. 

Burnside accomplished but little on our left of a 
positive nature, but negatively a great deal. He 
kept Lee from reinforcing his center from that 
quarter. If the Fifth Corps, or rather if Wai- 
ren, had been as prompt as Wright was with the 
Sixth Corps, better results might have been ob- 
tained. 

Lee massed heavily from his left flank on the 
broken point of his line. Five times during the 
day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging 
our troops from their new position. His losses 
must have been fearful. Sometimes the belligerents 
would be separated by but a few feet. In one place 
a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely 
down by musket -balls. ' All the trees between the 
lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and 
musketry. It was three o'clock next morning be- Mayis.ise* 
fore the fighting ceased. Some of our troops had 
then been twenty hours under fire. In this engage- 
ment we did not lose a single organization, not even 
a company. The enemy lost one division with its 
commander, one brigade, and one regiment, with 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

337 



138 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XI lieavj losses elsewhere.^ Our losses were heavy, 

but, as stated, no whole company was captured. 

May 13, 1864 At night Lee took a position in rear of his former 

one, and by the following morning he was strongly 

intrenched in it. 

Warren's corps was now temporarily broken up. 

Cutler's division sent to Wright, and Griffin's to 

4.v^-^"™- Hancock. Meade ordered his chief of staff, Gen- 

Ma/5rop.' ei'^1 Humphreys, to remain with Warren and the 

^"et; Brfgf-' remaining division, and authorized him to give it 

Gen. Vols. -, . -, . 

Ai)r.28,i862; orders m his name. 

July 8, 1863 During the day I was passing along the line from 
wing to wing continuously. About the center stood 
a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady 
and her daughter. She showed such unmistakable 
signs of being strongly Union that I stopped. She 
said she had not seen a Union flag for so long a 
time that it did her heart good to look upon it 
again. She said her husband and son, being Union 
men, had had to leave early in the war, and were 
now somewhere in the Union army, if alive. She 
was without food or nearly so, so I ordered rations 
issued to her, and promised to find out, if I could, 
where the husband and son were. 

May, 1864 There was no fighting on the 13th, further than 
a little sldrmishing between Mott's division and the 

1 Headquarters Armies U. S., enemy are obstinate, and seem 

May 12, 18G4. 6 : 30 p.m. to have found the last ditch. We 

Major-General Halleck, have lost no organizations, — not 

Washington, D. C. : even that of a company, — whilst 

The eightli day of the battle ^^e have destroyed and captured 

closes, leaving between three and "ne division (Johnson's), one bri- 

four thousand prisoners in our g'^tle (Doles's), and one regiment 

hands for the day's work, includ- '^"tire from the enemy, 
ing two general officers, and over U. S. Grant, 

thirty pieces of artillery. The Lieutenant-General. 



PROMOTIONS RECOMMENDED 



139 



enemy. I was afraid that Lee might be moving out, chap, xi 
and I did not want him to go without my knowing 
it. The indications were that he was moving, but 
it was found that he was only taking his new position 
back from the salient that had been captured. Our 
dead were buried this day. Mott's division was re- 
duced to a brigade and assigned to Birney's division. 
During this day I wrote to Washington recom- 
mending Sherman and Meade ^ for promotion to 
the grade of major-general in the regular army; 
Hancock for brigadier-general; Wright, Gibbon, 
and Humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers ; 
and Upton and Carroll to be brigadiers. Upton had 
already been named as such, but the appointment A^ite, ii, m 
had to be confirmed by the Senate on the nomina- 
tion of the President. 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

695 



iSpottsylvania Court House, 

May 13, 1804. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary 
of War, 
Washington, D. C. : 
I beg leave to recommend the 
following promotions to be made 
for gallant and distinguished ser- 
vices in the last eight days'battles, 
to wit : Brigadier-General H. G. 
Wright and Brigadier-General 
John Gibbon to bo major-gener- 
als ; Colonel S. S. Carroll, Eighth 
Ohio Volnnteers ; Colonel E. Up- 
ton, One Hundred and Twenty- 
first New York Volnnteers ; Colo- 
nel William MeCandless, Second 
Pennsylvania Resei'ves, to be 
brigadier-generals. I would also 
recommend Major-General W. S. 
Hancock for brigadier-genei-al in 
the regular army. His services 
and qualifications are eminently 
deserving of this recognition. In 
making these recommendations I 



do not wish the claims of General 
G. M. Dodge for promotion for- 
gotten, but recommend his name 
to be sent in at the same time. I 
woidd also ask to have General 
Wright assigned to the command 
of the Sixth Army-corps. I would 
further ask the confirmation of 
General Humphrej's to the rank 
of majoi'-general. 

General Meade has more than 
met my most sanguine exjiecta- 
tions. He and Shernum are the 
fittest officers for large commands 
I have come in contact with. If 
their services can be rewarded by 
promotion to the rank of major- 
generals in the regular army the 
honor would be worthily be- 
stowed, and I would feel person- 
ally gratified. I would not like 
to see one of these promotions at 
this time withoiit seeing both. 

U, S, Grant, 
Lieutcnant-General. 



140 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XI The night of the 13th Warren and Wright were 
moved by the rear to the left of Burnside. The 
X A'^' (1) niglit was very dark and it rained heavily ; the i-oads 
^*^ were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and cor- 
duroy the road a part of the way to get through. 
It was midnight before they got to the point where 
they were to halt, and daylight before the troops 
could be organized to advance to their position in 
line. They gained their position in line, however, 
without any fighting, except a little in Wright's 
Ibid. 669 front. Here Upton had to contend for an eleva- 
tion which we wanted and which the enemy was 
not disposed to yield. Upton first drove the enemy, 
^^p^S* ^^^^ ^^^ ^^®^ repulsed in turn. Ayres coming to 
^^iMf-isT' ^^^^ support with his brigade (of Griffin's division, 

Capt. 5tli 



Art! May 14, Warrcu's corps), the position was secured and for 

1861 ; Bris.- 

Gen. Vol.s. 

Nov. 29, 1862 



Gen. vX." tified. There was no more battle during the 14th. 
This brought our line east of the Court House and 
running north and south and facing west. 

During the night of the 14th-15th Lee moved to 
cover this new front. This left Hancock without 
an enemy confronting him. He was brought to the 
rear of our new center, ready to be moved in any 
direction he might be wanted. 

xxxvi (2) ^^ ^^^ 1''^^^ news came from Butler and Averell. 
771, 803 rpj^g former I'eported the capture of the outer works 
at Drury's Bluff, on the James River, and that his 
cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of 
Richmond on the Danville road ; and the latter, the 
destruction of a depot of supplies at Dublin, West 
Virginia, and the breaking of New River Bridge on 

Sherman the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The next day 

to Hauec , j^g^g came from Sherman and Sheridan. Sherman 

xxxvni 

(4)172,173 had forced Johnston out of Dalton, Georgia, and 



DISCOMFITURE OF THE ENEMY 



141 



was following him south. The report from Sheri- 
dan embraced his operations up to his passing the 
outer defenses of Richmond. The prospect must 
now have been dismal in Richmond. The road 
and telegraph were cut between the capital and 
Lee. The roads and wires were cut in every direc- 
tion from the rebel capital. Temporarily that city 
was cut off from all communication with the outside 
except by courier. This condition of affairs, how- 
ever, was of but short duration. 
I wi'ote Halleck : 



Chap. XI 



Sheridan to 
Meade, W. 
K. XXXVI 

(1) 778 



Near Spottsylvania Court House, 
May 16, 1864, 8 a.m. 
Major-General Halleck, 
WashingtoD, D. C. : 

"We have had five days' abnost constant rain without any 
prospect yet of its clearing up. The roads have now be- 
come so impassable that ambulances with wounded men 
can no longer run between here and Fredericksburg. All 
offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have 
twenty-four hours of dry weather. The army is in the 
best of spirits, and feels the greatest confidence of ultimate 



success. 
# 



You can assure the President and Secretary of War that 
the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it 
is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

809 



The condition of the roads was such that nothing 
was done on the 17th. But that night Hancock and 
Wright were to make a night-march back to their 
old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock 
in the morning. Lee got troops back in time to 
protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccess- 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

337, 338 



142 



PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XI 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

840 

^Y. R. 

xxxvn (1) 

475 



Ibid. 485, 492 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

11,12 

\V. R. 

XXXIV (3) 

490, 543 



W. R. 
XXXVI (2) 

906 



R. O. Tyler, 
W. P. 1849- 

53 ; Col. 4t,li 

Conn. Art. 

Sept. 17, 

1861 ; Brig.- 
Gen. Vols. 

Nov. 29, 1862 



ful. On this day (18th) the news was almost as dis- 
couraging to us as it had been two days before in 
the rebel capital. As stated above, Hancock's and 
Wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. 
News came that Sigel had been defeated at New 
Market l^adly, and was retreating down the valley. 
Not two hours before I had sent the inquiry to 
Halleck whether Sigel could not get to Staunton to 
stop supplies coming from there to Lee. I asked 
at once that Sigel might be relieved and some one 
else put in his place. Hunter's name was suggested, 
and I heartily approved. Further news from Butler 
reported him diiven from Drury's Bluff, but still in 
possession of the Petersburg road. Banks had been 
defeated in Louisiana, relieved, and Canby put in 
his. place. This change of commander was not on 
my suggestion. All this news was very discourag- 
ing. All of it must have been known by the enemy 
before it was by me. In fact, the good news (for 
the enemy) must have been known to him at the 
moment I thought he was in despair, and his anguish 
had been already relieved when we were enjoying 
his supposed discomfiture. But this was no time for 
repining. I immediately gave orders for a move- 
ment by the left flank on toward Richmond, to 
commence on the night of the 19th. I also asked 
Halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in 
changing our base of supplies from Fredericksburg 
to Port Royal, on the Rapj)ahannock. 

Up to this time I had received no reinforcements, 
except six thousand raw troops under Brigadier- 
General Robert O. Tyler, just arrived. They had 
not yet joined their command, Hancock's corps, but 
were on our right. This corps had been brought to 



EWELL'S ATTACK 



143 



the rear of the center, ready to move in any direc- 
tion. Lee, probably suspecting some move on my 
part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, 
moved Ewell's corps about five o'clock in the after- 
noon, with Early's as a reserve, to attack us in that 
quarter. Tyler had come up from Fredericksburg, 
and had been halted on the road to the right of our 
line, near Kitching's brigade of Warren's corps. 
Tjder received the attack with his raw troops, and 
they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a 
manner worthy of veterans. 

Hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, 
and was the soldier to do it without waiting to 
make dispositions. Birney was thrown to Tyler's 
right and Crawford to his left, with Gibbon as a 
reserve ; and Ewell was whirled back speedily and 
with heavy loss. 

Warren had been ordered to get on Ewell's flank 
and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrench- 
ments. But his efforts were so feeble that under 
the cover of night Ewell got back with only the 
loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed 
and wounded. The army being engaged until after 
dark, I rescinded the order for the march by our 
left flank that night. 

As soon as it was discovered that the enemy were 
coming out to attack, I naturally supposed they 
would detach a force to destroy our trains. The 
withdrawal of Hancock from the right uncovered 
one road from Spottsylvania to Fredericksburg over 
which trains drew our supplies. This was guarded 
by a division of colored troops, commanded by Gen- 
eral Ferrero, belonging to Burnside's corps. Fer- 
rero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered 



Chap. XI 



J. H. Kitch- 
in.c, Capt. 2d 

N. Y. Art. 
Aug. 19, 1861; 
Col.ethN.Y. 

Art. Apr. 
1863 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

338 



E. Ferrero, 

Ool. 5lst 

N.Y.Oct. 11, 

1861 ; Brig.- 

Gen. Vols. 

8ept.l9, 1862 



Mai. -Gen 
C. 8. A. 



144 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP. XI to throw his cavahy pickets out to the south and be 
prepared to meet the enemy if he should come ; if 
he had to retreat, to do so toward Fredericksburg. 
The enemy did detach as expected, and captured 
twenty-five or thirty wagons, which, however, were 
soon retaken. 

In consequence of the disasters that had befallen 
lis in the past few days Lee could be reinforced 
largely, and I had Ho doubt he would be. Beaure- 
gard had come up from the south with troops to 
guard the Confederate capital when it was in dan- 
ger. Butler being driven back, most of the troops 

R F.Hoke, could be sent to Lee. Hoke was no longer needed 
in North Carolina ; and Sigel's troops having gone 
back to Cedar Creek, whipped, many troops could 
be spared from the valley. 

.^®'^^?,V'^ The Wilderness and Spottsylvania battles con- 
vinced me that we had more artillery than could 
ever be brought into action at any one time. It 
occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed 
the trains in bringing up forage. Artillery is very 
useful when it can be brought into action, but it is 
a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. 
Before leaving Spottsylvania, therefore, I sent back 
to the defenses of Washington over one hundred 
pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. 
This relieved the roads over which we were to 
march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, 
and still left us more artillery than could be advan- 
tageously used. In fact, before reaching the James 
River I again reduced the artillery with the army 
largely. 

I beheved that if one corps of the army was ex- 
posed on the road to Richmond, and at a distance 



TEMPTING THE ENEMY 145 

from the main army, Lee would endeavor to attack chap, xi 
the exposed corps before reinforcements could come 
up ; in which case the main army could follow Lee 
up and attack him before he had time to intrench. 
So I issued the following orders : 

Near Spottsylvania Court House, Virginia, 

May 18, 1864. 
Major-General Meade, 

Commaudiug Army of the Potomac : 

Before dayUght to-morrow morning I propose to di'aw w. r. 
Hancock and Bm-nside fi'om the position they now hold, 864 
and put Burnside to the left of Wright. Wright and 
Burnside should then force theh way up as close to the 
enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or 
with a general engagement if the enemy wiU come out of 
their works to fight and intrench. Hancock should march 
and take up a position as if in support of the two left 
corps. To-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will 
be moved southeast with all his force and as much cavalry 
as can be given to him, to get as far toward Richmond on 
the hne of the Fredericksburg raOroad as he can make, 
fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. If 
the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be 
followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, 
if possible, before time is given to intrench. 

Suitable directions wiU at once be given for all trains 
and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. 

U. S. Grant. 

On the 20th, Lee showing no signs of coming out 
of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank 
movement, to commence after night. 



Vol. II.— 1G 



CHAPTER XII 

MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK — BATTLE OF NORTH 
ANNA — AN INCIDENT OF THE MARCH — MOVING ON 
RICHMOND — SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY — POSI- 
TION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY 

CHAP. XII WT^E were now to operate in a different country 
▼ ▼ from any we had before seen in Virginia. 
The roads were wide and good and the country 
well cultivated. No men were seen except those 
bearing arms, even the black man having been sent 
away. The country, however, was new to us, and 
we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where 
the roads were or where they led to. Engineer 
and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty 
of supplying the place of both maps and guides. 
By reconnoitering they were enabled to locate the 
roads in the vicinity of each army-corps. Our 
course was south, and we took all roads leading in 
that direction which would not separate the army 
too widely. 

v^^\^- n. Hancock, who had the lead, had marched easterly 
3*°' 2*1 to Guiney's Station on the Fredericksburg railroad, 
thence southerly to Bowling Green and Milford. 
He was at Milford by the night of the 21st. Here 
he met a detachment of Pickett's division coming 
from Richmond to reinforce Lee. They were speed- 

146 



MOVEMENT BY THE LEFT FLANK 147 

ily driven away and several hundred captured, chap, xii 
Warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and x:^^'(i) 
reached Guiney's Station that night without moles- ^ 
tation. Burnside and Wright were retained at 
Spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an in- 
tended assault, and to hold Lee, if possible, while 
Hancock and Warren should get start enough to 
interpose between him and Richmond. 

Lee had now a superb opportunity to take the oV^ortuMty 
initiative either by attacking Wright and Burnside 
alone, or by following by the Telegraph Eoad and 
striking Hancock's and Warren's corps, or even 
Hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come 
up. But he did not avail himself of either oppor- 
tunity. He seemed really to be misled as to my 
designs ; but moved by his interior line — the Tele- 
graph Road — to make sure of keeping between his 
capital and the Army of the Potomac. He never 
again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy 
blow. 

The evening of the 21st, Burnside, Ninth Corps, 
moved out, followed by Wright, Sixth Corps. Burn- ^^^ 
side was to take the Telegraph Road; but finding 
Stanard's Ford, over the Po, fortified and guarded, 
he turned east to the road taken by Hancock and 
Warren, without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. 
The night of the 21st I had my headquarters near 
the Sixth Corps, at Guiney's Station, and the 
enemy's cavalry was between us and Hancock. 
There was a slight attack on Burnside's and Wright's 
corps as they moved out of their lines ; but it was 
easily repulsed. The object, probably, was only to 
make sure that we were not lea^dng a force to fol- 
low upon the rear of the Confederates. 



W. R. 
XXXVI (V 



148 



PERSONAL, MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XII 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3) 

81 



By the morning of tlie 22d Burnside and Wright 
were at Guiney's Station. Hancock's corps had now 
been marching and fighting continuously for several 
days, not having had rest even at night much of the 
time. They were therefore permitted to rest during 
the 22d. But Warren was pushed to Harris's Store, 
directly west of Milford, and connected with it by 
a good road, and Biu'nside was sent to New Bethel 
Church. Wright's corps was still back at Guiney's 
Station. 

I issued the following order for the movement of 
the troops the next day : 

New Bethel, VmomiA, 

May 22, 1864. 
Major-General Meade, 

Commauding Ai-my of the Potomac : 

Direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readi- 
ness to march at 5 a.m. to-morrow. At that hour each 
command wiU send out cavahy and infantry on all roads 
to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, 
where the enemy is. If beyond the South Anna, the Fifth 
and Sixth corps will march to the forks of the road, where 
one branch leads to Beaver Dam Station, the other to 
Jericho Bridge, then south by roads reaching the Anna, as 
near to and east of Hawkins's Creek as they can be found. 

The Second Corps will move to Chesterfield Ford. The 
Ninth Corps wiU be directed to move at the same time to 
Jericho Bridge. The map only show^s two roads for the 
four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of 
plantation roads and pressing in guides, others can be 
found, to give one for each corps. 

The troops will foUow then- respective reconnoitering 
parties. The trains will be moved at the same time to 
Milford Station. 

Headquarters will foUow the Ninth Corps. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 



BATTLE OF THE NORTH ANNA 



149 



Warren's corps was moved from Harris's Store to 
Jericho Ford, Wright's following. Warren arrived 
at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock 
effected a crossing under the protection of sharp- 
shooters. The men had to w^ade in water up to 
their waists. As soon as enough troops were over 
to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artil- 
lery and the rest of the troops crossed. The line 
formed was almost perpendicular to the course Of 
the river — Crawford on the left, next to the river, 
Griffin in the center, and Cutler on the right. Lee 
was found intrenched along the front of their line. 
The whole of Hill's corps was sent against Warren's 
right before it had got in position. A brigade of 
Cutler's division was driven back, the enemy fol- 
lowing; but assistance coming up, the enemy was 
in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy 
loss in killed and wounded, with about five hun- 
dred prisoners left in our hands. By night Wright's 
corps was up ready to reinforce Warren. 

On the 23d Hancock's corps was ipoved to the 
wooden bridge which spans the North Anna River 
just west of where the Fredericksburg railroad 
crosses. It was near night when the troops arrived. 
They found the bridge guarded, with troops in- 
trenched, on the north side. Hancock sent two 
brigades, Egan's and Pierce's, to the right and left, 
and when properly disposed they charged simulta- 
neously. The bridge was carried quickly, the enemy 
retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved 
into the river, and some of them were drowned. 
Several hundi-ed prisoners were captured. The 
hour was so late that Hancock did not cross until 
next morning. 



Chap. XII 

W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

6r(3 



Ibid. 612 



Ibid. 341 



T. W. Egan, 

Lt.-Col. 40th 

N. Y. Jime 

14, 1861 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. Sept. 

3. 1864 

B. R. Pierce, 

Capt. 3d 

Mich. 1861 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. June", 

1864 



150 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP. XII Burnside's corps was moved by a middle road 

x:^vi' (1) I'unning between those described above, and which 

^^^ strikes the North Anna at Ox Ford, midway between 

Telegraph Road and Jericho Ford. The hour of its 

arrival was too late to cross that night. 

Ibid. 341 On the 24th Hancock's corps crossed to the south 
side of the river without opposition, and formed 
line facing nearly west. The railroad in rear was 
taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. 
Wright's corps crossed at Jericho early the same 
day, and took position to the right of Warren's 
corps, extending south of the Virginia Central rail- 
road. This road was torn up for a considerable dis- 
tance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the 
rails bent and twisted by heating them over the 

Ibid. 912 burning ties. It was found, however, that Burn- 
side's corps could not cross at Ox Ford. Lee had 
taken a position with his center on the river at this 
point, with the two wings thrown back, his line mak- 
ing an acute angle where it overlooked the river. 

Before the exact position of the whole of Lee's 
line was accurately known I directed Hancock and 
Warren each to send a brigade to Ox Ford by the 
south side of the river. They found the enemy too 
strong to justify a serious attack. A third ford was 
found between Ox Ford and Jericho. Burnside 
was directed to cross a division over this ford, and 
to send one division to Hancock. Crittenden was 
crossed by this newly discovered ford, and formed 
up the river to connect with Crawford's left. Pot- 
ter joined Hancock by way of the Wooden Bridge. 
Crittenden had a severe engagement with some of 
Hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost 
heavily. When joined to Warren's corps he was 



AN INCIDENT OF THE MAKCH 151 

no fui-ther molested. Burnside still guarded Ox chap, xii 
Ford from the north side. 

Lee now had his entire army south of the North 
Anna. Our lines covered his front, with the six 
miles separating the two wings guarded by but a 
single division. To get from one wing to the other 
the river would have to be crossed twice. Lee could 
reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in 
a very short march, or could concentrate the whole 
of it wherever he might choose to assault. We were, 
for the time, practically two armies besieging. 

Lee had been reinforced and was being rein- 
forced largely. About this time the very troops 
whose coming I had predicted had arrived or were 
coming in. Pickett with a full di^dsion from Rich- ^eu,'w!?' 
mond was up ; Hoke from North Carolina had come Mexl^o^ 
with a brie:ade : and Breckinridge was there — in all Brig.-Ge'n. 

„ „ ? ^ ^ J C. 8. A. Feb. 

probably not less than fifteen thousand men. But 1862; m^.- 

^ "^ Gen. Oct. 10, 

he did not attempt to drive us from the field. ^862 

On the 22d or 23d I received despatches from 
Washington sajdng that Sherman had taken Kings- mSSm^i, 
ton, crossed the Etowah River, and was advancing 
into Georgia. 

I was seated at the time on the porch of a fine 
plantation house waiting for Burnside's corps to 
pass. Meade and his staff, besides my own staff, 
were with me. The lady of the house, a Mrs. Tyler, 
and an elderly lady were present. Burnside, seeing 
us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber 
rattling as he walked. He touched his hat politely 
to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they 
had never seen so many " live Yankees " before in 
their lives. The elderly lady spoke up promptly, say- 
ing, " Oh yes, I have ; many more." " Where ? " said 



41-*3 



152 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XII Burnside. " lu Riclimond." Prisoners, of course, 
was understood. 

I read my despateli aloud, when it was received. 
This threw the younger lady into tears. I found 
the information she had received (and I suppose it 
was the information generally in circulation through 
the South) was that Lee was driving us from the 
State in the most demoralized condition, and that 
in the Southwest our troops were but little better 
than prisoners of war. Seeing our troops moving 
south was ocular proof that a part of her informa- 
tion was incorrect, and she asked me if my news 
from Sherman was true. I assured her that there 
was no doubt about it. I left a guard to protect the 
house from intrusion until the troops should have 
all passed, and assui'ed her that if her husband was 
in hiding she could bring him in and he should be 
protected also. But I ^iresume he was in the Con- 
federate army. 

v^vaIV /. . ^11 the 25th I gave orders, through Halleck, to 
Hunter, who had relieved Sigel, to move up the 
Valley of Virginia, cross over the Blue Eidge to 
Charlottesville, and go as far as Lynchburg, if pos- 
sible, living upon the country and cutting the rail- 
roads and canal as he went. After doing this he 
could find his way back to his base, or join me. 

On the same day news was received that Lee 
was falling back on Eichmond. This proved not to 
be true. But we could do nothing where we were 
unless Lee would assume the offensive. I deter- 
mined, therefore, to draw out of our present posi- 
tion and make one more effort to get between him 
and Eichmond. I had no expectation now, however, 
of succeeding in this ; but I did expect to hold him 



183 



POSITIONS OF THE ARMIES 



153 



far enougli west to enable me to reach the James 
River high up. Sheridan was now again with the 
Army of the Potomac. 

On the 26th I informed the government at Wash- 
ington of the position of the two armies ; of the re- 
inforcements the enemy had received ; of the move 
I proposed to make ;^ and directed that om- base of 



Chap. XII 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3) 

206 



1 QuARLEs's Mills, Virginia, 
May 26, 1864. 
Major-General Halleck, 
Washington, D. C. : 

The relative position of the two 
armies is now as follows : Lee's 
right rests on a swamp east of the 
Richmond and Fredericksburg 
road and south of the North 
Anna, his center on the river at 
Ox Ford, and his left at Little 
River, with the crossings of Little 
River guarded as far up as we 
have gone. Hancock with his 
corps and one division of the 
Ninth Corps crossed at Chester- 
field Ford and covers the right 
wing of Lee's armj-. One division 
of the Ninth Corps is on the north 
bank of the Anna at Ox Ford, 
with bridges above and below at 
points nearest to it where both 
banks are held by us, so that it 
could reinforce either wing of 
our army with equal facility. 
The Fifth and Sixth corps, with 
one di^asion of the Ninth Corps, 
run from the soutli bank of the 
Anna from a sliort distance above 
Ox Ford to Little River, and par- 
allel with and near to the enemy. 
To make a direct attack from 
either wing would cause a slaugh- 
ter of our men that even success 
would not justify. To tm-n the 
enemy by his right, between the 
two Annas, is impossible on ac- 
count of the swamp upon which 



his right rests. To turn him by 
the left leaves Little River, New 
Found River, and South Anna 
River — all of them streams pre- 
senting considerable obstacles to 
the movement of our army — to 
be crossed. I have determined, 
therefore, to turn the enemy's 
right by crossing at or near 
Hanover Town. This crosses all 
three streams at once, and leaves 
lis still where we can draw sup- 
plies. 

During the last night the teams 
and artillery not in position, 
belonging to the right wing of 
our army, and one division of 
that wing, were quietly with- 
drawn to the north bank of the 
river and moved down to the 
rear of the left. As soon as it 
is dark this division, with most 
of the cavalry, will commence a 
forced march for Hanover Town, 
to seize and hold the crossings. 
The balance of the right wing 
will withdraw at the same liour, 
and follow as rapidly as possible. 
The left wing will also withdraw 
from the soiitli bank of the river 
to-night and follow in rear of the 
right wing. 

Lee's army is really whipped. 
The prisoners we now take show 
it, and the action of his army 
shows it unmistakably. A battle 
with them outside of intrench- 
ments cannot be had. Oui- men 



154 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap, xn supplies should be shifted to White House, on the 
Pamunkey. The wagou-train and guards moved 
directly from Port Royal to White House. Sup- 
plies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. 
xxxvi (3) Orders had previously been sent, through Halleck, 
77,183 £^j^ Butler to send Smith's corps to White House. 
This order was repeated on the 25th, with direc- 
tions that they should be landed on the north side 
of the Pamunkey, and marched until they joined 
the Army of the Potomac. 

It was a delicate move to get the right wing of 
the Army of the Potomac from its position south 
of the North Anna in the presence of the enemy. 
Ibid. 183 To accomplish it I issued the following order: 

QuARLES's Mills, Virginia, 
May 25, 1864. 
Major-General Meade, 
Commanding A. P. : 
Direct Generals Warren and Wright to withdraw all 
their teams and artUlery not in position to the north side 
of the river to-morrow. Send that belonging to General 
Wright's corps as far on the road to Hanover Town as it 

feel that they have gained the track they will have to import 

morale over the enemy, and at- rail from elsewhere. 

tack him with confidence. I may Even if a crossing is not effected 

be mistaken, but I feel that at Hanover Town, it will proba- 

our success over Lee's army is bly be necessary for us to move 

already assured. The prompt- on down the Pamunkey until a 

ness and rapidity with which you crossing is effected. I think it 

have forwarded reinforcements advisable, therefore, to change 

has contributed largely to the our base of supplies from Port 

feeling of confidence inspired in Royal to the White House. I 

our men, and to break down that wish you would direct this change 

of the enemy. at once, and also direct Smith to 

We are destroying all the rails put the railroad-bridge there in 

we can on the Central and Fred- condition for crossing troops and 

ericksburg roads. I want to leave artillery, and leave men to hold it. 

a gap on the roads north of Rich- U. S. Grant, 

mond so big that to get a single Lieutenant-General. 



MOVING ON RICHMOND 155 

can go, without attracting attention to the fact. Send with chap, xn 
it Wright's best division or division under his ablest com- 
mander. Have their places filled up in the line so, if pos- 
sible, the enemy will not notice then* withdi-awal. Send 
the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you 
may deem necessary, to watch, and seize if they can, Little- 
page's Bridge and Taylor's Ford, and to remain on one or 
other side of the river at these points rmtil the infantry and 
artillery all pass. As soon as it is dark to-mon-ow night 
start the di\-ision which you withdraw first from Wright's 
corps to make a forced march to Hanover Town, taking 
with them no teams to impede their march. At the same 
time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 
Fifth and Sixth corps from the south side of the river, and 
march them for the same place. The two divisions of the 
Ninth Corps not now with Hancock may be moved down 
the north bank of the river, where they wiU be handy to 
support Hancock if necessary, or will be that much on 
their road to follow the Fifth and Sixth corps. Hancock 
should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as 
the wa}^ is clear for him. To-morrow it will leave noth- 
ing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all 
his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which 
he will have to take. As soon as the troops reach Han- 
over Town they should get possession of all the crossings 
they can in that neighborhood. I think it would be well 
to make a heavy cavahy demonstration on the enemy's 
left to-morrow afternoon, also. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Wilson's di\dsion of cavalry was brought up from 
the left and moved by om* right south to Little 
River. Here he manoeuvered to give the impression 
that we were going to attack the left flank of Lee's 
army. 

Under cover of night our right wing was with- 
drawn to the north side of the river, Lee being com- 



156 PEESONAI. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap, xu pletely deceived by Wilson's feint. On the afternoon 
of the 26th Sheridan moved, sending Gregg's and 
Torbei't's cavahy to Taylor's and Littlepage's fords 
xxk\i (1) toward Hanover. As soon as it was dark both divi- 
'^^ sions moved quietly to Hanover ferry, leaving small 
guards behind to keep up the impression that cross- 
. ings were to be attempted in the morning. Sheri- 
dan was followed by a division of infantry under 
DA.Russeii, General Russell. On the morning of the 27th the 

W .r. 1841-40, <-' 

isitTbhr.- crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy 
j^Tw,i862; losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. Thus a posi- 
septJ'w "i864 tion was secui^ed south of the Pamunkey. 

Russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry 
Ba?ringer P^^''^lied ou to Hauovcr Towu. Hcrc Barringer's, 
■^c!^s] A^.°' formerly Gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was 
encountered, but it was speedily driven away. 

Warren's and Wright's corps were moved by the 
rear of Burnside's and Hancock's corps. Wlien out 
of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pick- 
ets confronting the enemy. Wilson's cavalry fol- 
lowed last, watching all the fords until everything 
had recrossed; then, taking up the pontoons and 
destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. 

Two roads were traversed by the troops in this 
move. The one nearest to and north of the North 
Anna and Pamunkey was taken by Wright, fol- 
lowed by Hancock. Warren, followed by Burnside, 
moved by a road farther north, and longer. The 
trains moved by a road still farther north, and had 
to travel a still greater distance. All the troops that 
had crossed the Pamunkey on the morning of the 
May, 1864 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, 
while the troops north of that stream marched to 
reach the crossing that had been secured for them. 




FIELD OF OPERATIONS 

BETWEEN THE 

i^ V PAMUNKEY ^^D THE JAMES RIVERS. 






^l^aiio?/al 2'orce3. 










' / ^yitJ*»«57^ 




ki^castle^^y\ 






\ 







7icM^ 










rP^' 



SOUTH OF THE PAMUNKEY 157 

Lee had evidently been deceived by our move- chap, xii 
nient from North Anna ; for on the morning of the 
27th he telegraphed to Richmond : " Enemy crossed 
to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at xx':j^i% 
Hanover Town." The troops that had then crossed ^^^ 
left his front the night of the 25th. 

The comitry we were now in was a difificiilt one 
to move troops over. The streams were numerons, 
deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into 
swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of 
trees and underbrush. The banks were generally 
low and marshy, making the streams difficult to ap- 
proach except where there were roads and bridges. 

Hanover Town is about twenty miles from Rich- Topography 
mond. There are two roads leading there ; the most 
direct and shortest one crossing the Chickahominy 
at Meadow Bridge, near the Virginia Central rail- 
road, the second going by New and Old Cold Har- 
bor. A few miles out from Hanover Town there 
is a third road by way of Mechanicsville to Rich- 
mond. New Cold Harbor was important to us be- 
cause while there we both covered the roads back to 
White House (where our supplies came from), and 
the roads southeast over which we would have to 
pass to get to the James River below the Richmond 
defenses. 

On the morning of the 28th the army made an w.k. 
early start, and by noon all had crossed except 343,543,913 
Burnside's corps. This was left on the north side 
temporarily to guard the large wagon-train. A line 
was at once formed extending south from the river, 
Wright's corps on the right, Hancock's in the center, 
and Warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy 
if he should come. 



158 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT 

CHAP.xn At the same time Sheridan was directed to recon- 

xA'vi'o) iioiter toward Mechanicsville to find Lee's position. 
^''^ At Hawes's Shop, just where the middle road leaves 
the direct road to Richmond, he encountered the 
Confederate cavalry dismounted and partially in- 
trenched. Gregg attacked with his division, but 

xxkYia) w^s unable to move the enemy. In the evening 
821, 854 Quster came up with a brigade. The attack was 
now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charg- 
ing as infantry. This time the assault was success- 
ful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. 
But our troops had to bury the dead, and found 
that more Confederate than Union soldiers had been 
killed. The position was easily held, because oui- 
infantry was near. 

Ibid. 343, 543, On the 29th a reconnaissance was made in force, 

•7X0 

to find the position of Lee. Wright's corps pushed 
to Hanover Court House. Hancock's corps pushed 
toward Totopotomoy Creek ; Warren's corps to the 
left on the Shady C-rove Church road ; while Burn- 
side was held in reserve. Our advance was pushed 
forward three miles on the left with but little fight- 
ing. There was now an appearance of a move- 
ment past our left flank, and Sheridan was sent to 
meet it. 
May, 1864 On the 30th Hancock moved to the Totopoto- 
moy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. 
Wright was moved to the right of Hancock's corps, 
and Burnside was brought forward and crossed, 
taking position to the left of Hancock. Warren 
moved up near Huntley Corners on the Shady Grove 
Church road. There was some skirmishing along 
the center, and in the evening Early attacked War- 
ren with some vigor, dri^dng him back at fir^, and 



INSTRUCTIONS TO MEADE 



159 



threatening to turn our left flank. As the best 
means of reinforcing the left, Hancock was ordered 
to attack in his front. He carried and held the 
rifle-pits. While this was going on Warren got his 
men up, repulsed Early, and drove him more than 
a mile. 

On this day I wrote to Halleck ordering all the 
pontoons in Washington to be sent to City Point. 
In the evening news was received of the arrival of 
Smith with his corps at White House. I notified 
Meade, in writing, as follows : 

Near Hawes's Shop, VmoiNiA, 

6 : 40 P.M., May 30, 1864. 
Major-General Meade, 
Commanding A. P. : 

General Smith will debark his force at the White House 
to-night and start up the south bank of the Pamunkey at 
an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. It is 
not improbable that the enemy, being aware of Smith's 
movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the 
purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and 
get back before we are aware of it. Sheridan ought to 
be notified to watch the enemy's movements weU out 
toward Cold Harbor, and also on the MechanicsviUe 
road. Wright should be got well massed on Hancock's 
right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place 
of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east 
of the Totopotomoy if necessary. 

I want Sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half 
a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 o'clock in the morn- 
ing, to communicate with Smith and to return with him. 
I wiU send orders for Smith by the messenger you send to 
Sheridan with his orders. 

U. S. Grant. 



Chap. XII 



W. R. 

XXXVI (1) 

343 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3) 

322 



Ibid. 323 



I also notified Smith of his danger and the pre- 
cautions that would be taken to protect him. 



Ibid. 371 



Culpeper "/"^i^ 

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ordonsville. 






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•.Si „ lVJleT.i :•, Newcastle^ Kmg^yuesjs. 



TheKilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid 
Sheridan's Richmond Raid 

Sheridan's Trevilian'sRaid 



Drewrys Bl\^f 



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./Charles 
,^ ->■■? City CH. 

^ -"'■'^Ji^'rkiurs^-^'-- George C.R 
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BATTLES© 



Sc*i.e~ 



=)15M1LC5 




POSITION OF THE NATIONAL ARMY 



161 



The night of the 30th Lee's position was substan- 
tially from Atlee's Station on the Virginia Central 
railroad south and east to the vicinity of Cold Har- 
bor. Ours was : The left of Warren's corps was on 
the Shady Grove road, extending to the Mechanics- 
ville road and about three miles south of the Toto- 
potomoy ; Burnside to his right, then Hancock, and 
Wright on the extreme right, extending toward 
Hanover Court House, six miles southeast of it. 
Sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watch- 
ing our left front toward Cold Harbor. Wilson with 
his division on oiu- right was sent to get on the Vir- 
ginia Central railroad and destroy it as far back 
as possible. He got possession of Hanover Court 
House the next day after a skirmish with Young's 
cavalry brigade. The enemy attacked Sheridan's 
pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the 
attack was speedily repulsed, and the enemy fol- 
lowed some distance toward Cold Harbor. 



Chap. XII 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

872, 873 



P. M. B. 

Young, 

Maj.-Gen. 

C. 8. A. 

Dec. 12, 1864 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

782 



Vol. II.— 11 



CHAPTER XIII 

ADVANCE ON COLD HAEBOE — AN ANECDOTE OF THE 
WAE — BATTLE OF COLD HAEBOE — COEEESPOND- 
ENCE WITH LEE — EETEOSPECTIVE 



Chap. XIII 

W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

783 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3) 

404 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

783 



ON the 31st Sheridan advanced to near Old 
Cold Harbor. He fonnd it intrenched and 
occupied by cavalry and infantry. A hard fight 
ensued, but the place was carried. The enemy well 
knew the importance of Cold Harbor to us, and 
seemed determined that we should not hold it. He 
retm-ned with such a large force that Sheridan was 
about withdi-awing without making any effort to 
hold it against such odds ; but about the time he 
commenced the evacuation he received orders to 
hold the place at all hazards until reinforcements 
could be sent to him. He speedily turned the rebel 
works to face against them and placed his men in 
position for defense. Night came on before the 
enemy was ready for assault. 

Wright's corps was ordered early in the evening 
to march directly to Cold Harbor, passing by the 
rear of the army. It was expected to arrive by 
daylight or before ; but the night was dark and the 
distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st 
of June before it reached its destination. Before 
the arrival of Wright the enemy had made two as- 

162 



ADVANCE ON COLD HAEBOE 



163 



466 



Ibid. 371 



saults on Sheridan, both of which were repulsed chap.xiii 
with heavy loss to the enemy. Wright's corps com- 
ing- up, there was no further assault on Cold Harbor. 

Smith, who was coming up from White House, xxxyio) 
was also directed to march directly to Cold Har- 
bor, and was expected early on the morning of the 
1st of June ; but by some blunder the order which 
reached Smith directed him to New Castle instead of 
Cold Harbor. Through this blunder Smith did not 
reach his destination until three o'clock in the after- 
noon, and then with tired and worn-out men from 
their long and dusty march. He landed twelve 
thousand five hundred men from Butler's command, 
but a division was left at White House temporarily 
and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long 
march. 

Before the removal of Wright's corps from our 
right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, Federal 
and Confederate, were so close together at that point 
that either side could detect directly any movement 
made by the other. Finding at daylight that Wright 
had left his front, Lee evidently divined that he had 
gone to our left. At all events, soon after light on 
the 1st of June, Anderson, who commanded the 
corps on Lee's left, was seen moving along War- 
ren's front. Warren was ordered to attack him 
vigorously in flank, while Wright was directed to 
move out and get on his front. Warren fired his 
artillery at the enemy, but lost so much time in 
making ready that the enemy got by ; and at three 
o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly in- 
trenched in his front, and, besides, his lines were so 
long that he had no mass of troops to move with. 
He seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of 



Ibid. 448 



164 



PERSONiVL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

543 



Chap, xm ail ai'iny hold themselves while their defenders are 
fighting in their front. Wright reconnoitered some 
distance to his front ; but the enemy, finding Old 
Cold Harbor already taken, had halted and fortified 
some distance west. 

By six o'clock in the afternoon Wright and Smith 
were ready to make an assault. In front of both 
the ground was clear for several hundred yards, 
and then became wooded. Both charged across 
this open space and into the wood, capturing and 
holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and 
also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. 

While this was going on the enemy charged 
Warren three separate times with vigor, but was 
repulsed each time with loss. There was no officer 
more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than 
Warren when the enemy forced him to it. There 
was also an attack upon Hancock's and Burnside's 
corps at the same time ; but it was feeble and prob- 
ably only intended to relieve Anderson, who was 
being pressed by Wright and Smith. 

During the night the enemy made frequent at- 
tacks with the view of dispossessing us of the impor- 
tant position we had gained, but without effecting 
his object. 

Hancock was moved from his place in line dur- 
ing the night and ordered to the left of Wright. I 
expected to take the offensive on the morning of 
the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust 
so excessive, and the roads so intricate and hard 
to keep, that the head of the column only reached 
Old Cold Harbor at six o'clock, but was in position 
at 7 : 30 A.M. Preparations were made for an attack 
in the afternoon, but it did not take place until the 



Ibid. 344 



A WAK ANECDOTE 165 

next morning. Warren's corps was moved to the chap.xhi 
left to connect with Smith ; Hancock's corps was got 
into position to the left of Wright's ; and Burnside 
was moved to Bethesda Church in reserve. While 
Warren and Burnside were making these changes xxxvi(i) 
the enemy came out several times and attacked 5«, 544, 913, 
them, capturing several hundred prisoners. The 
attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they 
should have been. I was so annoyed at this that 
I directed Meade to instruct his corps commanders 
that they should seize all such opportunities when 
they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of om- 
manoeuvers being made for the very pm-pose of 
getting the enemy out of his cover. 

On this day Wilson returned from his raid upon 
the Virginia Central raih'oad, ha\dng damaged it 
considerably. But, like om-selves, the rebels had be- 
come experts in repairing such damage. Sherman, 
in his Memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign voi.ii.p.m 
to Atlanta that well illustrates this point. The 
rebel cavalry, lurking in his rear to burn bridges 
and obstruct his communications, had become so 
disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within 
a few hours after a bridge had been burned that 
they proposed to try blowing up some of the tun- 
nels. One of them said, " No use, boys ; old Sher- 
man carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will re- 
place them as fast as you can blow them up ; better 
save your powder." 

Sheridan was engaged reconnoitering the banks 
of the Chickahominy, to find crossings and the con- 
dition of the roads. He reported favorably. 

During the night Lee moved his left up to make 
his line correspond to oui^s. His lines extended 



1G6 



PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 



W.R. 
XXXVI (3) 

626 



CHAP. XIII now from the Totopotomoy to New Cold Harbor ; 
mine from Bethesda Church by Old Cold Harbor 
to the Chickahomiuy, with a division of cavalry 
guarding our right. An assault was ordered for 
the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of Hancock, 
Wright, and Smith ; but Warren and Burnside were 
to support it by threatening Lee's left, and to attack 
with great earnestness either if he should reinforce 
more threatened points by drawing from that quar- 
ter, or if a favorable opportunity shoidd present 
itself.^ 

The corps commanders v/ere to select the points 
in their respective fronts where they would make 
their assaults. The move was to commence at half- 
past four in the morning. Hancock sent Barlow 

369,432,433 ^^^ Glbbou forward at the appointed hour, with 
Birney as a reserve. Barlow pushed forward with 
great vigor, under a heavy tire of both artillery 
and musketry, through thickets and swamps. Not- 
withstanding all the resistance of the enemy and 
the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a 
position occupied by the enemy outside their main 
line, where the road makes a deep cut through a 
bank, affording as good a shelter for troops as if it 
had been made for that purpose. Three pieces of 
artillery had been captured here, and several hun- 
dred prisoners. The guns were immediately turned 
against the men who had just been using them. No 



W.R. 
XXXVI 

(1) 344, 345, 



W.R. 
XXXVI (3) 

526 



1 Near Cold Harbor, 

June 3, 1864, 7 a.m. 

Major-General Meade,' 

Commanding A. P. : 

The moment it becomes certain 
that an assault cannot succeed, 
suspend the offensive ; but when 



one does succeed, push it vigor- 
ously, and if necessary pile in 
troops at the successful point 
from wherever they can be taken. 
I shall go to where you are in the 
course of an hour. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 



BATTLE OF COLD HAKBOR 



167 



assistance coming to liim, he (Barlow) intrenclied 
under fire and continued to hold his place. Gibbon 
was not so fortunate in his front. He found the 
ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep 
ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. But his 
men struggled on until some of them got up to the 
very parapet covering the enemy. Gibbon gained 
ground much nearer the enemy than that which he 
left, and here he intrenched and held fast. 

Wright's corps, moving in two lines, captui*ed the 
outer rifle-pits in its front, but accomplished noth- 
ing more. Smith's corps also gained the outer rifle- 
pits in its front. The ground over which this corps 
(Eighteenth) had to move was the most exposed of 
any over which charges were made. An open plain 
intervened between the contending forces at this 
point, which was exposed both to a direct and a 
cross fire. Smith, however, finding a ravine run- 
ning toward his front, sufficiently deep to protect 
men in it from cross-fire, and somewhat from a 
direct fire, put Martindale's division in it, and, with 
Brooks supporting him on the left and Devens on 
the right, succeeded in gaining the outer — probably 
picket — rifle-pits. Warren and Burnside also ad- 
vanced and gained ground — which brought the 
whole army on one line. 

This assault cost us heavily, and probably with- 
out benefit to compensate ; but the enemy was not 
cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him 
to take the offensive. In fact, nowhere after the 
battle of the Wilderness did Lee show any disposi- 
tion to leave his defenses far behind him. 

Fighting was substantially over by half -past seven 
in the morning. At eleven o'clock I started to visit 



Chap. XIII 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

1002-1005 



J.H.Martin- 
dale 

W. T. H. 
Broofes 

Chas. De- 
vens 



W.E. 
XXXVI (1) 

544, 914 



168 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XIII all the corps commanders to see for myseK the dif- 
ferent positions gained, and to get their opinion of 
the practicability of doing anything more in their 
respective fronts. 

Hancock gave the opinion that in his front the 
enemy was too strong to make any further assault 
promise success. "Wright thought he could gain 
the lines of the enemy, but it would require the co- 
operation of Hancock's and Smith's corps. Smith 
thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine. 
Burnside thought something could be done in his 
front, but Warren differed. I concluded, therefore, 
to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve 
directed in the following letter that all offensive 
action should cease. 

Cold Harbor, June 3, 1864, 12 : 30 p.m. 
Major-General Meade, 
Commanding A. P. : 
w. R. The opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine 

526 of success in case an assault is ordered, you may du-ect a 
suspension of further advance for the present. Hold our 
most advanced positions and strengthen them. Whilst on 
the defensive our line may be contracted from the right 
if practicable. Reconnaissances should be made in front 
of every corps, and advances made to advantageous posi- 
tions by regular approaches. To aid the expedition under 
General Hunter it is necessary that we should detain all 
the army now with Lee until the former gets well on his 
way to Lynchburg. To do this effectually it will be better 
to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of Richmond 
than to have them go back there. 

Wright and Hancock should be ready to assault in case 
the enemy should break through General Smith's hues, and 
all should be ready to resist an assault. 

U. S. Grant, 
lAeutenant- General. 



h:i -r ri 















^1 i r f^arfte^^::-^.^=.^ 







GENERAL GRANT AND STAFF AT BETHESDA CHrRCH. GENERAL GRANT IS SITTING WITH HIS BACK 
TO THE SMALLER TREE. (FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.) 



COKRESPONDENCE WITH LEE 



169 



The remainder of the day was spent in strength- 
ening the line we now held. By night we were as 
strong against Lee as he was against us. 

During the night the enemy quitted our right 
front, abandoning some of his wounded, and with- 
out burying his dead. These we were able to care 
for. But there were many dead and wounded men 
between the lines of the contending forces, which 
were now close together, who could not be cared 
for without a cessation of hostilities. 

So I wrote the following : 

Cold Harbor, Virginia, 

June 5, 1864. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate Ai-my : 
It is reported to me that there are wounded men, prob- 
ably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering be- 
tween the Unes occupied respectively by the two armies. 
Humanity would dictate that some provision should be 
made to provide against such hardships. I would propose, 
therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either 
party be authorized to send to any point between the 
pickets or skirmish-lines unarmed men bearing litters to 
pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon 
by the other party. Any other method, equally fair to 
both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired 

wiU be accepted by me. 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 



Chap. XIII 



W.R. 
XXXVI (3) 

600 



Lee replied that he feared such an arrange- 
ment would lead to misunderstanding, and pro- 
posed that in future, when either party wished 
to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of 
truce be sent. I answered this immediately by 
saying : 



Ibid. 



170 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XIII 



"VV. R. 

XXXVI (3) 

638 



Cold Harbor, Virginia, 

June 6, 1864. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Army of Northern Virginia : 

Your communication of j^esterday's date is received. I 
will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead 
and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and 
vn.]l also instruct that j-ou be allowed to do the same. I 
propose that the time for doing this be between the hom-s 
of 12 M. and 3 p.m. to-day. I will direct all parties going 
out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond 
where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on 
ground occupied by your troops. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieu ten an t- Genera I. 



Ibid. Lee's response was that he could not consent to 

the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded 
in the way I proposed, but when either party desired 
such permission it should be asked for by flag of 
truce ; and he had directed that any parties I might 
have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, be turned 
back. I answered : 



Cold Harbor, Virginia, 

June 6, 1864. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Army Northern Virginia : 

Ibid. The knowledge that wounded men are now suffering 

from want of attention, Ijetween the two armies, compels 
me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to 
collect them in — say two hours. Permit me to say that 
the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to 
me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties 
as you may wish to send out on the same duty without 
further application. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General 



COKKESPONDENCE WITH LEE 171 

Lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting chap.xui 
the correspondence brought it to the 7th of June x^vi'o) 
— forty-eight hours after it commenced — before 
parties were got out to collect the men left upon 
the field. In the mean time all but two of the 
wounded had died. And I wi'ote to Lee: 

Cold Harbor, ViRGmiA, 
June 7, 1864, 10 : 30 a.m. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Army of Northern Virginia : 

I regret that yonr note of 7 p.m. yesterday shoidd have ibid. 666 
been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where 
it was delivered, after the horn- which had been given for 
the removal of the dead and wounded had expired ; 10 : 45 
P.M. was the hour at which it was received at corps head- 
quarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my 
headquarters. As a consequence, it was not understood 
by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of 
hostilities for the purpose of coUecting the dead and 
wounded, and none were collected. Two officers and six 
men of the Eighth and Twenty-fifth North Carolina Regi- 
ments, who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their 
respective regiments, were captiu'ed and brought into our 
lines, owing to this want of understanding. I regret this, 
but will state that as soon as I learned the fact I directed 
that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be re- 
turned to their commands. These officers and men having 
been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear, I have 
determined whether they will be sent back the way they 
came, or whether they wiU be sent by some other route. 

Regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the suffer- 
ings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been 

rendered nugatory, I remain, etc., 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

I have always regretted that the last assault at -me last as- 
Cold Harbor was ever made. I might say the same Harbor 



172 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT . 

Chap. XIII tiling of the assault of the 22d of May, 1863, at 
Vicksbui'g. At Cold Harbor no advantage what- 
ever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss 
we sustained. Indeed, the advantages other than 
those of relative losses were on the Confederate 
side. Before that the Army of Northern Virginia 
seemed to nave acquired a wholesome regard for 
the coui"age, endurance, and soldierly quahties gen- 
erally of the Army of the Potomac. They no longer 
wanted to fight them "one Confederate to five 
Yanks." Indeed, they seemed to have given up 
any idea of gaining any advantage of their antago- 
nist in the open field. They had come to much pre- 
fer breastworks in their front to the Army of the 
Potomac. This charge seemed to revive their hopes 
temporarily; but it was of short duration. The 
effect upon the Army of the Potomac was the re- 
verse. When we reached the James River, how- 
ever, aU. effects of the battle of Cold Harbor seemed 
to have disappeared, 
'''onvick^* There was more justification for the assault at 
burg^,May22, Yic]jg]3^i.g^ ^^q wbyg iR a Southcrii climatc, at the 

beginning of the hot season. The Army of the Ten- 
nessee had won five successive victories over the 
garrison of Vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. 
They had driven a portion of that army from Port 
Gribson with considerable loss, after having flanked 
them out of their stronghold at Grand Gulf. They 
had attacked another portion of the same army at 
Raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the in- 
terior of the State, and driven them back into Jack- 
son with great loss in killed, wounded, captm'ed, and 
missing, besides loss of large and small arms. They 
had captm-ed the capital of the State of Mississippi, 



KETROSPECT 173 

with a large amount of materials of war and manu- chap, xiii 
factures. Only a few days before, they had beaten 
the enemy, then penned up in the town, first at 
Champion's Hill, next at Big Black River Bridge, 
inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or 
more men (including those cut oif from returning), 
besides large losses in arms and ammunition. The 
Army of the Tennessee had come to believe that 
they could beat their antagonist under any circum- 
stances. There was no telling how long a regular 
siege might last. As I have stated, it was the be- 
ginning of the hot season in a Southern climate. 
There was no telling what the casualties might be 
among Northern troops working and li\ing in 
trenches, drinking surface-water filtered through 
rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. If Yicksburg 
could have been carried in May it would not only 
have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater 
danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it 
would have given us a splendid army, well equipped 
and officered, to operate elsewhere with. These are 
reasons justifying the assault. The only benefit we 
gained — and it was a slight one for so great a sac- 
rifice — was that the men worked cheerfully in the 
trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the 
enemy out. Had. the assault not been made I have 
no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the 
siege of Vicksburg would have believed that had 
we assaulted it would have proven successful, and 
would have saved life, health, and comfort. 



CHAPTER XIV 

LEFT- FLANK MOVEMENT ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY 
AND JAMES — GENERAL LEE — VISIT TO BUTLER — 
THE MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG — THE INVEST- 
MENT OF PETERSBURG 



Chap. XIV 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3) 

598 



LEE'S position was now so near Richmond, and 
the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy 
so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in 
the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my 
next left-flank move carry the Army of the Potomac 
south of the James River.^ Preparations for this 



1 Cold Harbor, 

June 5, 1864. 
Major-General, Halleck, 

Chief of Staff of the Army, 
Washington, D. C. : 

A full survey of all the ground 
satisfies me that it would be im- 
practicable to hold a line north- 
east of Richmond that would pro- 
tect the Fredericksburg railroad, 
to enable us to use that road for 
supplying the army. To do so 
would give us a long vulnerable 
line of road to protect, exhausting 
much of our strength to guard it, 
and would leave open to the 
enemy all of his lines of com- 
munication on the south side of 
the James. My idea from the 
start has been to beat Lee's army, 
if possible, north of Richmond; 



then, after destroying his lines of 
communication on the north side 
of the James River, to transfer 
the army to the south side and 
besiege Lee in Richmond, or fol- 
low him south if he should re- 
treat. 

I now find, after over thirty 
days of trial, the enemy deems 
it of the first importance to run 
no risks with the armies they now 
have. They act purely on the 
defensive behind breastworks, or 
feebly on the offensive immedi- 
ately in front of them, and where 
in case of repulse they can in- 
stjmtly retire beliind them. With- 
out a greater sacrifice of human 
life than I am willing to make, all 
cannot be accomplished that I 
had designed outside of the city. 



174 



ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 175 

were promptly commenced. The move was a haz- chap.xiv 
ardous one to make : the Chickahominy River, with 
its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to 
be crossed ; all the bridges over it east of Lee were 
destroyed ; the enemy had a shorter line and better 
roads to travel on to confront me in crossing ; more 
than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler, 
by the roads I should have to travel, with both the 
James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; 
and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got 
out of a position but a few hundred yards from the 
enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose 
to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to 
travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy and 
the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him 
before the army with me could come to his relief. 
Then, too, he might spare troops enough to send 

I have therefore resolved upon Ouce on the south side of the 
the following plan : James River, I can cut off all 
I will continue to hold substan- soiu'ces of supply to the enemy 
tially the ground now occupied by except what is furnished by the 
the Army of the Potomac, taking canal. If Hunter succeeds in 
advantage of any favorable cir- reaching Lynchburg, that will be 
cumstance that may present it- lost to him also. Should Hunter 
self, until the cavalry can be not succeed, I will still make the 
sent west to destroy the Vir- effort to destroy the canal by 
giuia Central railroad from about sending cavalry up the south side 
Beaver Dam for some twenty-five of the river with a pontoon-train 
or thirty miles west. When this to cross wherever they can. 
is effected I will move the army The feeling of the two armies 
to the south side of the James now seems to be that the rebels 
River, either by crossing the can protect themselves only by 
Chickahominy and marching near strong intrenchraents, whilst our 
to City Point, or by going to the army is not only confident of pro- 
mouth of the Chickahominy on tecting itself without intrench- 
north side and crossing there, ments, but that it can beat and 
To pi'ovide for this last and drive the enemy wherever and 
most possible contingency, sev- whenever he can be found with- 
eral ferry-boats of the largest out this protection, 
class ought to be immediately U. S. Grant, 
provided. Lieutenant- General. 



17G PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIV agaiiist Huiitei', who was approaching Lynchburg, 
Hving upon the country he passed through, and 
without ammunition further than what he carried 
with him. 

But the move had to be made, and I rehed upon 
Lee's not seeing my danger as I saw it. Besides, we 
had armies on both sides of the James River and 
not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that 
its safety would be a matter of the first considera- 
tion with the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches of the so-called Confederate government, 
if it was not with the military commanders. But I 
took all the precaution I knew of to guard against 
all dangers. 

Grant to Shcridau was sent with two divisions to com- 

Meade.W.B. 

sS^Meade Hiunicate with Hunter and to break up the Virginia 

mKsIe^g Central railroad and the James Eiver Canal, on the 

7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come 

back with him.^ Hunter was also informed by way 

1 Cold Harbor, Virginia, for a single day. But that point 
June 6, 1864. is of so much importance to the 
Major-General D. Hunter, enemy that in attempting to get 
Commanding Department of it such resistance may be met as 
West Virginia : to defeat your getting on to the 
W.R. General Sheridan leaves here road or canal at all. I see, in 
598 to-morrow morning, with instruc- looking over the letter to General 
tions toproceed to Charlottesville, Halleek on the subject of your in- 
Virginia, and to commence there structions, that it rather indicates 
the destruction of the Virginia that your route should be from 
Central railroad, destroying this Staunton via Charlottesville. If 
way as much as possible. The you have so understood it, you 
complete destruction of this road will be doing just what I want, 
and of the canal on James River is The direction I would now give 
of great importance to us. Accord- is that if this letter reaches you 
ing to the instructions I sent to in the valley between Staunton 
General Halleek for your gui- and Lynchburg, you immediately 
dance, you were to proceed to turn east by the most practicable 
Lynchburg and commence there, road until you strike the Lynch- 
It would be of great value to us burg branch of the Virginia Cen- 
to get possession of Lynchburg tralroad. From thence moveeast- 



ACEOSS THE CHICI^HOMINY AND JAMES 177 

of Wasliiugtou aud the Valley that Sheridan was on chap, xiv 
the way to meet hhn. The canal and Central road, 
and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast 
importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying 
a large per cent of all the supplies for the Ai-my 
of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. 
Before Sheridan got off on the 7th news was re- xxxViiu) 
ceived from Hunter reporting his advance to Staun- 
ton and successful engagement with the enemy near 
that place on the 5th, in which the Confederate 
commander, W. E. Jones, was killed. On the 4th ^:|:i^^f|.' 
of June, the enemy having withdrawn his left cal'.6llt.2i 
corps, Burnside, on our right, was moved up be- Gen.'asS. 
tween Warren and Smith. On the 5tli Birney re- Maj.-den. ' 

1863 

turned to Hancock, which extended his left now to 
the Chickahominy, and Warren was withdrawn to 
Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send two 
divisions to the left to extend down the banks 
to that stream to Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry 
extended still farther east to Jones's Bridge. 

On the 7th Abercrombie — who was in command crombfe! w. 
at Wliite House, and who had been in command at ^Mellco!' 
our base of supplies in all the changes made from col nh m. 

• Feb ''5 

the start — was ordered to take up the iron from BriK.-Gen. 

Vols. Aug. 
31, 1861 

ward along the line of the road, If on receipt of this you should 

destroying it completely and thor- be near to Lynchburg aud deem 

oughly, until you join General it practicable to reach that point, 

Sheridan. After the work laid you will exercise your judgment 

out for General Sheridan and about going there, 

yourself is thoroughly done, pro- If you should be on the rail- 

ceed to join the Army of the Po- road between Charlottes^^lle and 

tomae by the route laid out in Lynchburg, it may be practicable 

General Sheridan's instructions, to detach a cavalry force to de- 

If any portion of your force stroy the canal. Lose no oppor- 

— especially your cavalry — is tunity to destroy the canal, 

needed back in your department, U. S. Grant, 

you are authorized to send it back. Lieutenant-General. 

Vol. II.— 12 



178 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIV the Yoi'k River railroad and put it on boats, 
x:^'^'(3) aiid to be in readiness to move by water to City 

'«" Point. 
Ibid. 695 On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line 
down the bank overlooking the Chickahominy, 
under cover of which the army could move. 
Ibid. 716 On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all 
organized troops arriving at White House, without 
debarking from their transports, to report to But- 
ler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all 
reinforcements to City Point. 
On the 11th I wrote : 

Cold Harbor, Virgentea, 
June 11, 1864. 
Major-Gteneral B. F. Butler, 
Commanding Department of Virginia and North Carolina : 
Ibid. 754 The movement to transfer this army to the south side 
of the James River will commence after dark to-morrow 
night. Colonel Comstock, of my staff, was sent specially 
to ascertain what was necessary to make your position 
secure in the interval, during which the enemy might use 
most of his force against you, and also to ascertain what 
point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if 
it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river 
at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has not yet re- 
turned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I 
would wish ; but the time between this and Sunday night 
being so short in which to get word to you, I must do the 
best I can. Colonel Dent goes to make arrangements for 
gunboats and transportation to send up the Chickahominy 
to take to you the Eighteenth Corps. The corps will leave 
its position in the trenches as early in the evening to- 
morrow as possible, and make a forced march to Cole's 
Landing or Ferry, where it should reach by 10 a.m. the 
following morning. This corps numbers now 15,300 men. 
They take with them neither wagons nor artiUery, these 
latter marching with the balance of the army to the James 



ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 179 

River. The remainder of the army will cross the Chicka- chap, xiv 
hominy at Long- Bridge and at Jones's, and strike the river 
at the most practicable crossing below City Point. 

I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for 
the army should be sent to you. I am not advised of the 
number that may have gone, but suppose you have received 
from six to ten thousand. General Smith will also reach 
you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of 
Richmond. 

The balance of the force will not be more than one day 
behind, unless detained by the whole of Lee's army, in 
which case you will be strong enough. 

I wish you would du-ect the proper staff-officers, your 
chief engineer and your chief quartermaster, to commence 
at once the collection of all the means in their reach for 
crossing the army on its arrival. If there is a point below 
City Point where a pontoon-bridge can be tlu-OTvn, have it 
laid. 

Expecting the arrival of the Eighteenth Corps by Mon- 
day night, if you deem it practicable, from the force you 
have, to seize and hold Petersburg, you may prepare to 
start on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. 
I do not want Petersbiu'g visited, however, unless it is 
held, nor an attempt to take it unless you feel a reasona- 
ble degree of confidence of success. If you should go 
there, I think troops should take nothing with them except 
what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent 
after the place is secm-ed. If Colonel Dent should not 
succeed in securing the requisite amount of transi)ortation 
for the Eighteenth Corps before reaching you, please have 

the balance supplied. 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant-General. 

p_ s. — On reflection I will send the Eighteenth Corps by 
way of White House. The distance which they will have 
to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach 
you about the same time, and the uncertainty of naviga- 
tion on the Chickahominy will be avoided. 

U. S. Grant. 



180 



PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XIV 



W. R. 
XXXVI (3> 

746 



Cold Harbor, Virginia, 
June 11, 1864. 
Major-General G. G. Meade, 

Commanding Army of the Potomac : 

Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the 
purpose of ascertaining the best point below Bermuda 
Hundred to which to march the army, has not yet re- 
turned. It is now getting so late, however, that all prep- 
arations may be made for the move to-morrow night 
without waiting longer. 

The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon ; 
that is, the Eighteenth Corps make a rapid march with 
the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompany- 
ing the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or Ferry, 
and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest 
until they reach the latter point. 

The Fifth Corps will seize Long Bridge and move out 
on the Long Bridge road to its junction with Quaker 
road, or until stopped by the enemy. 

The other three corps will follow in such order as you 
may direct, one of them crossing at Long Bridge and two 
at Jones's Bridge, After the crossing is effected, the most 
practicable roads will be taken to reach about Fort Powhat- 
tan. Of course this is supposing the enemy makes no 
opposition to our advance. The Fifth Corps, after secur- 
ing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or 
follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge 
with themselves. The wagon-trains should be kept well 
east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made, 
lower down than Jones's, they should take it. 

U. S, Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

P. S. — In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, 
and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number 
of men there, the direction of the Eighteenth Corps may be 
changed to White House. They should be directed to load up 
transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waitmg 
for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. 

U. S. Grant. 



ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 181 

About this time word was received (through the chap, xiv 
Richmond papers of the 11th) that Crook and xxxVn (d 
Averell had united and were moving east. This, 120, ue 
with the news of Huntei-'s successful engagement iwd. 95,96 
near Staunton, was no doubt known to Lee before 
it was to me. Then Sheridan's leaving with two 
divisions of cavalry looked indeed threatening, both xxx'^' (d 
to Lee's communications and to his supplies. Much 
of his cavalry was sent after Sheridan, and Early, 
with Ewell's entire corps, was sent to the Valley. 
Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and 
the sources from which to draw them were in our 
hands. People from outside began to pour into 
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Con- 
sternation reigned there. 

On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night xx^'^O) 
to White House, not to stop until he reached there, ^*^' '"' '^^^ 
and to take Ijoats at once for City Point, leaving his 
trains and artillery to move by land. 

Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long 
Bridge effected a crossing by wading and floun- 
dering through the water and mud, leaving their 
horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. 
A pontoon-bridge was speedily thrown across, over 
which the remainder of the army soon passed, and 
pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain 
any advance that might be made from the other 
side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by the 
morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. 
Hancock followed Warren. Burnside took the road 
to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright. Ferrero's 
division, with the wagon-train, moved farther east, 
by Window Shades and Cole's ferry, our rear being 
covered by cavalry. 



182 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. XIV It was kiiowii that the enemy had some gunboats 
at Eichmond. These might run down at night and 
inflict great damage upon us before they could be 
sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler 
had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone, 
ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in 

w. R. XL (2) an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have 
these sunk as high up the river as we could guard 
them and prevent their removal by the enemy. 

As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chicka- 
hominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in 
holding the roads from Richmond while the army 
passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to 
impede our march, however, but Warren and Wil- 
son reported the enemy strongly fortified in their 
^•\f^<^> front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's 
corps was at Charles City Court House, on the 

Ibid. 521 James River, Burnside's and Wright's corps were 
on the Chickahominy, and crossed during the 
night, Warren's corps and the cavalry still cover- 
ing the army. The material for a pontoon-bridge 
was already at hand, and the work of lajdng it 

SaX'w.T ^^^ commenced immediately, under the superin- 
Me^co', tendence of Brigadier-General Benham, command- 

Maj.' En'ff. iug the Engineer Brigade. On the evening of the 

Gen. Vols. 14th the crossing commenced, Hancock m advance, 

Aug. 13, 1861 . 

using both the bridge and boats, 
xxxvi^i) When the Wilderness campaign commenced the 
Army of the Potomac, including Burnside's corps, 
— which was a separate command until the 24th of 
May, when it was incorporated with the main 
army, — numbered about 116,000 men. During the 
progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforce- 
ments were received. At the crossing of the James 



106 et seq. 



ACROSS THE CHICKAHOMINY AND JAMES 



183 



River, June 14th-15th, the array numbered a}3orit chap, xw 
115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a 
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or 
skirmishing, about one half of the artillery was 
sent back to Washington, and many men were dis- 
charged by reason of the expiration of their term of 
service.^ In estimating our strength every enlisted 
man and every commissioned officer present is in- 
eluded, no matter how employed : in bands, sick in 
field-hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks, 
and all. Operating in an enemy's country, and be- 
ing supplied always from a distant base, large de- 
tachments had at all times to be sent from the 
front, not only to guard the base of supplies and 
the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our 
flanks and rear. We were also operating in a 
country unknown to us, and without competent 
guides, or maps showing the roads accurately. 

The manner of estimating numbers in the two 
armies differs materially. In the Confederate army 
often only bayonets are taken into account ; never, 
I believe, do they estimate more than are handling 
the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets 
or carbines. Generally the latter are far enough 



I FROM A STATEMENT OF LOSSES COMPILED IN THE ADJUTANT- 
GENERAL'S OFFICE. 



FIELD OF ACTION AND DATE. 


KILLED. 


WOTJNDED. 


MISSING. 


AGGKEGATE. 


Wilderness, May 5th to 7th ... . 
Spottsylvania, May 8th to 21 st. 
North Auna, May 23d to 27th . . 
Totopotomoy, May 27th to 3l8t 
Cold Harbor, May 31st to June 
12th 


2,261 

2,271 

186 

99 

1,769 


8,785 

9,360 

792 

358 

6,752 


2,902 

1,970 

165 

52 

1,537 


13,948 

13,601 

1,143 

509 

10,058 


Tntal 


6,586 


26,047 


6,626 


39,259 







184 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIV away to be excluded from the count in any one 
field. Officers and details of enlisted men are not 
included. In the Northern armies the estimate is 
most liberal, taking in all connected with the army 
and drawing pay. 

IxxYuh Estimated in the same manner as ours, Lee had 

io2iet8eq. j^q|; j^gg than eighty thousand men at the start. 
His reinforcements were about equal to ours dur- 
ing the campaign, deducting the discharged men 
and those sent back. He was on the defensive, and 
in a country in which every stream, every road, 
every obstacle to the movement of troops, and 
every natural defense was familiar to him and his 
ai-my. The citizens were all friendly to him and 
his cause, and could and did furnish him with 
accurate reports of our every move. Rear-guards 
were not necessary for him, and having always a 
railroad at his back, large wagon-trains were not 
required. All circumstances considered, we did 
not have any advantage in numbers. 

General Lee General Lcc, wlio had led the Army of Northern 
Virginia in all these contests, was a very highly es- 
timated man in the Confederate army and States, 
and filled also a very high place in the estimation 
of the people and press of the Northern States. 
His praise was sounded throughout the entire 
North after every action he was engaged in ; the 
number of his forces was always lowered, and that 
of the National forces exaggerated. He was a large, 
austere man, and, I judge, difficult of approach to his 
subordinates. To be extolled by the entire press of 
the South after every engagement, and by a por- 
tion of the press North with equal vehemence, was 
calculated to give him the entire confidence of his 




OtNEKAL IjUANl- Al II K AU'jL' AK ni US Dl-U1N<, l)ll': \Ik<,lMA CAMl'AIGN. 

(from a photograph bv bradv.) 



VISIT TO BUTLER 185 

troops and to make him feared by his antagoiiists. chap.xiv 
It was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers 
to hear from Eastern officers, "Well, Grant has 
never met Bobby Lee yet." There are good and 
true officers who believe now that the Army of 
Northern Virginia was supeiior to the Army of the 
Potomac man to man. I do not believe so, except 
as the advantages spoken of above made them so. 
Before the end I believe the difference was the other 
way. The Army of Northern Virginia became de- 
spondent and saw the end. It was not pleased 
thereby. The National army saw the same thing, 
and was encouraged by it. 

The advance of the Army of the Potomac reached 
the James on the 14th of June. Preparations were 
at once commenced for laying the pontoon-bridges 
and crossing the river. As already stated, I had Ante, n, 182 
previously ordered General Butler to have two 
vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river 
to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, 
where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so 
as to obstruct the passage and prevent Confederate 
gunboats from coming down the river. Butler had 
had these boats filled and put in position, but had 
not had them sunk before my arrival. I ordered 
this done, and also directed that he should turn 
over all material and boats not then in use in the 
river to be used in ferrying the troops across. 

I then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to 
Bermuda Hundred to see General Butler for the 
purpose of directing a movement against Peters- 
burg, while our troops of the Army of the Potomac 
were crossing. 

I had sent General W. F. Smith back from Cold Ante, ii,i8i 



186 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIV Harbor by the way of White House, thence on 
steamers to City Point, for the purpose of giving 
General Butler more troops with which to accom- 

xxxvi'o) plisli tliis result. General Butler was ordered to 
"^ send Smith, with his troops reinforced, as far as 
that could be conveniently done, from other parts 
of the Army of the James. He gave Smith about six 
thousand reinforcements, including some twenty- 
five hundred cavalry under Kautz, and about thirty- 

R^v\Hinks fi^'^' huudrcd colored infantry under Hinks. 

The distance which Smith had to move to reach 
the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the 
Confederate advance-line of works was but two 
miles outside of Petersburg. Smith was to move, 
under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, 
and assault as soon as he could after daylight. I 
believed then, and still believe, that Petersburg 
could have been easily captured at that time. It 
had only about twenty-five hundred men in the 
defenses, besides some irregular troops, consisting 
of citizens and employees in the city who took up 

^■^7(55^^^^ arms in case of emergency. Smith started as pro- 
posed, but his advance encountered a rebel force 
intrenched between City Point and their lines out- 
side of Petersburg. This position he carried, with 
some loss to the enemy; but there was so much 
delay that it was daylight before his troops really 

w.E.^xL(2) gQJ; off fi-om there. While there I informed General 
Butler that Hancock's corps would cross the river 
and move to Petersburg to support Smith in case 
the latter was successful, and that I could reinforce 
there more rapidly than Lee could reinforce from 
his position. 

I retm'ned down the river to where the troops of 



72 



MOVEMENT ON PETERSBUKG 187 

the Army of the Potomac now were, communicated chap, xiv 
to General Meade, in writing, the directions I had 
given to General Butler, and directed him (Meade) 
to cross Hancock's corps over under cover of night, 
and push them forward in the morning to Peters- 
burg, halting them, however, at a designated point 
until they could hear from Smith. I also informed 
General Meade that I had ordered rations from Ber- '^^ \f^ <^^ 
muda Hundred for Hancock's corps, and desired 
him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more 
time than was absolutely necessary. The rations 
did not reach him, however, and Hancock, while 
he got all his corps over during the night, remained ^"^gof^^^^ 
until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. 
He then moved without them, and on the road re- 
ceived a note from General W. F. Smith asking him ^- ^gf^'^^ 
to come on. This seems to have been the first infor- 
mation that General Hancock had received of the fact 
that he was to go to Petersburg, or that anything 
particular was expected of him. Otherwise he would 
have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. 

Smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early ibid. 705 
in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until 
after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering 
what appeared to be empty works. The enemj^'s 
line consisted of redans occupying commanding 
positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. To the 
east side of Petersburg, from the Appomattox back, 
there were thirteen of these redans, extending a 
distance of several miles — probably three. If they 
had been properly manned they could have held 
out against any force that could have attacked 
them, at least until reinforcements could have got 
up from the north of Eichmond, 



188 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XIV Smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with 
^' ^7of ^ ^^^ success. By nine o'clock at night he was in posses- 
sion of five of these redans and, of course, of the 
connecting lines of rifle-pits. All of them contained 
artillery, which fell into our hands. Hancock came 
up and proposed to take any part assigned to him ; 
and Smith asked him to relieve his men who were 
in the trenches. 
^' ^3(5^ '^^ Next morning, the 16th, Hancock himself was in 
command, and captured another redan. Meade 
came up in the afternoon and succeeded Hancock, 
who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the com- 
mand of his corps on account of the breaking out 
afresh of the wound he had received at Gettysburg. 
During the day Meade assaulted and carried one 
more redan to his right and two to his left. In 
all this we lost very heavily. The works were nob 
strongly manned, but they all had guns in them, 
which fell into our hands, together with the men 
who were handling them in the effort to repel 
these assaults. 

Up to this time Beauregard, who had commanded 
south of Richmond, had received no reinforcements, 
except Hoke's division from Drury's Bluff,^ which 

1 City Poikt, Virginia, tage of this and moved a force at 

June 17, 1864, 11 a.m. once upon the railroad and plank 

W. R. XL (2) Major-General Halleck, road between Richmond and Pe- 

Washington, D. C. : tersburg, which I hope to retain 

***** possession of. Too much credit 

The enemy, in their endeavor cannot be given to the troops and 

to reinforce Petersburg, aban- their commanders for the energy 

doned their intrenchments in and fortitude displayed during 

front of Bermuda Hundred. They the last five days. Day and night 

no doubt expected troops from has been all the same, no delays 

north of the James River to take being allowed on any account, 
their place before we discovered U. S. Grant, 

it. General Butler took advan- Lientenant-General. 



115 



MOVEMENT ON PETERSBURG 189 

had arrived on the morning of the 16th ; though he chap, xiv 
had urged the authorities very strongly to send 
them, believing, as he did, that Petersburg would 
be a valuable prize which we might seek. 

During the 17th the fighting was very severe and ^"3^,^^^^^ 
the losses heavy ; and at night our troops occupied 
about the same position they had occupied in the 
morning, except that they held a redan which had 
been captured by Potter during the day. During 
the night, however, Beauregard fell back to the line 
which had been already selected, and commenced 
fortifying it. Our troops advanced on the 18th to 
the line which he had abandoned, and found that 
the Confederate loss had been very severe, many of 
the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and 
in front of them. 

Colonel J. L. Chamberlain, of the Twentieth *^^^erfata™" 
Maine, was wounded on the 18th. He was gal- 
lantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had 
been in the habit of doing in all the engagements 
in which he had previously been engaged. He had 
several times been recommended for a brigadier- 
generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. On 
this occasion, however, I promoted him on the spot, Yi6f2n,^236* 
and forwarded a copy of my order to the War De- 
partment, asking that my act might be confirmed 
and Chamberlain's name sent to the Senate for 
confirmation without any delay. This was done, 
and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received 
partial justice at the hands of his government, which 
he had served so faithfully and so well. 

If General Hancock's orders of the 15th had been 
communicated to him, that officer, with his usual 
promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon 



190 PEBSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XIV the ground around Petersburg as early as four 
o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. The days 
were long, and it would have given him considera- 
ble time before night. I do not think there is any 
doubt that Petersburg itself could have been car- 
ried without much loss ; or, at least, if protected by 
inner detached works, that a line could have been 
established very much in rear of the one then oc- 
cupied by the enemy. This would have given us 
control of both the Weldon and South Side rail- 
roads. This would also have saved an immense 
amount of hard fighting which had to be done from 

June, 1864 the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us 
greatly the advantage in the long siege which 
ensued. 

I now ordered the troops to be put under cover 
and allowed some of the rest which they had so 
long needed. They remained quiet, except that 
there was more or less firing every day, until the 

w. E.xL(2) 22d, when General Meade ordered an advance to- 

241 274 ' 

ward the Weldon railroad. We were very anxious 
to get to that road, and even round to the South 
Side railroad, if possible. 
w.R.xL(i) Meade moved Hancock's corps, now commanded 
by Birney, to the left, with a view to at least force 
the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. 
General Wright, with the Sixth Corps, was ordered, 
by a road farther south, to march directly for the 
Weldon road. The enemy passed in between these 
two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very 
serious results to the National troops, who were 
then withdrawn from their advanced position. 

The Army of the Potomac was given the invest- 
ment of Petersburg, while the Army of the James 



325 



INVESTMENT OF PETEESBURG 191 

held Bermuda Hundred and all the ground we pos- chap, xiv 
sessed north of the James River. The Ninth Corps, 
Burnside's, was placed upon the right at Peters- 
burg ; the Fifth, Warren's, next ; the Second, Bir- 
ney's, next; then the Sixth, Wright's, broken off 
to the left and south. Thus began the siege of 
Petersburg. 



CHAPTER XV 

RAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD — RAID ON 
THE WELDON RAILROAD — EARLY'S MOVEMENT 
UPON WASHINGTON — MINING THE WORKS BEFORE 
PETERSBURG — EXPLOSION OF THE MINE BEFORE 
PETERSBURG — CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH 
VALLEY — CAPTURE OF THE WELDON RAILROAD 



CHAP. XV r\^ the 7tli of June, while at Cold Harbor, I had, 
^-^ as already indicated, sent Sheridan with two 
divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could 
of the Virginia Central railroad. General Hunter 



W. R. 
XXXVII (1) 

94-96 



had been operating up the Shenandoah Valley with 
some success, having fought a battle near Staunton, 
where he captured a great many prisoners, besides 
killing and wounding a good many men. After 
the battle he formed a junction at Staunton with 
Averell and Crook, who had come up from the Ka- 
nawha or Gauley River. It was supposed, there- 
fore, that Greiieral Hunter would be about Char- 
lottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan could get 
there, doing on the way the damage that he w^as 
sent to do. 

I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in 
case he should meet him about Charlottesville, join 
and return with him to the Army of the Potomac. 
Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the Valley, 

192 



KAID ON THE VIRGINIA CENTRAL RAILROAD 193 

started Breckinridge out for its defense at once, chap.xv 
Learning later of Sheridan's going with two divi- 
sions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of hS^ou, 
cavalrv, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's. c.8.A".june, 

" -■ n n • T o ji AT J.1 1862; Maj.- 

Sheridan moved to the north side ot the Wortli oen. aus.3, 

1863 ; Lt.- 

Anna to get out west, and learned of the movement ^en^ Aug. 
of these troops to the south side of the same stream 
almost as soon as they had started. He pushed 
on to get to Trevillian Station to commence his 
destruction at that point. On the night of the 10th 
he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of Tre- xxxvi' (d 
vilhan, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at 
Trevilhan Station, and Hampton but a few miles 

away. 

During the night Hampton ordered an advance 
on Sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and 
very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a 
countermove, sent Custer on a rapid march to get 
between the two divisions of the enemy and into 
their rear. This he did successfully, so that at 
daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy 
found himself at the same time resisted in front 
and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. 
The losses were probably very light on both sides 
in killed and wounded, but Sheridan got away with 
some five hundred prisoners and sent them to City 
Point. 

During that day, the llth, Sheridan moved into iwd, 
Trevilhan Station, and the following day proceeded 
to tear up the road east and west. There was con- 
siderable fighting during the whole of the day, but 
the work of destruction went on. In the mean 
time, at night, the enemy had taken possession of 
the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take 
Vol. II.— 13 



194 



PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XV 



W. R. 
XXXVI (1) 

784 



to go noi'tli when lie left Trevilliaii. Sheridan 
learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had 
captured here, that G eneral Hunter was about Lynch- 
burg, and therefore that there was no use of his going 
on to Charlottesville with a view to meet him. 

Sheridan started back during the night of the 
12th, and made his way north and farther east, 
coming around by the north side of White House, 
and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an 
abundance of forage for his animals, food for his 
men, and security while resting. He had been 
obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in 
the field-hospital which he had established near 
Trevillian, and these necessarily feU into the hands 
of the enemy. 

White House up to this time had been a depot ; 
but now that our troops were all on the James 
River it was no longer wanted as a store of sup- 
plies. Sheridan was therefore directed to break it 
up, which he did on the 22d of June, bringing the 
garrison and an immense wagon-train with him. 
All these were over the James River by the 26th of 
the month, and Sheridan ready to follow. 

In the mean time Meade had sent Wilson's divi- 
sion on a raid to destroy the Weldon and South 
Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and 
Hampton free to return to Richmond with his cav- 
alry, Wilson's position became precarious. Meade 
w.E.xL(2) therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the 
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. 
Wilson got back, though not without severe loss, 
having struck both roads; but the damage done 
was soon repaired. 

After these events comparative quiet reigned 



Ibid. 786 



W. R. XL (1) 

620 



HUNTER IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 195 

about Petersburg until late iu July. The time, chap, xv 
however, was spent in strengthening the intrench- 
ments and making our position generally more se- 
cure against a sudden attack. In the mean time I 
had to look after other portions of my command, 
where things had not been going on so favorably, 
always, as I could have wished. 

General Hunter, who had been appointed to sue- xxx\li (d 
ceed Sigel in the Shenandoah Valley, immediately 
took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 
5th of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On 
the 8th he formed a junction with Crook and Ave- 
rell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct 
on Lynchburg via Lexington, which he reached 
and invested on the 16th. Up to this time he was 
very successful ; and but for the difficulty of taking 
with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long 
a march through a hostile country, he would no 
doubt have captured Lynchburg. The destruction 
of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had 
been very great. To meet this movement under 
General Hunter, General Lee sent Early with his 
corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before 
Hunter. After some skirmishing on the 17th and june, im 
18th, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammuni- 
tion to give battle, retired from before the place. xxxV?i(i) 
Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him 
no choice of route for his return but by way of the 
Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up the Ohio 
River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad. A long time was con- 
sumed in making this movement. Meantime the 
Valley was left open to Early's troops and others in 
that quarter ; and Washington also was uncovered. 



196 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S, GRANT 

CHAP. XV Early took advantage of tliis condition of affairs 
and moved on Washington. 

In the absence of Hunter, General Lew. Wallace, 
with headquarters at Baltimore, commanded the 
department in which the Shenandoah lay. His 
surplus of troops with which to move against the 
enemy was small in number. Most of these were 
raw, and consequently very much inferior to our 
veterans and to the veterans which Early had with 
him; but the situation of Washington was pre- 
xxxVfid) carious, and Wallace moved with commendable 
^^^ promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. 
He could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, 
but he hoped to cripple and delay him until Wash- 
ington could be put into a state of preparation for 
xxxvn(2) liis reception. I had previously ordered General 
^^° Meade to send a division to Baltimore for the pur- 
pose of adding to the defenses of Washington, and 
ette.'w! r" lie had sent Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps 
Melfco, (Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th 
BriS^Gek of July. Finding that Wallace had gone to the 
^2l!i86i^^ front with his command, Ricketts immediately took 
the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with 
his entire division. They met the enemy and, as 
xxxVn (1) niight have been expected, were defeated ; but they 
^"* succeeded in stopping him for the day on which 
the battle took place. The next morning Early 
Ibid. 348 started on his march to the capital of the nation, 
arriving before it on the 11th. 

Learning of the gravity of the situation, I had 

w. E- directed General Meade to also order Wright with 

158 the rest of his corps directly to Washington for the 

relief of that place, and the latter reached there the 

very day that Early arrived before it. The Nine- 



EAKLY'S movement on WASHINGTON 197 

teenth Corps, which had been stationed in Louisi- chap, xv 
ana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies 
about Richmond, had about this time arrived at xxxVii(2) 
Fortress Monroe, on their way to join us. I di- ^*^ 
verted them from that point to Washington, which 
place they reached, almost simultaneously with 
Wright, on the 11th. The Nineteenth Corps was En^ix'w 
commanded by Major-General Emory. Lt-coLctii 

Early made his reconnaissance with a view of m^ii'm^g*' 
attacking on the following morning, the 12th ; but Man iv "1862 
the next morning he found our intreuchments, xxxviio 
which were very strong, fully manned. He at once ^*^ 
commenced to retreat, Wright following. There is 
no telling how much this result was contributed to 
by General Lew. Wallace's leading what might well 
be considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had 
been but one day earlier he might have entered the 
capital before the arrival of the reinforcements I 
had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle 
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace con- 
tributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the 
troops under him, a greater benefit to the cause 
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an 
equal force to render by means of a victory. 

Farther west, also, the troubles were threatening. \?-|*^4f^ 
Some time before, Forrest had met Sturgis in com- **'i^{^ir' 
mand of some of our cavalry in Mississippi and vois;"Aug. 
handled him very roughly, gaining a very great Brice's 
victory over him. This left Forrest free to go Roa^s^june 
almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in ^^•'^^^*- ®^® 

W. R. 

rear of Sherman, who was then advancing. Slier- xxxix (d 

' ^ passim 

man w^as abundantly able to look after the army 
that he was immediately with, and all of his mili- 
tary division so long as he could communicate with 



W. R. 
XXXIX (2) 

182 



198 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XV it ; but it was my place to see that he had the means 
with which to hold his rear. Two divisions under 
A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana 
some months before. Sherman ordered these back, 

xxx'ix(i) "^^t^ directions to attack Forrest. Smith met and 
250,320 defeated him very badly. I then directed that 
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go, 
and to prevent by all means his getting upon the 
Memphis and Nashville railroad. Sherman had 
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same 
orders in substance; but receiving my directions 
for this order to Smith, he repeated it. 

^' ^52?^ '^^ ^^ t^® 25th of June General Burnside had com- 
menced running a mine from about the center of 
his front under the Confederate works confronting 
him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Plea- 

Hcnrv 

Pleasants, sauts, of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regi- 
ment was mostly composed of miners, and who 
was himself a practical miner. Burnside had sub- 
mitted the scheme to Meade and myself, and we 
both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men 
occupied. His position was very favorable for 
carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the 
operations to follow its completion. The positions 
of the two lines at that point were only about a 
hundred yards apart, with a comparatively deep 
ravine intervening. In the bottom of this ravine 
the work commenced. The position was unfavor- 
able in this particular : that the enemy's line at that 
point was reentering, so that its front was com- 
manded by his own lines both to the right and 
left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward 
back of the Confederate line for a considerable 
distance, and it was presumable that the enemy 



48tli Pa. 



MINING THE WORKS BEFORE PETERSBURG 199 

had, at least, a detached work on this highest point, chap, xv 
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the 
mine was finished ready for charging ; but I had this 
work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. ^- ^^^-f ^ <^' 

On the 17th of July several deserters came in ibid. 305 
and said that there was great consternation in 
Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make 
an attack upon us — the object being to put us on 
the defensive so that he might detach troops to go 
to Georgia, where the army Sherman was operating 
against was said to be in great trouble. I put the 
army commanders, Meade and Butler, on the look- iwd. 290, 307 
out, but the attack was not made. 

I concluded, then, a few days later, to do some- 
thing in the way of offensive movement myself, 
having in \dew something of the same object that - 
Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in 
Washington, and with this reduction of my force 
Lee might very readily have spared some troops 
from the defenses to send West. I had other ob- 
jects in view, however, besides keeping Lee where 
he was. The mine was constructed and ready to 
be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to 
carry Petersburg if I coidd. It was the object, 
therefore, to get as many of Lee's troops away 
from the south side of the James River as possible. 
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a move- ^g^iihi^^i.' 
ment with Hancock's corps and Sheridan's cavalry niofra,i!^u6 
to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom, where 
Butler had a pontoon-bridge laid. The plan, in the 
main, was to let the cavalry cut loose, and, joining 
with Kautz's cavalry of the Army of the James, 
get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they 
could of the Virginia Central railroad, while, in 



200 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAP. XV the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as 
to protect their rear and cover their retreat back 
when they should have got through with their 
work. We were successful in drawing the enemy's 
troops to the north side of the James, as I expected. 
The mine was ordered to be charged, and the morn- 
ing of the 30th of July was the time fixed for its 
explosion. I gave Meade minute orders ^ on the 



Battles & 
LciHlcrs.IV 

545-5(17 



W 



K. XL (3) 

421 



1 City Point, Virginia, 
Jiily 24, 1864. 
Major-General Meade, 
Commanding, etc. : 

The engineer officers who made 
a survey of the front from Ber- 
muda Hundred report against the 
probability of success from an 
attack there. The chances, they 
think, will be better on Burn- 
side's front. If this is attempted 
it will be necessary to concen- 
trate all the force possible at the 
point in the enemy's line we ex- 
pect to penetrate. All officers 
should be fully impressed with 
the absolute necessity of pushing 
entirely beyond the enemy's pres- 
ent line if tliey sliould succeed in 
penetrating it, and of gettingback 
to their present line promptly if 
they should not succeed in break- 
ing through. 

To the right and left of the 
point of assault all the artillery 
possible should be brought to 
play upon the enemy in front 
during the assault. Their lines 
would be sufficient for the sup- 
port of the artillery, and all the 
reserves could be brought on the 
flanks of their commands nearest 
to the point of assault, ready to 
follow in if successful. The field 
artillery and infantry held in the 
lines during the first assault 



should be in readiness to move 
at a moment's notice either to 
their front or to follow the main 
assault, as they should receive 
orders. One thing, however, 
should be impressed on corps 
commanders : if they see the 
enemy giving away on their front 
or moving from it to reinforce a 
heavily assaulted portion of their 
line, they should take advantage 
of such knowledge and act 
l>romptly without waiting for 
orders from army commanders. 
General Ord can cooperate with 
his corps in this movement, and 
about five thousand troops from 
Bermuda Hundred can be sent to 
reinforce you, or can be used to 
threaten an assault between the 
Appomattox and James rivers, as 
may be deemed best. 

This should be done by Tues- 
day morning, if done at all. If 
not attempted, we will then start 
at the date indicated to destroy 
the railroad as far as Hicksford 
at least', and to Weldon if pos- 
sible. 
***** 

Whether we send an expedition 
on the road or assault at Peters- 
burg, Burnside's mine will be 
blown up. . . 

U. S. Grant, 
Lien tenan t- General. 



MINING THE WOEKS BEFORE PETERSBURG 201 

24th, directing how I wanted the assanlt conducted, chap, xv 
which orders he amplified into general instructions ^-5^6,^97'^^ 
for the guidance of the troops that were to be en- 
gaged. 

Meade's instructions, which I, of course, approved 
most heartily, were all that I can see now was neces- 
sary. The only further precaution which he could 
have taken, and which he could not foresee, would 
have been to have different men to execute them. 

The gallery to the mine was over five hundred ibid. 476, 477 
feet long from where it entered the ground to the 
point where it was under the enemy's works, and 
with a cross-gallery of something over eighty feet 
running under their lines. Eight chambers had 
been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge 
them. All was ready by the time I had prescribed ; 
and on the 29th Hancock and Sheridan were 
brought back near the James River with their 
troops. Under cover of night they started to re- ibid. 602 
cross the bridge at Deep Bottom, and to march di- 
rectly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. 

Warren was to hold his line of intrenchments iwd. 596 
with a sufficient number of men, and concentrate 
the balance on the right next to Burn side's cori3S, 
while Ord, now commanding the Eighteenth Corps, 
temporarily under Meade, was to form in the rear 
of Burnside to support him when he went in. All 
were to clear off the parapets and the abatis in their 
front, so as to leave the space as open as possible, 
and be able to charge the moment the mine had 
been sprung and Burnside had taken possession. 
Burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at 
all, but push on to the top of the hill, supported 
on the right and left by Ord's and Warren's corps. 



202 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XV Warren and Ord fulfilled tlieir instructions per- 
fectly so far as making ready was concerned. Burn- 
side seemed to have paid no attention whatever to 
the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his 
own front for his troops to get over in the best way 
they coidd. The four divisions of his corps were 
commanded by Grenerals Potter, Willcox, Ledlie, 
and Ferrero. The last was a colored division ; and 
Burnside selected it to make the assault. Meade 
interfered with this. Burnside then took Ledlie's 
division — a worse selection than the first could 
have been. In fact, Potter and Willcox were the 
only division commanders Burnside had who were 

J^H. Ledlie, equal to the occasion. Ledlie, besides being other- 

isei^^Brig'- ^i^^ inefficient, proved also to possess a disqualifi- 

iSc°2Z*i862 cation less common among soldiers. 

There was some delay about the explosion of the 
mine, so that it did not go off until about five o'clock 
xL^(if527 "^ *^® morning. When it did explode it was very 
successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and 
something like a hundred feet in length. Instantly 
one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, 
which had been placed in the most commanding 
positions covering the ground to the right and left 
of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, 
Ibid. 536 commenced playing. Ledlie's division marched 
into the crater immediately on the explosion, but 
most of the men stopped there in the absence of 
any one to give directions, their commander hav- 
ing found some safe retreat to get into before they 
started. There was some delay on the left and 
right in advancing, but some of the troops did get 
in and tm*n to the right and left, carrying the rifle- 
pits, as I expected they would do. 



EXPLOSION OF THE PETEESBURG MINE 203 

There had been great consternation in Peters- chap, xv 
burg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine 
that we were going to explode. They knew we 
were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine 
off by countermining, though Beauregard had taken 
the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to 
the rear of that part of their line fronting where 
they could see that our men were at work. "We 
had learned through deserters who had come in 
that the people had very wild rumors about what 
was going on on our side. They said that we had 
undermined the whole of Petersburg; that they 
were resting upon a slumbering volcano, and did 
not know at what moment they might expect an 
eruption. I somewhat based my calculations upon 
this state of feeling, and expected that when the 
mine was exploded the troops to the right and left 
would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if 
they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen 
themselves before the enemy had come to a reali- 
zation of the true situation. It was just as I ex- 
pected it would be. We coidd see the men run- 
ning without any apparent object except to get 
away. It was half an hour before musketry firing, 
to amount to anything, was opened upon our men 
in the crater; it was an hour before the enemy 
got artillery up to play upon them ; and it was nine 
o'clock before Lee got up reinforcements from his 
right to join in expelling our troops. 

The effort was a stupendous failure. It cost us c^^ofi^'qy, 
about four thousand men, mostly, however, cap- ^42^et'l^q.^' 
tured ; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the 
corps commander, and the incompetency of the divi- 
sion commander who was sent to lead the assault. 



204 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP. XV After being fully assured of the failure of the 
mine, and finding that most of that part of Lee's 
army which had been drawn north of the James 

w.R.xLO) River was still there, I gave Meade directions to 

637, 638 

send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next 
morning, before Lee could get his forces back, to 
destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the Weldon rail- 
road. But misfortunes never come singly. I learned 
during that same afternoon that Wright's pursuit 
of Early was feeble because of the constant and 
contrary orders he had been receiving from Wash- 
ington, while I was cut off from immediate com- 
munication by reason of our cable across Chesa- 
peake Bay being broken. Early, however, was not 
aware of the fact that Wright was not pursuing 
until he had reached Strasburg. Finding that he 
was not pursued, he turned back to Winchester, 

^^^v?f M. where Crook was stationed with a small force, and 
^^ drove him out. He then pushed north until lie 

Brig.-Gen. j^^d readied the Potomac : then he sent McCausland 

Jonn Mc- ' 

causiand ^cross to Chambersbui'g, Pennsylvania, to destroy 
that town. Chambersburg was a purely defense- 
less town, with no garrison whatever, and no forti- 
xxxvn(i) fixations; yet McCausland, under Early's orders, 
333-335,355 "b^i-ned thc place and left about three hundred 
families houseless. This occurred on the 30th of 
July. I rescinded my orders for the troops to go 
^•.?A^.!i^^> out to destroy the Weldon railroad, and directed 

639, 641 •' 

them to embark for Washington city. After burn- 
ing Chambersburg, McCausland retreated, pursued 
B.F.Keuey, by our cavaliy, toward Cumberland. He was met 
vofs'MLy and defeated by General Kellev and driven into 

17, 1861 '' 

w. R. Virginia. 
xxxviKi) ^j^^ Shenandoah Valley was very important to 



CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 205 

the Confederates, because it was the principal chap.xv 
storehouse they now had for feeding their armies 
about Richmond. It was well known that they 
would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. 
It had been the source of a great deal of trouble to 
us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, 
partly because of the incompetency of some of the 
commanders, but chiefly because of interference 
from Washington. It seemed to be the policy of 
General Halleck and Secretary Stanton to keep 
any force sent there, in pm-suit of the invading 
army, moving right and left so as to keep between 
the enemy and our capital ; and, generally speak- 
ing, they pursued this policy until all knowledge 
of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. They 
were left, therefore, free to supply themselves vdth 
horses, beef- cattle, and such provisions as they 
could carry away from western Maryland and 
Pennsylvania. I determined to put a stop to this. 
I started Sheridan at once for that field of opera- xxxH^i (2) 
tion, and on the following day sent another division ^^^ 
of his cavalry. 

I had previously asked to have Sheridan assigned 
to that command, but Mr. Stanton objected, on the i|Sft. 
ground that he was too young for so important a 
command. On the 1st of August, when I sent re- 
inforcements for the protection of Washington, I 

sent the following orders: 

City Point, Virginia, 
August 1, 1864, 11 : 30 a.m. 
Major-General Halleck, 
Washington, D. C. : 
I am sending General Sheridan for temporary duty xxxvn(2) 
whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. 
Unless General Hunter is in the field m person, I want 



558 



206 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XV Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, 
with instructions to put liimself south of the enemy and 
follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let 
om* troops go also. Once started up the Valley, they ought 
to be followed until we get possession of the Virginia 
Central railroad. If General Hunter is in the field, give 
Sheridan direct command of the Sixth Corps and cavalry 
division. All the cavahy, I presume, will reach Washing- 
ton in the course of to-morrow. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

The President in some way or other got to see 
this despatch of mine directing certain instructions 
to be given to the commanders in the field operat- 
ing against Early, and sent me the following very 
characteristic despatch : 

Office U. S. Military Telegraph, 

War Department, 
Washington, D. C, August 3, 1864. 
Cipher. 6 p.m. 

Lieutenant-General Grant, 
City Point, Virginia: 

xxxvn(2) ^ have seen your despatch in which you say, "I want 
682 Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, 
with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and 
follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let 
our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right, as to 
how our forces should move. But please look over the 
despatches you may have received from here, even since 
you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there 
is any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our 
army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the 
death" in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither 
be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and 

hour, and force it. 

A. Lincoln. 



CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 207 

I replied to this that " I would start in two hours chap, xv 
for Washington " ; and soon got off, going directly ^^- g, f^^^ 
to the Monocacy without stopping at Washington 
on my way. I found General Hunter's army en- 
camped there, scattered over the fields along the 
banks of the Monocacy, with many hundreds of 
cars and locomotives, belonging to the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad, which he had taken the precau- 
tion to bring back and collect at that point. I 
asked the general where the enemy was. He re- 
plied that he did not know. He said the fact was 
that he was so embarrassed with orders from Wash- 
ington moving him first to the right and then to 
the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. 

I then told the general that I would find out 
where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam 
got up and trains made up, giving directions to 
push for Halltown, some four miles above Harper's 
Ferry, in the Shenandoah Valley. The cavalry and 
the wagon-trains were to march, but all the troops 
that could be transported by the cars were to go 
in that way. I knew that the Valley was of such 
importance to the enemy that, no matter how much 
he was scattered at that time, he would in a very 
short time be found in front of our troops moving 
south. 

I then wrote out General Hunter's instructions, ^{j^gvf^"^ 
I told him that Sheridan was in Washington, and p^''^^^^^- 
still another division was on its way ; and suggested 
that he establish the headquarters of the depart- 
ment at any point that would suit him best, — 
Cumberland, Baltimore, or elsewhere, — and give 
Sheridan command of the troops in the field. The 
general replied to this that he thought he had better 



208 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XV be relieved entirely. He said that General Halleck 
seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the posi- 
tion he was in that he thought somebody else ought 
to be there. He did not want in any way to em- 

?o GrTnt? barrass the cause ; thus showing a patriotism that 

Dec. 6, 18C4, . • J.1 rrn 

w. R. was none too common m the army. There were 
366,3(57 not many major-generals who would voluntarily 
have asked to have the command of a department 
taken from them on the supposition that for some 
particular reason, or for any reason, the service 
would be better performed. I told him, "Very 

^(1)^6% ^96^ well, then," and telegraphed at once for Sheridan to 
come to the Monocacy, and suggested that I would 
wait and meet him there. 

Sheridan came at once by special train, but 
reached there after the troops were all off. I went 
to the station and remained there until he arrived. 
Myself and one or two of my staff were about all 
the Union people, except General Hunter and his 
staff, who were left at the Monocacy when Sheridan 

mSSi, arrived. I hastily told Sheridan what had been 

^^ done and what I wanted him to do, giving him, at 

the same time, the wi'itten instructions which had 

been prepared for General Hunter and directed to 

that officer. 

™ie*^^ «* Sheridan now had about thirty thousand men to 
move with, eight thousand of them being cavalry. 
Early had about the same number ; but the superior 
ability of the National commander over the Confed- 
erate commander was so great that all the latter's 
advantage of being on the defensive was more than 
counterbalanced by this circumstance. As I had 
predicted. Early was soon found in front of Sheri- 
dan in the Valley, and Pennsylvania and Maryland 



CAMPAIGN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY 209 

were speedily freed from the invaders. The im- chap, xv 
portance of the Valley was so great to the Confed- 
erates that Lee reinforced Early, but not to the 
extent that we thought and feared he would. 

To prevent as much as possible these reinforce- 
ments from being sent out from Richmond, I had 
to do something to compel Lee to retain his forces 
about his capital. I therefore gave orders for an- 
other move to the north side of the James River, 
to threaten Richmond. Hancock's corps, part of "^^i^^flf^ 
the Tenth Corps under Birney, and Gregg's divi- 
sion of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the 
James during the night of the 13th-14th of August. ise* 
A threatening position was maintained for a num- 
ber of days, with more or less skirmishing and 
some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my 
object and my instructions that anything like a 
battle should be avoided, unless opportunities 
should present themselves which would insure 
gi'eat success. Greneral Meade was left in command 
of the few troops around Petersburg, strongly in- 
trenched ; and was instructed to keep a close watch 
upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to 
take advantage of any weakening that might occur 
through an effort on the part of the enemy to re- 
inforce the north side. There was no particular 
victory gained on either side ; but during that time 
no more reinforcements were sent to the Valley. 

I informed Sheridan of what had been done to '""•fj-^fg^™ 
prevent reinforcements being sent from Richmond 
against him, and also that the efforts we had made 
had proven that one of the divisions which we sup- 
posed had gone to the Valley was still at Richmond, 
because we had captured six or seven hundred 
Vol. II.— 14 



210 



PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XV 



W. E. 
XXXVIII 

(5) 408 



Ibid. 488 



E. K. Smith, 

'\V.P.l841-45; 

Mexico, 

1846-48 ; 

Brig.-Geii. 

C. S.A.June 

17, Maj.- 

Gen. Oct. 11, 

1861; Lt.- 

Geii. Oct. 9, 

1862; Gen. 

Feb. 19, 1864 



W. R. XLII 

(2) 111 



prisoners from that division, each of its four bri- 
gades having contributed to our list of captures. I 
also informed him that but one division had gone, 
and it was possible that I should be able to prevent 
the going of any more. 

To add to my embarrassment at this time, Sher- 
man, who was now near Atlanta, wanted reinforce- 
ments. He was perfectly willing to take the raw 
troops then being raised in the Northwest, saying 
that he could teach them more soldiering in one 
day among his troops than they would learn in a 
week in a camp of instruction. I therefore asked 
that all troops in camps of instruction in the North- 
west be sent to him. Sherman also wanted to be 
assured that no Eastern troops were moving out 
against him. I informed him of what I had done, 
and assured him that I would hold all the troops 
there that it was possible for me to hold, and that 
up to that time none had gone. I also informed 
him that his real danger was from Kirby Smith, 
who commanded the trans-Mississippi Department. 
If Smith should escape Steele and get across the 
Mississippi River, he might move against him. I 
had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready 
to move from New Orleans against Mobile in case 
Kirby Smith should get across. This would have a 
tendency to draw him to the defense of that place, 
instead of going against Sherman. 

Right in the midst of all these embarrassments 
Halleck informed me that there was an organized 
scheme on foot in the North to resist the draft, and 
suggested that it might become necessary to draw 
troops from the field to put it down. He also ad- 
vised taking in sail and not going too fast. 



CAPTUKE OF THE WELDON KAILROAD 211 

The troops were withdrawn from the north side chap, xv 
of the James River on the night of the 20th. Be- 
fore they were withdrawn, however, and while 
most of Lee's force was on that side of the river, 
Warren had been sent with most of the Fifth Corps 
to capture the Weldon railroad. He took up his ^-J'^s" 
line of march weU back to the rear, south of the 
enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches 
extended so as to cover that part of the line which 
he had vacated by moving out. From our left, 
near the old Hue, it was about three miles to the 
Weldon railroad. A division was ordered from the 
right of the Petersburg line to reinforce Warren, 
while a division was brought back from the north 
side of the James River to take its place. 

This road was very important to the enemy. The 
limits from which his supplies had been drawn 
were already very much contracted, and I knew 
that he must fight desperately to protect it. War- md. 429 
ren carried the road, though with heavy loss on 
both sides. He fortified his new position, and our 
trenches were then extended from the left of our 
main line to connect with his new one. Lee made 
repeated attempts to dislodge Warren's corps, but 
without success, and with heavy loss. 

As soon as Warren was fortified and reinforce- 
ments reached him, troops were sent south to 
destroy the bridges on the Weldon railroad ; and 
with such success that the enemy had to draw in 
wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the 
supplies he got thereafter from that source. It 
was on the 21st that Lee seemed to have given up 
the Weldon railroad as having been lost to him ; 
but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed 



212 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XV attempts to recapture it. Again he failed, and with 
: very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. 

On the night of the 20th our troops on the north 
5;.^?^" side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock 

(l)221et8eq., ' 

eoeetseq. ^^^^ Gregg Were sent south to destroy the Weldon 
railroad. They were attacked on the 25th at 
Reams's Station, and after desperate fighting a part 
of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. 
But the Weldon railroad never went out of our 
possession from the 18th of August to the close of 
the war. 



CHAPTER XVI 

SHEEIDAN'S advance — VISIT TO SHERIDAN — SHERI- 
DAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH — SHERIDAN'S 
RIDE TO WINCHESTER — CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN 
FOR THE WINTER 

WE had our troops on the Weldon railroad chap, xvi 
contending against a large force that re- 
garded this road of so much importance that they 
could afford to expend many lives in retaking it ; 
Sherman just getting through to Atlanta with great 
losses of men from casualties, discharges, and de- 
tachments left along as guards to occupy and hold 
the road in rear of him ; Washington threatened but 
a short time before, and now Early being strength- <> 
ened in the Valley so as, probably, to renew that 
attempt. It kept me pretty active in looking after 
all these points. 



On the 10th of August Sheridan had advanced ^.r 



XLIII 



(1)17 



on .Early up the Shenandoah Valley, Early falling 
back to Strasburg. On the 12th I learned that Lee 
had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions 
of infantry, and a considerable cavalry force to 
strengthen Early. It was important that Sheridan 
should be informed of this ; so I sent the inf orma- ibid. 775, 783 
tion to Washington by telegraph, and directed a 
courier to be sent from there to get the message to 

213 



214 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XVI 



Visit to 
Sheridan 



Sheridan, 

Memoirs, II, 

9 



Sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. 
The messenger, an officer of the army, pushed 
through with great energy and reached Sheridan 
just in time. The officer went through by way of 
Snicker's Grap, escorted by some cavalry. He found 
Sheridan just making his preparations to attack 
Early in his chosen position. Now, however, he 
was thrown back on the defensive. 

On the 15th of Sejitember I started to \asit Gen- 
eral Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley. My pur- 
pose was to have him attack Early, or drive him 
out of the Valley and destroy that source of sup- 
plies for Lee's army. I knew it was impossible for 
me to get orders through Washington to Sheridan 
to make a move, because they would be stojDped 
there, and such orders as Halleck's caution (and 
that of the Secretary of War) would suggest would 
be given instead, and would no doubt be contra- 
dictory to mine. I therefore, without stopping at 
Washington, went directly through to Charles- 
town, some ten miles above Harper's Ferry, and 
waited there to see General Sheridan, having sent 
a courier in advance to inform him where to 
meet me. 

When Sheridan arrived I asked him if he had a 
map showing the positions of his army and that of 
the enemy. He at once drew one out of his side- 
pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the 
camps of the two armies. He said that if he had 
permission he would move so and so (pointing out 
how) against the Confederates, and that he could 
" whip them." Before starting I had drawn up a 
plan of campaign for Sheridan, which I had brought 
with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so 



VISIT TO SHERIDAN 215 

positive in his views, and so confident of success, I chap, xvt 
said nothing about this, and did not take it out of 
my pocket. 

Sheridan's vragon-trains v^ere kept at Harper's 
Ferry, where all of his stores were. By keeping 
the teams at that place, their forage did not have 
to be hauled to them. As supplies of ammunition, 
provisions, and rations for the men were wanted, 
trains would be made up to deliver the stores to 
the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at 
Winchester. Knowing that he, in making prepara- 
tions to move at a given day, would have to bring 
up wagon-trains from Harper's Ferry, I asked him 
if he could be ready to get off by the following 
Tuesday. This was on Friday. " Oh yes," he said, 
he " could be off before daylight on Monday." I 
told him then to make the attack at that time and 
according to his own plan; and I immediately 
started to return to the army about Richmond. 
After visiting Baltimore and Burlington, New Jer- 
sey, I arrived at City Point on the 19tli. 

On the way out to Harper's Ferry I had met 
Mr. Robert Garrett, president of the Baltimore and 
Ohio railroad. He seemed very anxious to know 
when workmen might be put upon the road again 
so as to make repairs and put it in shape for run- 
ning. It was a large piece of property to have 
standing idle. I told him I could not answer then 
positively, but would try and inform him before a 
great while. On my return Mr. Garrett met me 
again with the same question, and I told him I 
thought that by the following Wednesday he might 
send his workmen out on his road. I gave him no 
further information, however, and he had no sue- 



216 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVI picioii of liow I expected to have the road cleared 
for his workmen. 

a^'S«^554 Sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. 
He met Early at the crossing of Opequan Creek, 
and won a most decisive victory — one which elec- 
trified the country. Early had invited this attack 
himself by his bad generalship, and made the vic- 
tory easy. He had sent G. T. Anderson's division 
east of the Blue Ridge before I went to Harper's 
Ferry; and about the time I arrived there he 

M^emSrs n started with two other divisions (leaving but two 
^" in their camps) to march to Martinsburg for the 
purpose of destroying the Baltimore and Ohio 
railroad at that point. Early here learned that I 
had been with Sheridan, and, supposing there was 
some movement on foot, started back as soon as 
he got the information. But his forces were sepa- 
rated, and, as I have said, he was very badly de- 
feated. He fell back to Fisher's Hill, Sheridan 
following. 

The Valley is narrow at that point, and Early 
made another stand there, behind works which 

WR.XLIII extended across. But Sheridan turned both his 

(1) Jo~Jot 46— 

49,655-558 flanks and again sent him speeding up the Vallej^, 
following in hot pursuit. The pursuit was con- 
tinued up the Valley to Mount Jackson and New 
Market. Sheridan captured about eleven hundred 
prisoners and sixteen guns. The houses which he 
passed all along the route were found to be filled 
with Early's wounded, and the country swarmed 
with his deserters. Finally, on the 25th, Early 
turned from the Valley eastward, leaving Sheridan 
at Harrisonburg in undisputed possession. 
Ibid. 60 Now one of the main objects of the expedition 



SHENANDOAH 

VALLEY 

CAMPAIGN. 




SHERIDAN'S VICTORY IN THE SHENANDOAH 217 

began to be accomplished. Sheridan went to work ciiAr. xvi 
with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, 
and everything in the upper part of the Valley 
required by our troops ; and especially taking what 
might be of use to the enemy. What he could not 
take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would 
not be invited to come back there. I congratulated 
Sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a ^•^■)fi8"^ 
salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the 
guns being aimed at the enemy around Petersburg. 
I also notified the other commanders throughout 
the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his 
victory. 

I had reason to believe that the administration 
was a little afraid to have a decisive battle fought 
at that time, for fear it might go against us and 
have a bad effect on the November elections. The dan® Me-" 
convention which had met and made its nomina- ™°^^^' ^' ''^*' 
tion of the Democratic candidate for the Presidency 
had declared the war a failure. Treason was talked 
as boldly in Chicago at that convention as ever it 
had been in Charleston. It was a question whether 
the government would then have had the power 
to make arrests and punish those who thus talked 
treason. But this decisive victory was the most 
effective campaign argument made in the canvass. 

Sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they 
could hear from him in Washington, and the Presi- 
dent became very much frightened about him. He 
was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little 
like that of General Cass was said to have been, in 
one of our Indian wars, when he was an officer of 
the army. Cass was pursuing the Indians so closely 
that the first thing he knew he found himself in 



218 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVI their front and the Indians pursuing him. The 
President was afraid that Sheridan had got on the 
other side of Early and that Early was in behind 
him. He was afraid that Sheridan was getting so 

W.R.XLIII far away that reinforcements would be sent out 

(2) 208 "^ 1 1 • T 

from Richmond to enable Early to beat him. i 
replied to the President that I had taken steps to 
prevent Lee from sending reinforcements to Early, 
by attacking the former where he was. 

On the 28th of September, to retain Lee in his 
w. R. xLii position, I sent Ord with the Eighteenth Corps and 

(1) 793 A 7 

Birney with the Tenth Corps to make an advance 
on Richmond, to threaten it. Ord moved with the 
left wing up to Chaffin's Bluff; Birney with the 
Tenth Corps took a road farther north ; while Kautz 
with the cavalry took the Darby road, still farther 
to the north. They got across the river by the next 

Ibid. 798 morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. 
In that, however, they were unsuccessful. 

The enemy's lines were very strong and very in- 
tricate. Stannard's division of the Eighteenth 

Hiram Corps, with General Bumham's brigade leading, 
coi-6t^^Me- i^i-ied an assault against Fort Harrison, and cap- 

Apil^isS' tured it with sixteen guns and a good many prison- 
ers. Burnham was killed in the assault. Colonel 

Aaron F. gtcveus, who succccded him, was badly wounded ; 

Stevens '-^7 ci 

and his successor also fell in the same way. Some 
works to the right and left were also carried with 
the guns in them — six in number — and a few more 
prisoners. Birney's troops to the right captured 
the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were un- 
successful in their efforts upon the main line. 

Our troops fortified their new position, bringing 
Fort Harrison into the new line and extending it 



SHERIDAN'S VICTOEY IN THE SHENANDOAH 219 

to the river. This brought us pretty close to the chap.xvi 
enemy ou the north side of the James, and the two 
opposing Hues maintained their relative positions 
to the close of the siege. 

In the afternoon a further attempt was made to 
advance, but it failed. Ord fell badly wounded, 
and had to be relieved; the command devolved 
upon General Heckman, and later Greneral Weitzel ^^^^ "S' 
was assigned to the command of the Eighteenth ^^o.isetr' 
Corps. During the night Lee reinforced his troops n. j. Feb. lo, 
about Fort Gilmer, which was at the right of Fort '^^^''-^^gO/- 
Harrison, by transferring eight additional brigades 
from Petersburg, and attempted to retake the 
works which we had captured by concentrating 
ten brigades against them. All their efforts failed, 
their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy 
loss. In one of these assaults upon us General 
Stannard, a gallant officer, who was defending Fort ^a?dS" 
Harrison, lost an arm. Our casualties during these May? isl*;' 
operations amounted to 394 killed, 1554 wounded, voisiMar" 

^ . . 11,1863 

and 324 missing. 

While this was going on General Meade was in- 
structed to keep up an appearance of moving troops 
to our extreme left. Parke and Warren were kept 
with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move, 
leaving their inclosed batteries manned, with a 
scattering line on the other intrenchments. The 
object of this was to prevent reinforcements from 
going to the north side of the river. Meade was 
instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if Lee ^-(J-ins"^ 
weakened his lines, to make an attack. 

On the 30th these troops moved out, under War- 
ren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at 
Peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main 



220 PEESONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT 

Chap. XVI line. Our troops followed and made an attack in 
the hope of carrying the enemy's main line ; but in 
this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number 
of men, mostly captured. The number of killed 
and wounded was not large. The next day our 
troops advanced again and established themselves, 
intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the 
enemy. This advanced Warren's position on the 
Weldon railroad very considerably. 

Sheridan, having driven the enemy out of the 
Valley, and taken the productions of the Valley, so 
that instead of going there for supplies the enemy 
would have to bring his provisions with him if he 
again entered it, recommended a reduction of his 

^2)^4^250^ own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be 
^^^ of more use. I approved of his suggestion, and 
ordered him to send Wright's corps back to the 
James River. I further directed him to repair the 
railroad up the Shenandoah Valley toward the ad- 
vanced position, which we would hold with a small 
force. The troops were to be sent to Washington 
by the way of Culpeper, in order to watch the east 
side of the Blue Ridge, and prevent the enemy from 
getting into the rear of Sheridan while he was still 
doing his work of destruction. 

The Valley was so very important, however, to 
the Confederate army that, contrary to our expec- 
tations, they determined to make one more strike, 
and save it, if possible, before the supplies should 
be all destroyed. Reinforcements were sent, there- 
fore, to Early, and this before any of our troops 
had been withdrawn. Early prepared to strike 
Sheridan at Harrisonburg; but the latter had not 
remained there. 



SHEKIDAN'S VICTOEY IN THE SHENANDOAH 221 

On the 6tli of October Sheridan commenced re- chap, xvi 
thing down the Vahey, taking or destroying all the ^(i^^Jgo" 
food and forage, and driving the cattle before him, 
Early following. At Fisher's Hill Sheridan turned 
his cavalry back on that of Early, which, under the 
lead of Rosser, was pm'suing closely, and routed it w.p.fs^e^i; 
most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large cav.^6ct!i6, 
number of prisoners. Sheridan lost only about Gen'. Nov. 

1864 

sixty men. His cavalry pursued the enemy back 
some twenty-five miles. On the 10th of October J^^i^^J^o^ 
the march down the Valley was again resumed, ^^ 
Early again following. 

I now ordered Sheridan to halt, and to improve 
the opportunity, if afforded by the enemy's having 
been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and 
cut the James River Canal and Virginia Central 
railroad. But this order had to go through Wash- '^•^jlg"^ 
ington, where it was intercepted ; and when Sheri- 
dan received what purported to be a statement of 
what I wanted him to do, it was something entirely 
different. Halleck informed Sheridan that it was ibid. 345 
my wish for him to hold a forward position as a 
base from which to act against Charlottesville and 
Gordonsville ; that he should fortify this position 
and provision it. 

Sheridan objected to this most decidedly ; and I 

was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as 

follows : 

City Point, Virginia, 

October 14, 18C4, 12 : 30 p.m. 

Major-General Sheridan, 

Cedar Creek, Virginia : 

What I want is for yon to threaten the Virginia Central ibid. 363 

railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you 

is best, holding yourself ready to advance if the enemy 



222 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVI draw off tlieir forces. If you make the enemy hold a force 
equal to your own for the protection of those thorough- 
fares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruc- 
tion. If jon cannot do this, then the next best thing to 
do is to send here all the force you can. I deem a good 
cavahy force necessary for your offensive as well as defen- 
sive operations. You need not, therefore, send here more 
than one division of cavahy. 

U. S. Grant, 
lAeutenant- Genera I. 



W. R. XLIII 

(2) 363 



Sheridan, having been summoned to Washington 
city, started on the 15th, leaving Wright in com- 
mand. His army was then at Cedar Creek, some 
twenty miles south of Winchester. The next 
morning, while at Front Royal, Sheridan received 
Ibid. 389 a despatch from Wright, saying that a despatch 
from Longstreet to Early had been intercepted. 
It directed the latter to be ready to move and to 
crush Sheridan as soon as he, Longstreet, arrived. 
On the receipt of this news Sheridan ordered the 
cavalry up the Valley to join Wright. 

a)"5t5™- On the 18th of October Early was ready to 
^^* move, and during the night succeeded in getting 
Ms troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled 
precipitately and in great confusion down the 
VaUey, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a 
thousand or more prisoners. The right, under 

Ibid. 193-196 General Getty, maintained a firm and steady front, 
falling back to Middletown, where it took a position 
and made a stand. The cavalry went to the rear, 
seized the roads leading to Winchester, and held 
them for the use of our troops in falling back. 
General Wright having ordered a retreat back to 

Cf. Sbei'i- 4.1 J. 1 
dan, Me- that plaCC. 

etseq.' Slicridau, having left Washington on the 18th, 



SHERIDAN'S KIDE TO WINCHESTER 223 

reached Winchester that night. The following chap.xvi 
morning he started to join his command. He had 
scarcely got out of town when, he met his men re- 
turning in panic from the front, and also heard 
heavy firing to the south. He immediately ordered 
the cavalry at Winchester to be deployed across 
the Valley to stop the stragglers. Leaving mem- 
bers of his staff to take care of Winchester and the 
public property there, he set out with a small es- 
cort directly for the scene of battle. As he met the 
fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding 
them that they were going the wrong way. His 
presence soon restored confidence. Finding them- 
selves worse frightened than hurt, the men did halt 
and turn back. Many of those who had run ten 
miles got back in time to redeem their reputation 
as gallant soldiers before night. 

When Sheridan got to the front he found Getty and ^'- ^i^^^" 
Custer still holding their ground firmly between the 
Confederates and our retreating troops. Everything 
in the rear was now ordered up. Sheridan at once 
proceeded to intrench his position ; and he awaited 
an assault from the enemy. This was made with 
vigor, and was directed principally against Emory's iwd. 284 
corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the 
first attack. By one o'clock the attack was repulsed. 
Early w^as so badly damaged that he seemed disin- 
clined to make another attack, but went to work to 
intrench himself with a view to holding the position 
he had already gained. He thought, no doubt, that 
Sheridan would be glad enough to leave him un- 
molested; but in this he was mistaken. 

About the middle of the afternoon Sheridan ad- sherifc 
vanced. He sent his cavalry by both flanks, and 



Memoirs, II, 

88 



224 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVI they penetrated to the enemy's rear. The contest 
was close for a time, but at length the left of the 
enemy broke, and disintegi'ation along the whole 
line soon followed. Early tried to rally his men, 
but they were followed so closely that they had to 
give way very quickly every time they attempted 
to make a stand. Our cavalry, having pushed on 
and got in the rear of the Confederates, captured 
twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking 
what had been lost in the morning. This victory 
pretty much closed the campaigning in the Valley 
of Virginia. All the Confederate troops were sent 
back to Richmond, with the exception of one 
division of infantry and a little cavalry. Wright's 
corps was ordered back to the Army of the Poto- 
mac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from 
the Valley. Early had lost more men in killed, 
wounded, and captured in the Valley than Sheridan 
had commanded from first to last. 

Gen. Hayes Ou morc tliau ouc occasiou in these engagements 
General E. B. Hayes, who succeeded me as Presi- 
1877-1880 dent of the United States, bore a very honorable 
part. His conduct on the field was marked by 
conspicuous gallantry, as well as the display of 
qualities of a higher order than that of mere per- 
sonal daring. This might well have been expected 
of one who could write at the time he is said to 
have done so, "Any officer fit for duty who at this 
crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a 

Ma-i. 23d , ^ 

Lt'^coi^oct' ^^^^ ^^ Congress, ought to be scalped." Ha\'ing 

Coif Oct 24 entered the army as a major of volunteers at the 

Gen.vSf." beginning of the war, General Hayes attained by 

Bvt. Maj.*' meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general 

Gen. Mar. 13, t p ., , 

1865 before its close. 







GENERAL GKANT, MRS. GRANT, AND MASTER JESSE AT HEADcJl'ARTERS AT CITY POINT. 
(from photograph by E. and H. T. ANTHON"!'.) 



CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN FOE THE WINTER 225 

On the north side of the James River the enemy chap.xvi 
attacked Kantz's cavahy on the 7th of October, "^'S-gfa"^ 
and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, 
wonnded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the 
artiUery. This was followed up by an attack on 
our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with 
severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnaissance 
was sent out by General Butler, with a view to 
drive the enemy from some new works he was con- 
structing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. 

On the 24th I ordered General Meade to attempt w- l/gn"^ 
to get possession of the South Side railroad, and 
for that purpose to advance on the 27th. The at- 
tempt proved a failure, however, the most ad- ibid. 35-37 
vanced of our troops not getting nearer than 
within six miles of the point aimed for. Seeing 
the impossibility of its accomplishment, I ordered 
the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in 
their former positions the next day. 

Butler, by my directions, also made a demonstra- iMd.^331,390. 
tion on the north side of the James River in order 
to support this move, by detaining there the Con- 
federate troops who were on that side. He suc- 
ceeded in this, but failed of further results by not 
marching past the enemy's left before turning in 
on the Darby road, and by reason of simply coming 
up against their lines in place. 

This closed active operations around Richmond 
for the winter. Of course there was frequent skir- 
mishing between pickets, but no serious battle was 
fought near either Petersburg or Richmond. It 
would prolong this work to give a detailed account 
of all that took place from day to day around 
Petersburg and at other parts of my command, 
Vol. II.— 15 



226 PEKSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVI aiid it would iiot interest the general reader if 
given. All these details can be found by the mili- 
tary student in a series of books published by the 
Scribners ; Badeau's history of my campaigns ; and 
also in the publications of the War Department, 
including both the National and Confederate re- 
ports. 

w- K.^xLii jjj tj^e latter part of November General Hancock 
was relieved from the command of the Second 
Corps by the Secretary of War and ordered to 
Washington, to organize and command a corps of 
veteran troops to be designated the First Corps. 
It was expected that this would give him a large 
command to cooperate with in the spring. It was 
my expectation, at the time, that in the final opera- 
tions Hancock should move either up the Valley, or 
else east of the Blue Ridge to Lynchburg ; the idea 
being to make the spring campaign the close of the 
war. I expected, with Sherman coming up from 
the South, Meade south of Petersburg and around 
Richmond, and Thomas's command in Tennessee, 
with depots of supplies established in the eastern 
part of that State, to move from the direction of 
Washington or the Valley toward Lynchburg. We 
would then have Lee so surrounded that his sup- 
plies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible 
for him to support his army. 

Ibid. 705,714 General Humphreys, chief of staff of the Army 
of the Potomac, was assigned to the command of 
the Second Corps, to succeed Hancock. 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA — SHERMAN'S MARCH TO 
THE SEA — WAR ANECDOTES — THE MARCH ON 
SAVANNAH — INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH — CAPTURE 
OF SAVANNAH 

IET US now return to the operations in the chap.xvii 
^ Military Division of the Mississippi, and ac- 
company Sherman in his march to the sea. 

The possession of Atlanta by us narrowed the 
territory of the enemy very materially, and cut off 
one of his two remaining lines of roads from east 

to west. 

A short time after the fall of Atlanta Mr. Davis 
visited Palmetto and Macon and made speeches at 
each place. He spoke at Palmetto on the 20th of ise* 
September, and at Macon on the 22d. Inasmuch 
as he had reheved Johnston and appointed Hood, ^.^^^^y^ 
and Hood had immediately taken the initiative, it ^^^""'^ 
is natural to suppose that Mr. Davis was disap- 
pointed with General Johnston's policy. My own 
judgment is that Johnston acted very wisely : he 
husbanded his men and saved as much of his terri- 
tory as he could, without fighting decisive battles 
in which all might be lost. As Sherman advanced, 
as I have shown, his army became spread out, until, 
if this had been continued, it would have been 

227 



228 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Jos. E. 
Brown, Gov. 

1857-64 ; 

U. S. Sen. 

1880-91 



Chap. XVII easy to destroy it in detail. I know that both 
Sherman and I were rejoiced when we heard of the 
change. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant 
soldier, and not destitute of ability; but unfor- 
tunately his policy was to fight the enemy wher- 
ever he saw him, without thinking much of the 
consequences of defeat. 

In his speeches Mr. Davis denounced Governor 
Brown, of Greorgia, and General Johnston in un- 
measured terms, even insinuating that their loy- 
alty to the Southern cause was doubtful. So far 
as General Johnston is concerned, I think Davis 
did him a great injustice in this particular. I had 
known the general before the war, and strongly be- 
lieved it would be impossible for him to accept a 
high commission for the purpose of betraying the 
cause he had espoused. Then, as I have said, I 
think that his policy was the best one that could 
have been pursued by the whole South — protract 
the war, which was all that was necessary to en- 
able them to gain recognition in the end. The 
North was already growing weary, as the South 
evidently was also, but with this difference. In 
the North the people governed, and could stop 
hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. 
The South was a military camp, controlled abso- 
lutely by the government with soldiers to back it, 
and the war could have been protracted, no matter 
to what extent the discontent reached, up to the 
point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. 
Mr. Davis's speeches were frank appeals to the 
people of Georgia and that portion of the South to 
come to their relief. He tried to assure his fright- 
ened hearers that the Yankees were rapidly digging 



Johnston's 
policy 



Davis on 
the war 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 



229 



Cf. Hood's 
Rep. W. R. 
XXXIX (1) 

801 



their own graves; that measures were ah^eady chap.xvii 
being taken to cut them off: from supplies from the 
North ; and that, with a force in front and cut off 
from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst 
of a hostile people. Papers containing reports of 
these speeches immediately reached the Northern 
States, and they were republished. Of course that 
caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communica- 
tion was kept up with Sherman. 

When Hood was forced to retreat from Atlanta 
he moved to the southwest, and was followed by a 
portion of Sherman's army. He soon appeared 
upon the railroad in Sherman's rear, and with his 
whole army began destroying the road. At the 
same time, also, the work was begun in Tennessee 
and Kentucky which Mr. Da\T.s had assured his 
hearers at Palmetto and Macon would take place. 
He ordered Forrest (about the ablest cavalry gen- 
eral in the South) north for this purpose ; and For- 
rest and Wlieeler carried out their orders with 
more or less destruction, occasionally picking up 
a garrison. Forrest, indeed, performed the very 
remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two 
gunboats and a number of transports, something 
the accomplishment of which is very hard to ac- 
count for. Hood's army had been weakened by 
Governor Brown's withdrawing the Georgia State Memoh-Mi, 
troops for the pui'pose of gathering in the season's 
crops for the use of the people and for the use of 
the army. This not. only depleted Hood's forces, 
but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering 
in supplies of food and forage for the use of our 
army in its subsequent march. Sherman was 
obliged to push on with his force and go himself 



W. R. 
XXXIX 

(1) 868-871 



138, 139 



230 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVII with portions of it Mther and thither, until it was 
clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he 
then had it would be impossible to hold the line 
from Atlanta back and leave him any force what- 
ever with which to take the offensive. Had that 
plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements 
would have been necessary ; and Mr, Da^ds's pre- 
diction of the destruction of the army would have 
been realized, or else Sherman would have been 
obliged to make a successful retreat, which Mr. 
Davis said in his speeches would prove more 
disastrous than Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. 

These speeches of Mr. Davis were not long in 
reaching Sherman. He took advantage of the in- 
formation they gave, and made all the preparation 
possible for him to make to meet what now became 
expected — attempts to break his communications. 
Something else had to be done ; and to Sherman's 
sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long 
in dawning upon him, not only that something 
else had to be done, but what that something else 
should be. 

On September 10th I telegraphed Sherman as 
follows : 

City Point, Virginia, 
September 10, 1864. 
Major-General Sherman, 
Atlanta, Georgia: 
^ w.K. So soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and prepara- 

355 tions can be made, it is desirable that another campaign 
should be commenced. We want to keep the enemy con- 
stantly pressed to the end of the war. If we give him no 
peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. Now 
that we have all of Mobile Bay that is valuable, I do not 
know but it will be tlie best move to transfer Canby's 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 



231 



troops to act iipon Savannah, whilst you move on Augusta, chap xvii 
I should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. 

U. S. Grant, 
Ideiitenant- General. 

Sherman replied promptly : 



If I could be sm-e of finding provisions and ammuni- 
tion at Augusta or Columbus, Georgia, I can march to 
Milledgeville, and compel Hood to give up Augusta or 
Macon, and then turn on the other. ... If you can man- 
age to take the Savannah River as high up as Augusta, 
or the Chattahoochee as far up as Columbus, I can sweep 
the whole State of Georgia. 



W.R. 
XXXIX (2) 

356 



On the 12th I sent a special messenger, one 
of my own staff, with a letter inviting Sherman's 
views about the next campaign. 

City Point, Virginia, 
September 12, 1864. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, 

Commanding MiUtary Division of the Mississippi : 

I send Lieutenant-Colonel Porter, of my staff, with this. 
Colonel Porter will explain to you the exact condition of 
affairs here better than I can do in the limits of a letter. 
Although I feel myseh strong enough for offensive opera- 
tions, I am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits 
and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. 
My lines are necessarily very long, extending from Deep 
Bottom north of the James across the peninsula formed 
by the Appomattox and the James, and south of the Ap- 
pomattox to the Weldon road. This hue is very strongly 
fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but 
from its great length takes many in the aggregate. I pro- 
pose, when I do move, to extend my left so as to control 
what is known as the South Side, or Lynchburg and 
Petersburg, road, then, if possible, to keep the Danville 
road cut. At the same time this move is made, I want to 



Ibid. 364 



Horace Por- 
ter, W. P. 
1855-60; 2d 
Lt.Ord.Apr. 
22, 1861 ; 
Lt.-Col. 
Staff, A.D.C. 
Apr. i, 1864 



232 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVII send a force of from six to ten thousand men against 
Wilmington. 

The way I propose to do this is to land the men north 
of Fort Fisher, and hold that point. At the same time a 
large naval fleet Avill be assembled there, and the ironclads 
will run the batteries as they did at Mobile. This will give 
us the same control of the harbor of Wilmington that we 
now have of the harbor of Mobile. What you are to do 
with the forces at your command I do not see. The diffi- 
culties of supplying your army, except when you are con- 
stantly moving, beyond where you are, I plainly see. If 
it had not been for Price's movements, Canby would have 
sent twelve thousand more men to Mobile. From yom- 
command on the Mississippi an equal number could have 
been taken. With these forces my idea would have been 
to divide them, sending one half to Mobile and the other 
half to Savannah. You could then move as proposed 
in your telegram, so as to threaten Macon and Augusta 
equally. Whichever was abandoned by the enemy you 
could take and open up a new base of supphes. My ob- 
ject now in sending a stafe-offtcer is not so much to suggest 
operations for you as to get your views and have plans 
matured by the time everything can be got ready. It mil 
probably be the 5th of October before any of the plans 
herein indicated wiU be executed. 

If you have any promotions to recommend, send the 
names forward and I will approve them. . . . 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

This reached Sherman on September 20th. 
w.R. On the 25th of September Sherman reported to 

«* Washington that Hood's troops were in his rear. 
He had provided against this by sending a division 
to Chattanooga and a division to Rome, Georgia, 
which was in the rear of Hood, supposing that 
Hood would fall back in the direction from which 
he had come to reach the railroad. At the same 



XXXIX (2) 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 233 

time Sherman and Hood kept up a correspondence chap, xvii 
relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment M^emoirMi, 
of citizens, and other matters suitable to be ar- ^29, 143 
ranged l^etween hostile commanders in the field. 
On the 27th of September I telegraphed Sherman 
as follows: 

City Point, Virginia, 
September 27, 1864, 10 : 30 a.m. 
Ma.jor-General Sherman : 

I have directed all recruits and new troops from the x:^'ix(2) 
Western States to be sent to Nashville, to receive their *^^ 
further orders from you. . . . 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

On the 29th Sherman sent Thomas back to Chat- M^emota.n. 
tanooga, and afterward to Nashville, with another ^** 
division (Morgan's) of the advanced army. Sher- ga^Brig.' 
man then suggested that, when he was prepared, j^*^y iT, ^2 
his movements should take place against Milledge- 
ville and then to Savannah. His expectation at 
that time was to make this movement as soon as 
he could get up his supplies. Hood was moving in 
his own country, and vf as moving light, so that he 
could make two miles to Sherman's one. He de- 
pended upon the country to gather his supplies, 
and so was not affected by delays. 

As I have said, until this unexpected state of 
affairs happened. Mobile had been looked upon as 
the objective point of Sherman's army. It had 
been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when 
I first suggested to the then commander-in-chief 
that the troops in Louisiana, instead of frittering 
away their time in the trans-Mississippi, should 
move against Mobile. I recommended this from " '^iss' ' 



234 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVII time to time until I came into command of the 

army, the last of March, 1864. Having the power 

cf. w. R. in mv own hands, I now ordered the concentration 

XXXIX (3) '' ' 

25,63 of supplies, stores, and troops in the Department of 
the Gulf about New Orleans, with a view to a move 
against Mobile, in support of, and in conjunction 
with, the other armies operating in the field. Be- 
fore I came into command these troops had been 
scattered over the trans-Mississippi Department in 
such a way that they could not be, or were not, 
gotten back in time to take any part in the original 
movement; hence the consideration which had 
caused Mobile to be selected as the objective point 
for Sherman's army, to find his next base of sup- 
plies after having cut loose from Atlanta, no longer 
existed. 
M^emoi?rii Greneral G. M. Dodge, an exceedingly efficient 
"^ officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave 
the army about the 1st of October. He was in 
command of two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, 
consolidated into one. Sherman then divided his 
army into the right and left wings — the right com- 
manded by General O. 0. Howard and the left by 
General Slocmn. General Dodge's two divisions 
were assigned, one to each of these wings. How- 
ard's command embraced the Fifteenth and Seven- 
teenth corps, and Slocum's the Fourteenth and 
Twentieth corps, commanded by Generals Jeff. C. 
A.8.wii- Davis and A. S. Williams. Generals Logan and 

liams, Brig.- ^ 

MaTirisei Blair commanded the two corps composing the 
right wing. About this time they left to take part 
in the Presidential election, which took place that 
year, leaving their corps to Osterhaus and Ransom. 
I have no doubt that their leaving was at the ear- 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 235 

nest solicitation of the War Department. General chap, xvii 
Blair got back in time to resume his command and 
to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea 
and back to the grand review at Washington. 
General Logan did not return to his command 
until after it reached Savannah. 

Logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer ^gf^°ed^' 
of General Howard from that portion of the Army 
of the Potomac which was then with the Western 
army, to the command of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, with which army General Logan had served 
from the battle of Belmont to the fall of Atlanta — 
having passed successively through all grades from 
colonel commanding a regiment to general com- 
manding a brigade, division, and army-corps, until, 
upon the death of McPherson, the command of the 
entire Army of the Tennessee devolved upon him 
in the midst of a hotly contested battle. He con- 
ceived that he had done his full duty as commander 
in that engagement; and I can bear testimony, 
from personal observation, that he had proved 
himself fully equal to all the lower positions which 
he had occupied as a soldier. I will not pretend to 
question the motive which actuated Sherman in 
taking an officer from another army to supersede 
General Logan. I have no doubt whatever that 
he did this for what he considered would be to the 
good of the service, which was more important than 
that the personal feelings of any individual should 
not be aggrieved ; though I doubt whether he had 
an officer with him who could have filled the place 
as Logan would have done. Differences of opinion 
must exist between the best of friends as to policies 
in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. The 



236 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVII of&cer who has the command, however, should be 
allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under 
him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. 
Sherman, Shcrmau's army, after all the depletions, num- 

Memoirs.II, -^ ' . 

^*^ bered about sixty thousand elfective men. All 
weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those 
remaining were not only well men, but strong and 
hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers 
as ever trod the earth ; better than any European 
soldiers, because they not only worked like a 
machine, but the machine thought. European 
armies know very little what they are fighting for, 
and care less. Included in these sixty thousand 
troops there were two small divisions of cavalry, 
numbering altogether about four thousand men. 
Hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, 
independent of Forrest, whose forces were operat- 
ing in Tennessee and Kentucky, as Mr. Davis had 

pres. promised they should. This part of Mr. Davis's 

DaiVi8*8 mil- i^ *^ 

itary genius military plan was admirable, and promised the best 
results of anything he could have done, according 
to my judgment. I say this because I have crit- 
icized his military judgment in the removal of 
Johnston, and also in the appointment of Hood. 
I am aware, however, that there was high feeling 
existing at that time between Davis and his sub- 
ordinate, whom I regarded as one of his ablest 
lieutenants. 
w.R. ^ On the 5th of October the railroad back from 
581, 802 Atlanta was again very badly broken. Hood having 
got on the track with his army. Sherman saw after 
night, from a high point, the road burning for 
miles. The defense of the railroad by our troops 
was very gallant, but they could not hold points 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 237 

between their intrenched positions against Hood's chap, xvii 
whole army. In fact, they made no attempt to do 
so; bnt generally the intrenched positions were 
held, as well as important bridges, and stores 
located at them. Allatoona, for instance, was de- 
fended by a small force of men under the command 
of General Corse, one of the very able and efficient 
volunteer officers produced by the war. He, with 
a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the corse'sRep. 
National army, and was attacked with great vigor 760 et seq. 
by many times his own number. Sherman from 
his high position could see the battle raging, with 
the Confederate troops between him and his sub- 
ordinate. He sent men, of course, to raise the M^emoUMi, 
temporary siege, but the time that would be ne- i*^-^*^ 
cessarily consumed in reaching Corse would be 
so great that all occupying the intrenchments 
might be dead. Corse was a man who would 
never surrender. From a high position some of 
Sherman's signal corps discovered a signal-flag 
waving from a hole in the block-house at Al- 
latoona. It was from Corse. He had been shot 
through the face, but he signaled to his chief a 
message which left no doubt of his determination 
to hold his post at all hazards. It was at this 
point, probably, that Sherman first realized that 
with the forces at his disposal the keeping open of 
his line of communications with the North would 
be impossible if he expected to retain any force 
with which to operate offensively beyond Atlanta. 
He proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back xxxix(3) 
to Chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave ^^' ^^*' ^"^^ 
the latter place garrisoned. Yet, before abandoning 
the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair 



238 



PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XVII 



W.R. 
XXXIX (3) 

594 



D. S. Stan- 
ley, w. p. 

1848-52 ; 

Capt. Ist 

Cav. Mar.16, 

Brig.-Geu. 

Vols. Sept. 

28, 1861; 

Maj.-Gen. 

Nov. 29, 1862 



Thomas's 
strength 



damages already done, and hold the road until he 
could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores, 
and small rations as he wanted to carry with him 
on his proposed march, and to return to the north 
his surplus artillery ; his object being to move light, 
and to have no more artillery than could be used to 
advantage on the field. 

Sherman thought Hood would follow him, though 
he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the 
latter's moving the other way while he was moving 
south, by making Thomas strong enough to hold 
Tennessee and Kentucky. I myself was thoroughly 
satisfied that Hood would go north, as he did. On 
the 2d of November I telegraphed Sherman, author- 
izing him definitely to move according to the plan 
he had proposed — that is, cutting loose from his 
base, giving up Atlanta and the railroad back to 
Chattanooga. To strengthen Thomas he sent Stan- 
ley (Fourth Corps) back, and also ordered Scho- 
field, commanding the Army of the Ohio, twelve 
thousand strong, to report to him. In addition to 
this, A. J. Smith, who, with two divisions of Sher- 
man's army, was in Missouri aiding Rosecrans in 
driving the enemy from that State, was under 
orders to return to Thomas, and, under the most 
unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to 
arrive there long before Hood could reach Nashville. 

In addition to this the new levies of troops that 
were being raised in the Northwest went to Thomas 
as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. Thomas, with- 
out any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison 
at Chattanooga — which had been strengthened by 
one division — and garrisons at Bridgeport, Steven- 
son, Decatur, Murfreesboro', and Florence. There 



THE CAMPAIGN IN GEORGIA 239 

were already with him in Nashville ten thousand chap, xvii 
soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of 
employees in the quartermaster's and other depart- 
ments who could be put in the intrenchments in 
front of Nashville, for its def en se. Also, Wilson was 
there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, 
who were being equipped for the field. Thomas 
had at this time about forty-five thousand men 
without any of the reinforcements here above 
enumerated. These reinforcements gave him al- 
together about seventy thousand men, without 
counting what might be added by the new levies 
already spoken of. 

About this time Beauregard arrived upon the xxxixo) 
field, not to supersede Hood in command, but to '^^^'^^^-^^s 
take general charge over the entire district in which 
Hood and Sherman were, or might be, operating. 
He made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for ^- \f ^^^ 
assistance to be rendered in every way : by sending 
reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line 
of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges 
over which they would have to cross, and by, in 
every way, obstructing the roads to their front. But 
it was hard to convince the people of the propriety 
of destroying supplies which were so much needed 
by themselves, and each one hoped that his own 
possessions might escape. 

Hood soon started north, and went into camp 
near Decatur, Alabama, where he remained until 
the 29th of October, but without making an attack 
on the garrison of that place. 

The Tennessee River was patrolled by gunboats 
from Muscle Shoals east, and also below the 
second shoals out to the Ohio River. These, with 



240 PERSON.\L MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVII the troops that might be concentrated from the 
garrisons along the river at any point where Hood 
might choose to attempt to cross, made it impos- 
sible for him to cross the Tennessee at any place 
where it was navigable. But Muscle Shoals is not 
navigable, and below them again is another shoal 
XXXIX (1) which also obstructs navigation. Hood therefore 
^"^ moved down to a point nearly opposite Florence, 
Alabama, crossed over, and remained there for 
some time, collecting supplies of food, forage, and 
ammunition. All of these had to come from a 
considerable distance south, because the region in 
which he was then situated was mountainous, with 
small valleys which produced but little, and what 
they had produced had long since been exhausted. 
w.R. On the 1st of November I suggested to Sherman — 
^''^ and also asked his views thereon — the propriety ot 
destroying Hood before he started on his campaign. 
Ante, II, 238 On the 2d of November, as stated, I approved def- 
initely his making his proposed campaign through 
Georgia, leaving Hood behind to the tender mercy 
of Thomas and the troops in his command. Sher- 
man fixed the 10th of November as the day of 
starting. 
^ w.R. Sherman started on that day to get back to At- 

^^*^^^J^ lanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea 
w. E. xLiv commenced. The right wing, under Howard, and 
the cavalry went to Jonesboro' ; Milledgeville, then 
the capital of Greorgia, being Sherman's objective 
or stopping-place on the way to Savannah. The 
Ibid. 157 left wing moved to Stone Mountain, along roads 
much farther east than those taken by the right 
wing. Slocum was in command, and threatened 
Augusta as the point to which he was moving ; but 




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vX-fc 


(^^ 


^^6 


5C<?^ 


^ 





SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA 241 

he was to turn off and meet the right wing at chap, xvir 
Milledgeville. 

Atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it 
worthless for military purposes before starting, 
Sherman himself remaining over a day to super- 
intend the work and see that it was well done. 
Sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect, xxknio) 
Before starting he had sent back all sick, disabled, 627,701,713 
and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, 
well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long 
march in prospect. His artillery was reduced Mem^sji, 
to sixty-five guns. The ammunition carried with ^'^ 
them was two hundred rounds for musket and 
gun. Small rations were taken in a small wagon- 
train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid 
movement. The army was expected to live on the 
country, and to always keep the wagons full of 
forage and provisions against a possible delay of a 
few days. 

The troops, both of the right and left wings, 
made most of their advance along the line of rail- 
roads, which they destroyed. The method adopted ^t^^f r^°^ 
to perform this work was to burn and destroy all ''"'^'^^ 
the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, 
at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. 
Soldiers, to do this rapidly, would form a line 
along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, 
place these under the rails, and, hoisting all at once, 
turn over many rods of road at one time. The ties 
would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they 
were loosened, would be carried and put across 
these log-heaps. When a sufficient number of rails 
were placed upon a pile of ties, it would be set on 
fire. This would heat the rails very much more in 
' Vol. 11—16 



242 PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVII tliG middle — that being over the main part of the 
fire — than at the ends, so that they would naturally 
bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to in- 
crease the damage, would take tongs, and, one or 
two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force 
against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus 
leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest- 
trees of Georgia. All this work was going on at the 
same time, there being a sufficient number of men 
detailed for that purpose. Some piled the logs and 
built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; 
while others would bend those that were sufficiently 
heated : so that, by the time the last bit of road was 
torn up that it was designed to destroy at a certain 
place, the rails previously taken up were already 
destroyed. 
Foraging The Organization for supplying the army was 
very complete. Each brigade furnished a company 
to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the 
command to which they belonged. Strict injunc- 
tions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise 
unnecessarily annoying the people ; but everything 
in shape of food for man and forage for beast was 
taken. The supplies were turned over to the 
brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were 
issued by them to their respective commands pre- 
cisely the same as if they had been purchased. 
The captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, 
poultry, some bacon, corn-meal, often molasses, 
and occasionally coffee or other small rations. 

"^bSfe'l-'s" The skill of these men, called by themselves and 
the army " bummers," in collecting their loads and 
getting back to their respective commands, was 
marvelous. When they started out in the morning 



WAE ANECDOTES 



243 



they were always on foot ; but scarcely one of them chap, xvn 
returned in the evening without being mounted on 
a horse or mule. These would be turned in for the 
general use of the army, and the next day these 
men would start out afoot and return again in the 
evening mounted. 

Many of the exploits of these men would fall 
under the head of romance; indeed, I am afraid 
that in telling some of their experiences the ro- 
mance got the better of the truth upon which the 
story was founded, and that, in the way many of 
these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation 
is left. I suspect that most of them consist chiefly 
of the fiction added to make the stories better. In 
one instance it was reported that a few men of 
Sherman's army passed a house where they dis- 
covered some chickens under the dwelling. They 
immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to 
the army's supplies. The lady of the house, who 
happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to 
have these spared, saying they were a few she had 
put away to save, by permission of other parties 
who had preceded, and who had taken all the others 
that she had. The soldiers seemed moved at her 
appeal; but, looking at the chickens again, they 
were tempted, and one of them replied, " The rebel- 
lion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken 
in the Confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate 
the last one. 

Another anecdote characteristic of these times 
has been told. The South, prior to the rebellion, 
kept bloodhounds to piu'sue runaway slaves who 
took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to 
hunt convicts. Orders were issued to kill all these 



244 ' PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVII animals as they were met with. On one occasion 
a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its 
mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when 
the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. 
The soldier replied, " Madam, our orders are to kill 
every bloodhound." "But this is not a blood- 
hound," said the lady. " Well, madam, we cannot 
tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," 
said the soldier as he went off with it. 

Notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the neces- 
sary hardship they would seem to imply, I do not 
man^M^e- Relieve there was much unwarrantable pillaging, 
™i82"i84^' considering that we were in the enemy's territory 
and without any supplies except such as the country 
afforded. 

w.R. xLiv, On the 23d Sherman, with the left wing, reached 
Milledgeville. The right wing was not far off, but 
proceeded on its way toward Savannah, destroying 
the road as it went. The troops at Milledgeville 
remained over a day, to destroy factories, buildings 
used for military purposes, etc., before resuming 
their march. 

^Browif ■ '^^^ governor, who had been almost defying Mr. 
Davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the 
Legislature of the State and all the State officers. 

^^^Tss"'^^' The governor, Sherman says, was careful to carry 
away even his garden vegetables, while he left the 
archives of the State to fall into our hands. The 
only military force that was opposed to Sherman's 
forward march was the Greorgia militia, a division 

w^-ioS2'^o' under the command of General G. W. Smith, and a 
fsltlsl battalion under Harry Wayne. Neither the quality 

cS'.^slpt. of the forces nor their number was sufficient to 
even i-etard the progress of Sherman's army. 



• SHEKMAN'S MAKCH TO THE SEA 245 

The people at the South became so frantic at this chap, xvii 
time at the successful invasion of Georgia that they M^em^sji, 
took the cadets from the military college and added ^^^"^^° 
them to the ranks of the militia. They even lib- 
erated the State convicts, under promise from them 
that they would serve in the army. I have but little 
doubt that the worst acts that were attril)uted to 
Sherman's army were committed by these convicts, 
and by other Southern people who ought to have 
been under sentence, — such people as could be 
found in every community, North and South, — who 
took advantage of their country being invaded to 
commit crime. They were in but little danger of 
detection, or of arrest even if detected. 

The Southern papers, in commenting upon Sher- 
man's movements, pictured him as in the most 
deplorable condition, stating that his men were 
starving, that they were demoralized and wander- 
ing about almost without object, aiming only to 
reach the sea-coast and get under the protection of 
our navy. These papers got to the North and had 
more or less effect upon the minds of the people, 
causing much distress to all loyal persons — partic- 
ularly to those who had husbands, sons, or brothers 
with Sherman. Mr. Lincoln, seeing these accounts, 
had a letter written asking me if I could give him 
anything that he could say to the loyal people that 
would comfort them. I told him there was not the 
slightest occasion for alarm ; that with sixty thou- 
sand such men as Sherman had with him, such a 
commanding officer as he was could not be cut off 
in the open country. He might possibly be pre- 
vented from reaching the point he had started out 
to reach, but he would get through somewhere and 



246 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XVII woulcl filially get to his chosen destination; and 
even if worst came to worst he could return North. 
I heard afterward of Mr. Lincoln's saying, to those 
who would inquire of him as to what he thought 
about the safety of Sherman's army, that Sherman 
was all right : " Grant says they are safe with such 
a general, and that if they cannot get out where 
they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they 
went in at." 

M?moS^s n While at Milledgeville the soldiers met at the 
^^^ State House, organized a legislature, and proceeded 
to business j^recisely as if they were the legisla- 
tive body belonging to the State of G-eorgia. The 
debates were exciting, and were upon the subject 
of the situation the South was in at that time, 
particularly the State of Georgia. They went so 
far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious 
debate, the ordinance of secession. 
Nov. 1864 The next day (24tli) Sherman continued his 
march, going by the way of Waynesboro' and 
Louisville, Milieu being the next objective, and 
where the two columns (the right and left wings) 
were to meet. The left wing moved to the left of 
the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off, so 
as to make it look as though Augusta was the 
point they were aiming for. They moved on all 
the roads they could find leading in that direction. 
The cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in 
hope of surprising Milieu before the Union prisoners 
could be carried away ; but they failed in this. 
The distance from Milledgeville to Milieu was 
Sherman, about ouc huudrcd miles. At this point Wheeler, 

Memoirs, n, ^ , ' 

^^^ who had been ordered from Tennessee, arrived and 
swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops 



THE MAKCH ON SAVANNAH 247 

confronting Sherman. Hardee, a native of Georgia, chap, xvii 
also came, but brought no troops with him. It was 
intended that he should raise as large an army as 
possible with which to intercept Sherman's march. 
He did succeed in raising some troops, and, with 
these and those under the command of Wheeler 
and Wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some wSne^fi.- 
annoyance, but no great detention. Our cavalry A^c^t.-oen." 
and Wlieeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in 
which Wheeler was driven toward Augusta, thus 
giving the idea that Sherman was probably making 
for that point. 

Millen was reached on the 3d of December, and w.r.xliv, 
the march was resumed the following day for Sa- 
vannah, the final objective. Bragg had now been 
sent to Augusta with some troops. Wade Hamp- 
ton was there also, trying to raise cavalry sufficient 
to destroy Sherman's army. If he ever raised a 
force it was too late to do the work expected of it. 
Hardee's whole force probably numbered less than 
ten thousand men. 

From Millen to Savannah the country is sandy 
and poor, and affords but very little forage other 
than rice-straw, which was then growing. This 
answered a very good purpose as forage, and the 
rice-grain was an addition to the soldiers' rations. 
No further resistance worthy of note was met with, 
until within a few miles of Savannah. This place 
was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. Sher- 
man proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the 
place, and found that the enemy had placed torpe- M^emoSrii, 
does in the ground, which were to explode when 
stepped on by man or beast. One of these ex- 
ploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal 



248 PEKSONAIi MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP.xvn to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer 
so badly that it had to be amputated. Sherman 
at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving 
them in a compact body in advance, to either ex- 
plode the torpedoes or dig them up. No further 
explosion took place. 
Sherman, Qu the lOtli of December the siege of Savannah 

Memoirs, II, ^ 

195 etseq. commenced. Sherman then, before proceeding any 
further with operations for the capture of the 
place, started with some troops to open communi- 
cation with our fleet, which he expected to find in 
the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the 
enemy would permit. In marching to the coast he 
encountered Fort McAllister, which it was necessary 
to reduce before the supplies he might find on ship- 

W.R.XLIV board could be made available. Fort McAUister 
was soon captured by an assault made by General 
Hazen's division. Communication was then es- 
tablished with the fleet. The capture of Savan- 
nah then only occupied a few days, and involved 
no great loss of life. The garrison, however, as 
we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the 
river and moving eastward. 

When Sherman had opened communication with 
the fleet he found there a steamer, which I had for- 
warded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for 
his army, also supplies which I supposed he would 

M?nS,n. ^^® ^^ ^^^^^^ ^^- General J. Gr. Foster, who com- 
manded all the troops south of North Carohna on 
the Atlantic seaboard, visited General Sherman be- 
fore he had opened communication with the fleet, 
with the view of ascertaining what assistance he 
could be to him. Foster returned immediately 
to his own headquarters at Hilton Head, for the 



202 



W. R. XLIV 

611 



INVESTMENT OF SAVANNAH 249 

purpose of sending Sherman siege-guns, and also, chap.xvii 
if he should find he had them to spare, supplies 
of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these 
articles might not be found outside. The mail on 
the steamer which I sent down had been collected 
by Colonel A. H. Markland, of the Post-office De- 
partment, who went in charge of it. On this 
same vessel I sent an officer of my staff (Lieu- 
tenant Dunn) with the following letter to General 
Sherman : 

City Point, Virginia, 
December 3, 1864. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman, 

Commandiug Armies near Savannah, Georgia: 

The httle information gleaned from the Southern press 
indicating no great obstacle to your progress, I have 
directed yoiu" mails (which had been previously collected 
at Baltimore by Colonel Markland, Special Agent of the 
Post-ofiB.ce Department) to be sent as far as the blockading 
squadron off Savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as 
heard from on the coast. 

Not liking to rejoice before the \dctory is assured, I ab- 
stain from congratulating you and those under your com- 
mand until bottom has been struck. I have never had a 
fear, however, for the result. 

Since you left Atlanta no very great progi-ess has been 
made here. The enemy has been closely watched, though, 
and prevented from detaching against you. I think not 
one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen 
hundred dismounted eavahy. Bragg has gone from Wil- 
mington. I am trying to take advantage of his absence to 
get possession of that place. Owing to some preparations 
Admiral Porter and General Butler are making to blow 
up Fort Fisher (which, w^hile hoping for the best, I do not 
beheve a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expe- 
dition off. I hope they wiU be ready to start by the 7th, 
and that Bragg wiU not have started back by that time. 



250 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XVII In this letter I do not intend to give you anything like 
directions for future action, but will state a general idea 
I have, and will get yom* views after you have established 
yourself on the sea-coast. With your veteran army I hope 
to get control of the only two through routes from east to 
west possessed by the enemy before the fall of Atlanta. 
The condition will be filled by holding Savannah and 
Augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of 
Savannah and Branchville. If Wilmington falls, a force 
from there can cooperate with you. 

Thomas has got back into the defenses of Nashville, with 
Hood close upon him. Decatur has been abandoned, and 
so have all the roads except the main one leading to 
Chattanooga. Part of this falling back was undoubtedly 
necessary, and all of it may have been. It did not look so, 
however, to me. In my opinion Thomas far outnumbers 
Hood in infantry. In cavalry Hood has the advantage in 
morale and numbers. I hope yet that Hood will be badty 
crippled, if not destroyed. The general news you will learn 
from the papers better than I could give it. 

After all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up 
here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing 
can be done, I wiU run down the coast to see you. If yoa 
desu-e it, I will ask Mrs. Sherman to go with me. 

Yours truly, 
U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

I quote this letter because it gives the reader a 
full knowledge of the events of that period. 
Sherman, Sherman now (the 15th) returned to Savannah 

Memoira.II, ^ ' 

207 et seq. iq complete its investment and ensure the surrender 
of the garrison. The country about Savannah is 
low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched 
from the river above to the river below, and as- 
saults could not be made except along a compara- 
tively narrow causeway. For this reason assaults 
must have resulted in serious destruction of life to 



CAPTURE OF SAVANNAH 251 

the Union troops, with the chance of failing alto- chap, xvii 
gether. Sherman therefore decided upon a com- 
plete investment of the place. When he believed 
this investment completed, he summoned the gar- ^- ^j^^^"^ 
rison to surrender. General Hardee, who was in 
command, replied in substance that the condition 
of affairs was not such as Sherman had described. 
He said he was in full communication with his 
department, and was receiving supplies constantly. 

Hardee, however, was cut oft' entirely from all 
communication with the west side of the river, and 
by the river itself to the north and south. On the 
South Carolina side the country was all rice-fields, 
through which it would have been impossible to 
bring supplies — so that Hardee had no possible 
communication with the outside world except by a 
dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank 
of the river. Sherman, receiving this reply, pro- M^emoSi, 
ceeded in person to a point on the coast where 
General Foster had troops stationed under General 
Hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements 
with the latter officer to go through, by one of the 
numerous channels running inland along that part 
of the coast of South Carolina, to the plank road 
which General Hardee still possessed, and thus to 
cut him off from the last means he had of getting 
supplies, if not of communication. 

While arranging for this movement, and before 
the attempt to execute the plan had been com- 
menced, Sherman received information through one w. r^ xliv 
of his staff-officers that the enemy had evacuated 
Savannah the night before. This was the night of 
the 21st of December. Before evacuating the place i864 
Hardee had blown up the navy-yard. Some iron- 



252 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GEANT 

cuAP. XVII clads had been destroyed, as well as other property 
that might have been valuable to us ; but he left an 
immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of 
cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces 
of artillery, and several thousand stands of small 
arms. 

A little incident occurred, soon after the fall of 

II, 218, 219 Savannah, which Sherman relates in his " Memoirs," 
and which is worthy of repetition. Savannah was 
one of the points where blockade-runners entered. 
Shortly after the city fell into our possession a 
blockade-runner came sailing up serenely, not 
doubting but the Confederates were still in posses- 
sion. It was not molested, and the captain did not 
find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone 
to the custom-house, where he found a new oc- 
cupant of the building, and made a less profitable 
disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had 
expected. 

As there was some discussion as to the author- 
ship of Sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his 
book when it appeared before the public, I want to 
state here that no question upon that subject was 
ever raised between General Sherman and myself. 
Circumstances made the plan on which Sherman 
expected to act impracticable, and as commander 
of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new one 
which would give more promise of success; con- 

Ante, II, 237 scqucutly he recommended the destruction of the 
railroad back to Chattanooga, and that he should 
be authorized then to move, as he did, from Atlanta 
forward. His suggestions were finally approved, 
although they did not immediately find favor in 
Washington. Even when it came to the time of 



THE PLAN OF SHEilMAN'S CAMPAIGN 



JLOo 



starting, the greatest apprehension as to the pro- 
priety of the campaign he was about to coiumence 
filled the niind of the President, induced, no doubt, 
by his advisers. This went so far as to move the 
President to ask me to suspend Slierman's march 
for a day or two until I could think the matter 
over. My recollection is, though I find no record 
to show it, that out of deference to the President's 
wish I did send a despatch to Sherman asking him 
to wait a day or two, or else the connections be- 
tween us were already cut, so that I could not do 
so. However this may be, the question of who 
devised the plan of march from Atlanta to Savan- 
nah is easily answered: it Vv^as clearly Sherman, 
and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant 
execution. It was hardly possible that any one 
else than those on the spot could have devised 
a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did 
not promise success.^ 

I was in favor of Sherman's plan from the time 
it was first submitted to me. My chief of staff, 
however, was very bitterly opposed to it, and, as 
I learned subsequently, finding that he could 
not move me, he appealed to the authorities at 
Washington to stop it. 



Chap. XVII 



Credit tor 
the mar<-li 
to the sea 



Halleck'8 
opposition 



1 See Appendix, letters of October lltli. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

THE BATTLE OF FKANKLIN — THE BATTLE OF NASH- 
VILLE 

chap.xviii as we have seen, Hood succeeded in crossing the 

Ante, u, 240 J\. Tennessee Eiver between Muscle Shoals and the 

lower shoals at the end of October, 1864. Thomas 

sent Schofield with the Fourth and Twenty-third 

corps, together with three brigades of Wilson's 

cavalry, to Pulaski to watch him. On the 17th 

of November Hood started, and moved in such a 

manner as to avoid Schofield, thereby turning his 

^p^i8^o-54l' position. Hood had with him three infantry corps, 

junel3?i864 commanded respectively by Stephen D. Lee, Stew- 

A. p. stew- art, and Cheatham. These, with his cavalry, num- 

art W. P 

183842;' Lt.- bcred about forty-five thousand men. Schofield 

Gen. C. S. A. •' 

June 23. 1864 i^^(j^ <3f Q^i ^j.j-j^g^ about thirty thousand. Thomas's 
orders were, therefore, for Schofield to watch the 
movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle 
if he could avoid it ; but to fall back in case of an 
advance on Nashville, and to fight the enemy, as 
he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements 
until he could be reinforced by Thomas himself. 
As soon as Schofield saw this movement of Hood's, 
he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back 
himself until the 21st, and then only to Columbia. 
^'w3ii^^ At Columbia there was a slight skirmish, but no 

254 



THE BATTLE OF FKANKLIN 255 

battle. From this place Schofield then retreated to chap.xviii 
Franklin. He had sent his wagons in advance, and 
Stanley had gone with them with two divisions to 
protect them. Cheatham's corps of Hood's army 
pursued the wagon-train and went into camp at 
Spring Hill for the night of the 29th. 

Schofield, retreating from Columbia on the 
29th, passed Spring Hill, where Cheatham was ^^^-.^e^^^" 
bivouacked, during the night without molestation, BrKeu! 
thoug-h within half a mile of where the Confederates iWi ; m^.-' 

• f 1 on 1 1 ^^^- Sept. 

were encamped. On the morning oi tiie oOth he i862 
had arrived at Franklin. 

Hood followed closely and reached Franklin in 
time to make an attack the same day. The fight ^j mSiT 
was very desperate and sanguinary. The Con- 
federate generals led their men in the repeated 
charges, and the loss among them was of unusual 
proportions. This fighting continued with great 
severity until long after the night closed in, when 
the Confederates drew off. General Stanley, who 
commanded two divisions of the Union troops, 
and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, 
was wounded in the fight, but maintained his 
position. 

The enemy's loss at Franklin, according to 
Thomas's report, was 1750 buried upon the field by 
our troops, 3800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners 
besides. Schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 
189 killed, 1033 wounded, and 1104 captured and 

missing. 

Thomas made no effort to reinforce Schofield at 
Franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should 
have done, and fight out the battle there. He 
simply ordered Schofield to continue his retreat to ma. im 



256 PERSONAL MEMOIllS OF U. S. GRANT 

cnAP.xviii ]Srash\i.lle, which the latter did during that night 
and the next daj^ 

Thomas, in the mean time, was making his 
preparations to receive Hood. The road to Chatta- 
nooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons 
at Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, and Chat- 
tanooga. Thomas had previously given up De- 
ian;a.L4m catur, and had been reinforced by A. J. Smith's 
Maj!-Geu.' two divisious lust returned from Missouri. He 

Vols. Apr. 

24;i864 ■ also had Steedman's division and R. S. Granger's, 
E. fi.Gran- which lic had drawn from the front. His quarter- 

ger, A\ . P. ^ 

Brig^-Gen. Hi^-ster's meu, about ten thousand in number, had 

^°^*'i862*"^"' been organized and armed under the command of 

the chief quartermaster, Greneral J. L. Donaldson, 

w.p.SsT^i; ^i^cl placed in the fortifications under the general 

iltf-is; supervision of Greneral Z. B. Tower, of the United 

rjg.-Ger 
ols. No-? 
23, 1861 



Vols." Nov." States Engineers 



Hood was allowed to move upon Nashville, and 
to invest that place almost without interference. 
Thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so 
that he would have been safe against the attack of 
Hood. He had troops enough even to annihilate 
him in the open field. To me his delay was unac- 
countable — sitting there and permitting himself to 
be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege 
he would have to fight the enemy strongl}^ posted 
behind fortifications. It is true the weather was 
very bad. The rain was falling, and freezing as it 
fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of 
ice, that made it very difiicult to move. But I was 
afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, 
elude Thomas, and manage to get north of the 
Cumberland River. If he did this, I apprehended 
most serious results from the campaign in the 



SIEGE OF NASHVILLE 



257 



North, and was afraid we might even have to send CHAP.xvm 
troops from the East to head him off if he got 
there, General Thomas's movements being always 
so deliberate and so slow, though effective in 
defense. 

I consequently urged Thomas, in frequent des- 
patches sent from City Point,^ to make the attack 



W. R. XLV 

(2) 17, 55, 70, 
97, 143, 195 



1 City Point, Vieginia, 
December 2, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 
If Hood is permitted to remain 
quietly about Nasliville, you will 
lose all the road back to Chatta- 
nooga, and possibly have to aban- 
don the line of the Tennessee. 
Should he attack you, it is all 
well ; but if he does not, you 
should attack him before he forti- 
fies. Arm and put in the trenches 
your quartermaster employees, 
citizens, etc. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieidenant-Gcneral. 



City Point, Virginia, 
December 2, 1864, 1 : 30 p.m. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 
With your citizen employees 
armed, you can move out of Nash- 
ville with all your army, and force 
the enemy to retire or fight vipon 
. ground of your own choosing. 
After the repiilse of Hood at 
Franklin, it looks to me that in- 
stead of falling back to Nashville 
we shovild have taken the offen- 
sive against the enemy where he 
was. At this distance, however, 
I may err as to the best method 
of dealing with the enemy. Yovi 
will now suffer incalculable in- 
jury upon your railroads if Hood 

Vol. II.— 17 



is not speedily disposed of. Put 
forth, therefore, every possible 
exertion to attain this end. Should 
you get him to retreating, give 
him no peace. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieufcnunt-Gcneral. 



City Point, Virginia, 
December 5, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 

Is there not danger of Forrest 
moving down the Cumberland to 
where he can cross it ? It seems 
to me, whilst you should be get- 
ting up your cavalry as rapidly 
as possible to look after Forrest, 
Hood should be attacked where 
he is. Time strengthens him, in 
all possibility, as much as it does 
you. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General. 



City Point, Virginia, 
December 6, 1864, 4 p.m. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 

Attack Hood at once, and wait 
no longer for a remnant of your 
cavalry. There is great danger 
of delay resulting in a campaign 
back to the Ohio River. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant-General. 



258 



PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GKANT 



chap.xviii at once. The country was alarmed, the administra- 
tion was alarmed, and I was alarmed lest the very 
thing would take place which I have just described 
— that is, Hood would get North. It was all with- 

.^■R-xLv out avail, further than to elicit despatches from 

115,143 Thomas saying that he was getting ready to move 

as soon as he could, that he was making prepara- 



CiTY Point, Virginia, 
December 8, 1864, 8 : 30 p.m. 
Major-General, Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 
Your despatch of yesterday re- 
ceived. It looks to me evident 
the enemy are trying to cross the 
Cumberland Eiver, and are scat- 
tered. Why not attack at once ? 
By all means avoid the contin- 
gency of a foot-race to see which 
— you or Hood — can beat to the 
Ohio. If you think necessary, 
call on the governors of States 
to send a force into Louisville to 
meet the enemy if he should cross 
the river. You clearly never 
should cross except in rear- of 
the enem}\ Now is one of the 
finest opportunities ever pre- 
sented of destroying one of the 
three armies of the enemy. If 
destroyed he never can replace 
it. Use the means at your com- 
mand, and you can do this and 
cause a rejoicing that will re- 
sound from one end of the land 
to the other. 

TJ. S. Grant, 
Lieiifenan t- General.. 



City Point, Virginia, 
December 11, 1864, 4 p.m. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 

If you delay attack longer, the 
mortifying spectacle will be wit- 



nessed of a rebel army moving 
for the Ohio Eiver, and you will 
be forced to act, accepting such 
weather as you find. Let there 
be no further delay. Hood can- 
not even stand a drawn battle so 
far from his supplies of ordnance 
stores. If he retreats and you 
follow, he must lose his material 
and much of his army. I am in 
hopes of receiving a despatch 
from you to-day announcing that 
jou have moved. Delay no longer 
for weather or reinforcements. 
U. S. Grant, 
Lieu fen an t- G eneral. 



Washington, D. C, 
December 15, 1864. 
Major-General Thomas, 
Nashville, Tennessee : 
I was just on my way to Nash- 
ville, but receiving a despatch 
from Van Duzer detailing your 
splendid success of to-day, I shall 
go no farther. Push the enemy 
now and give him no rest until 
he is entirely destroyed. Your 
jirmy will cheerfully suffer many 
privations to break up Hood's 
army and render it useless for 
future operations. Do not stop 
for trains or supplies, but take 
them from the country, as the 
enemy have done. Much is now 
expected. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieu tenan t- General. 






//cti "riesi/oro^ 






s^'y^ 



jThpf, 



^IHzcftRire/^^c^ 



VitrHccoie 



\Ccdxmb^ls\ 



ieynou 




;5V 



f 



. SuripershiCl ^,^p'^ ^-i i'> f :i r . 






,6" 



ViPahS/k 
^ Vrthrr 






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^K/XiV^*^ 



JHE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE 



259 



W. K. XLV 

(2) 114 



tions, etc. At last I had to say to General Thomas chap.xviii 
that I should be obliged to remove him unless ho 
acted promptly. He replied that he was very 
sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. 

General Logan happening to visit City Point 
about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, 
gallant, and efficient officer, I gave him an order to 
proceed to Nashville to relieve Thomas. I directed 
him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it 
until he reached there, and if Thomas had moved, 
then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with 
me by telegraph. After Logan started, in thinking 
over the situation, I became restless, and concluded 
to go myself. I went as far as Washington city, 
when a despatch was received from General Thomas 
announcing his readiness at last to move, and des- 
ignating the time of his movement. I concluded 
to wait until that time. He did move, and was 
successful from the start. This was on the 15tli of 
December. General Logan was at Louisville at the 
time this movement was made, and telegraphed 
the fact to Washington, and proceeded no farther 
himself. 

The battle during the 15tli was severe, but favor- 
able to the Union troops, and continued until night 
closed in upon the combat. The next day the 
battle was renewed. After a successful assault 
upon Hood's men in their intrenchments, the 
enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving 
their dead, their artillery and small arms in great 
numbers on the field, besides the wounded that 
were captured. Our cavalry had fought on foot as 
infantry, and had not their horses with them ; so 
that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the 



Ibid. 230 



Thomas's 
Rep. W. R. 
XLV (1) 38 

et seq. ; 

Hood's Rep. 

Ibid. 654 et 

seq. 



260 PEBSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT 

CHAP.XVIII moment the enemy retreated. They sent back, 
however, for their horses, and endeavored to get 
to Frankhn ahead of Hood's broken army by the 
Granny White road ; but too much time was con- 
sumed in getting started. They had got but a few 
miles beyond the scene of the battle when they 
found the "enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind 
intrenchments covering the road on which they 

.^•q?-.^^!^ were advancing. Here another battle ensued, our 
men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which 
the Confederates were again routed and driven in 
great disorder. Our cavalry then w^ent into bivouac. 

Ibid. 552, 553 and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. 
They were too late. The enemy already had pos- 
session of Franklin, and was beyond them. It now 
became a chase in which the Confederates had the 
lead. 

553*^554,' 655 ^^^'^' ti'oops coutinued the pursuit to within a few 
miles of Columbia, where they found the rebels had 
destroyed the railroad-bridge as well as all other 
bridges over Duck River. The heavy rains of a 
few days before had swelled the stream into a mad 
torrent, impassable except on bridges. Unfortu- 
nately, either through a mistake in the wording of 
the order or otherwise, the pontoon-bridge which 
was to have been sent by rail out to Franklin, to be 
taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone 
Ibid. 41, 42 toward Chattanooga. There was, consequently, a 
delay of some four days in building bridges out of 
the remains of the old railroad bridge. Of course 
Hood got such a start in this time that further pur- 
suit was useless, although it was continued for some 
distance, but without coming upon him again. 



CHAPTER XIX 

EXPEDITION AGAINST FOKT FISHER — ATTACK ON THE 
FORT — FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION — SECOND 
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FORT — CAPTURE OF 
FORT FISHER 

UP to January, 1865, the enemy occupied Fort chap, xix 
Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River and 
below the city of Wilmington. This port was of J^wiSg^ 
immense importance to the Confederates, because *"° 
it formed their principal inlet for blockade-runners, 
by means of which they brought in from abroad 
such supplies and munitions of war as they could 
not produce at home. It was equally important to 
us to get possession of it, not only because it was 
desirable to cut off their supplies so as to ensure a 
speedy termination of the war, but also because 
foreign governments, particularly the British gov- 
ernment, were constantly threatening that unless 
ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they 
should cease to recognize any blockade. For these 
reasons I determined, with the concurrence of the 
Navy Department, in December, to send an ex- 
pedition against Fort Fisher for the purpose of 
capturing it. 

To show the difficulty experienced in maintaining 
the blockade, I will mention a circumstance that 

261 



262 



PERSONAL, MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 



CHAP. XIX 

Surprised 
blockade- 
runners 



G. Weitzel. 
W.P.1861-65; 
ist Lt. Eng. 
July 1. 1860 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols. Aug. 
29, 1862 : 

Maj.-Gen. 
Nov. 17, 1864 



Gen. But- 
ler's scheme 



Porter, Nav. 

Hist. p. 692 

et seq. 



took place at Fort Fisher after its fall. Two Eng- 
lish blockade-runners came in at night. Their com- 
manders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked 
their way through all our fleet and got into the 
river unobserved. They then signaled the fort, an- 
nouncing their arrival. There was a colored man 
in the fort who had been there before and who 
understood these signals. He informed General 
Terry what reply he should make to have them 
come in, and Terry did as he advised. The vessels 
came in, their officers entirely unconscious that 
they were falling into the hands of the Union 
forces. Even after they were brought into the 
fort they were entertained in conversation for 
some little time before suspecting that the Union 
troops were occupying the fort. They were finally 
informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. 

I selected General Weitzel, of the Army of the 
James, to go with the expedition, but gave instruc- 
tions through General Butler. He commanded the 
department within whose geographical limits Fort 
Fisher was situated, as well as Beaufort and other 
points on that coast held by our troops; he was 
therefore entitled to the right of fitting out the 
expedition against Fort Fisher. 

General Butler conceived the idea that if a 
steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run 
up near the shore under the fort and exploded, it 
would create great havoc and make the capture 
an easy matter. Admiral Porter, who was to com- 
mand the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the 
idea, and it was not disapproved of in Washington ; 
the navy was therefore given the task of preparing 
the steamer for this purpose. I had no confidence 




surveyed under the direction of *\ 

Bvt. Brig.-Gen. C. B. Comstock, ^ 

Chief Engineer, ™ 

W 



J.t. Cd^LDrA IfrrfX. d 



EXPEDITION AGAINST FORT FISHER 263 

in the success of the scheme, and so expressed my- ohap.xix 
self; but as no serious harm could come of the xm'M:i)TO9 
experiment, and the authorities at Washington 
seemed desirous to have it tried, I pernutted it. 
The steamer was sent to Beaufort, North Carolina, 
and was there loaded with powder and prepared for 
the part she was to play in the reduction of Fort 
Fisher.i 

General Butler chose to go in command of the 
expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 
9th of December. Very heavy storms prevailed, isu 
however, at that time along that part of the sea- 
coast, and prevented him from getting off until ^i')^6S 
the 13th or 14th. His advance arrived off Fort 
Fisher on the 15th. The naval force had been 
already assembled, or was assembling, but was 
obliged to run into Beaufort for munitions, coal, 
etc. ; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully 
prepared. The fleet was ready to proceed on the 
18th ; but Butler, who had remained outside from 
the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of 
coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into Beaufort 
to replenish. Another storm overtook him, and 
several days more were lost before the army and 
navy were both ready at the same time to cooperate. 

On the night of the 23d the powder-boat was ^^^^^^^^^,- 
towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was 
safe to run. She was then propelled by her own 

1 The report of Major T. L. the mechanism for firing the ex- 
Casey, of the Corps of Engineers, plosives. Embraced also iu the 
published in the Official Records report are accounts of several pre- 
of the War of the Rebellion, vious military and accidental ex- 
Vol. XLII, part 1, pp. 988-993, plosions of large quantities of 
gives a full description of the powder, and their effects.— F. 
powder-boat, her stowage, and D. G. 



264 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIX machinery to within about five hundred yards of 
w- Rxi.n ii^Q shore. There the clockwork, which was to ex- 
plode her within a certain length of time, was set 
and she was abandoned. Everybody left, and even 
the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of 
the explosion upon them. At two o'clock in the 
morning the explosion tOok place — and produced 
no more effect on the fort, or anything else on 
land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the 
Atlantic Ocean would have done. Indeed, when 
the troops in Fort Fisher heard the explosion, they 
supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of 
the Yankee gunboats. 
Fort Fisher Fort Fishcr was situated upon a low, flat penin- 
sula north of Cape Fear Eiver. The soil is sandy. 
Back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, 
and covered with fresh-water swamps. The fort ran 
across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in 
width, and extended along the sea-coast about thir- 
teen hundred yards. The fort had an armament 
of twenty-one guns and three mortars on the land 
side, and twenty-four guns on the sea-front. At 
that time it was only garrisoned by four companies 
of infantry, one light battery, and the gunners at 
the heavy guns, — less than seven hundred niei], — 
with a reserve of less than a thousand men five 
whitin-^w ^iiil'^s up the peninsula. G-eneral Whiting, of the 
BrS^otu. Confederate army, was in command, and General 
^■f^.tset;'^' Bragg was in command of the force at Wilming- 
Feb!'28,i863 ton. Both commenced calling for reinforcements 
the moment they saw our troops landing. The 
z. B. Vance Govcmor of Nortli Carolina called for everybody 
who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun 
■(3)'i284 to join them. In this way they got two or three 



ATTACK ON THE FORT 265 

hundred additional men into Fort Fisher; and chap.xix 
Hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was 
sent down from Richmond. A few of these troops 
arrived the very day that Butler was ready to 
advance. 

On the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs H*iet pS; 
of concentric circles, their heavy ironclads going in ^^^ 
very close range, being nearest the shore, and leav- 
ing intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels 
could fire between them. Porter was thus enabled 
to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. 
The damage done to the fort by these shells was very 
slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in 
the fort. But the firing silenced all the guns by 
making it too hot for the men to maintain their 
positions about them, and compelling them to seek 
shelter in the bomb-proofs. 

On the next day part of Butler's troops, under ^p^^-^g^^'g^- 
General Adelbert Ames, effected a landing out of iuSasel i 
range of the fort without difficulty. This was ac- v^Saylo, 
complished under the protection of gunboats sent ^ ^ ^^^^ 
for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed at- (D^sietseq. 
tack upon the fort by the fleet. They formed a 
line across the peninsula and advanced, part going 
north and part toward the fort, covering them- 
selves as they did so. Curtis pushed forward and gaJft-SthN! 
came near to Fort Fisher, capturing the small gar- i^ifBriJ- 
rison at what was called the Flag Pond Battery, jan^is.ises 
Weitzel accompanied him to within half a mile 
of the works. Here he saw that the fort had not 
been injured, and so reported to Butler, advising 
against an assault. Ames, who had gone north in 
his advance, captured two hundred and twenty- 
eight of the reserves. These prisoners reported to 



266 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIX Butlei" that sixteen hundred of Hoke's division of 
six thousand from Richmond had akeady arrived, 
and the rest would soon be in his rear. 

w- J-g^g"i Upon these reports Butler determined to with- 
draw his troops from the peninsula and return to 
the fleet. At that time there had not been a man 
on our side injured except by one of the shells 
from the fleet. Curtis had got within a few yards 
Ibid. 983 of the works. Some of his men had snatched a flag 
from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken 
a horse from the inside of the stockade. At night 

w- R-^xLii Butler informed Porter of his withdrawal, giving 
the reasons above stated, and announced his pur- 
pose, as soon as his men could embark, to start for 

^mat^^i^ioo Hampton Eoads. Porter represented to him that 
he had sent to Beaufort for more ammunition. He 
could fire much faster than he had been doing, and 
would keep the enemy from showing himself until 
our men were within twenty yards of the fort ; and 
he begged that Butler would leave some brave fel- 
lows like those who had snatched the flag from the 
parapet and taken the horse from the fort. 

Butler was unchangeable. He got all his troops 
aboard, except Curtis's brigade, and started back. 
In doing this Butler made a fearful mistake. My 
instructions to him, or to the officer who went in 
command of the expedition, were explicit in the 

w- (g-gfg^^^ statement that to effect a landing would be of itself 
a great victory, and if one should be effected, the 
foothold must not be relinquished. On the contrary, 
a regular siege of the fort must be commenced ; and 
to guard against interference by reason of storms, 
supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as 
they could be got on shore. But General Butler 



FAILURE OF THE EXPEDITION 



267 



seems to have lost sight of this part of his instruc- 
tions, and was back at Fort Monroe on the 28th. 
I telegraphed to the President as follows : 

City Point, Virginia, 
December 28, 1864, 8 : 30 p.m. 
The Wilmington expedition lias proven a gross and 
culpable failure. Many of the troops are back here. 
Delays and free talk of the object of the expedition en- 
abled the enemy to move troops to Wilmington to defeat 
it. After the expedition sailed from Fort Monroe, three 
days of fine weather were squandered, during which the 
enemy was without a force to protect himself. Who is to 
blame will, I hope, be known. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant' General. 

Porter sent despatches to the Navy Department 
in which he complained bitterly of having been 
abandoned by the army just when the fort was 
nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops 
might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a 
different commander. As soon as I heard this I 
sent a messenger to Porter with a letter asking him 
to hold on. I assured him that I fully sympathized 
with him in his disappointment, and that I would 
send the same troops back with a different com- 
mander, with some reinforcements to offset those 
which the enemy had received. I told him it would 
take some little time to get transportation for the 
additional troops ; but as soon as it could be had 
the men should be on their way to him, and there 
would be no delay on my part. I selected A. H. 
Terry to command. 

It was the 6th of January before the transports 
could be got ready and the troops aboard. They 



Chap. XTX 



W. K. XLII 

(3) 1087 



Nav. Hist, 
pp. 698-706 



W. R. XLII 

(3) 1100 



A. H. Terry, 

Col. 7tll 
Conu. Sept. 

17, 1861 ; 

Brig.-Gen. 

Vols.Apr.25, 

1862; Maj.- 

Gen. Vols. & 

Brig.-Geu. 

U. S. A. Jan. 

15, 1865 



268 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIX Sailed from Fort Monroe on that day. The ob- 
ject and destination of the second expedition were 
at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the 
Navy Department and in the army to whom it was 

^' a) 395^^^ necessary to impart the information. Greneral Terry 
had not the slightest idea of where he was going or 
what he was to do. He simply knew that he was 
going to sea and that he had his orders with him, 
which were to be opened when out at sea. 
Ibid. 43 He was instructed to communicate freely with 
Porter and have entire harmony between army and 
navy, because the work before them would require 
the best efforts of both arms of the service. They 
arrived off Beaufort on the 8th. A heavy storm, 
however, prevented a landing at Fort Fisher until 

^mBL^ni the 13th. The navy prepared itself for attack about 
^^^^^- as before, and at the same time assisted the army 
in landing, this time five miles away. Only iron- 
clads fired at first, the object being to draw the fire 
of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their posi- 
tions. This object being accomplished, they then 
let in their shots thick and fast. Very soon the 
guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident 
signs of being much injured. 

waaeSoT Terry deployed his men across the peninsula as 
had been done before, and at two o'clock on the 
following morning was up within two miles of the 
fort, with a respectable abatis in front of his line. 
His artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. 
Again Curtis's brigade of Ames's division had the 
lead. By noon they had carried an unfinished wftrk 
less than a half-mile from the fort, and turned it 
so as to face the other way. 

Terry now saw Porter and arranged for an as- 



SECOND EXPEDITION AGAINST THE FOET 260 

sault on the following day. The two commanders chap.xix 

arranged their signals so that they could commu- Jau.i5,i8C5 

nicate with each other from time to time as they ^hLTpp.^' 

might have occasion. At daylight the fleet com- "^'''" 

menced its firing. The time agreed upon for the 

assault was the middle of the afternoon, and Ames, ^- JJj f^^ 

who commanded the assaulting column, moved at 

3 : 30. Porter landed a force of sailors and marines 

to move against the sea-front in cooperation with 

Ames's assault. They were under Commander 

Breese, of the navy. These sailors and marines u:s.n.''nov.' 

had worked their way up to within a couple of comdr.'jiliy 

hundred yards of the fort before the assault. The 

signal was given and the assault was made ; but the 

poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very HK^lie' 

badly handled by the enemy, losing two hundred 

and eighty killed and wounded out of their number. 

Curtis's brigade charged successfully, though met 
by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade 
through the swamp up to their waists to reach the 
fort. Many were wounded, of course, and some 
killed ; but they soon reached the palisades. These 
they cut away, and pushed on through. The other 
troops then came up, Pennypacker's following Cur- '^•gj^^^^ 
tis, and Bell, who commanded the Third Brigade of 
Ames's division, following Pennypacker. But the 
fort was not yet captured, though the parapet was 
gained. 

The works were very extensive. The large para- 
pet around the work would have been but very little 
protection to those inside except when they were 
close up under it. Traverses had therefore been ibid. 399 
run until really the work was a succession of small 
forts inclosed by a large one. The rebels made a 



270 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XIX desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be 
driven from these traverses one by one. The fight 
continued till long after night. Our troops gained 
first one traverse and then another, and by ten 
o'clock at night the place was carried. During this 
engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in 
their assault on the bastion, rendered the best ser- 

^ ■ u) ^9^^^ ^^*^^ ^^®y could by reinforcing Terry's northern line 
— thus enabling him to send a detachment to the 
assistance of Ames. The fleet kept up a continu- 
ous fire upon that part of the fort which was still 
occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they 
could be informed where to direct their shots. 

^fsrp^^Tn" During the succeeding nights the enemy blew 
up Fort Caswell, on the opposite side of Cape Fear 
River, and abandoned two extensive works on 
Smith's Island in the river. 

Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, be- 
sides small arms, with full supplies of ammunition, 
and 2083 prisoners. In addition to these, there 
were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We 
had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. 

coL4th N.' In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the 

H. Mar. 1862 "j^i.^ga^^jg commaudcrs, was killed, and two, Curtis 
CJ- Penny- and Pennypacker, were badly wounded. 

^111^1864^ Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back 

voit'Fib; from Savannah, arrived off Fort Fisher soon after 
it fell. Wlien he heard the good news he promoted 
all the officers of any considerable rank for their 
conspicuous gallantry. Terry had been nominated 
for major-general, but had not been confirmed. 
This confirmed him ; and soon after I recommended 
him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, 

Xcri'v uro- 

mited and it was given to him for this victory. 



CHAPTER XX 

SHEKMAN'S march north — SHERIDAN ORDERED TO 
LYNCHBURG — CANBY ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST 
MOBILE — MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS 
— CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA — 
SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 

WHEN news of Sherman being in possession of chap, xx 
Savannah reached the North, distinguished 
statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. m^cSmi, 
Among others who went was the Secretary of War, ^*^ ''* '''"^' 
who seemed much pleased at the result of his cam- 
paign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New |j™^«? 
York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in 
charge of the public property that had been aban- 
doned and captured. Savannah was then turned 
over to Greneral Foster's command to hold, so that 
Sherman might have his own entire army free to 
operate as might be decided upon in the future. I 
sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac 
(General Barnard) with letters to General Sherman. 
He remained some time with the general, and when n^S|,n, 
he returned brought back letters, one of which con- 
tained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought 
to be done in cooperation with him, when he should 
have started upon his march northward. 

I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had 

271 



237-240 



272 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XX no idea originally of having Sherman march from 
Savannah to Richmond, or even to North Carolina. 
The season was bad, the roads impassable for any- 
thing except such an army as he had, and I should 
not have thought of ordering such a move. I had 
therefore made preparations to collect transports to 
carry Sherman and his army around to the James 
Eiver by water, and so informed him. On receiv- 
ing this letter he went to work immediately to pre- 

w. E. xLiv pare for the move, but seeing that it would require 

636. 727, 728, -■■ i 

'?*2, 743, 798, a long time to collect the transports, he suggested 
the idea then of marching up north through the 
Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this ; 
for, if successful, it promised every advantage. His 
march through Georgia had thoroughly destroyed 
all lines of transj^ortation in that State, and had 
completely cut the enemy off from all sources of 
supply to the west of it. If North and South Caro- 
lina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for 
feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate 
garrison at Richmond would be reduced in terri- 
tory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow 
limits in the State of Virginia ; and although that 
section of the country was fertile, it was already 
well exhausted of both forage and food. I approved 
Sherman's suggestion, therefore, at once. 
I'repanng ^\^q work of preparation was tedious, because 
supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to 
be brought from a long distance. Sherman would 
now have to march through a country furnishing 
fewer provisions than that he had previously been 
operating in during his march to the sea. Besides, 
he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of 
the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had en- 



march 



SHEKMAN'S MARCH NORTH 273 

countered on their previous march; and the ter- chap.xx 
ritory through which he had to pass had now 
become of such vast importance to the very ex- 
istence of the Confederate army that the most des- 
perate efforts were to be expected in order to 
save it. 

Sherman, therefore, while collecting the neces- 
sary supplies to start with, made arrangements with 
Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part of ^r6t',v!s^^. 
the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, ^capt.'ji^iiy' 

1 A "I ftfiO • 

and General Foster, commanding the troops^ to take ReaV-Adm. 
positions, and hold a few points on the sea-coast, 
which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighbor- ^^S^^ii^ 
hood of Charleston. '" ' ' 

This provision was made to enable him to fall 
back upon the sea-coast in case he should encoun- 
ter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. 
He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to 
what he would like to have done in support of his 
movement farther north. This letter was brought 
to City Point by General Barnard at a time when 
I happened to be going to Washington City, where 
I arrived on the 21st of January. I cannot tell the 
provision I had already made to cooperate with 
Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, 
better than by giving my reply to this letter. 

Headquarters Armies of the United States, 
Washington, D. C, January 21, 1865. 

Major-General W. T. Sherman, 

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi. 
General: Your letters brought by General Barnard n)id.257 
were received at City Point, and read with interest. Not 
having them with me, however, I cannot say that in this 
I will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommenda- 
VOL. II.— 18 



274 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. XX tion. As I arrived here at 1 p.m. and must leave at 6 p.m., 
having in the mean time spent over three hours with the 
Secretary and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before 
your last request to have Thomas make a campaign into 
the heart of Alabama, I had ordered Schofield to Annapolis, 
Maryland, with his corps. The advance (six thousand) will 
reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as 
rapidly as raili'oad transportation can be procui*ed from 
Cincinnati. The corps numbers over twenty-one thousand 
men. I was induced to do this because I did not beUeve 
Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His pur- 
suit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that 
he would' never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The 
command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subor- 
dinates, whilst Thomas followed far behind. When Hood 
had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had 
reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed 
the State, from whence he returned to Nashville to take 
steamer for Eastport. He is possessed of excellent judg- 
ment, great coolness, and honesty, but he is not good on 
a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it 
was necessary to equip up. This report and a determina- 
tion to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his 
surplus troops elsewhere. 

Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go 
to Selma under an energetic leader. He has been tele- 
graphed to to know whether he could go, and if so, which 
of the several routes he woidd select. No reply is yet re- 
ceived. Canby has been ordered to act offensive^ from the 
sea-coast to the interior, toward Montgomery and Selma. 
Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, 
or some of his troops will be sent to Canby. Without 
further reinforcements Canby will have a moving column 
of twenty thousand men. 

Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We 
have a force there of eight thousand effective. At New 
Berne about half the number. It is rumored, through de- 
serters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am inclined to 
believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy 



SHEEMAN'S MAKCH NORTH 275 

were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that chap, xx 
on the 18th Terry moved on Wilmington. 

If Wilmington is captured, Sehofield will go there. If 
not, he will be sent to New Berne. In either event, all the 
surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior 
toward Goldsboro' in cooperation with your movements. 
From either point raili-oad communications can be run out, 
there being here abundance of roUing-stock suited to the 
gauge of those roads. 

There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from 
Lee's army south. Of these you will have fourteen thou- 
sand against you, if Wilmington is not held by the enemy, 
casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about two 
thousand. 

All these troops are subject to yom- orders, as you come 
in communication with them. They will be so instructed, 
Fi'om about Richmond I wiU watch Lee closely, and 
if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will 
pitch in. 

In the mean time, should you be brought to a halt any- 
where, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective 
men to your support, from the troops about Richmond. 

To resimie : Canby is ordered to operate to the interior 
from the Gulf. A. J. Smith may go from the north, but 
I think it doubtful. A force of twenty-eight or thirty 
thousand will cooperate with you from New Berne or 
Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements. 

This wiU be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my 

staff, who wiU return with any message you may have for 

me. If there is anything I can do for you in the way of 

having supplies on shipboard, at any point on the sea-coast, 

ready for you, let me know it. 

Yours truly, 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 

I had written on the 18th of December to Greneral ^'-^^^^""^ 
Sherman, giving him the news of the battle of 
Nashville. He was much pleased at the result, al- 



276 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XX though, Hke myself, he had been very much disap- 
pointed at Thomas for permitting Hood to cross the 
Tennessee River and nearly the whole State of Ten- 
nessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. 
He, however, as I had done, sent Thomas a warm 
congratulatory letter. 

Sherman. Qu the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of 

Memoirs, II, *' ' ' i i /-t 

229 thanks to Sherman and his army passed by Con- 
gress were approved. 

Ibid. 218, 219 Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris 
in Savannah cleared up, commencing the work by 
removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, 
and taking up all other obstructions. He had then 
intrenched the city, so that it coidd be held by a 
small garrison. By the middle of January all his 
work was done, except the accumulation of supplies 
to commence his movements with. 

Ibid. 268 et He proposed to move in two columns — one from 

SCO 

Savannah, going along by the river of the same 
name, and the other by roads farther east, threat- 
ening Charleston. He commenced the advance by 
moving his right wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, 
then to Pocotahgo by water. This column, in 
moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, 
it was not determined at first that they would not 
have a force visit Charleston. South Carolina had 
done so much to prepare the public mind of the 
South for secession, and had been so active in pre- 
cipitating the decision of the question before the 
South was fully prepared to meet it, that there 
was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North, 
and also largely entertained by people of the. South, 
toshe^'an, that the State of South Carolina, and Charleston, 
w. R. xLiv ^^^ hotbed of secession, in particular, ought to have 



CANBY OEDEKED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE 277 

a heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing chap.xx 
but the decisive results that followed deterred the 
radical portion of the people from condemning the 
movement because Charleston had been left out. 
To pass into the interior would, however, be to en- 
sure the evacuation of the city, and its possession 
by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so situated 
between two formidable rivers that a small garri- 
son could have held it against all odds as long as 
their supplies would hold out. Sherman, therefore, 
passed it by. 

By the 1st of February all preparations were com- >femoSMi, 
pleted for the final march, Columbia, South Caro- ^esetseq.' 
lina, being the first objective ; Fayetteville, North 
Carolina, the second ; and Goldsboro', or neighbor- 
hood, the final one, unless something further should 
be determined upon. The right wing went from 
Pocotaligo, and the left from about Hardeeville, on 
the Savannah River, both columns taking a pretty 
direct route for Columbia. The cavalry, however, 
were to threaten Charleston on the right and 
Augusta on the left. 

On the 15th of January Fort Fisher had fallen, ises 
news of which Sherman had received before start- 
ing out on his march. We already had New Berne, 
and had soon Wilmington, whose fall followed that 
of Fort Fisher ; as did other points on the sea-coast, 
where the National troops were now in readiness 
to cooperate with Sherman's advance when he had 
passed Fayetteville. 

On the 18th of January I ordered Canby, in m^«J^^«°* 
command at New Orleans, to move against Mobile, 
Montgomery, and Selma, Alabama, for the purpose 
of destroying roads, machine-shops, etc. On the 



Mobile 



278 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XX 8tli of February I ordered Sheridan, who was in the 
Valley of Virginia, to push forward as soon as the 
weather would permit, and strike the canal west of 
Eiehmond at or about Lynchburg ; and on the 20tli 
I made the order to go to Lynchburg as soon as the 
roads would permit, saying : 

^" a')?8^^ As soou as it is possible to travel, I think you will 
have no difficulty about reaehiug Lyuehburg with a eav- 
ah-y force alone. From there you could destro}^ the rail- 
road and canal in every direction, so as to be of no fur- 
ther use to the rebellion. . , . This additional raid, with 
one starting from East Tennessee under Stoneman, num- 
bering about four or five thousand cavahy; one from 
Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavahy ; Canby, from 
Mobile Bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops, 
— these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma, and 
Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out 
the vitals of South Carolina, — is aU that will be wanted 
to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I woidd 
advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. 
Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. 

by&S" C)n the 27th of February, more than a month 
after Canby had received his orders, I again wrote 
to him, saying that I was extremely anxious to 
hear of his being in Alabama. I notified him, also, 
that I had sent Grrierson to take command of his 
cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. I further 
suggested that Forrest was probably in Mississippi, 
and if he was there, he would find him an officer of 
great courage and capacity, whom it would be diffi- 
cult to get by. I still further informed him that 
Thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force 
into Mississippi on the 20th of February, or as 
soon as possible thereafter. This force did not get 
off, however. 



CANBT ORDERED TO MOVE AGAINST MOBILE 279 

All these movements were designed to be in sup- chap.xx 
port of Sherman's march, the object being to keep 
the Confederate troops in the West from leaving 
there. But neither Canby nor Thomas could be 
got off in time. I had some time before depleted ^ (Jeu^^ 
Thomas's army to reinforce Canby, for the reason 
that Thomas had failed to start an expedition which 
he had been ordered to send out, and to have the 
troops where they might do something. Canby 
seemed to 'be equally deliberate in all of his move- 
ments. I ordered him to go in person ; but he pre- 
pared to send a detachment under another officer. 
General Granger had got down to New Orleans in 
some way or other, and I wrote Canby that he must 
not put him in command of troops. In spite of this 
he asked the War Department to assign Granger to 
the command of a corps. 

Almost in despair of having adequate service ren- 
dered to the cause in that quarter, I wrote to Canby : 

I am in receipt of a despatch . . . informing me that 
you have made requisitions for a construction corps and 
material to build seventy miles of railroad. I have di- 
rected that none be sent. Thomas's army has been de- 
pleted to send a force to you, that they might be where 
they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the 
enemy had in the West. If there had been any idea of 
repairing railroads, it coidd have been done much better 
from the North, where we already had the troops. I ex- 
pected your movements to he cooperative with Sherman's 
last. This has now entirely failed. I wrote to you long 
ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the 
country, and destroy railroads, machine-shops, etc., not to 
build them. Take Mobile and hold it, and push your 
forces to the interior— to Montgomery and to Selma. 
Destroy railroads, rolling-stock, and everything useful for 
carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such 



280 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT 

Chap. XX positions as can be supplied by water. By this means 
alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's 
roads in the interior can be kept broken. 

Most of these expeditions got off finally, but too 
late to render any service in the direction for which 
they were designed. 

The enemy, ready to intercept his advance, con- 
sisted of Hardee's troops and Wheeler's cavalry — 
perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all ; but 

Se^Sltfon fi'autic efforts were being made in Eichmond, as I 
was sure would be the case, to retard Sherman's 
movements. Everything possible was being done 
to raise troops in the South. Lee despatched 
against Sherman the troops which had been sent 
to relieve Fort Fisher, which, including those of the 
other defenses of the harbor and its neighborhood, 
amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, 
wounded, and captured, to fourteen thousand men. 
After Thomas's victory at Nashville, what remained 
of Hood's army were gathered together and for- 
warded as rapidly as possible to the East to cooper- 
ate with these forces ; and, finally. General Joseph 

^'Si'^i^^ E. Johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the 
South, though not in favor with the administration 

N^arelti've! (^^* ^^ ^^^^* ^i^^ -^1*- Davis), was put in command 
P- ^^^ of all the troops in North and South Carolina. 

Schofield arrived at Annapolis in the latter part 
of January ; but before sending his troops to North 

^'*S'4^I^ Carolina I went with him down the coast to see the 
situation of affairs, as I could give fuller directions 
after being on the ground than I could very well 
have given without. We soon returned, and the 
troops were sent by sea to Cape Fear River. Both 
New Berne and Wilmington are connected with 



MOVEMENTS OP SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS 281 

Raleigh by railroads which unite at Goldsboro'. chap.xx 
Schofield was to land troops at Smith ville, near the 
mouth of the Cape Fear River on the west side, and 
move up to secure the Wilmington and Charlotte- 
ville railroad. This column took their pontoon- 
bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to 
the island south of the city of Wilmington. A 
large body was sent by the north side to cooperate 
with them. They succeeded in taking the city on 
the 22d of February. I took the precaution to isee 
provide for Sherman's army, in case he should be 
forced to turn in toward the sea-coast before reach- 
ing North Carolina, by forwarding supplies to every 
place where he was liable to have to make such a 
deflection from his projected march. I also sent 
railroad rolling-stock, of which we had a great 
abundance, now that we were not operating the 
roads in Virginia. The gauge of the North Caro- 
lina railroads, being the same as the Virginia rail- 
roads, had been altered too ; these cars and locomo- 
tives were ready for use there without any change. 

On the 31st of January I countermanded the ^^ut^oT^' 
orders given to Thomas to move south to Alabama ^^^^' 
and Greorgia. (I had previously reduced his force 
by sending a portion of it to Terry.) I directed, in 
lieu of this movement, that he should send Stone- 
man through East Tennessee, and push him well 
down toward Columbia, South Carolina, in support 
of Sherman. Thomas did not get Stoneman off in 
time, but, on the contrary, when I had supposed he 
was on his march in support of Sherman, I heard 
of his being in Louisville, Kentucky. I immedi- 
ately changed the order, and directed Thomas to ibid. 385, 386 
send him toward Lynchburg. Finally, however, on 



279 



282 PERSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XX the 12tli of Marcli, lie did push down through the 
northwestern end of South CaroKna, creating some 
consternation. I also ordered Thomas to send the 
Fourth Corps (Stanley's) to Bull Glap, and to de- 
stroy no more roads east of that. I directed him to 
concentrate supplies at Knoxville, with a view to a 
probable movement of his army through that way 
toward Lynchburg. 

Groldsboro' is four hundred and twenty-five miles 
from Savannah. Sherman's march was without 
Mlmoiwi, i^auch incident until he entered Columbia, on the 
17th of February. He was detained in his progress 
by having to repair and corduroy the roads and re- 
build the bridges. There was constant skirmishing 
and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, 
but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. 
Four days, also, were lost in making complete the 
destruction of the most important railroads south 
of Columbia ; there was also some delay caused by 
the high water, and the destruction of the bridges 
on the line of the road. A formidable river had to 
be crossed near Columbia, and that in the face of 
a small garrison under General Wade Hampton. 
There was but little delay, however, further than 
that caused by high water in the stream. Hamp- 
ton left as Sherman approached, and the city was 
found to be on fire. 

There has since been a great deal of acrimony dis- 
played in discussions of the question as to who set 
Columbia on fire. Sherman denies it on the part 
of his troops, and Hampton denies it on the part of 
the Confederates. One thing is certain : as soon as 
our troops took possession, they at once proceeded 
to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability 



Ibid. 280 et 
seq. 



CAPTURE OF COLUMBIA 283 

with the limited means at hand. In any case, the chap, xx 
example set by the Confederates in burning the vil- 
lage of Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, a town which 
was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defense 
of the act of firing the seat of government of the 
State most responsible for the conflict then raging 
not imperative. 

The Confederate troops having vacated the city, 
the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet 
the commander of the National forces for the pur- 
pose of surrendering the town, making terms for 
the protection of property, etc. Sherman paid no 
attention at all to the overture, but puslied forward 
and took the town without making any conditions 
whatever with its citizens. He then, however, coop- 
erated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames 
and providing for the people who were rendered 
destitute by this destruction of their homes. When 
he left there he even gave the mayor flve hundred 
head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, 
to tide them over until some arrangement could 
be made for their future supplies. He remained in M^Srii, 
Columbia until the roads, public buildings, work- 
shops, and everything that could be useful to the 
enemy were destroyed. While at Columbia Sher- 
man learned for the first time that what remained 
of Hood's army was confronting him, under the 
command of General Beauregard. 

Charleston was evacuated on the 18th of Febru- 
ary, and Foster garrisoned the place. Wilmington 
was captured on the 22d. Columbia and Cheraw, 
farther north, were regarded as so secure from in- 
vasion that the wealthy people of Charleston and 
Augusta had sent much of their valuable property 



287 



284 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XX to these two points to be stored. Among the 
goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old 
Madeira, silverware, and furniture. I am afraid 

lyfemoSs n i^uch of these goods fell into the hands of our 
^^^ troops. There was found at Columbia a large 
amount of powder, some artillery, small arms, and 
fixed ammunition. These, of course, were among 
the articles destroyed. While here Sherman also 
learned of Johnston's restoration to command. The 
latter was given, as already stated, all troops in 
North and South Carolina. After the completion of 
the destruction of public property about Columbia, 
Sherman proceeded on his march, and reached 
Cheraw without any special opposition and with- 
out incident to relate. The railroads, of course, 
were thoroughly destroyed on the way. Sherman 
remained a day or two at Cheraw, and finally, on 

Ibid. 292 et the 6th of March, crossed his troops over the Pedee 
and advanced straight for Fayetteville,, Hardee and 
Hampton were there, and barely escaped. Sher- 
man reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March. 
He had despatched scouts from Cheraw with letters 
to General Terry, at Wilmington, asking him to 
send a steamer with some supplies of bread, cloth- 
ing, and other articles which he enumerated. The 
scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent 
with the mail and such articles for which Sherman 
had asked as were in store at Wilmington. Un- 
fortunately, however, those stores did not contain 
clothing. 
Ibid. 300 Four days later, on the 15th, Sherman left Fay- 
etteville for Goldsboro'. The march now had to be 
made with great caution, for he was approaching 
Lee's army and nearing the country that still re- 



SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS 285 

mained open to the enemy. Besides, lie was con- chap.xx 
fronting all that he had had to confront in his pre- 
vious march up to that i^oint, reinforced by the 
garrisons along the road and by what remained of 
Hood's army. Frantic appeals were made to the 
people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks 
of our foe. I presume, however, that Johnston did 
not have in all over thirty-five or forty thousand 
men. The people had grown tired of the war, and ^^^aSss^ 
desertions from the Confederate army were much 
more numerous than the voluntary accessions. 

There was some fighting at Averysboro' on the M«noirM]» 
16th between Johnston's troops and Sherman's, ^^^ 
with some loss ; and at Bentonville on the 19th and 
21st of March, but Johnston withdrew from the con- 
test before the morning of the 22d. Sherman's loss 
in these last engagements, in killed, wounded, ajid 
missing, was about sixteen hundred. Sherman's 
troops at last reached Goldsboro' on the 23d of the ibid. 306 
month and went into bivouac ; and there his men 
were destined to have a long rest. Schofield was 
there to meet him with the troops which had been 
sent to Wilmington. 

Sherman was no longer in danger. He had Johns- 
ton confronting him, but with an army much in- Narratfve^ 
ferior to his own, both in numbers and in morale, pp-3'^2-374 
He had Lee to the north of him with a force largely ' 
superior ; but I was holding Lee with a still greater 
force, and had he made his escape and gotten down 
to reinforce Johnston, Sherman, with the reinforce- MemoS-s n 
ments he now had from Schofield and Terry, would ^^ 
have been able to hold the Confederates at bay for 
an indefinite period. He was near the sea-shore, 
with his back to it, and our navy occupied the har- 



286 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XX boi's. He had a railroad to both Wilmington and 
New Berne, and his flanks were thoroughly protected 
by streams, which intersect that part of the coun- 
try and deepen as they approach the sea. Then, 
too, Sherman knew that if Lee should escape me I 
would be on his heels, and he and Johnston together 
would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to 
make a stand. With the loss of their capital, it is 
doubtful whether Lee's army would have amounted 
to much as an army when it reached North Caro- 
lina. Johnston's army was demoralized by constant 
defeat, and would hardly have made an offensive 
movement, even if they could have been induced 
to remain on duty. The men of both Lee's and 
Johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the 
North, as brave as men can be; but no man is so 
brave that he may not meet such defeats and dis- 
asters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor 
for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. 



CHAPTER XXI 

ARKIVAL OF THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — LINCOLN 
AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS — AN ANECDOTE 
OF LINCOLN — THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG 
— SHERIDAN DESTROYS THE RAILROAD — GORDON 
CARRIES THE PICKET-LINE — PARKE RECAPTURES 
THE LINE — THE BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD 

ON the last of January, 1865, peace commission- chap, xxi 
ers from the so-called Confederate States pre- 
sented themselves on our hues around Petersburg, h^V^S of 
and were immediately conducted to my headquar- ^'m^.^u ' 
ters at City Point. They proved to be Alexander j ^ camp- 
H. Stephens, A^ice-President of the Confederacy, justAifs?" 

^ ,,■,..,. f>i i P TTT T Sup.Ct.l853- 

Judge Campbell, Assistant Secretary ot War, and ei 
R. M. T. Hunter, formerly United States Senator (^li.fisTei 
and then a member of the Confederate Senate. 

It was about dark when they reached my head- 
quarters, and I at once conducted them to the 
steamer Mary Martin, a Hudson River boat which 
was very comfortably fitted up for the use of pas- 
sengers. I at once communicated by telegraph with 
Washington, and informed the Secretary of War 
and the President of the arrival of these commis- 
sioners, and that their object was to negotiate 
terms of peace between the United States and, as 
they termed it, the Confederate government. I 



OCT 



288 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXI was instructed to retain them at City Point until 
^'state^ the President, or some one whom he would desig- 
papers. II, ^^^q^ should come to meet them. They remained 
several days as guests on board the boat. I saw 
them quite frequently, though I have no recoUec- 
ibid. 646 tion of having had any conversation whatever with 
them on the subject of their mission. It was some- 
thing I had nothing to do with, and I therefore did 
not wish to express any views on the subject. For 
my own part, I never had admitted, and never was 
c^-^^ranuo j-eady to admit, that they were the representatives 
pou?'*^ii,48 of a government. There had been too great a waste 
of blood and treasure to concede anything of the 
kind. As long as they remained there, however, 
our relations were pleasant, and I found them all 
very agreeable gentlemen. I directed the captain to 
furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and 
to minister to their comfort in every way possible. 
No guard was placed over them and no restriction 
was put upon their movements ; nor was there any 
pledge asked that they would not abuse the privi- 
leges extended to them. They were permitted to 
leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, 
coming up on the bank and visiting me at my 
headquarters. 

I had never met any of these gentlemen before 

the war, but knew them well by reputation and 

through their public services, and I had been a 

g^A. H^ u P^i'ticular admirer of Mr. Stephens. I had always 

^■?84^i59^'''^ sup'posed that he was a very small man, but when 

^T^c^il:' I saw him in the dusk of the evening I was very 

mII'T,\s83 much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed 

to be. When he got down on to the boat I found 

that he was wearing a coarse gray woolen overcoat, 



LINCOLN AND THE PEACE COMMISSIONERS 289 

a manufacture that had been introduced into the chap.xxi 
South during the rebellion. The cloth was thicker 
than anything of the kind I had ever seen, even in 
Canada. The overcoat extended nearly to his feet, 
and was so large that it gave him the appearance of 
being an average-sized man. He took this off when 
he reached the cabin of the boat, and I was struck 
with the apparent change in size, in the coat and 
out of it. 

After a few days, about the 2d of February, I re- 
ceived a despatch from Washington, directing me l-^e^Pa^ 
to send the commissioners to Hampton Roads to ^^^^' "' ^" 
meet the President and a member of the Cabinet. 
Mr. Lincoln met them there and had an interview Hay°me*f 
of short duration. It was not a great while after ^'uT-m^' 
they met that the President visited me at City 
Point. He spoke of his having met the commis- 
sioners, and said he had told them that there would 
be no use in entering into any negotiations unless 
they would recognize, first, that the Union as a d^^-Sig 
whole must be forever preserved ; and, second, that °' ^^^""^ 
slavery must be abolished. If they were willing 
to concede these two points, then he was ready to 
enter into negotiations, and was almost willing to 
hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature 
attached, for them to fill in the terms upon which 
they were willing to live with us in the Union and 
be one people. He always showed a generous and o^iSraSw 
kindly spirit toward the Southern people, and I 
never heard him abuse an enemy. Some of the 
cruel things said about President Lincoln, particu- 
larly in the North, used to pierce him to the heart ; 
but never in my presence did he evince a revenge- 
ful disposition — and I saw a great deal of him at 
Vol. II.— 19 



290 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GKANT 

CHAP. XXI City Point, for he seemed glad to get away from 

the cares and anxieties of the capital. 

chSacteri Right here I might relate an anecdote of Mr. Liu- 

H*8t?phen8 coln. It was on the occasion of his visit to me just 

after he had talked with the peace commissioners 

at Hampton Roads. After a little conversation he 

asked me if I had seen that overcoat of Stephens's. 

I replied that I had. " Well," said he, " did you see 

him take it ofe ! " I said yes. " Well," said he, " didn't 

you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest 

ear that ever you did seel" Long afterward I 

j.B.Gor- told this story to the Confederate Greneral J. B. 

don, Lt.- "^ 

^v^^ie'n." Gordon, at the time a member of the Senate. He 
19^,'im-^'; repeated it to Stephens, and, as I heaVd afterward. 
Gov. 1887-90 g^gpijgjjg laughed immoderately at the simile of 

Mr. Lincoln. 

The rest of the winter, after the departure of the 
peace commissioners, passed off quietly and un- 
eventfully, except for two or three little incidents. 
On one occasion during this period, while I was 
visiting Washington City for the purpose of confer- 
ring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry 
under General Wade Hampton, passing our extreme 
left and then going to the south, got in east of us. 
Aconfeder- Beforc their presence was known they had driven 

ate reprisal ^ x •' 

off a large number of beef-cattle that were grazing 
in that section. It was a fair capture, and they 
were sufficiently needed by the Confederates. It 
was only retaliating for what we had done, some- 
times for many weeks at a time, when out of sup- 
plies — taking what the Confederate army otherwise 
would have gotten. As appears in this book, on 
Ante, 1, 485, one single occasion we captured five thousand head 
of cattle which were crossing the Mississippi River 



THE WINTER BEFOEE PETEESBUEG 291 

near Port Hudson on tlieir way from Texas to sup- chaf. xxi 
ply the Confederate army In the East. 

One of the most anxious periods of my experi- f^^p^tert 
ence during the rebeUion was the last few weeks ^"^^ 
before Petersburg. I felt that the situation of the 
Confederate armj^ was such that they would try to 
make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, 
and I was afraid, every morning, that I would 
awake from my sleep to hear that Lee had gone, 
and that nothing was left but a picket-line. He 
had his railroad by the way of Danville south, and 
I was afraid that he was running oft' his men and 
all stores and ordnance except such as it would be 
necessary to carry with him for his immediate de- 
fense. I knew he could move much more lightlj^ 
and more rapidly than I, and that, if he got the 
start, he would leave me behind, so that we would 
have the same army to fight again farther south — 
and the war miglit be prolonged another year. 

I was led to this fear by the faot that I could not 
see how it was possible for the Confederates to hold 
out much longer where they w^ere. There is no 
doubt that Eichmond would have been evacuated ^^?R*eh-''*' 
much sooner than it was if it had not been that it '"*'°'^ 
was the capital of the so-called Confederacy, and 
the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, 
have had a very demoralizing effect upon the Con- 
federate army. When it was evacuated (as we 
shall see further on) the Confederacy at once began 
to crumble and fade away. Then, too, desertions 
were taking place not only among those wdio were 
with General Lee in the neighborhood of their 
capital, but throughout the w^hole Confederacy. I 
remember that, in a conversation with me on one 



292 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXI occasioD. long prioi" to this, General Butler remarked 
that the Confederates would find great difficulty in 
getting more men for their army ; possibly adding, 
though I am not certain as to this, "unless they 
should arm the slave." 

Confederate ^1^^ South, as we all kuew, wcrc conscripting 
**°° every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen 
and forty-five ; and now they had passed a law for 
the further conscription of boys from fourteen to 
eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men 
from forty-five to sixty, to be called the senior re- 
serves. The latter were to hold the necessary points 
not in immediate danger, and especially those in the 
rear. General Butler, in alluding to this conscrip- 
tion, remarked that they were thus " robbing both 
the cradle and the grave," an expression which I 
afterward used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn. 

^deSion? ^^ ^^^ ™y belief that, while the enemy could get 
no more recruits, they were losing at least a regi- 
ment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, 
by desertions alone. Then, by casualties of war, 
sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were 
much heavier. It was a mere question of arithmetic 
to calculate how long they could hold out while that 
rate of depletion was going on. Of course, long be- 
fore their army would be thus reduced to nothing 
the army which we had in the field would have been 
able to capture theirs. Then, too, I knew from the 
great number of desertions that the men who had 
fought so bravely, so gallantly, and so long for the 
cause which they believed in — and as earnestly, I 
take it, as our men believed in the cause for which 
they were fighting — had lost hope and become de- 
spondent. Many of them were making application 



THE WINTER BEFORE PETERSBURG 293 

to be sent North, where they might get employment chap, xxi 
until the war was over, when they could return to 
their Southern homes. 

For these and other reasons I was naturally very 
impatient for the time to come when I could com- 
mence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly be- 
lieved would close the war. 

There were two considerations I had to observe, 
however, and which detained me. One was the 
fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, 
and the roads were impassable for artillery and 
teams. It was necessary to wait until they had 
dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon- 
trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an 
army operating in the enemy's country. The other 
consideration was that General Sheridan, with the ^g^herffan^ 
cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, was operat- 
ing on the north side of the James River, having 
come down from the Shenandoah. It was neces- 
sary that I should have his cavalry with me, and I 
was therefore obliged to wait until he could join 
me south of the James River. 

Let us now take account of what he was doing. 

On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. 
He had met Early between Staunton and Charlottes- (Y^^e^sS 
ville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire MeuJofrsji; 
command. Early and some of his officers escaped ^ ^^^' 
by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in 
the woods. 

On the 12th I heard from him again. He had 
turned east, to come to Wliite House. He could not 
go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had 
been so very heavy and the streams were so very 
much swollen. He had a pontoon-train with him, 



294 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXI but it would iiot reacli half-way across some of the 
streams, at their thee stage of water, which he would 
have to get over in going south as first ordered. 

I had supplies sent around to White House for 
him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. 
We had intended to abandon it, because the James 
River had now become our base of supplies. 

Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with 

him, divided into two divisions commanded respec- 

coLothN^Y: tively by Ouster and Devin. General Merritt was 

^i86i?im!'' acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very 

voif: Aug.' light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, 

with a larger supply of coffee, salt, and other small 

rations, and very little else besides ammunition. 

w-g.xLvi They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced 

tearing up the railroad back toward Lynchburg. 

He also sent a division along the James River 

Canal to destroy locks, culverts, etc. All mills 

and factories along the lines of march of his troops 

were destroyed also. 

Sheridan had in this way consumed so much 
time that his making a march to White House was 
now somewhat hazardous. He determined, there- 
fore, to fight his way along the railroad and canal 
till he was as near to Richmond as it was possible 
Ibid. 478 et to get, or until attacked. He did this, destroying 
mS:iMi9 *^i® canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to 
®*^*'*^" a point as near Richmond as he could get. On 
the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes had joined 
his column to the number of two thousand or more, 
and they assisted considerably in the work of de- 
stroying the railroads and the canal. His cavalry 
was in as fine a condition as when he started, be- 
cause he had been able to find plenty of forage. He 



SHEEMAN'S MARCH TO WHITE HOUSE 



295 



Cf. Sher- 
ujau, Me- 
moirs, II, 
325, 3t;i, 333 
et seq. 



had captured most of Early's horses and picked up chap.xxi 
a good many others on the road. When he reached 
Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. 
He resisted their assault with part of his command, 
moved quickly across the South and North Anna, 
going north, and reached White House safely on 
the 19th. 

The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed 
with reference to the time he could get away from 
Goldsboro', where he then was. Supplies had to be 
got up to him which would last him through a long 
march, as there would probably not be much to be 
obtained in the country through which he would 
pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should 
start from where he w^as, in the neighborhood of 
Goldsboro', on the 18th of April, the earliest day at 
which he supposed he could be ready. 

Sherman was anxious that I should w^ait where I 
was until he could come up and make a sure thing 
of it ; but I had determined to move as soon as the 
roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I 
had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fix- 
ing any time at my pleasure for starting, until 
Sheridan, who w^as on his way from the Shenan- 
doah Valley to join me, should arrive, as both his 
presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to 
the execution of the plans which I had in mind. 
However, having arrived at White House on the 
19th of March, I was enabled to make my plans. 

Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get 
away some night before I was aware of it, and, 
having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to 
join with Johnston in attempting to crush out 
Sherman, I had, as early as the 1st of the month 



296 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXI of March, given instructions to the troops around 
Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such 
a movement should not escape their notice, and to 
be ready to strike at once if it was undertaken. 

It is now known that early in the month of 
March Mr. Davis and Greneral Lee had a consulta- 
tion about the situation of affairs in and about 
Richmond and Petersburg, and they both agreed 
that these places were no longer tenable for them, 
and that they must get away as soon as possible. 
They, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condi- 
tion of the roads which would make it possible to 
move. 

General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to 
secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the 
Danville road with greater security than he would 
have in the way the two armies were situated, de- 
termined upon an assault upon the right of our 
lines around Petersburg. The night of the 24th of 
1865 March was fixed upon for this assault, and GTeneral 
Gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. 
The point between Fort Stedman and Battery 
No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was 
selected as the point of his attack. The attack 
was to be made at night, and the troops were to get 
possession of the higher ground in the rear, where 
they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep 
to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of 
our army, and force me to contract my lines. Lee 
hoped this would detain me a few days longer and 
give him an opportunity of escape. The plan was 
well conceived and the execution of it very well 
done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion 
of our line. 



GORDON CAREIES THE PICKET-LINE 297 



Gordon assembled his troops, under the cover of chap, xxi 
night, at the point at which they were to make ^-Sis^^ 
their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, 
entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside 
of our main line of intrenchments ; this reduced the 
distance he would have to charge over to not much 
more than fifty yards. For some time before, the 
deserters had been coming in with great frequency, 
often bringing their arms with them ; and this the 
Confederate general knew. Taking advantage of 
this knowledge, he sent his pickets, with their arms, 
creeping through to ours, as if to desert. When 
they got to our lines they at once took possession 
and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In 
the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if 
in great security. This plan was to have been exe- 
cuted and much damage done before daylight ; but 
the troops that were to reinforce Grordon had to be 
brought from the north side of the James River, and, 
by some accident on the railroad on their way over, 
they were detained for a considerable time ; so that 
it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready 
to make the charge. 

The charge, however, was successful and almost ^i^-wn, 
without loss, the enemy passing through our lines 
between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then, 
turning to the right and left, they captured the 
fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops 
in them. Continuing the charge, they also carried 
Batteries 11 and 12 to our left, which they turned 
toward City Point. 

Meade happened to be at City Point that night, 
and this break in his line cut him off from all com- 
munication with his headquarters. Parke, however, 



298 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap, XXI Commanding the Ninth Corps when this breach took 
place, telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, 
and, learning that the general was away, assumed 
command himself, and with commendable promp- 
titude made all preparations to drive the enemy 
captlijd Art! hack. General Tidball gathered a large number of 
^BvtS-' pieces of artillery, and planted them in rear of the 

Gen. Vols. j. i i - i i n 

Apr. 2, 1865 captured works so as to sweep the narrow space ot 
J- F- Hart- ground between the lines very thoroughly. Hart- 
jiuv^27^86i- I'^iift was soon out with his division, as also was 
Yoiiuini Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breach 
(Pa.V 1872-78 headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly 
drove them back into Fort Stedman. On the other 
side they were driven back into the intrenchments 
\)%^3Z^ which they had captured, and Batteries 11 and 12 
were retaken by Willcox early in the morning. 
Ibid. 318 Parke then threw a line around outside of the 
captured fort and batteries, and communication 
was once more established. The artillery fire was 
kept up so continuously that it was impossible for 
the Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible 
for reinforcements to join them. They all, there- 
fore, fell captives into our hands. This effort of 
Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and re- 
sulted in their killing, wounding, and capturing 
about two thousand of ours. 

After the recapture of the batteries taken by the 
Confederates, our troops made a charge and carried 
the enemy's intrenched picket-line, which they 
strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but 
a short distance to charge over when our attack 
came to be made a few days later. 
Appx.%S The day that Gordon was making dispositions for 
Ma/24, 1865 this attack (24th of March) I issued my orders for 



BATTLE OF WHITE OAK ROAD 299 

the movement to commence on the 29th. Ord, with chap, xxi 

three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavahy, 

was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, 

from the north side of the James River, and take 

his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. 

He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the 

James to hold Bermuda Hundred and the north of 

the James River. The Engineer Brigade was to he 

left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines 

about Petersburg. 

Ord was at his jjlace promptly. Humphreys and 
Warren were then on our extreme left with the 
Second and Fifth corps. They were directed, on 
the arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position 
in their places, to cross Hatcher's Run and extend 
out west toward Five Forks, the object being to get 
into a position from which we could strike the 
South Side railroad and ultimately the Danville 
railroad. There was considerable fighting in tak- ^i")^02f67T,^ 
ing up these new positions for the Second and ^^^ 
Fifth corps, in which the Army of the James had 
also to participate somewhat, and the losses were 
quite severe. 

This was what was known as the battle of White 
Oak road. 



CHAPTER XXII 

INTEKVIEW WITH SHERIDAN — GEAND MOVEMENT OF 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC — SHERIDAN'S AD- 
VANCE ON FIVE FORKS — BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS 
— PARKE AND WRIGHT STORM THE ENEMY'S LINES 
— BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG 

CHAP. XXII QHERIDAN reached City Point on the 26th of 
1865 ^ March. His horses, of course, were jaded, and 
many of them had lost their shoes. A few days of 
rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and 
also to have them shod and put in condition for 
moving. Immediately on General Sheridan's ar- 

w. R. xLvi rival at City Point I prepared his instructions for 

(1) 52. But *' x- jr 

MemoSJii; the move which I had decided upon. The move- 
127,134 jjient was to commence on the 29th of the month. 
After reading the instructions I had given him 
Sheridan walked out of my tent, and I foUowed to 
have some conversation with him by himself — not 
in the presence of anybody else, even of a member 
of my staff. In preparing his instructions I con- 
templated just what took place ; that is to say, cap- 
turing Five Forks, driving the enemy from Peters- 
burg and Richmond, and terminating the contest 
before separating from the enemy. But the nation 
had already become restless and discouraged at the 
prolongation of the war, and many believed that 

300 



INTERVIEW WITH SHERIDAN 301 

it would never terminate except by compromise. CHAP.xxn 
Knowing that unless my plan proved an entire suc- 
cess it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, 
I provided in these instructions that in a certain 
event he was to cut loose from the Army of the 
Potomac and his base of supplies, and, living upon 
the country, proceed south by the way of the Dan- 
ville railroad, or near it, across the Roanoke, get in 
the rear of Johnston, who was guarding that road, 
and cooperate with Sherman in destroying Johns- 
ton ; then with these combined forces to help carry 
out the instructions which Sherman already had re- 
ceived, to act in cooperation with the armies around 
Petersburg and Richmond. 

I saw that after Sheridan had read his instructions M^emoSrii, 
he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, pos- 
sibly, of having to cut loose again from the Army 
of the Potomac, and place himself between the two 
main armies of the enemy. I said to him, " Gen- 
eral, this portion of your instructions I have put 
in merely as a blind ; " and gave him the reason for 
doing so, heretofore described. I told him that, as 
a matter of fact, I intended to close the war right 
here with this movement, and that he should go 
no farther. His face at once brightened up, and 
slapping his hand on his leg he said, " I am glad to 
hear it, and we can do it." 

Sheridan was not, however, to make his move- 
ment against Five Forks until he got further in- 
structions from me. 

One day, after the movement I am about to de- cf.ibid.i42- 
scribe had commenced, and when his cavalry was 
on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, 
Sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were 



302 PEKSONAL MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXII then established, at Dabuey's Mills. He met some 
of my staff-officers outside, and was highly jubilant 
over the prospects of success, giving reasons why 
he believed this would prove the final and success- 
ful effort. Although my chief of staff had urged 
very strongly that we return to our position about 
City Point and in the lines around Petersburg, he 
asked Sheridan to come in to see me and say to me 
what he had been saying to them. Sheridan felt a 
little modest about giving his advice where it had 
not been asked ; so one of my staff came in and told 
me that Sheridan had what they considered impor- 
tant news, and suggested that I send for him. I 
did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence 
with which he was imbued. Knowing, as I did 
from experience, of what great value that feeling 
of confidence by a commander was, I determined to 
make a movement at once, although, on account of 
the rains which had fallen after I had started out, 
the roads were still very heavy. Orders were given 
accordingly. 

Five FOTk? Finally the 29th of March came, and fortunately, 
there having been a few days free from rain, the 
surface of the ground was dry, giving indications 
that the time had come when we could move. On 
that date I moved out with all the army available 
after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about 
Petersburg. It soon set in raining again, however, 
^rofdi* and in a very short time the roads became practi- 
cally impassable for teams, and almost so for cav- 
alry. Sometimes a horse or mule would be stand- 
ing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one 
foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling 
to catch himself, all his feet would sink, and he 



SHERIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FORKS 303 

would have to be drawn by hand out of the quick- chap, xxii 
sands so common in that part of Virginia and other 
Southern States. It became necessary, therefore, to 
build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we 
advanced, to move our artillery upon. The army 
had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and 
were so well prepared for it, that it was done very 
rapidly. Tlie next day (March 30th) we had made 
sufficient progress to the southwest to warrant me 
in starting Sheridan with his cavalry over by Din- 
widdle, with instructions to then come up by the 
road leading northwest to Five Forks, thus menac- 
ing the right of Lee's line. 

This movement was made for the purpose of ex- i'lveFo^rk" 
tending our lines to the west as far as practicable 
toward the enemy's extreme right, or Five Forks. 
The column moving detached from the army still in 
the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. 
The forces in the trenches were themselves extend- 
ing to the left flank. Warren was on the extreme 
left when the extension began, but Humphreys was 
marched around later and thrown into line between 
him and Five Forks. 

My hope was that Sheridan would be able to 
carry Five Forks, get on the enemy's right flank 
and rear, and force them to weaken their center to 
protect their right, so that an assault in the center 
might be successfully made. General Wright's corps 
had been designated to make this assault, which I 
intended to order as soon as information reached 
me of Sheridan's success. He was to move under 
cover as close to the enemy as he could get. 

It is natural to suppose that Lee would under- 
stand my design to be to get up to the South Side 



304 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP. XXII and ultimately to the Danville railroad, as soon as 
lie had heard of the movement commenced on the 

March, 1865 29th. These roads were so important to his very 
existence while he remained in Eichmond and 
Petersburg, and of such vital importance to him 
even in case of retreat, that naturally he would 
make most strenuous efforts to defend them. He 

^•,?;£^^^ did on the 30th send Pickett with five brigades to 
reinforce Five Forks. He also sent around to the 
right of his army some two or three other divisions, 
besides directing that other troops be held in readi- 
ness on the north side of the James Eiver to come 
over on call. He came over himself to superintend 
in person the defense of his right flank. 
Ibid. no2 Sheridan moved back to Dinwiddle Court House 
on the night of the 30th, and then took a road lead- 
ing northwest to Five Forks. He had only his cav- 
alry with him. Soon encountering the rebel cavalry, 
he met with a very stout resistance. He gradually 
drove them back, however, until in the neighbor- 
hood of Five Forks. Here he had to encounter 
other troops besides those he had been contending 
with, and was forced to give way. 
Sheridan, Jn this couditiou of affairs he notified me of 

Memoirs, II, 

146, m ^Y^^^ ^^^ taken place, and stated that he was tail- 
ing back toward Dinwiddle gradually and slowly, 
and asked me to send Wright's corps to his assis- 
tance. I replied to him that it was impossible to 
send Wright's corps, because that corps was already 
in line close up to the enemy, where we should 
want to assault when the proper time came, and 
was, besides, a long distance from him; but the 
Second (Humphreys's) and Fifth (Warren's) corps 
were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of 



SHEEIDAN'S ADVANCE ON FIVE FOKKS 305 

it, in a position to threaten the left flank of the CHAP.xxn 
enemy at Five Fork's, and that I would send Warren. 

Accordingly orders were sent to Warren to move ^{m^sl^. 
at once that night (the 31st) to Dinwiddle Court 
House and put himself in communication with 
Sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. 
He was very slow in moving, some of his troops not 
starting until after five o'clock next morning. When 
he did move it was done very deliberately, and on 
arriving at Gravelly Run he found the stream 
swollen from the recent rains, so that he regarded 
it as not fordable. Sheridan, of course, knew of 
his coming, and being impatient to get the troops 
up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. MMnoix8,n, 
He was also hastened, or at least ordered to move 
up rapidly, by General Meade. He now felt that 
he could not cross that creek without bridges, and 
his orders were changed to move so as to strike the 
pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear ; but he 
was so late in getting up that Sheridan determined 
to move forward without him. However, Ayres's 
division of Warren's corps reached him in time to 
be in the fight all day, most of the time separated 
from the remainder of the Fifth Corps and fighting 
directly under Sheridan. 

Warren reported to Sheridan about eleven o'clock 
on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up ^'lvi S 
so as to be much engaged until late in the after- ^^°^ 
noon. Griffin's division, in backing to get out of the 
way of a severe cross-fire of the enemy, was found 
marching away from the fighting. This did not 
continue long, however; the division was brought 
back, and with Ayres's division did most excellent ibid. 838,869 
service during the day. Crawford's division of the 
Vol. II.— 20 



30G PEKSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXII Same coi'ps had backed still farther off, and although 
orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was 
late before it finally got to where it could be of 
material assistance. Once there it did very excel- 
lent service. 

Sheridan succeeded by the middle of the after- 
noon, or a little later, in advancing up to the point 
from which to make his designed assault upon Five 

impaSce Forks itself. He was very impatient to make the 
assault and have it all over before night, because 
the ground he occupied would be untenable for him 
in bivouac during the night. Unless the assault 
was made and was successful he would be obliged 
to return to Dinwiddle Court House, or even farther 
than that, for the night. 

It was at this junction of affairs that Sheridan 
wanted to get Crawford's division in hand, and he 
also wanted Warren. He sent staft'-of&cer after 
staff-officer in search of Warren, directing that 
general to report to him, but they were unable to 
find him. At all events, Sheridan was unable to 

M^emoira n S^t that officer to him. Finally he went himself. 
^^" He issued an order relieving Warren and assigning 
Griffin to the command of the Fifth Corps. The 
troops were then brought up and the assault suc- 
cessfully made, 
warren^s J ^as SO mucli dissatlsficd with Warren's dilatory 
movements in the battle of White Oak road, and 
in his failure to reach Sheridan in time, that I was 
very much afraid that at the last moment he would 
fail Sheridan. He was a man of fine intelligence, 
great earnestness, quick perception, and could make 
his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under 
difficulties where he was forced to act. But I had 



BATTLE OF FIVE FORKS 307 

before discovered a defect whicli was beyond his chap.xxii 
control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness 
in emergencies like the one just before us. He 
could see every danger at a glance before he had 
encountered it. He would not only make prepara- 
tions to meet the danger which might occur, but he 
would inform his commanding officer what others 
should do while he was executing his move. 

I had sent a staff-officer to General Sheridan to ]vfemSr8,n, 
call his attention to these defects, and to say that, ^^" 
as much as I liked General Warren, now was not a 
time when we could let our personal feelings for 
any one stand in the way of success ; and if his re- 
moval was necessary to success, not to hesitate. It 
was upon that authorization that Sheridan removed ibid, les 
Warren. I was very sorry that it had been done, 
and regretted still more that I had not long before 
taken occasion to assign him to another field of 
duty. 

It was dusk when our troops under Sheridan went ^"Snos^^ 
over the parapets of the enemy. The two armies 
were mingled together there for a time in such 
manner that it was almost a question which one 
was going to demand the surrender of the other. 
Soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every 
direction, some six thousand prisoners, besides artil- 
lery and small arms in large quantities, falling into 
our hands. The flying troops were pursued in dif- 
ferent directions, the cavalry and Filth Corps under 
Sheridan pursuing the larger body, which moved 
northwest. 

This pursuit continued until about nine o'clock 
at night, when Sheridan halted his troops, and, 
knowing the importance to him of the part of the 



308 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

CHAP.xxn enemy's line which had been captured, returned, 
sending the Fifth Corps across Hatcher's Run to 
just southwest of Petersburg, and facing them 
toward it. Merritt, with the cavahy, stopped and 
bivouacked west of Five Forks. 

This was the condition which affairs were in on 
the night of the 1st of April. I then issued orders 
for an assault by Wright and Parke at four o'clock 
on the morning of the 2d. I also ordered the 
Second Corps, General Humphreys, and General 
Ord with the Army of the James, on the left, to 
hold themselves in readiness to take any advan- 
tage that could be taken from weakening in their 
front. 

KmS I notified Mr. Lincoln at City Point of the suc- 
cess of the day ; in fact, I had reported to him dur- 
ing the day and evening as I got news, because he 
was so much interested in the movements taking 
place that I wanted to relieve his mind as much as 
I could. I notified Weitzel on the north side of the 
James River, directing him, also, to keep close up 
to the enemy, and take advantage of the with- 
drawal of troops from there to promptly enter the 
city of Richmond. 

I was afraid that Lee would regard the posses- 
sion of Five Forks as of so much importance that 
he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, 
risking everything upon the cast of a single die. It 
was for this reason that I had ordered the assault 
to take place at once, as soon as I had received the 
news of the capture of Five Forks. The corps 
commanders, however, reported that it was so 
dark that the men could not see to move, and it 
would be impossible to make the assault then. 



ASSAULT BY PAEKE AND WRIGHT 309 

But we kept up a coutinuous artillery fire upon the chap.xxii 

enemy around the whole line, including that north 

of the James River, until it was light enough to 

move, which was about a quarter to five in the Apr. 2,i865 

morning. 

At that hour Parke's and Wright's corps moved "^^^^o^i^i^ 
out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front 
as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry 
and artillery, and went without flinching directly 
on till they mounted the parapets and threw them- 
selves inside of the enemy's line. Parke, who was 
on the right, swept down to the right and captured 
a very considerable length of line in that direction ; 
but at that point the outer was so near the inner 
line which closely enveloped the city of Petersburg 
that he could make no advance forward, and, in 
fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which 
he had captured to the defense of his own troops 
and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. 

Wright swung around to his left and moved to ibid, go* 
Hatcher's Run, sweeping everything before him. 
The enemy had traverses in rear of his captured 
line, under cover of which he made something of a 
stand, from one to another, as Wright moved on ; 
but the latter met no serious obstacle. As you 
proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradu- 
ally much farther from the inner one, and along 
about Hatcher's Run they must be nearly two 
miles apart. Both Parke and Wright captured a 
considerable amount of artillery and some prison- 
ers — Wright about three thousand of them. 

In the mean time Ord and Humphreys, in obedi- rbid.679,n6i 
ence to the instructions they had received, had suc- 
ceeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, 



310 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXII in capturing the intrenclied picket-lines in their 
front ; and before Wright got up to that point, Ord 
had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's 
intrenchments. The Second Corps soon followed ; 
and the outer works of Petersburg were in the 
hands of the National troops, never to be wrenched 
from them again. When Wright reached Hatcher's 
Eun, he sent a regiment to destroy the South Side 
railroad just outside of the city. 

My headquarters were still at Dabney's saw-mills. 
As soon as I received the news of Wright's success 
I sent despatches announcing the fact to all points 
around the line, including the troops at Bermuda 
Hundred and those on the north side of the James, 
and to the President at City Point. Further des- 
patches kept coming in, and as they did I sent the 

Badeau^Mii. additional news to these points. Finding at length 
"^ that they were all in, I mounted my horse to join 
the troops who were inside the works. When I ar- 
rived there I rode my horse over the parapet just 
as Wright's three thousand prisoners were coming 
out. I was soon joined inside by General Meade 
and his staff. 

Lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part 

^'S)^i8^^ of the lost ground. Parke on our right was repeat- 
edly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. Before 
noon Longstreet was ordered up from the north 
side of the James River, thus bringing the bulk of 
Lee's army around to the support of his extreme 
right. As soon as I learned this I notified Weitzel 

G. L Hart- ^^^ directed him to keep up close to the enemy, and 
^"K2f' to have Hartsuff, commanding the Bermuda Hun- 
vo'iI:"ap?: dred front, to do the same thing, and if they 

Nov.'^i), 1862 found any break to go in; Hartsuff especially 



BATTLES BEFORE PETERSBURG .'511 

should do SO, for this would separate Richmond chap.xxii 
and Petersburg. 

Sheridan, after he had returned to Five Forks, 
swept down to Petersburg, coming in on our left. 
This gave us a continuous line from the Appomat- 
tox River below the city to the same river above. 
At eleven o'clock, not having heard from Sheridan, 
I reinforced Parke with two brigades from C;ty ^-(f/j^i^^^ 
Point. With this additional force he completed his 
captured works for better defense, and built back 
from his right, so as to protect his flank. He also 
carried in and made an abatis between himself 
and the enemy. Lee brought additional troops 
and artillery against Parke even after this was 
done, and made several assaults with very heavy 
losses. 

The enemy had, in addition to their intrenched 
line close up to Petersburg, two inclosed works 
outside of it, Fort Gregg and Fort Whitworth. 
We thought it had now become necessary to carry 
them by assault. About one o'clock in the day, Fort 
Gregg was assaulted by Foster's division of the ibid. 1179 
Twenty-fourth Corps (Gibbon's), supported by two 
brigades from Ord's command. The battle was des- 
perate, and the National troops were repulsed several 
times ; but it was finally carried, and immediately 
the troops in Fort Whitworth evacuated the place. 
The guns of Fort Gregg were turned upon the 
retreating enemv, and the commanding officer, 

N. A. Miles 

with some sixty of the men of Fort Whitworth, I'stLt. 22d' 

*' ' Mass. Sept. 

surrendered. ^^i^ey coi. 

I had ordered Miles in the morning to report to igelffirig.- 

Sheridan. In moving to execute this order he came MaTiaTise^i; 

upon the enemy at the intersection of the White octVi.lses 



312 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxn Oak road and the Claiborne road. The enemy fell 
back to Sutherland's station on the South Side road 
and were followed by Miles. This position, natu- 
rally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly 

^iMi^!'-^ intrenched. Sheridan now came up, and Miles asked 

Mimoirsji, permisslou from him to make the assault, which 
Sheridan gave. By this time Humphreys had got 
through the outer works in his front, and came up 
also and assumed command over Miles, who com- 
manded a division in his corps. I had sent an 
order to Humphreys to turn to his right and move 
toward Petersburg. This order he now got, and 
started off, thus leaving Miles alone. The latter 
made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had 
to fall back a few hundred yards. 

Hearing that Miles had been left in this position, 
I directed Humphreys to send a division back to his 
relief. He went himself. 

Sheridan, before starting to sweep down toPeters- 

MemoS'i, ^1^1*^5 ^^cl seut Merritt with his cavalry to the west 
to attack some Confederate cavalry that had assem- 
bled there. Merritt drove them north to the Appo- 
mattox River. Sheridan then took the enemy at 
Sutherland's station on the reverse side from where 
Miles was, and the two together captured the place, 
with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of 
artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three 
Confederate corps, to flight. Sheridan followed, and 
drove them until night, when further pursuit was 

w-R-xvLi stopped. Miles bivouacked for the night on the 
ground which he, with Sheridan, had carried so hand- 
somely by assault. I cannot explain the situation 
here better than by giving my despatch to City Point 
that evening : 



EVACUATION OF PETERSBURG 313 

BoYDTON Road, near Petersburg, chap.xxh 
April 2, 1865,4:40 p.m. 
Colonel T. S. Bowers, 

City Point: Henry Heth, 

We are now up and have a continuous line of troops, MaT'-Gen^c 
and in a few hours will be intrenched from the Appomattox s- Ag^'^y' 
below Petersburg to the river above. Heth's and Wilcox's ^ „ „,., 

p , , CM. Wil- 

divisions — such part of them as were not captured — were cox, w. p. 

. 1842-46 ; 

cut off from town, either designedly on theii* part or be- Mjn.-Gen.'c. 
cause they could not help it. Sheridan with the cavalry ' isea^' ' 
and Fifth Corps is above them. Miles's division, Second 
Corps, was sent from the White Oak road to Sutherland's 
station on the South Side railroad, where he met them, 
and at last accounts was engaged with them. Not know- 
ing whether Sheridan would get up in time. General 
Humphreys was sent with another division from here. 
The whole captnres since the army started out gunning 
will amount to not less than twelve thousand men and 
probably fifty pieces of artillery. I do not know the num- 
ber of men and guns accui'ately, however, ... I think the 
President might come out and pay us a visit to-morrow. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

During the night of April 2d onr line was in- 
trenched from the river above to the river below. 
I ordered a bombardment to be commenced the 
next morning at 5 a.m., to be followed by an assault 
at six o'clock ; but the enemy evacuated Petersburg 
early in the morning. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

THE CAPTURE OF PETERSBUEG — MEETING PRESIDENT 
LINCOLN IN PETERSBURG — THE CAPTURE OF 
RICHMOND — PURSUING THE ENEMY — VISIT TO 
SHERIDAN AND MEADE 

CHAP.xxiii /^ ENERAL MEADE and I entered Petersburg 
peterablifg ^^ ^^^ ^^^^ moming of the 3d and took a position 
under cover of a house which protected us from the 
enemy's musketry, which was flying thick and fast 
there. As we would occasionally look around the 
corner we could see the streets and the Appomat- 
tox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed 
with the Confederate army. I did not have artil- 
lery brought up, because I was sure Lee was trying 
to make his escape, and I wanted to push immedi- 
ately in pursuit. At all events, I had not the heart 
to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated 
and fleeing men, and I hoped to capture them soon. 
Soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated 
A military Petersburg, a man came in who represented him- 
self to be an engineer of the Army of Northern 
Virginia. He said that Lee had for some time been 
at work preparing a strong inclosed intrenchment, 
into which he would throw himself when forced 
out of Petersburg, and fight his final battle there ; 
that he was actually at that time drawing his troops 

314 



ruse 



PLAN OF OPEEATIONS AGAINST LEE 315 

from Richmond, and falling back into this prepared chap.xxiii 
work. This statement was made to General Meade 
and myself when we were together. I had already 
given orders for the movement up the south side 
of the Appomattox for the purpose of heading off 
Lee; but Meade was so much impressed by this 
man's story that he thought we ought to cross the 
Appomattox there at once and move against Lee in 
his new position. I knew that Lee was no fool, as 
he would have been to have put himself and his 
army between two formidable streams like the 
James and Appomattox rivers, and between two 
such armies as those of the Potomac and the James. 
Then these streams coming together as they did to 
the east of him, it would be only necessary to close 
up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from 
all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. It would 
only have been a question of days, — and not many 
of them, — if he had taken the position assigned to 
him by the so-called engineer, when he would have 
been obliged to surrender his army. Such is one of 
the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antago- 
nist. My judgment was that Lee would necessarily 
have to evacuate Richmond, and that the only 
course for him to pursue would be to follow the 
Danville road. Accordingly my object was to se- 
cure a point on that road south of Lee, and I told 
Meade this. He suggested that if Lee was going 
that way we should follow him. My reply was that 
we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ^'^^^°^"' 
ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only 
stay in the position he (Meade) believed him to be 
in at that time, I wanted nothing better ; that when 
we got in possession of the Danville railroad, at its 



316 PEKSONAI. MEMOIBS OF U. S. GRANT 

chap.xxiii crossing of the Appomattox River, if we still found 
him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to 
move eastward and close him up ; that we would 
then have all the advantage we could possibly have 
by moving directly against him from Petersburg, 
even if he remained in the position assigned him 
by the engineer officer. 

I had held most of the command aloof from the 
intrenchments, so as to start them out on the Dan- 
ville road early in the morning, supposing that 
Lee would be gone during the night. During the 
night I strengthened Sheridan by sending him 
Humphreys's corps. 

i)i^^,"^ii, L^®? ^^ ^® ^^^ know, had advised the author- 
^^ ities at Richmond, during the day, of the condition 
of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for 
him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold 
out that long. Davis was at church when he re- 
ceived Lee's despatch. The congregation was dis- 
missed with the notice that there would be no 
evening service. The rebel government left Rich- 
mond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. 

^rlte plln^ At uight Leo ordered his troops to assemble at 
Amelia Court House, his object being to get away, 
join Johnston, if possible, and try to crush Sher- 
man before I could get there. As soon as I was 
sure of this I notified Sheridan, and directed him to 
move out on the Danville railroad to the south side 
of the Appomattox River as speedily as possible. 
He replied that he already had some of his com- 
mand nine miles out. I then ordered the rest of the 
Army of the Potomac under Meade to follow the 
same road in the morning. Parke's corps followed 
by the same road, and the Army of the James was 



ALTEKING THE RAILROilD GAUGE 



317 



directed to follow the road which ran alongside of chap.xxiii 
the South Side railroad to Burke's Station, and to 
repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. 
That road was a 5-feet gauge, while our rolling- 




NORTH C. 



MAP OF THE PETERSBURG AKD APPOMATTOX CAMPAIGNS. 

stock was all of the 4 feet 8^ inches gauge ; conse- 
quently the rail on one side of the track had to be 
taken up throughout the whole length and relaid 
so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and loco- 
motives. 

Mr. Lincoln was at City Point at the time, and 
had been for some days. I would have let him 
know what I contemplated doing, only, while I felt 



318 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



The Presi- 
dent's visit 
to Peters- 
burg 



chap.xxiii a strong conviction that the move was going to be 
successful, yet it might not prove so; and then I 
would have only added another to the many disap- 
pointments he had been suffering for the past three 
years. But when we started out he saw that we 
were moving for a purpose, and bidding us God- 
speed, remained there to hear the result. 

The next morning after the capture of Petersburg 
I telegraphed Mr. Lincoln, asking him to ride out 
there and see me, while I would await his arrival. 
I had started all the troops out early in the morn- 
ing, so that after the National army left Petersburg 
there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal 
in the streets. There was absolutely no one there 
except my staff-officers and, possibly, a small es- 
cort of cavalry. We had selected the piazza of a 
deserted house, and occupied it until the President 
arrived. 

About the first thing that Mr. Lincoln said to 
me, after warm congratulations for the victory and 
thanks both to myself and to the army which had 
accomplished it, was, " Do you know, general, that 
I have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days 
that you intended to do something like this ? " Our 
movements having been successful up to this point, 
I no longer had any object in concealing from the 
President all my movements, and the objects I 
had in view. He remained for some days near City 
Point, and I communicated with him frequently 
and fully by telegraph. 
Possible ri- Mr. Liucolu kucw that it had been arranged for 

valry be- ~ 

E^ttndthe Sherman to join me at a fixed time, to cooperate in 

^®®* the destruction of Lee's army. I told him that I 

had been very anxious to have the Eastern armies 



MEETING THE PRESIDENT IN PETERSBURG 319 

vanquish their old enemy, who had so long resisted cuAr.xxiii 
all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue 
them or drive them from their capital. The West- 
ern armies had been in the main successful until 
they had conquered all the territory from the Mis- 
sissippi Elver to the State of North Carolina, and 
were now almost ready to knock at the back door 
of Richmond, asking admittance. I said to him 
that if the Western armies should be even upon 
the field, operating against Richmond and Lee, the 
credit would be given to them for the capture, by 
politicians and non-combatants from the section of 
country which those troops hailed from. It might 
lead to disagreeable bickerings between members 
of Congress of the East and those of the West in 
some of their debates. Western members might be 
throwing it up to the members of the East that in 
the suppression of the rebellion they were not able 
to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the 
way of contributing toward that end, but had to 
wait until the Western armies had conquered all the 
territory south and west of them, and then come on 
to help them capture the only army they had been 
engaged with. 

Mr. Lincoln said he saw that now, but had never 
thought of it before, because his anxiety was so 
great that he did not care where the aid came from 
so the work was done. 

The Army of the Potomac has every reason to ?ii^eP^tomaJ 
be proud of its four years' record in the suppres- 
sion of the rebellion. The army it had to fight was 
the protection to the capital of a people which was 
attempting to found a nation upon the territory of 
the United States. Its loss would be the loss of the 



320 PEESONAI. MEMOmS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxm cause. Every energy, therefore, was put forth by 
the Confederacy to protect and maintain their cap- 
ital. Everything else would go if it went. Lee's 
army had to be strengthened to enable it to main- 
tain its position, no matter what territory was 
wrested from the South in another quarter. 

I never expected any such bickering as I have 
indicated between the soldiers of the two sections ; 
and fortunately there has been none between the 
politicians. Possibly I am the only one who thought 
of the liability of such a state of things in advance. 
When our conversation was at an end Mr. Lin- 
coln mounted his horse and started on his return to 
City Point, while I and my staff started to join the 
army, now a good many miles in advance. Up to 
this time I had not received the report of the cap- 
ture of Richmond. 

FauofRich- Soon after I left President Lincoln I received a 
despatch from General Weitzel which notified me 
that he had taken possession of Richmond at about 
April, 1865 8 : 15 o'clock in the morning of that day (the 3d), and 
that he had found the city on fire in two places. 
The city was in the most utter confusion. The 
authorities had taken the precaution to empty all 
the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the 
provisions which the Confederate government had 
left, for the people to gather up. The city had 
been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, 
without any notice whatever that they were about 
to leave. In fact, up to the very hour of the evac- 
uation the people had been led to believe that Lee 
had gained an important victory somewhere around 
Petersburg. 

Weitzel's command found evidence of great de- 



THE FALL OF RICHMOND 321 

moralization in Lee's army, there being still a great CHAP.xxm 
many men and even officers in the town. The city %KiS^ 
was on fire. Our troops were directed to extin- 
guish the flames, which they finally succeeded in 
doing. The fire had been started by some one con- 
nected with the retreating army. All authorities 
deny that it was authorized, and I presume it was 
the work of excited men who were leaving what 
they regarded as their capital, and may have felt 
that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into 
the hands of their enemy. Be that as it may, the 
National troops found the city in flames, and used 
every effort to extinguish them. 

The troops that had formed Lee's right, a great LeKw 
many of them, were cut off from getting back into 
Petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so 
hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, 
ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to 
lighten their loads, and pushed along up the Ap- 
pomattox River until finally they took water and 
crossed over. 

I left Mr. Lincoln and started, as I have already 
said, to join the command, which halted at Suther- 
land's station, about nine miles out. We had still 
time to march as much farther, and time was an 
object ; but the roads were bad, and the trains be- 
longing to the advance corps had blocked up the 
^oad so that it was impossible to get on. Then, 
again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy 
and were pursuing them ; and the orders were that 
the roads should be given up to the cavalry when- 
ever they appeared. This caused further delay. 

General Wright, who was in command of one of 
the corps which were left back, thought to gain 
Vol. II.— 21 



322 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxm time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying 
to get up some rations for them, and clearing out 
the road, so that when they did start they would 
be uninterrupted. Humphreys, who was far ahead, 
was also out of rations. They did not succeed in 
getting them up through the night ; but the Army 

St trTopJ of the Potomac, officers and men, were so elated by 
the reflection that at last they were following up a 
victory to its end that they preferred marching withr 
out rations to running a possible risk of letting the 
enemy elude them. So the march was resumed at 
three o'clock in the morning. 

w. R. xLvi Merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at Deep 
Creek, and driven them north to the Appomattox, 
where, I presume, most of them were forced to 
cross. 

On the morning of the 4th I learned that Lee had 
ordered rations up from Danville for his famishing 
army, and that they were to meet him at Farmville. 
This showed that Lee had already abandoned the 
idea of following the railroad down to Danville, but 
had determined to go farther west, by the way of 
sheridau, Famiville. I notified Sheridan of this and directed 

Memoirs, II, 

^■'^ him to get possession of the road before the supplies 
could reach Lee. He responded that he had already 
sent Crook's division to get upon the road between 
Burkesville and Jetersville, then to face north and 
march along the road upon the latter place ; and he 
thought Crook must be there now. The bulk of the 
army moved directly for Jetersville by two roads. 
After I had received the despatch from Sheridan 
saying that Crook was on the Danville road, I im- 
mediately ordered Meade to make a forced march 
with the Army of the Potomac, and to send Parke's 



PURSUING THE ENEMY 323 

corps across from the road they were on to the chap.xxiii 
South Side raih'oad, to fall in the rear of the Army 
of the James and to protect the railroad which that 
army was repairing as it went along. 

Our troops took possession of Jetersville, and in 
the telegraph-office they found a despatch from Lee, ^ate pug^t 
ordering two hundred thousand rations from Dan- 
ville. The despatch had not been sent, but Sheri- 
dan sent a special messenger with it to Burkesville 
and had it forwarded from there. In the mean time, 
however, despatches from other sources had reached 
Danville, and they knew there that our army was 
on the line of the road ; so that they sent no further 
supplies from that quarter. 

At this time Merritt and Mackenzie, with the cav- ^- f^^^^J^ 
airy, were off between the road which the Army of 
the Potomac was marching on and the Appomat- 
tox River, and were attacking the enemy in flank. 
They picked up a great many prisoners and forced 
the abandonment of some property. 

Lee intrenched himself at Amelia Court House, 
and also his advance north of Jetersville, and sent 
his troops out to collect forage. The country was 
very poor and afforded but very little. His foragers 
scattered a great deal; many of them were picked 
up by our men, and many others never returned to 
the Army of Northern Virginia. 

Griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad 
south of Jetersville, and Sheridan notified me of 
the situation. I again ordered Meade up with all iMd. 604 
despatch, Sheridan having but the one corps of in- 
fantry, with a little cavalry, confronting Lee's entire 
army. Meade, always prompt in obeying orders, 
now pushed forward with great energy, although he 



324 PEKSONAI. MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxiii was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. 

w^K-gXLvi Humphreys moved at two, and Wright at three 
o'clock in the morning, without rations, as I have 
said, the wagons being far in the rear. 

I stayed that night at Wilson's Station on the 
South Side railroad. On the morning of the 5th I 
sent word to Sheridan of the progTess Meade was 
making, and suggested that he might now attack 
Lee. We had now no other objective than the 
Confederate armies, and I was anxious to close the 
thing up at once. 
sLeridan Q^ the 5th I marchcd again with Ord's command 

Memoirs, II, ^ 

"^ until within about ten miles of Burkesville, where I 
stopped to let his army pass. I then received from 
Sheridan the following despatch : 

The whole of Lee's army is at or near AmeHa Coui't 
H. E. House, and on this side of it. General Davies, whom I 
capt. 5th N. sent out to PainesviUe on their right flank, has just cap- 
^Bril.^Gen.' tured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. We can 
"^wMelf ■ capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force enough 
May'Ss can be thrown to tliis point, and then advance upon it. My 
cavalry was at Burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, 
on the Danville road, last night. General Lee is at AmeUa 
Court House in person. They are out of rations, or nearly 
so. They were advancing up the railroad toward Burkes- 
ville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point. 

It now became a life-and-death struggle with Lee 
to get south to his provisions. 
w.R. xLvi Sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off im- 
mediately toward Farmville, moved Davies's bri- 
md. 1145 gade of cavalry out to watch him. Davies found the 
movement had already commenced. He attacked 
and drove away their cavalry, which was escorting 
wagons to the west, capturing and burning one 



PUKSUING THE ENEMY 325 

hundred and eighty wagons. He also captured CHAP.xxni 
five pieces of artillery. The Confederate infantry 
then moved against him, and probably would have 
handled him very roughly, but Sheridan had sent 
two more brigades of cavalry to follow Davies, and 
they came to his relief in time. A sharp engage- 
ment took place between these three brigades of 
cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter 
was repulsed. 

Meade himself reached Jetersville about two ^"^J^^^ 
o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his 
troops. The head of Humphreys's corps followed 
in about an hour afterward. Sheridan stationed ibid. 1107 
the troops as they came up, at Meade's request, the 
latter still being very sick. He extended two divi- 
sions of this corps off to the west of the road to the 
left of Griffin's corps, and one division to the right. 
The cavalry by this time had also come up, and 
they were put still farther off to the left, Sheridan 
feeling certain that there lay the route by which 
the enemy intended to escape. He wanted to attack, 
feeling that, if time was given, the enemy would get 
away ; but Meade prevented this, preferring to wait 
till his troops were all up. 

At this juncture Sheridan sent me a letter which Memoes, n, 
had been handed to him by a colored man, with a "''' ^^^ 
note from himself saying that he wished I was there 
myself. The letter was dated Amelia Court House, 
April 5th, and signed by Colonel Taylor. It was to 
his mother, and showed the demoralization of the 
Confederate army. Sheridan's note also gave me 
the information, as here related, of the movements 
of that day. I received a second message from 
Sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more em- 



326 TEPtSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

chap.xxtii pliatieally the importance of my presence. This 
was In'ought to me by a scout in gray nniform. It 
re^autiou ^^'^^ Written on tissue-paper and wrapped up in 
tin-foil such as chewing-tobacco is folded in. This 
was a precaution taken so that if the scout should 
be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his 
pocket and, putting it into his mouth, chew it. It 
would cause no surprise at all to see a Confederate 
soldier chewing tobacco. It was nearly night when 

^•/^•tS'^^ this letter was received. I gave Ord directions to 
continue his march to Burkesville and there in- 
trench himself for the night, and in the morning 
to move west to cut off all the roads between there 
and Farmville. 

I then started with a few of my staff and a very 
small escort of cavalry, going directly through the 
woods, to join Meade's army. The distance was 
about sixteen miles ; but the night being dark, our 
progress was slow through the woods in the absences 
of direct roads. However, we got to the outposts 
about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some 
little parley convinced the sentinels of our iden- 
tity and were conducted in to where Sheridan was 

M^emSji. l>ivouacked. We talked over the situation for some 
little time, Sheridan explaining to me what he 
thought Lee was trying to do, and that Meade's 
orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, 
would give him the coveted opportunity of escap- 
ing us and putting us in rear of him. 

We then together visited Meade, reaching his 
headquarters about midnight. I explained to Meade 
that we did not want to follow the enemy — we 
wanted to get ahead of him ; and that his orders 
would allow the enemy to escape ; and besides that, 



178 



VISIT TO SHEKIDAN AND MEADE 327 

T had no doubt that Lee was moving right then, chap.xxiii 
Meade changed his orders at once. They were ^-^j^^^'^ 
now given for an advance on Amelia Court House, 
at an early hour in the morning, as the army then 
lay ; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, 
most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry 
swung out still farther to the left. 



Creek 



CHAPTER XXIV 

BATTLE OF SAILOE'S CREEK — ENGAGEMENT AT FAEM- 
VILLE — CORRESPONDENCE WITH GENERAL LEE — 
SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY 

CHAP.xxiv rilHE Appomattox, going westward, takes a long 
Jl. sweep to the southwest from the neighbor- 

of siuSs liood of the Richmond and Danville railroad bridge, 
and then trends northwesterly. Sailor's Creek, an 
insignificant stream, running northward, empties 
into the Appomattox between the High Bridge and 
Jetersville. Near the High Bridge the stage-road 
from Petersburg to Lynchburg crosses the Appo- 
mattox River, also on a bridge. The railroad runs 
on the north side of the river to Farmville, a few 
miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on 
the south side of it. The roads coming up from 
the southeast to Farmville cross the Appomattox 
River there on a bridge and run on the north side, 
leaving the Lynchburg and Petersburg railroad well 
to the left. 

Lee, in pushing out from Amelia Court House, 
availed himself of all the roads between the Dan- 
ville road and Appomattox River to move upon, 
and never permitted the head of his columns to 
stop because of any fighting that might be going 
on in his rear. In this way he came very near suc- 

328 



BATTLE OF SAILOE'S CREEK 329 

ceeding in getting to his provision-trains and elud- chap.xxiv 
ing us with at least part of his army. 

As expected, Lee's troops had moved during the M^emolrMi, 
night before, and our army in moving upon Amelia ^^^ 
Court House soon encountered them. There was 
a good deal of fighting before Sailor's Creek was 
reached. Our cavalry charged in upon a body of 
theirs which was escorting a wagon-train in order 
to get it past our left. A severe engagement ensued, 
in which we captured many prisoners, and many 
men also were killed and wounded. There was as 
much gallantry displayed by some of the Confeder- 
ates in these little engagements as was displayed at 
any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad 
defeats of the past week. 

The armies finally met on Sailor's Creek, when a Lfader^/A. 
heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, 
artillery, and cavalry were all brought into action. 
Our men on the right, as they were brought in 
against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and 
upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be 
derived from the lay of the country. Our firing 
was also very much more rapid, because the enemy 
commenced his retreat westward, and in firing as he 
retreated had to turn around every time he fired. 
The enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed 
and wounded as in captures. Some six general 
officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and 
seven thousand men were made prisoners. This 
engagement was commenced in the middle of the 
afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit 
were continued until nightfall, when the armies 
bivouacked upon the ground where the night had 
overtaken them. 



720-722 



330 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT 



CHAP. XXIV 

W. R. XLVI 

(1) 906 



Ibid. 1161 



Francis 
Washbum, 

Col. 5tb 
Mass. Cav. 



Theo. Read, 

Capt. A. A. 

G. Oct. 24, 

1861; Maj. 

July 25, 1864 



W. E. XLVI 

(1) 1162 



Wheu the move toward Amelia Court House had 
commenced that morning, I ordered Wright's corps, 
which was on the extreme right, to be moved to 
the left past the whole army, to take the place of 
Griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to 
move by and place itself on the right. The object 
of this movement was to get the Sixth Corps 
(Wright's) next to the cavalry, with which they had 
formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently 
in the Valley of Virginia. 

The Sixth Corps now remained with the cavalry 
and under Sheridan's direct command until after 
the surrender. 

Ord had been directed to take possession of all 
the roads southward between Burkesville and the 
High Bridge. On the morning of the 6th he sent 
Colonel Washburn, with two infantry regiments, 
with instructions to destroy High Bridge and to 
return rapidly to Burkesville Station ; and he pre- 
pared himself to resist the enemy there. Soon after 
Washburn had started Ord became a little alarmed 
as to his safety, and sent Colonel Read, of his staff, 
with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and 
bring him back. Very shortly after this he heard 
that the head of Lee's column had got up to the 
road between him and where Washburn now was, 
and attempted to send reinforcements, but the rein- 
forcements could not get through. Read, however, 
had got throngh ahead of the enemy. He rode on 
to Farmville, and was on his way back again when 
he found his return cut off, and Washburn con- 
fronting apparently the advance of Lee's army. 
Read drew his men up into line of battle, his force 
now consisting of less than six hundred men, in- 



DEATH OF KEAD AND WASHBURN 331 

fantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, chap.xxiv 
making a speech to his men to inspire them with 
the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. He then 
gave the order to charge. This little band made 
several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but 
inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to 
their own entire number. Colonel Read fell mor- 
tally wounded, and then Washburn; and at the 
close of the conflict nearly every officer of the com- 
mand and most of the rank and file had been either 
killed or wounded. The remainder then surren- 
dered. The Confederates took this to be only the ^•^^•^62^^ 
advance of a larger column which had headed them 
off, and so stopped to intrench ; so that this gallant 
band of six hundred had checked the progress of a 
strong detachment of the Confederate army. 

This stoppage of Lee's column no doubt saved 
to us the trains following. Lee himself pushed on 
and crossed the wagon-road bridge near the High 
Bridge, and attempted to destroy it. He did set 
fire to it, but the flames had made but little head- 
way when Humphreys came up with his corps and iwd. 682, 683 
drove away the rear-guard which had been left to 
protect it while it was being burned up. Humphreys 
forced his way aci'oss with some loss, and followed 
Lee to the intersection of the road crossing at Farm- 
ville with the one from Petersburg. Here Lee held 
a position which was very strong naturally, besides 
being intrenched. Humphreys was alone, confront- 
ing him all through the day, and in a very hazard- 
ous position. He put on a bold face, however, and 
assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in 
return. 

Our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of 



332 PERSONAL MEMOIBS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxiv Prince Edward's Court House, along with the Fifth 
Corps (Griffin's), Ord falling in between Griffin and 

w. K. XL VI the Appomattox. Crook's division of cavalry and 
Wright's corps pushed on west of Farmville. When 
the cavalry reached Farmville they found that some 
of the Confederates were in ahead of them, and had 
already got their trains of provisions back to that 
point ; but our troops were in time to prevent them 
from securing anything to eat, although they suc- 
ceeded in again running the trains off, so that we 
did not get them for some time. These troops re- 
treated to the north side of the Appomattox to join 
Lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after 
Ibid, m them. Considerable fighting ensued there between 
Wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and 
the Confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the 
stream and drove them away. Wright built a foot- 
bridge for his men to march over on, and then 
marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve 
Humphreys, arri\dng there that night. I had 
stopped the night before at Burkesville Junction. 
Our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, 
but we had a field-hospital there, and Ord's command 
was extended from that point toward Farmville. 

Here I met Dr. Smith, a Virginian and an officer 
of the regular army, who told me that in a conver- 
sation with General Ewell, one of the prisoners 
Eweirs and a relative of his, Ewell had said that when we 

views ' . 

had got across the James River he knew then* cause 
was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities 
to make the best terms they could while they still 
had a right to claim concessions. The authorities 
thought differently, however. Now the cause was 
lost and they had no right to claim anything. He 



COEEESPONDENCE WITH GENEEAL LEE 333 

said, further, that for every man that was killed chap.xxiv 
after this in the war somebody was responsible, and 
it would be but very little better than murder. He 
was not sure that Lee would consent to surrender 
his army without being able to consult with the 
President, but he hoped he would. 

I rode in to Farmville on the 7th, arriving there 
early in the day. Sheridan and Ord were pushing 
through, away to the south. Meade was back to- 
ward the High Bridge, and Humphreys confront- 
ing Lee as before stated. After having gone into 
bivouac at Prince Edward's Court House, Sheridan \fii^^I^ 
learned that seven trains of provisions and forage M^emSs.n, 
were at Appomattox, and determined to start at ^^^'^^^ 
once and capture them ; and a forced march was 
necessary in order to get there before Lee's army 
could secure them. He wrote me a note telling me 
this. This fact, together with the incident related 
the night before by Dr. Smith, gave me the idea of 
opening correspondence with General Lee on the 
subject of the surrender of his army. I therefore 
wrote to him on this day as follows : 

Headquarters Armies of the U. S., 
5 P.M., April 7, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

The result of the last week must convince you of the w. r. xlvi 

'' (1) 56 

hopelessness of f lu'ther resistance on the part of the Army 
of Northern Virginia In this struggle. I feel that it is so, 
and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the respon- 
sibihty of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you 
the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States 
army known as the Army of Northern Virginia. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 



334 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GEANT 

chap.xxiv Lee replied on the evening of the same day as 

follows : 

April 7, 1865. 

^y. R. xLvi General : I have received your note of this date. 

Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the 

hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army 

of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid 

useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering 

your proposition, ask the terms you wdl offer on condition 

of its surrender. 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

Lieutknant-General, U. S. Grant, 
Commandins' Armies of the U. S. 



^& 



This was not satisfactory, but I regarded it as 
deserving another letter, and wrote him as follows : 

April 8, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

Ibid Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, 

asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender 
of the Army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In 
reply I would say that, peace being my gi-eat desire, there 
is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, that the 
men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for tak- 
ing up arms again against the government of the United 
States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will 
designate officers to meet any officers you may name for 
the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the 
purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the 
surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia will be 

received. 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 

COTif^ederate Lee's army was rapidly crumbling. Many of his 
soldiers had enlisted from that part of the State 



SHERIDAN INTERCEPTS THE ENEMY 335 

where they now were, and were continually drop- chap.xxiv 
ping out of the ranks and going to their homes. I 
know that I occupied a hotel almost destitute of 
furniture at Farmville, which had probably been 
used as a Confederate hospital. The next morn- 
ing when I came out I found a Confederate colonel 
there, who reported to me and said that he was the 
proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel 
of a regiment that had been raised in that neigh- 
borhood. He said that when he came along past 
home, he found that he was the only man of the 
regiment remaining with Lee's army, so he just 
dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. 
I told him to stay there and he would not be mo- 
lested. That was one regiment which had been elim- 
inated from Lee's force by this crumbling process. 

Although Sheridan had been marching all day, ^^etevins^ 
his troops moved with alacrity and without any 
straggling. They began to see the end of what 
they had been fighting four years for. Nothing 
seemed to fatigue them. They were ready to move 
without rations and travel without rest until the 
end. Straggling had entirely ceased, and every 
man was now a rival for the front. The infantry 
marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. 

Sheridan sent Custer with his division to move ^Jyno^^^ 
south of Appomattox Station, which is about five 
miles southwest of the Court House, to get west 
of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. 
They got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded 
partially; but some of the trainmen had just dis- 
covered the movement of our troops and succeeded 
in running off three of the trains. The other four 
were held by Custer. 



336 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP.xxiv The head of Lee's column came marching up 
w.R- xLvi there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, I 
suppose, that there were any Union soldiers near. 
The Confederates were surprised to find our cavalry- 
had possession of the trains. However, they were 
desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover 
them. In the melee that ensued they succeeded in 
burning one of the trains, but not in getting any- 
thing from it. Custer then ordered the other trains 
run back on the road toward Farmville, and the 
fight continued. 

So far only our cavalry and the advance of Lee's 
army were engaged. Soon, however, Lee's men 
were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting 
they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. But our 
infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the 
time the enemy got up they found Griffin's corps 
Ibid. 841 and the Army of the James confronting them. A 
sharp engagement ensued, but Lee quickly set up 
a white flag. 



CHAPTER XXV 

NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX — INTERVIEW WITH LEE 

AT Mclean's house — the teems of surrender 

— LEE'S SURRENDER — INTERVIEW WITH LEE AFTER 
THE SURRENDER 







N the 8th I had followed ae Army of the chap, xxv 
Potomac iu rear of Lee. I was suffering LfadeSiv, 



731, 732 



very severely with a sick-headache, and stopped at 
a farm-house on the road some distance in rear of 
the main body of the arnjy. I spent the night in 
bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and 
putting mustard-plasters on my wrists and the 
back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morn- 
ing. During the night I received Lee's answer to ^{i^^f^^^ 
my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between ^''*'' ^^^^- 
the lines on the following morning. But it was 
for a different purpose from that of surrendering 
his army, and I answered him as follows: 

Headquarters Armies of the U. S., 
April 9, 1865. 
General R, E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

Your note of yesterday is received. I have no an- w. e.xlvi 

•^ _ (1) 57 

thority to treat on the subject of peace ; the meetmg pro- 
posed for 10 A.M. to-day could lead to no good. I will 
state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for 
Vol. II.— 22 337 



338 PEKSONAL MEMOIKS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXV peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the 
same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are 
well understood. By the South laying down then- arms 
they will hasten that most desu'able event, save thousands 
of human lives, and hundi-eds of millions of property not 
yet destroyed. Sincerely hoping tliat all our difficulties 
may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe 
myself, etc., 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- Gen eral. 



Lfadersjv, ^ procGeded at an early hour in the morning, still 
732-734 suffering with the headache, to get to the head of 
the column. I was not more than two or three 
miles from Appomattox Court House at the time, 
but to go direct I would have to pass through Lee's 
army, or a portion of it. I had therefore to move 
south in order to get upon a road coming up from 
another direction. 

When the white flag was put out by Lee, as al- 
ready described, I was in this way moving toward 
Appomattox Court House, and consequently could 
not be communicated with immediately, and be in- 
formed of what Lee had done. Lee, therefore, sent 

^- ^) f^^^ a flag to the rear to advise Meade, and one to the 
front to Sheridan, saying that he had sent a mes- 

itfemoS'i, ^^S^ to me for the purpose of haAdng a meeting to 

193 et seq. consult about the surrender of his army, and asked 
for a suspension of hostilities until I could be com- 
municated with. As they had heard nothing of 
this until the fighting had got to be severe and all 
going against Lee, both of these commanders hesi- 
tated very considerably about suspending hostilities 
at all. They were afraid it was not in good faith, 
and we had the Army of Northern Virginia where it 



NEGOTIATIONS AT APPOMATTOX 339 

could not escape except by some deception. They, chap, xxv 
however, finally consented to a suspension of hos- 
tilities for two hours, to give an opportunity of 
communicating with me in that time, if possible. 
It was found that, from the route I had taken, they 
would probably not be able to communicate with 
me and get an answer back within the time fixed 
unless the messenger should pass through the rebel 
lines. 

Lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer 
bearing this message through his lines to me: 

April 9, 1865. 
General : I received yom- note of tins morning on the w. R- xlv 
picket-line, whither I had come to meet you and ascertain 
definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of 
yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. 
I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer con- 
tained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, 
Commanding U. S. Armies. 

When the officer reached me I was still suffering Lf^-Ssj^ 
with the sick-headache; but the instant I saw the "^ 
contents of the note I was cured. I wrote the fol- 
lowing note in reply and hastened on : 

April 9, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

Your note of this date is but this moment (11 : 50 a.m.) ibid. 733 
received, in consequence of my having passed from the 
Richmond and Lynchburg road to the Farmville and 
Lynchburg road. I am at this writing about four miles 
west of Walker's Church, and will push forward to the 



340 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Chap. XXV front for the purpose of meeting you. Notice sent to me 
on this road where you wish the interview to take place 
will meet me. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- Gen era I. 



Sheridan, 

Memoirs, II, 

200 



Wilmer Mc- 
Lean 

Clias. Mar- 
shall, A. A. 

G. & iDSp. 

Gen. 



Facts about 
the apple- 
tree 



I was conducted at once to where Sheridan was 
located, with his troops drawn up in line of battle 
facing the Confederate army near by. They were 
very much excited, and expressed their view that 
this was all a ruse employed to enable the Confed- 
erates to get away. They said they believed that 
Johnston was marching up from North Carolina 
now, and Lee was moving to join him; and they 
would whip the rebels where they now were in five 
minutes if I would only let them go in. But I had 
no doubt about the good faith of Lee, and pretty 
soon was conducted to where he was. I found 
him at the house of a Mr. McLean, at Appomattox 
Court House, with Colonel Marshall, one of his 
staff-officers, awaiting my arrival. The head of 
his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of 
which was an apple-orchard, beyond a little valley 
which separated it from that on the crest of which 
Sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to 
the south. 

Before stating what took place between Greneral 
Lee and myself I will give all there is of the story 
of the famous apple-tree. 

Wars produce many stories of fiction, some of 
which are told until the}'' are believed to be true. 
The war of the rebellion was no exception to this 
rule, and the story of the apple-tree is one of those 
fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. As I 
bave said, there was an apple-orchard on the side 



APPOMATTOX COURT HOUSE. 

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INTEEVIEW WITH GENERAL LEE 341 

of the hill occupied by the Confederate forces, chap.xxv 
Eunning diagonally up the hill was a wagon-road, 
which at one point ran very near one of the trees, 
so that the wheels of vehicles had on that side cut 
off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embank- 
ment. Greneral Babcock, of my staff, reported to c^ck.'w^p. 
me that when he first met General Lee he was sit- coLltaff!'!! 
ting upon this embankment with his feet in the " ml ' 
road below and his back resting against the tree. 
The story had no other foundation than that. Like 
many other stories, it would be very good if it were 
only true. 

I had known General Lee in the old army, and 
had served with him in the Mexican war ; but did 
not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and 
rank, that he would remember me ; while I would 
more naturally remember him distinctly, because 
he was the chief of staff of General Scott in the 
Mexican war. 

When I had left camp that morning I had not LeadeSiv, 
expected so soon the result that was then taking 
place, and consequently was in rough garb. I was 
without a sword, as I usually was when on horse- 
back in the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a 
coat, with the shoulder-straps of my rank to indi- 
cate to the army who I was. When I went into 
the house I found General Lee. We greeted each 
other, and after shaking hands took our seats. I 
had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were 
in the room during the whole of the interview. 

What General Lee's feelings were I do not know. 
As he was a man of much dignity, with an impass- 
ible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt 
inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt 



737 



342 PEESONAIi MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXV sad ovei' the result and was too manly to show it. 
Whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed 
from my observation ; but my own feelings, which 
had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, 
were sad and depressed. I felt like anything rather 
than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had 
fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so 
much for a cause, though that cause was, I believe, 
one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and 
one for which there was the least excuse. I do not 
question, however, the sincerity of the great mass 
of those who were opposed to us. 

jS&devlvi, Greneral Lee was dressed in a full uniform which 
'^^^ was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of con- 
siderable value, very likely the sword which had 
been presented by the State of Virginia; at all 
events, it was an entirely different sword from the 
one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. In 
my rough traveling-suit, the uniform of a private 
with the straps of a lieutenant-general, I must have 
contrasted very strangely with a man so hand- 
somely dressed, six feet high, and of faultless form. 
But this was not a matter that I thought of until 
afterward. 

We soon fell into a conversation about old army 
times. He remarked that he remembered me very 
well in the old army ; and I told him that as a mat- 
ter of course I remembered him perfectly, but from 
the difference in our rank and years (there being 
about sixteen years' difference in our ages) I had 
thought it very likely that I had not attracted his 
attention sufficiently to be remembered by him 
after such a long interval. Our conversation grew 
so pleasant that I almost forgot the object of our 



THE TEEMS OF SUKEENDEK 343 

meeting. After the conversation had run on in this chap, xxv 
style for some time, General Lee called my attention 
to the object of our meeting, and said that he had 
asked for this interview for the purpose of getting 
from me the terms I proposed to give his army. I 
said that I meant merely that his army should lay 
down their arms, not to take them up again during 
the continuance of the war unless duly and prop- 
erly exchanged. He said that he had so understood 
my letter. 

Then we gradually fell off again into conversa- j^^aerlr^, 
tion about matters foreign to the subject which "^ 
had brought us together. This continued for some 
little time, when General Lee again interrupted 
the course of the conversation by suggesting that 
the terms I proposed to give his army ought to be 
written out. I called to General Parker, secretary ^rkfr, 
of my staff, for writing-materials, and commenced a^May'25,' 
writing out the following terms : 



1863 



Appomattox C. H., Virginia, 
April 9, 1865. 
General R. E. Lee, 

Commanding Confederate States Armies : 

General : In accordance with the substance of my let- ^- ^jfj^"^ 
ter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the sui*- 
render of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following 
terms, to wit : 

Rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, 
one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other 
to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. 
The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up 
arms against the Government of the United States until 
properly exchanged, and each company or regimental com- 
mander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. 

The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked 
and stacked, and tm*ned over to the officer appointed by 



344 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXV me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms 
of the officers, nor theii* private horses or baggage. This 
done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to 
their homes, not to be disturbed by United States author- 
ity so long as they observe their parole and the laws in 
force where they may reside. 

Very respectfully, 
IT, S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 

I'^rajnngup WliGii I put my peii to tliG paper I did not know 
the first word that I should make use of in writing 
the terms. I only knew what was in my mind, and 
I wished to express it clearly, so that there could 
be no mistaking it. As I wrote on, the thought 
occurred, to me that the officers had their own 
private horses and effects, which were important 
to them, but of no value to us ; also that it would 
be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them 
to deliver their side-arms. 

No conversation — not one word — passed between 
General Lee and myself, either about private prop- 
erty, side-arms, or kindred subjects. He appeared 
to have no objections to the terms first proposed ; 
or, if he had a point to make against them, he 
wished to wait until they were in writing to make 
it. When he read over that part of the terms 
about side-arms, horses, and private property of the 
officers, he remarked, with some feeling, I thought, 
that this would have a happy effect upon his army. 
Battles & Then, after a little further conversation, General 

Leaders, IV, ' _ ' 

Lee remarked to me again that their army was 
organized a little differently from the army of the 
United States (still maintaining by implication that 
we were two countries) ; that in their army the cav- 



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LEE'S SIJERENDEK 345 

alrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; chap, xxv 
and he asked if he was to understand that the men 
who so owned their horses were to be permitted to 
retain them. I told him that as the terms were 
written they would not ; that bnly the officers were 
permitted to take their private property. He then, 
after reading over the terms a second time, re- 
marked that that was clear. 

I then said to him that I thought this would be L?adeSn^, 
about the last battle of the war — I sincerely hoped 
so ; and I said, further, I took it that most of the 
men in the ranks were small farmers. The whole 
country had been so raided by the two armies that 
it was doubtful whether they would be able to put 
in a crop to carry themselves and their families 
through the next winter without the aid of the 
horses they were then riding. The United States 
did not want them, and I would therefore instruct 
the officers I left behind to receive the paroles of 
his troops to let every man of the Confederate 
army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the 
animal to his home. Lee remarked again that this 
would have a happy effect.^ 

He then sat down and wrote out the following 
letter : 

Headquarters Army of Northern Virge^ia, 
April 9, 1865. 
General : I have received your letter of this date con- w, r. xlvi 
taining the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern 

1 There is a popular error to parlor of McLean's house, while 

the effect that Generals Grant Genei-al Lee was sitting in the 

and Lee each signed the articles room ; and General Lee immedi- 

of surrender. The document in ately wrote a letter accepting the 

the form of a letter was signed terms, and handed it to General 

only by General Grant, in the Grant. — F. D. G. 



346. PERSONAIi MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXV Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the 
same as tliose expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they 
are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers 
to carry the stipulations into effect. 

R. E. Lee, 

General. 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 

While duplicates of the two letters were being 
made, the Union generals present were severally 
presented to General Lee. 
The fable of The mucli- talked- of surrendering; of Lee's sword 

the sword '^ 

and my handing it back, this and much more that 
has been said about it is the purest romance. The 
word "sword" or "side-arms" was not mentioned by 
either of us until I wrote it in the terms. There was 
no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until 
the moment I wrote it down. If I had happened 
to omit it, and G-eneral Lee had called my attention 
to it, I should have put it in the terms precisely as 
I acceded to the provision about the soldiers retain- 
ing their horses. 
BattiesA General Lee, after all was completed and before 
''^^ taking his leave, remarked that his army was m a 
very bad condition for want of food, and that they 
were without forage ; that his men had been living 
for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that 
he would have to ask me for rations and forage. I 
told him " Certainly," and asked for how many men 
he wanted rations. His answer was " About twenty- 
five thousand;" and I authorized him to send his 
own commissary and quartermaster to Appomattox 
Station, two or three miles away, where he could 
have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the pro- 
visions wanted. As for forage, we had ourselves 



LEE'S SUERENDEK 347 

depended almost entirely upon the country for chap.xxv 
that. 

Generals Gibbon, Griffin, and Merritt were des- 
ignated by me to carry into effect the paroling of 
Lee's troops before they should start for their 
homes — General Lee leaving Generals Longstreet, 
Gordon, and Pendleton for them to confer with in dTLvSi.w.p. 
order to facilitate, this work. Lee and I then sep- Artrc/s^A! 
arated as cordially as we had met, he returning to oen. m1?:' 
his own lines ; and all went into bivouac for the 
night at Appomattox. 

Soon ^f ter Lee's departure I telegraphed to Wash- 
ington as follows : 

Headquarters, 
Appomattox Court House, Virginia, 
April 9, 1865, 4 : 30 p.m. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, 
Washington : 
General Lee surrendered the Ai-my of Northern Vu-ginia 
this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. The ac- 
companying additional correspondence wiU show the con- 
ditions fully. 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenan t- General. 

When news of the surrender first reached our LfadeSiv. 
lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hun- ''^^ 
dred guns in honor of the victory. I at once sent 
word, however, to have it stopped. The Confeder- 
ates were now our prisoners, and we did not want 
to exult over their downfall. 

I determined to return to Washington at once, 
with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of 
supplies, and what I now deemed other useless out- 
lay of money. Before leaving, however, I thought 



348 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CHAP, XXV I would like to see General Lee again ; so next morn- 
LeaSSiv i^S I i'0<i® ^^t beyond our lines toward his head- 
'^*^ quarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer 
carrying a white flag. 

Lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, 
and met me. We had there between the lines, sit- 
ting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of 
over half an hour, in the course. of which Lee said 
to me that the South was a big country, and that 
we might have to march over it three or four times 
before the war entirely ended, but that we would 
now be able to do it, as they could no longer resist 
us. He expressed it as his earnest hop.e, however, 
that we would not be called upon to cause more loss 
and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the 
Ibid. 746 result. I then suggested to Greneral Lee that there 
was not a man in the Confederacy whose influence 
with the soldiery and the whole people was as great 
as his, and that if he would now advise the surren- 
der of all the armies I had no doubt his advice would 
be followed with alacrity. But Lee said that he 
could not do that without consulting the President 
first. I knew there was no use to urge him to do 
anything against his ideas of what was right. 

I was accompanied by my staff and other officers, 
some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go 
inside the Confederate lines. They finally asked 
permission of Lee to do so for the purpose of seeing 
some of their old army friends, and the permission 
was granted. They went over, had a very pleasant 
time with their old friends, and brought some of 
them back with them when they returned. 

When Lee and I separated he went back to his 
lines and I returned to the house of Mr. McLean. 



1 ab-fuarlers, ^4<^a^ ^;</ <^, 
, , ^^'~^ ^ 

^/i^M 9 186^, ^<^ o'clock,^ M, 



Y^^'t-^v^->i^r\,<\/\-^^ eP%^ 







By Ckimmand o£ 



FAC-SIMILE OF GENERAL GRANT'S DESPATCH ANNOUNCING THE SURRENDER OF GENERAL LEE. 



At the request of the Editor, General Badeau has 
given the history of the despatch in the following 
letter : 

"On Sunday afternoon, the 9th of April, 1865, 
as General Grant was riding to his headquarters 
from the farm-house in which he had received the 
surrender of Lee, it occurred to him that he had 
made no report of the event to the government. 
He halted at once and dismounted, with his staff, 
in a rough field, within the National lines. Sitting 
on a stone, he asked for paper. I happened to be 



near, and offered him my memorandum-book, such 
as staff-officers often carrj' for orders or reports in 
the field. He laid the book on his knee and wrote 
the above despatch in pencil; he handed it to me 
and told me to send it to the telegraph operator. I 
asked him if I might copy the despatch for the oper- 
ator and retain the original. He assented and I 
rewrote the paper, the original of which is in the 
keeping of The Centurv magazine. 

" Adam Badeau. 
" Tannersville, N. Y., July 10, 1885." 



FRATERNIZING OF OPPOSING OFFICERS 349 

Here the officers of both armies came in great num- chap, xxv 
hers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as 
though they had been friends separated for a long 
time while fighting battles under the same flag. 
For the time being it looked very much as if all 
thought of the war had escaped their minds. After 
an hour pleasantly passed in this way I set out on 
horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small 
escort, for Burkesville Junction, up to which point 
the railroad had by this time been repaired. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

MORALE OF THE TWO AEMIES — RELATIVE CONDITIONS 
OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH — PRESIDENT LINCOLN 
VISITS RICHMOND — ARRIVAL AT WASHINGTON — 
PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION — PRESIDENT 
JOHNSON'S POLICY 

Chap. XXVI AFTER the fall of Petersburg, and when the 
the^Soar- -^^ Armles of the Potomac and the James were 
^^^^ in motion to head off Lee's army, the morale of the 
National troops had greatly improved. There was 
no more straggling, no more rear-guards. The men 
who in former times had been falling back were 
now, as I have already stated, striving to get to 
the front. For the first time in four weary years 
they felt that they were now nearing the time when 
they could return to their homes with their coun- 
try saved. On the other hand, the Confederates 
were more than correspondingly depressed. Their 
despondency increased with each returning day, 
and especially after the battle of Sailor's Creek. 
They threw away their arms in constantly increas- 
ing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betak- 
ing themselves to the woods in the hope of reach- 
ing, n, 335 ing their homes. I have already instanced the case 
of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose 
colonel I met at Farmville. As a result of these 

350 



EELATIVE CONDITIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH 351 

and other influences, when Lee finally surrendered chap.xxvi 
at Appomattox there were only 28,356 officers and 
men left to be paroled, and many of these were 
without arms. It was probably this latter fact 
which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, 
North and South, that Lee surrendered a smaller 
number of men than what the official figures show. 
As a matter of official record, and in addition to Lee's losses 
the number paroled as given above, we captured be- 
tween March 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 
Confederates, to say nothing of Lee's other losses, 
killed, wounded, and missing, during the series of 
desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and 
determined flight. The same record shows the 
number of cannon, including those at Appomat- 
tox, to have been 689 between the dates named. 

There has always been a great conflict of opinion 
as to the number of troops engaged in every bat- 
tle, or all important battles, fought between the sec- 
tions, the South magnifying the number of Union 
troops engaged and belittling their own. Northern 
writers have fallen, in many instances, into the 
same error. I have often heard gentlemen who 
were thoroughly loyal to the Union speak of what 
a splendid fight the South had made and success- 
fully continued for four years before yielding, with 
their twelve million of people against our twenty, 
and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non- 
combatants. I will add to their argument. We 
had many regiments of brave and loyal men who 
volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve 
million belonging to the South. 

But the South had rebelled against the National 
government. It was not bound by any constitu- 



352 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

Chap. XXVI tional restrictions. The whole South was a mili- 
tary camp. The occupation of the colored people 

eSt^amies ^^^ ^^ fumish supplics for the army. Conscription 
was resorted to early, and embraced every male 
from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding 
only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and 
the necessary number of civil officers of State and 
intended National government. The old and phys- 
ically disabled furnished a good portion of these. 
The slaves, the non-combatants, one third of the 
whole, were required to work in the field without 
regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. 
Children from the age of eight years could and did 
handle the hoe ; they were not much older when 
they began to hold the plow. The four million of 
colored non-combatants were equal to more than 
three times their number in the North, age for age 
and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to 
support armies. Women did not work in the fields 
in the North, and children attended school. 

£a c^o'S ^^® ^^'^^ ^^ peace were carried on in the North, 
trasted Towus and cities grew during the war. Inventions 
were made in all kinds of machinery to increase 
the products of a day's labor in the shop and in the 
field. In the South no opposition was allowed to 
the government which had been set up, and which 
would have become real and respected if the rebel- 
lion had been successful. No rear had to be pro- 
tected. All the troops in service could be brought 
to the front to contest every inch of ground threat- 
ened with invasion. The press of the South, like 
the people who remained at home, was loyal to the 
Southern cause. 
In the North, the country, the towns, and the 



EELATTVE CONDITIONS OF NORTH AND SOUTH 353 

cities presented about the same appearance they chap.xxvi 
do in time of peace. The furnaces were in bhist, 
the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were 
cultivated, not only to supply the population of 
the North and the troops invading the South, but 
to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the 
war. In the North the press was free up to the 
point of open treason. The citizen could entertain 
his views and express them. Troops were neces- 
sary in the Northern States to prevent prisoners 
from the Southern army being released by outside 
force, armed, and set at large to destroy by fire our 
Northern cities. Plans were formed by Northern agaTisuhe 
and Southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison ^"^"*^ 
the water supplying them, to spread infection by 
importing clothing from infected regions, to blow 
up our river and lake steamers — regardless of the 
destruction of innocent lives. The copperhead dis- 'iJ'ead press' 
reputable portion of the press magnified rebel suc- 
cesses and belittled those of the Union army. It 
was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the Con- 
federate army. The North would have been much 
stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in 
the Confederate ranks and the rest of their kind 
thoroughly subdued, as the Union sentiment was in 
the South, than we were as the battle was fought. 

As I have said, the whole South was a military ^''^'Q^^^' 
camp. The colored people, four million in num- 
ber, were submissive, and worked in the field and 
took care of the families while the able-bodied white 
men were at the front fighting for a cause destined 
to defeat. The cause was popular, and was enthu- 
siastically supported by the young men. The con- 
scription took all of them. Before the war was 
Vol. II.— 23 



354 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

chap.xxvi over, further conscriptions took those between 
fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior re- 
serves, and those between forty-five and sixty as 
senior reserves. It would have been an offense 
directly after the war, and perhaps it would be 
now, to ask any able-bodied man in the South, 
who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at 
any time during the war, whether he had been in 
the Confederate army. He would assert that he 
had, or account for his absence from the ranks. 
Under such circumstances it is hard to conceive 
how the North showed such a superiority of force 
in every battle fought. I know they did not. 
JaS'Mex- During 1862 and 1863, John H. Morgan, a parti- 
M^'.-G^en-^c. zau officcr, of uo military education, but possessed 
i862''^"' of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of 
the Army of the Ohio in Kentucky and Tennessee. 
He had no base of supplies to protect, but was 
at home wherever he went. The army operating 
against the South, on the contrary, had to protect 
its lines of communication with the North, from 
which all supplies had to come to the front. Every 
foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed 
at convenient distances apart. These guards could 
not render assistance beyond the points where sta- 
^rS^ tioned. Morgan was foot-loose, and could operate 
where his information — always correct — led him 
to believe he could do the greatest damage. Dur- 
ing the time he was operating in this way he killed, 
wounded, and captured several times the number 
he ever had under his command at any one time. 
He destroyed many millions of property in addi- 
tion. Places he did not attack had to be guarded 
as if threatened by him. Forrest, an abler soldier, 



PRESIDENT LINCOLN VISITS RICHMOND 355 

operated farther west, and held from the National chap.xxvi 
front quite as many men as could be spared for 
offensive operations. It is safe to say that more 
than half the National army were engaged in guard- 
ing lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hos- 
pital, or on detail which prevented their bearing 
arms. Then, again, large forces were employed 
where no Confederate army confronted them. I 
deem it safe to say that there were no large en- 
gagements where the National numbers compen- 
sated for the advantage of position and intrench- 
ment occupied by the enemy. 

While I was in pursuit of General Lee, the Presi- 
dent went to Richmond in company with Admiral 
Porter, and on board his flag-ship. He found the £ Hay^lffe 
people of that city in great consternation. The "xfSis' 
leading citizens among the people who had re- 
mained at home surrounded him, anxious that 
something should be done to relieve them from 
suspense. General Weitzel was not then in the 
city, having taken offices in one of the neighbor- 
ing villages after his troops had succeeded in sub- 
duing the conflagration which they had found in 
progress on entering the Confederate capital. The 
President sent for him, and on his arrival a short '^'et^s^q.^^^ 
interview was had on board the vessel. Admiral 
Porter and a leading citizen of Virginia being also 
present. After this interview the President wrote 
an order in about these words, which I quote from 
memory: " General Weitzel is authorized to permit 
the body calling itself the Legislature of Virginia 
to meet for the purpose of recalling the Virginia 
• troops from the Confederate armies." 

Immediately some of the gentlemen composing 



cf^ « 



\A\^^ 



356 



PEKSONAJL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GKANT 



Pec Stan- 
ton's char- 
acteristics 



Chap. XXVI that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had 
it published in their papers. This call, however, 
went very much further than Mr. Lincoln had con- 
templated, as he did not say the " Legislature of 
Virginia," but " the body calling itself the Legisla- 
ture of A^irginia." Mr. Stanton saw the call as pub- 
lished in the Northern papers the very next issue, 
and took the liberty of countermanding the order 
authorizing any meeting of the Legislature, or any 
other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that 
the President was nearer W\^ spot than he was. 

This was characteristic of Mr. Stanton. He was 
a man who never questioned his own authority, 
and who always did in war-time what he wanted to 
do. He was an able constitutional lawyer and ju- 
rist; but the Constitution was not an impediment 
to him while the war lasted. In this latter particu- 
lar I entirely agree with the view he evidently held. 
Theconsti- rpj^g Constitution was not framed with a view to 
^^'li'o'f'^' any such rebellion as that of 1861-65. While it 
did not authorize rebellion, it made no provision 
against it. Yet the right to resist or suppress re- 
bellion is as inherent as the right of self-defense, 
and as natural as the right of an individual to pre- 
serve his life when in jeopardy. The Constitution 
was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far 
as it in any way affected the progress and termina- 
tion of the war. 

Those in rebellion against the government of the 
United States were not restricted by constitutional 
provisions, or any other, except the acts of their 
Congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause 
for which the South was then fighting. It would 
be a hard case, when one third of a nation, united in 



AKRIVAL AT WASHINGTON 357 

rebellion against the national authority, is entirely chap.xxvi 
untrammeled, that the other two thirds, in their 
efforts to maintain the Union intact, should be re- 
strained by a Constitution prepared by our ances- 
tors for the express purpose of ensuring the per- 
manency of the confederation of the States. 

After I left General Lee at Appomattox Station, 
I went with my staff and a few others directly to 
Burkes ville Station on my way to Washington. 
The road from Burkesville back having been newly 
repaired, and the ground being soft, the train got 
off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was 
after midnight of the second day when I reached 
City Point. As soon as possible I took a despatch- 
boat thence to Washington city. 

While in Washington I was very busy for a time 
in preparing the necessary orders for the new state 
of affairs ; communicating with my different com- , 
manders of separate departments, bodies of troops, 
etc. But by the 14th I was pretty well through 
with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, 
who were then in Burlington, New Jersey, attend- 
ing school. Mrs. Grant was with me in Washing- i^^^i^etf 
ton at the time, and we were invited by President ^""^29°' ^' 
and Mrs. Lincoln to accompany them to the theater 
on the evening of that day. I replied to the Presi- 
dent's verbal invitation to the effect that if we were 
in the city we would take great pleasure in accom- 
panying them ; but that I was very anxious to get 
away and visit my children, and if I could get 
through my work during the day I should do so. 
I did get through and started by the evening train 
on the 14th, sending Mr. Lincoln word, of course, 
that I would not be at the theater. 



358 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OP U. S. GRANT 

chap.xxvi At that time the railroad to New York entered 
Philadelphia on Broad Street; passengers were 
conveyed in ambulances to the Delaware Eiver, 
and then ferried to Camden, at which point they 
took the cars again. When I reached the ferry, on 
the east side of the city of Philadelphia, I found 
people awaiting my arrival there; and also des- 

Newsofthe patchcs informing me of the assassination of the 
tion President and Mr. Seward, and of the probable 
assassination of the Vice-President, Mr. Johnson, 
and requesting my immediate return. 

It would be impossible for me to describe the 
feeling that overcame me at the news of these as- 
sassinations, more especially the assassination of 
the President. I knew his goodness of heart, his 
generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to 
have everybody happy, and, above all, his desire 
to see all the people of the United States enter 
again upon the full privileges of citizenship with 

recoJTstruc- equality among all. I knew, also, the feeling that 
Hon ^ly Johnson had expressed in speeches and conver- 
sation against the Southern people, and I feared 
that his course toward them would be such as to 
repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if 
they became such they would remain so for a long 
while. I felt that reconstruction had been set back, 
no telling how far. 

I immediately arranged for getting a train to 
take me back to Washington City ; but Mrs. Grant 
was with me, it was after midnight, and Burling- 
ton was but an hour away. Finding that I could 
accompany her to our house and return about as 
soon as they would be ready to take me from the 
Philadelphia station, I went up with her and re- 



PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ASSASSINATION 



359 



turned immediately by the same special train. The chap.xxvi 
joy that I had witnessed among the people in the 
street and in public places in Washington when I 
left there had been turned to grief ; the city was in 
reality a city of mourning. I have stated what I 
believed then the e-ffect of this would be, and my 
judgment now is that I was right. I believe the 
South would have been saved from very much of 
the hardness of feeling that was engendered by Mr. 
Johnson's course toward them during the first few 
months of his administration. Be this as it may, 
Mr. Lincoln's assassination was particularly unfor- 
tunate for the entire nation. 

Mr. Johnson's course toward the South did en- fl^^*'^^"* 

Jormson s 

gender bitterness of feeling. His denunciations of harshness 
treason, and his ever-ready remark, " Treason is a 
crime and must be made odious," were repeated to 
all those men of the South who came to him to get 
some assurances of safety so that they might go to 
work at something with the feeling that what they 
obtained would be secure to them. He uttered his 
denunciations with great vehemence, and as they 
were accompanied with no assurances of safety, 
many Southerners were driven to a point almost 
beyond endurance. 

The President of the United States is, in a large 
degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feel- 
ing, wishes, and judgment of those over whom he 
presides ; and the Southerners who read the denun- 
ciations of themselves and their people must have 
come to the conclusion that he uttered the senti- 
ments of the Northern people ; whereas, as a mat- 
ter of fact, but for the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, foiiy of the 
I believe the great majority of the Northern peo 



assassina- 
tion 



360 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Reconstnic 
tion 



chap.xxvi pie, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been 
in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that 
would be the least humiliating to the people who 
had rebelled against their government. They be- 
lieved, I have no doubt, as I did, that besides being 
the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. 

The people who had been in rebellion must neces- 
sarily come back into the Union, and be incorpo- 
rated as an integral part of the nation. Naturally 
the nearer they were placed to an equality with 
the people who had not rebelled, the more recon- 
ciled they would feel with their old antagonists, 
and the better citizens they would, be from the be- 
ginning. They surely would not make good citi- 
zens if they felt that they had a yoke around their 
necks. 

I do not believe that the majority of the Northern 
people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. 
They supposed that it would naturally follow the 
freedom of the negro, but that there would be a 
time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could 
prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship 
before the full right would be conferred ; but Mr. 
Johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, 
seemed to regard the South not only as an oppressed 
people, but as the people best entitled to considera- 
tion of any of our citizens. This was more than 
the people who had secured to us the perpetuation 
of the Union were prepared for, and they became 
more radical in their views. The Southerners had 
the most power in the executive branch, Mr. John- 
son having gone to their side ; and with a compact 
South, and such sympathy and support as they 
could get from the North, they felt that they would 



fri 



age 



Pres. John- 
son'srevolu 
tion of sen- 
timent 



son 



PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S POLICY 361 

be able to control the nation at once, and already chap.xxvi 
many of them acted as if they thought they were 
entitled to do so. 

Thus Mr. Johnson, fighting Congress on the one tSn*con- 
hand, and receiving the supj^ort of the South on the ^eXim- 
other, drove Congress, which was overwhelmingly 
Republican, to the passing of first one measure and 
then another to restrict his power. There being a 
solid South on one side that was in accord with the 
political party in the North which had sympathized 
with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of Con- 
gress and of the majority of the legislatures of the 
States, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, 
in all his ignorance. In this work I shall not dis- 
cuss the question of how far the policy of Congress 
in this particular proved a wise one. It became 
an absolute necessity, however, because of the fool- 
hardiness of the President and the blindness of the 
Southern people to their own interest. As to my- 
self, while strongly favoring the course that would 
be the least humiliating to the people who had been 
in rebellion, I had gradually worked up to the point 
where, with the majority of the people, I favored 
immediate enfranchisement. 



CHAPTER XXVI 

SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON — JOHNSTON'S SURRENDER TO 
SHERMAN — CAPTURE OF MOBILE — WTLSON'S EXPE- 
DITION — CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS — GENERAL, 
THOMAS'S QUALITIES — ESTIMATE OF GENERAL 
CANBY 

ch. XXVII TTTHEN I left Appomattox I ordered General 

▼ ▼ Meade to proceed leisurely back to Burkes- 

ville Station with' the Army of the Potomac and 

the Army of the James, and to go into camp there 

until further orders from me. Gleneral Johnston, 

Ante,u,28o, as has been stated before, was in North Carolina 

284, 295, 316 ' 

confronting General Sherman. It could not be 
known positively, of course, whether Johnston 
would surrender on the news of Lee's surrender, 
though I supposed he would; and if he did not, 
Burkes ville Station was the natural point from 
which to move to attack him. The army which I 
could have sent against him was superior to his, 
and that with which Sherman confronted him was 
also superior ; and between the two he would neces- 
sarily have been crushed or driven away. With 
the loss of their capital and the Army of Northern 
Virginia it was doubtful whether Johnston's men 
would have had the spirit to stand. My belief was 
that he would make no such attempt ; but I adopted 

362 



SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON 



363 



Sherman's 
terms to 
Johnston 



this course as a precaution against what might ch. xxvii 
happen, however improbable. 

Simultaneously with my starting from City Point, 
I sent a messenger to North Carolina by boat with 
despatches to General Sherman, informing him of 
the surrender of Lee and his army; also of the 
terms which I had given him; and I authorized 
Sherman to give the same terms to Johnston if the 
latter chose to accept them. The country is famil- 
iar with the terms that Sherman agreed to condi- 
tionally^ because they embraced a political question 
as well as a military one, and he would therefore 
have to confer with the government before agree- 
ing to them definitely. 

Greneral Sherman had met Mr. Lincoln at City 
Point while visiting tliere to confer with me about 
our final movement, and knew what Mr. Lincoln Ante, ii, 289 
had said to the peace commissioners when he met 
them at Hampton Roads, viz., that before he could 
enter into negotiations with them they would have 
to agree to two points — one being that the Union 
should be preserved, and the other that slavery 
should be abolished; and if they were ready to 
concede these two points he was almost ready to 
sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit 
them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which 
we would live together. He had also seen notices 
in the newspapers of Mr. Lincoln's visit to Eich- 
mond, and had read in the same papers that while 
there he had authorized the convening of the Legis- 
lature of Virginia. 

Sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the 
terms that I had made with Greneral Lee, that he 
was but carrying out the wishes of the President of 



364 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

ch. XXVII the United States. But seeing that he was going 
]vSok8,n. beyond his authority, he made it a point that the 
^hnstou^ terms were only conditional. They signed them 
p.foiet^seq. with this Understanding, and agreed to a truce 
until the terms could be sent to Washington for 
approval; if approved by the proper authorities 
there, they would then be final ; if not approved, 
then he would give due notice before resuming 
hostilities. As the world knows, Sherman, from 
being one of the most popular generals of the land 
(Congress having even gone so far as to propose a 
bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for 
the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was 
jfemoSs n denounced by the President and Secretary of War 
358 et seq., jj^ very bitter terms. Some people went so far as 
to denounce him as a traitor — a most preposterous 
term to apply to a man who had rendered so much 
service as he had, even supposing he had made a 
mistake in granting such terms as he did to Johns- 
ton and his army. If Sherman had taken author- 
ity to send Johnston with his army home, with their 
arms to be put in the arsenals of their own States, 
without submitting the question to the authorities 
at Washington, the suspicions against him might 
have some foundation. But the feeling against 
Sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not 
many weeks before he was restored to the fullest 
confidence of the American people. 

When, some days after my return to Washing- 
ton, President Johnson and the Secretary of War 
received the terms which Gleneral Sherman had for- 
warded for approval, a Cabinet meeting was imme- 
diately called and I was sent for. There seemed to 
be the greatest consternation lest Sherman would 



SHERMAN AND JOHNSTON 365 

commit the government to terms which they were ch.xxtii 
not willing to accede to and which he had no right 
to grant. A message went out directing the troops 
in the South not to obey General Sherman. I was 
ordered to proceed at once to North Carolina and 
take charge of matters there myself. Of course I 
started without delay, and reached there as soon 
as possible. I repaired to Ealeigh, where Sher- 
man was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him 
without even his army learning of my presence. 

When I arrived I went to Sherman's headquarters, M^emoSMi. 
and we were at once closeted together. I showed ^^^ 
him the instructions and orders under which I 
visited him. I told him that I wanted him to no- 
tify General Johnston that the terms which they had 
conditionally agreed upon had not been approved 
in Washington, and that he was authorized to offer 
the same terms I had given General Lee. I sent 
Sherman to do this himself. I did not wish the 
knowledge Of my presence to be known to the army 
generally ; so I left it to Sherman to negotiate the 
terms of the surrender solely by himself, and with- 
out the enemy knowing that I was anywhere near 
the field. As soon as possible I started to get away, 
to leave Sherman quite free and untrammeled. 

At Goldsboro', on my way back, I met a mail, 
containing the last newspapers, and I found in 
them indications of great excitement in the North 
over the terms Sherman had given Johnston ; and 
harsh orders that had been promulgated by the 
President and Secretary of War. I knew that 
Sherman must see these papers, and I fully real- 
ized what great indignation they would cause him, 
though I do not think his feelings could have been 



366 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Belated ex 
pedltlous 



ch. XX VII more excited than were my own. But like the true 
Sherman's ^j^^\ loval soldier that he was, he carried out the in- 

loyalty •' ' 

structions I had given him, obtained the surrender 
of Jolmston's army, and settled down in his camp 
about Raleigh, to await final orders. 

There were still a few expeditions out in the 
South that could not be communicated with, and 
had to be left to act according to the judgment of 
their respective commanders. With these it was 
impossible to tell how the news of the surrender 
of Lee and Johnston, of which they must have 
heard, might affect their judgment as to what was 
best to do. 

The three expeditions which I had tried so hard 
to get off from the commands of Thomas and Canby 
did finally get off : one under Canby himself, against 
Mobile, late in March ; that under Stoneman, from 
East Tennessee, on the 20th; and the one under 
Wilson, starting from Eastport, Mississippi, on the 
22d of March. They were all eminently successful, 
but without any good result. Indeed, much valu- 
able property was destroyed and many lives lost 
at a time when we would have liked to spare them. 
The war was practically over before their victories 
were gained. They were so late in commencing 
operations that they did not hold any troops away, 
that otherwise would have been operating against 
the armies which were gradually forcing the Con- 
federate armies to a surrender. The only possible 
good that we may have experienced from these raids 
was by Stoneman's getting near Lynchburg about 
the time the Armies of the Potomac and the James 
Btoneman's WQYQ closiug in ou Lce at Appouiattox. 
^^pii^^""" stoneman entered North Carolina and then 



CAPTURE OF MOBILE 367 

pushed north to strike the Virginia and Tennessee ch. xxvii 
railroad. He got upon that road, destroyed its 
bridges at different places, and rendered the road 
useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of 
Lynchburg. His approach caused the evacuation 
of that city about the time we were at Appomat- 
tox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard 
of there. He then pushed south, and was operat- 
ing in the rear of Johnston's army about the time 
the negotiations were going on between Sherman 
and Johnston for the latter's surrender. In this raid 
Stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount 
of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thou- 
sand prisoners were the trophies of his success. 

Canby appeared before Mobile on the 27th of lSSiv, 
March. The city of Mobile was protected by two "^ 
forts, besides other intrenchments — Spanish Fort, 
on the east side of the bay, and Fort Blakely, north 
of the city. These forts were invested. On the 
night of the 8th of April, the National troops hav- 
ing carried the enemy's works at one point, Spanish 
Fort was evacuated ; and on the 9th, the very day 
of Lee's surrender, Blakely was carried by assault, 
with a considerable loss to us. On the 11th the city 
was evacuated. 

I had tried for more than two years to have an ^1%]^.^^^ 
expedition sent against Mobile when its possession 58.61,232-234 
by us would have been of great advantage. It 
finally cost lives to take it when its possession was 
of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would 
within a few days have fallen into our hands with- 
out any bloodshed whatever. 

Wilson moved out with full twelve thousand men, l^^ISiv, 
well equipped and well armed. He was an energetic '^^^^^ 



368 



PEESONAX, MEMOmS OF U. S. GEANT 



ch. XXVII officer and accomplished his work rapidly. Forrest 
was in his front, but with neither his old-time army 
nor his old-time prestige. He now had principally 
conscripts. His conscripts were generally old men 
and boys. He had a few thousand regular cavalry 
left, but not enough to even i-etard materially the 
progress of Wilson's cavalry. Selma fell on the 2d 
of April, with a large number of prisoners and a 
large quantity of war-material, machine-shops, etc., 
to be disposed of by the victors. Tuscaloosa, Mont- 
gomery, and West Point fell in quick succession. 
These were all important points to the enemy by 
reason of their railroad connections, as depots of 
supplies, and because of their manufactories of war- 
material. They were fortified or intrenched, and 
there was considerable fighting before they were 
captured. Macon surrendered on the 21st of April. 
Here news was received of the negotiations for the 
surrender of Johnston's army. Wilson belonged to 
the military division commanded by Sherman, and 
of course was bound by his terms. This stopped 
all fighting. 

General Eichard Taylor had now become the 
senior Confederate officer still at liberty east of the 
Mississippi River, and on the 4th of May he surren- 
dered everything within the limits of this extensive 
command. Greneral E. Kirby Smith surrendered 
the trans-Mississippi department on the 26th of 
May, leaving no other Confederate army at liberty 
to continue the war. 

Wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugi- 
tive President of the defunct Confederacy before he 
got out of the country. This occurred at Irwins- 
ville, Georgia, on the 11th of May. For myself — 



Surrender 

of Taylor 

and Kirby 

Smith 




RIGHT I'ROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND 

LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.) 



CAPTURE OF JEFFERSON DAVIS 369 

and I believe Mr. Lincoln shared the feeling — I ch.xxvii 
would have been very glad to have seen Mr. Davis mL^ Me- 
succeed in escaping, but for one reason: 1 feared ™326?327' 
that if not captured he might get into the trans-Mis- 
sissippi region and there set up a more contracted 
Confederacy. The young men now out of homes 
and out of employment might have rallied under 
his standard and protracted the war yet another 
year. The Northern people were tired of the war ; 
they were tired of piling up a debt which would be 
a further mortgage upon their homes. 

Mr. Lincoln, I believe, wanted Mr. Davis to escape, 
because he did not wish to deal with the matter of 
his punishment. He knew there would be people 
clamoring for the punishment of the ex-Confeder- 
ate President, for high treason. He thought blood 
enough had already been spilled to atone for our 
wickedness as a nation. At all events, he did not 
wish to be the judge to decide whether more should 
be shed or not. But his own life was sacrificed at 
the hands of an assassin before the ex-President of 
the Confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the 
government which he had lent all his talent and all 
his energies to destroy. 

All things are said to be wisely directed, and for 
the best interest of all concerned. This reflection 
does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense 
of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and 
great a man as Abraham Lincoln. 

He would have proven the best friend the South ^'jo^^^o^n "^ 
could have had, and saved much of the wrangling 
and bitterness of feeling brought out by recon- 
struction under a President who at first wished to 
revenge himself upon Southern men of better social 
Vol. n.— 24 



coutrastecl 



370 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CH. XXVII standing than himself, but who still sought their 
recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea 
and advanced the proposition to become their Moses 
to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. 

Reconstoic- rj^\^Q story of the legislation enacted during the 
reconstruction period to stay the hands of the 
President is too fresh in the minds of the people 
to be told now. Much of it, no doubt, was uncon- 
stitutional ; but it was hoped that the laws enacted 
would serve their purpose before the question of 
constitutionality could be submitted to the judici- 
ary and a decision obtained. These laws did serve 
their purpose, and now remain " a dead letter " upon 
the statute-books of the United States, no one tak- 
ing interest enough in them to give them a passing 
thought, 
cf. Davis, Much was said at the time about the garb Mr. 

'Rise and " 

F&iir^y'joi, Davis was wearing when he was captured. I can- 
not settle this question from personal knowledge 
of the facts ; but I have been under the belief from 
information given to me by General Wilson shortly 
after the event, that when Mr. Davis learned that 
he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent 
dressed in a gentleman's dressing-gown. Naturally 
enough, Mr. Davis wanted to escape, and would not 
reflect much how this should be accomplished pro- 
vided it might be done successfully. If captured, 
he would be no ordinary prisoner. He represented 
all there was of that hostility to the government 
which had caused four years of the bloodiest war 
— and the most costly in other respects — of which 
history makes any record. Every one supposed he 
would be tried for treason if captured, and that he 
would be executed. Had he succeeded in making 



GENERAL THOMAS 371 

his escape in any disguise it would have been ad- ch.xxvu 
judged a good thing afterward by his admirers. 

As my official letters on file in the War Depart- ThomS 
ment, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect 
upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon 
his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, 
that I give my estimate of him as a soldier. The 
same remark will apply also in the case of General 
Canby. I had been at West Point with Thomas 
one year, and had known him later in the old 
army. He was a man of commanding appearance, 
slow and deliberate in speech and action ; sensible, 
honest, and brave. He possessed valuable soldierly 
qualities in an eminent * degree. He gained the 
confidence of all who served under him, and almost 
their love. This implies a very valuable quality. 
It is a quality which calls out the most efficient 
services of the troops serviug under the commander 
possessing it. 

Thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, 
and always good. He could not be driven from a 
point he was given to hold. He was not as good, 
however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not 
believe that he could ever have conducted Sher- 
man's army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against 
the defenses and the commander guarding that line 
in 1864. On the other hand, if it had been given 
him to hold the line which Johnston tried to hold, 
neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other 
officer, could have done it better. 

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly de- 
served, as he has received, the plaudits of his coun- 
trymen for the part he played in the great tragedy 
of 1861-65. 



372 



PERSONAX, MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



CH. XXVII G-eneral Caiiby was an officer of great merit. 
lie was naturally studious and inclined to the law. 

Gen. canby There have been in the army but very few, if any, 
officers who took as much interest in reading and 
digesting every act of Congress and every regula- 
tion for the government of the army as he. His 
knowledge gained in this way made him a most 
valuable staff-officer, a capacity in which almost all 
his army services were rendered up to the time 
of his being assigned to the Military Division of 
the Gulf. He was an exceedingly modest officer, 
though of great talent and learning. I presume his 
feelings when first called upon to command a large 
army against a fortified city were somewhat like 

^"""201 ^°"' ^y ^^^ when marching a regiment against General 
Thomas Harris in Missouri in 1861. Neither of us 
would have felt the slightest trepidation in going 
into battle with some one else commanding. Had 
Canby been in other engagements afterward, he 
would, I have no doubt, have advanced without 
any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. 
He was afterward killed in the lava-beds of south- 
ern Oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile Modoc 
Indians. His character was as pure as his talent 
and learning were great. His services were valuable 
during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. 
I have no idea that it was from choice that his ser- 
vices were rendered in an office, but because of his 
superior efficiency there. 



CHAPTER XXVIII 

THE END OF THE WAE — THE MAEGH TO WASHINGTON 
— ONE OF LINCOLN'S ANCEDOTES — GRAND REVIEW 

AT WASHINGTON CHARACTERISTICS OF LINCOLN 

AND STANTON — ESTIMATE OF THE DIFFERENT 
CORPS COMMANDERS 

THINGS began to quiet down, and as the cer- CH.xxvm 
tainty that there would be no more armed re- 
sistance became clearer, the troops in North Carolina ^J troops 
and Virginia were ordered to march immediately to 
the capital, and go into camp there until mustered 
out. Suitable garrisons were left at the prominent 
places throughout the South to ensure obedience to 
the laws that might be enacted for the government 
of the several States, and to ensure security to the 
lives and property of all classes. I do not know 
how far this was necessary, but I deemed it neces- 
sary, at that time, that such a course should be pur- 
sued. I think now that these garrisons were con- 
tinued after they ceased to be absolutely required ; 
but it is not to be expected that such a rebeUion as 
was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 
could terminate without leaving many serious ap- 
prehensions in the mind of the people as to what 

should be done. Sherman, 

Sherman marched his troops from Goldsboro' up ^Tes^' 

373 



374 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CH.xxvni to Manchester, on the south side of the James 

River, opposite Eichmond, and there put them in 

camp, while he went back to Savannah to see what 

the situation was there. 

Sherman. It was duiing; this trip that the last outrage was 

Memoirs, II, ox ^-^ 

371-374 committed upon him. Halleck had been sent to 
Richmond to command Virginia, and had issued 
orders prohibiting even Sherman's own troops from 
obeying his, Sherman's, orders. Sherman met the 
papers on his return, containing this order of Hal- 
leck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. 
On his arrival at Fortress Monroe returning from 
Savannah, Sherman received an invitation from 
Halleck to come to Richmond and be his guest. 
This he indignantly refused, and informed Halleck, 
furthermore, that he had seen his order. He also 
stated that he was coming up to take command of 
his troops, and as he marched through it would 
probably be as well for Halleck not to show him- 
self, because he (Sherman) would not be responsible 
for what some rash person might do through indig- 
nation for the treatment he had received. Very 
soon after that Sherman received orders from me 

Ibid. 375 to proceed to Washington city, and to go into camp 
on the south side of the city pending the muster- 
ing out of the troops. 

There was no incident worth noting in the march 
northward from Groldsboro' to Richmond, or in that 
from Richmond to Washington city. The army, 
however, commanded by Sherman, which had been 
engaged in all the battles of the West and had 
marched from the Mississippi through the South- 
ern States to the sea, from there to Goldsboro', 
and thence to Washington city, had passed over 



THE END OF THE WAR 375 

many of the battle-fields of the Army of the Po- ch.xxvim 
tomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than 
any other body of troops, the entire theater of 
the four years' war for the preservation of the 
Union. 

The march of Sherman's army from Atlanta to ^eaSS 
the sea and north to Goldsboro', while it was not p^^^^ 
accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, 
yet was magnificent in its results, and equally mag- 
nificent in the way it was conducted. It had an 
important bearing, in various ways, upon the great 
object we had in view, that of closing the war. All 
the States east of the Mississippi River up to the 
State of Georgia had felt the hardships of the war. 
Georgia and South Carolina, and almost all of 
North Carolina, up to this time, had been exempt 
from invasion by the Northern armies, except upon ' 
their immediate sea-coasts. Their newspapers had 
given such an account of Confederate success that 
the people who remained at home had been con- 
vinced that the Yankees had been whipped from 
first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and 
that now they could hardly be holding out for any 
other purpose than to find a way out of the war 
with honor to themselves. 

Even during this march of Sherman's the news- 
papers in his front were proclaiming daily that his 
army was nothing better than a mob of men who 
were frightened out of their wits and hastening, 
panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our 
navy for protection against the Southern people. 
As the army was seen marching on triumphantly, 
however, the minds of the people became disabused, 
and they saw the true state of affairs. In turn they 



376 PERSONAL MEMOIES OF U. S. GEANT 

CH.xxvin became disheartened, and would have been glad to 
submit without compromise. 

Another great advantage resulting from this 
march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, 
was the fact that the great storehouse of Georgia 
was entirely cut off from the Confederate armies. 
As the troops advanced north from Savannah, the 
destruction of the railroads in South Carolina and 
the southern part of North Carolina further cut off 
their resources, and left the armies still in Virginia 
and North Carolina dependent for supplies upon a 
very small area of country, already very much ex- 
hausted of food and forage. 

In due time the two armies, one from Burkesville 
Junction and the other from the neighborhood of 
Raleigh, North Carolina, arrived and went into 
camp near the capital, as directed. The troops 
were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they ap- 
peared in their respective camps as ready and fit 
for duty as they had ever been in their lives. I 
doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, 
take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever 
gotten together that would have proved their equal 
in a gi"eat battle. 
American The armics of Europe are machines : the men are 

and Euro- -^ t i ji • -j. £ 

pf^a^n armies "brave and the officers capable; but the majority ot 
the soldiers in most of the nations of Europe are 
taken from a class of people who are not very in- 
telligent and who have very little interest in the 
contest in which they are called upon to take part. 
Our armies were composed of men who were able 
to read, men who knew what they were fighting 
for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, 
except in an emergency when the safety of the 



ANECDOTE OF PKESIDENT LINCOLN 377 

nation was involved, and so necessarily must have ch. xxviii 
been more than equal to men who fought merely 
because they were brave and because they were 
thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. 

Nothing of particular importance occurred dur- 
ing the time these troops were in camp before start- 
ing North. 

I remember one little incident which I will relate 
as an anecdote characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. It 
occurred a day after I reached Washington, and 
about the time General Meade reached Burkesville 
with the army. Grovernor Smith of Virginia had J^Ext™ 
left Richmond with the Confederate States govern- sm^thfaU. 

n T -1 , -r^ -11 n • T 1846-48,1863- 

ment, and had gone to Danville, bupposmg 1 was 65 
necessarily with the army at Burkesville, he ad- 
dressed a letter to me there, informing me that, 
as governor of the Commonwealth of the State of 
Virginia, he had temporarily removed the State 
capital from Richmond to Danville, and asking if 
he would be permitted to perform the functions of 
his office there without molestation by the Federal 
authorities. I give this letter only in substance. 
He also inquired of me whether, in case he was not 
allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with 
a few others might not be permitted to leave the 
country and go abroad without interference. Gen- 
eral Meade, being informed that a flag of truce was 
outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent 
out and had the letter brought in without inform- 
ing the officer who brought it that I was not pres- 
ent. He read the letter and telegraphed me its 
contents. Meeting Mr. Lincoln shortly after receiv- 
ing this despatch, I repeated its contents to him. 
Mr. Lincoln, supposing I was asking for instruc- 



378 PEESONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

CH. XXVIII tions, said, in reply to that part of Governor 
Smith's letter which inquired whether he with a 
few friends would be permitted to leave the coun- 
try unmolested, that his position was like that of 
a certain Irishman (gi\ang the name) he knew in 
Springfield, who was very popular with the people, 
a man of considerable promise, and very much 
liked. Unfortunately he had acquired the habit of 
drinking, and his friends could see that the habit 
was growing on him. These friends determined to 
make an effort to save him, and to do this they 
drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic 
drinks. They asked Pat to join them in sigDing 
the pledge, and he consented. He had been so long 
out of the habit of using plain water as a bever- 
age that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. 
After a few days this began to grow distasteful to 
him. So holding the glass behind him, he said, 
" Doctor, could n't you drop a bit of brandy in that 
unbeknownst to myself?" 

I do not remember what the instructions were 
the President gave me, but I know that Governor 
Smith was not permitted to perform the duties of 
his office. I also know that if Mr. Lincoln had 
been spared, there would have been no efforts 
made to prevent any one from leaving the country 
who desired to do so. He would have been equally 
wiUing to permit the return of the same expatri- 
ated citizens after they had time to repent of their 
choice. 
The srand Qu the 18th of May orders were issued by the ad- 
jutant-general for a grand review by the President 
and his Cabinet of Sherman's and Meade's armies. 
The review commenced on the 23d and lasted two 



^ 




1^ i^ 



Missing Pages 



These missing pages will be inserted at a future date. 



^ 




^ i^ 



Missing Pages 



These missing pages will be inserted at a future d 



ESTIMATE OF THE CORPS COMMANDERS 383 

it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those ch.xxviii 
around him to approach him even with informa- 
tion. In spite of this defect he was a most valu- 
able officer, and deserves a high place in the annals 
of his country. 

General Burnside was an officer who was gener- ^*^°'ide"™" 
ally liked and respected. He was not, however, 
fitted to command an army. No one knew this bet- 
ter than himself. He always admitted his blunders, 
and extenuated those of officers under him beyond 
what they were entitled to. It was hardly his fault 
that he was ever assigned to a separate command. 

Of Hooker I saw but little during the war. I aen.Hooker 
had known him very well before, however. Where 
I did see him, at Chattanooga, his achievement in 
bringing his command around the point of Look- 
out Mountain and into Chattanooga Valley was 
brilliant. I nevertheless regarded him as a danger- 
ous man. He was not subordinate to his superiors. 
He was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing 
for the rights of others. His disposition was, when 
engaged in battle, to get detached from the main 
body of the army and exercise a separate com- 
mand, gathering to his standard all he could of his 
juniors. 

Hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of ^ck.w.^p 
all the general officers who did not exercise a sepa- mfxim, 
rate command. He commanded a corps longer than Brig!^^eu. 
any other one, and his name was never mentioned 23,1861; ' 
as having committed in battle a blunder for which NnyigAses; 

^ _ Bng.-Geu. 

he was responsible. He was a man of very con- ^•fa.^'st"^" 
spicuous personal appearance. Tall, well formed, 
and, at the time of which I now write, young and 
fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that 



384 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



Gen. Sedg- 
wick 



ch. XXVIII would attract the attention of an army as he 
passed. His genial disposition made him friends, 
and his personal courage and his presence with his 
command in the thickest of the fight won for him 
the confidence of troops serving under him. No 
matter how hard the fight, the Second Corps always 
felt that their commander was looking after them. 

Sedgwick was killed at Spottsylvania before I 
had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his 
qualifications as a soldier from personal observa- 
tion. I had known him in Mexico when both of 
us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no 
indication that either of us would ever be equal to 
the command of a brigade.' He stood very high in 
the army, however, as an officer and a man. He 
was brave and conscientious. His ambition was 
not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. 
He was willing to do any amount of battling, but 
always wanted some one else to direct. He declined 
the command of the Army of the Potomac once, if 
not oftener. 

General Alfred H. Terry came into the army as a 
volunteer without a military education. His way 
was won without political influence up to an im- 
portant separate command — the expedition against 
Fort Fisher, in January, 1865. His success there 
was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of 
brigadier-general in the regular army and of major- 
general of volunteers. He is a man who makes 
friends of those under him by his consideration of 
their wants and their dues. As a commander he 
won their confidence by his coolness in action and 
by his clearness of perception in taking in the situa- 
tion under which he was placed at any given time. 



Gen. Terry 




LEFT PROFILE OF GENERAL GRANT. (FROM A 1-HOIoGKAI'H TAKEN BY WALKER IN 1875, AND 

LENT BY MAJOR C. C. SNIFFIN.) 



ESTIMATE OF THE COKPR COMMANDEES 385 

Griffin, Humphreys, and Mackenzie were good CH.xxvrn 
corps commanders, but came into that position so ^^,®w^^" 
near to the close of the war as not to attract pub- Me^Jo, 
he attention. Ah three served as such in the last capt.2dArt. 
campaign of the Armies of the Potomac and the S^^'^®°' 
James, which culminated at Appomattox Court ^en^^lJJ.^2] 
House, on the 9th of April, 1865. The sudden col- "^^ 
lapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the 
exclusion of almost everything else. I regarded 
Mackenzie as the most promising young officer in temie^w'. 
the army. Graduating at West Point, as he did, 2d'Lt Eng. 
during the second year of the war, he had won i862rBrig.- 
his way up to the command of a corps before its oct. 19, isu 
close. This he did upon his own merit and without 
influence. 



Vol. II.— 25 



CONCLUSION 

^^thc'lvrir"* rriHE cause of the great war of the rebellion 
J- against the United States will have to be at- 
tributed to slavery. For some years before the war 
began it was a trite saying among some politicians 
that " a state half slave and half free cannot exist." 
All must become slave or all free, or the state will 
go down. I took no part myself in any such view 
of the case at the time, but since the war is over, 
reviewing the whole question, I have come to the 
conclusion that the saying is quite true. 
Slavery Slavery was an institution that required unusual 
guaranties for its security wherever it existed ; and 
in a country like ours, where the larger portion of 
it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and 
well-to-do population, the people would naturally 
have but little sympathy with demands upon them 
for its protection. Hence the people of the South 
were dependent upon keeping control of the gen- 
eral government to secure the perpetuation of their 
favorite institution. They were enabled to main- 
tain this control long after the States where slavery 
existed had ceased to have the controlling power, 
through the assistance they received from odd men 
here and there throughout the Northern States. 
They saw their power waning, and this led them to 
encroach upon the prerogatives and independence 

386 



CONCLUSION 



387 



of the Northern States by enacting such laws as 
the Fugitive Slave Law. By this law every North- Jive sikve 
ern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to 
turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of 
a Southern man. Northern marshals became slave- 
catchers, and Northern courts had to contribute to 
the support and protection of the institution. 

This was a degradation which the North would 
not permit any longer than until they could get the 
power to expunge such laws from the statute-books. 
Prior to the time of these encroachments the great 
majority of the people of the North had no par- 
ticular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were 
not forced to have it themselves. But they were 
not willing to play the role of police for the South 
in the protection of this particular institution. 

In the early days of the country, before we had 
railroads, telegraphs, and steamboats, — in a word, 
rapid transit of any sort, — the States were each al- 
most a separate nationality. At that time the sub- 
ject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance 
to the public mind. But the country grew, rapid 
transit was established, and trade and commerce 
between the States got to be so much greater than 
before, that the power of the National government 
became more felt and recognized, and therefore had 
to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. 

It is probably well that we had the war when we '^^I'm^r 
did. We are better off now than we would have 
been without it, and have made more rapid pro- 
gress than we otherwise should have made. The 
civilized nations of Europe have been stimulated 
into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, 
travel, and thorough acquaintance among people 



388 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

of different nationalities have become common; 
whereas before it was but the few who had ever 
had the privilege of going beyond the limits of 
their own country, or who knew anything about 
other people. Then, too, our republican institu- 
tions were regarded as experiments up to the break- 
ing out of the rebellion, and monarchical Europe 
generally believed that our republic was a rope of 
sand that would part the moment the slightest 
strain was brought upon it. Now it has shown 
itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest 
wars that was ever made, and our people have 
proven themselves to be the most formidable in 
war of any nationality. 

But this war was a fearful lesson, and should 
teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the 
future. 
"^Sf^e"* "^^^ conduct of some of the European states 
during our troubles shows the lack of conscience 
of communities where the responsibility does not 
come upon a single individual. Seeing a nation 
that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the 
better part of a continent, growing as we were 
growing in population, wealth, and intelligence, the 
European nations thought it would be well to give 
us a check. We might possibly, after a while, 
threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of 
their institutions. Hence England was constantly 
finding fault with the administration at Washing- 
ton because we were not able to keep up an effec- 
tive blockade. She also joined, at first, with France 
and Spain in setting up an Austrian prince upon 
tempted the throuc in Mexico, totally disregarding any 
empire rights or claims that Mexico had of being treated 



CONCLUSION 



OQ 



89 



as an independent power. It is true they trumped 
up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pre- 
texts which can always be found when wanted. 

Mexico, in her various revolutions, had been un- 
able to give that protection to the subjects of foreign 
nations which she would have liked to give, and 
some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans 
from them. Under pretense of protecting their citi- 
zens, these nations seized upon Mexico as a foot- 
hold for establishing a European monarchy upon 
our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. 
I myself regarded this as a direct act of war against 
the United States by the powers engaged, and sup- 
posed as a matter of course that the United States 
would treat it as such when their hands were free 
to strike. I often spoke of the matter to Mr. Lin- 
coln and the Secretary of War, but never heard any 
special views from them to enable me to judge 
what they thought Or felt about it. I inferred that 
they felt a good deal as I did, but were unwilling to 
commit themselves while we had our own troubles 
upon our hands. 

All of the powers except France very soon with- 
drew from the armed intervention for the estab- 
lishment of an Austrian prince upon the throne of 
Mexico ; but the governing people of these coun- 
tries contin^^ed to the close of the war to throw 
obstacles in our way. After the surrender of Lee, 
therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, 
I sent Sheridan with a corps to tlie Rio Grande to Jntjo the 
have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling 
the French from Mexico. These troops got off be- 
fore they could be stopped, and went to the Rio 
Grande, where Sheridan distributed them up and 



Rio Grande 



390 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

down the river, much to the consternation of the 
troops in the quarter of Mexico bordering on that 
stream. This soon led to a request from France 
that we should withdraw our troops from the Rio 
Grande, and to negotiations for the withdrawal of 
Kps theirs. Finally Bazaine was withdrawn from Mex- 
TroSfMel^ ico by ordcr of the French government. From 
that day the empire began to totter. Mexico was 
then able to maintain her independence without 
aid from us. 

France is the traditional ally and friend of the 
United States. I did not blame France for her 
part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the 
ruins of the Mexican republic. That was the scheme 
of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. 
He had succeeded in stealing the government of his 
country, and made a change in its form against the 
wishes and instincts of his people. He tried to play 
the part of the first Napoleon, without the ability 
to sustain that role. He sought by new conquests 
to add to his empire and his glory ; but the signal 
failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor 
of his own overthrow. 

Like our own war between the States, the Franco- 
Prussian war was an expensive one; but it was 
worth to France all it cost her people. It was the 
completion of the downfall of Napoleon III. The 
beginning was when he landed troops on this con- 
tinent. Failing here, the prestige of his name — all 
the prestige he ever had — was gone. He must 
^N^iS^n"^ achieve a success or fall. He tried to strike down 
"■^ his neighbor, Prussia — and fell. 

I never admired the character of the first Napo- 
leon ; but I recognize his great genius. His work, 



CONCLUSION 



39\ 



too, has left its impress for good on the face of 
Europe. The third Napoleon could have no claii^ 
to having done a good or just act. 

To maintain peace in the future it is necessary 
to be prepared for war. There can scarcely be a 
possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, 
occurring among our own people again ; but, grow- 
ing as we are in population, wealth, and military 
power, we may become the envy of nations which 
led us in all these particulars only a few years 
ago ; and unless we are prepared for it we may 
be in danger of a combined movement being some 
day made to crush us out. Now, scarcely twenty 
years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the 
lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the 
greatest security, without the power to resist an in- 
vasion by the fleets of fourth -rate European powers 
for a time until we could prepare for them. 

We should have a good navy, and our sea-coast 
defenses should be put in the finest possible condi- 
tion. Neither of these cost much when it is con- 
sidered where the money goes, and what we get in 
return. Money expended in a fine navy not only 
adds to our security and tends to prevent war in 
the future, but is very material aid to our commerce 
with foreign nations in the mean time. Money 
spent upon sea-coast defenses is spent among our 
own people, and all goes back again among the 
people. The work accomplished, too, like that of 
the navy, gives us a feeling of security. 

England's course toward the United States dur- 
ing the rebellion exasperated the people of this 
country very much against the mother-country. 
I regretted it. England and the United States are 



The art of 
raaiHtain- 
iug peace 



Naval and 
coast de- 
fenses 



Attitude of 
England 



392 



PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 



The cotton 
famine 



The negro 
question 



natural allies, and should be the best of friends. 
They speak one language and are related by blood 
and other ties. We together, or even either sepa- 
rately, are better qualified than any other people to 
establish commerce between all the nationalities of 
the world. 

England governs her own colonies, and particu- 
larly those embracing the people of different races 
from her own, better than any other nation. She is 
just to the conquered, but rigid. She makes them 
self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to 
the laborer. She does not seem to look upon the 
colonies as outside possessions which she is at lib- 
erty to work for the support and aggrandizement 
of the home government. 

The hostility of England to the United States 
during our rebellion was not so much real as it was 
apparent. It was the hostility of the leaders of one 
political party. I am told that there was no time 
during the civil war when they were able to get up 
in England a demonstration in favor of secession, 
while these were constantly being gotten up in 
favor of the Union, or, as they called it, in favor 
of the North. Even in Manchester, which suffered 
so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her 
mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor 
of the North at the very time when their workmen 
were almost famishing. 

It is possible tha,t the question of a conflict be- 
tween races may come up in the futui'e, as did that 
between freedom and slavery before. The condition 
of the colored man within our borders may become 
a source of anxiety, to say the least. But he was 
brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now 



CONCLUSION 393 

should be considered as having as good a right ,to 

remain here as any other class of our citizens. It 

was looking to a settlement of this question that led 

me to urge the annexation of Santo Domingo diir- anuexS> 

ing the time I was President of tlie United States. ''^'^liisij'"" 

Santo Domingo was freely offered to us not only 
by the administration, but by all the people, almost 
without price. The island is upon our shores, is 
very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen 
millions of people. The products of the soil are so 
valuable that labor in her fields would be so com- 
pensated as to enable those who wished to go there 
to quickly repay the cost of their passage. I took 
]^ that the colored people would go there in great 
numbers, so as to have independent States governed 
by their own race. They would still be States of 
the Union, and under the protection of the gen 
eral government ; but the citizens would be almost 
wholly colored. 

By the war with Mexico we had acquired, as we ^l^ewfs"^ 
have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that 
we already possessed. It was seen that the vol- 
unteers of the Mexican war largely composed the 
pioneers to settle up the Pacific coast countr3\ 
Their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient 
to be a nucleus for the population of the important 
points of the territory acquired by that war. After 
our rebellion, when so many young men were at 
liberty to return to their homes, they found they 
were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the 
workshop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. 
The mines of the mountains first attracted them; 
but afterward they found that rich valleys and 
productive gi'azing and farming lands were there. 



394 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

This territory, the geography of which was not 
known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as 
well mapped as any portion of our country. Rail- 
roads traverse it in every direction — north, south, 
east, and west. The mines are worked. The high 
lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agri- 
cultural lands are found in many of the valleys. 
This is the work of the volunteer. It is probable 
that the Indians would have had control of these 
lands for a century yet but for the war. We must 
conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils 
unmixed with some good. 

Prior to the rebellion the great mass of the peo- 
ple were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their 
birth. In fact, an immense majority of the whole 
people did not feel secure against coming to want 
should they move among entire strangers. So much 
was the country divided into small communities that 
localized idioms had grown up, so that you could 
almost tell what section a person was from by hear- 
ing him speak. Before, new territories were set- 
tled by a "class" — people who shunned contact 
with others; people who, when the country began 
to settle up around them, would push out farther 
from civilization. Their guns furnished meat, and 
the cultivation of a very limited amount of the 
soil their bread and vegetables. All the streams 
abounded with fisli. Trapping would furnish pelts 
to be brought into the States once a year, to pay 
for necessary articles which they could not raise — 
powder, lead, whisky, tobacco, and some store 
goods. Occasionally some little articles of luxury 
would enter into these purchases — a quarter of a 
pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more 



CONCLUSION 395 

of sugar, some playing-cards, and, if anything was 
left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whisky. 

Little was known of the topography of the couu- na^.f.l ot?[,e 
try beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. *^^^^^'^y 
This is all changed now. The war begot a spirit of 
independence and enterprise. The feeling now is 
that a youth must cut loose from his old surround- 
ings to enable him to get up in the world. There 
is now such a commingling of the people that par- 
ticular idioms and pronunciation are no longer local- 
ized to any great extent ; the country has filled up 
" from the center all around to the sea " ; railroads 
connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior ; 
maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country 
are now furnished the student of geography. 

The war has made us a nation of great power and 
intelligence. We have but little to do to preserve 
peace, happiness, and prosperity at home, and the 
respect of other nations. Our experience ought to 
teach us the necessity of the first ; our power secures 
the latter. 

I feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when The new era 
there is to be great harmony between the Federal 
and Confederate. I cannot stay to be a living wit- 
ness to the correctness of this prophecy ; but I feel 
it within me that it is to be so. The universally 
kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it 
was supposed that each day would prove my last 
seemed to me the beginning of the answer to " Let 
us have peace." 

The expressions of these kindly feelings were 
not restricted to a section of the country nor to a 
division of the people. They came from individual 
citizens of all nationalities ; from all denominations 



96 PERSONAL MEMOIRS OF U. S. GRANT 

— the Protestant, the Catholic, and the Jew; and 
from the various societies of the land — scientific, 
educational, religious or otherwise. Politics did 
not enter into the matter at all. 

I am not egotist enough to suppose all this sig- 
nificance should be given because I was the object 
of it. But the war between the States was a very 
bloody and a very costly war. One side or the 
other had to yield principles they deemed dearer 
than life before it could be brought to an end. I 
commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged 
on the victorious side. I was, no matter whether 
deservedly so or not, a representative of that side 
of the controversy. It is a significant and gratify- 
ing fact that Confederates should have joined 
heartily in this spontaneous move. I hope the 
good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. 




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APPENDIX 



REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, OF THE 
UNITED STATES ARMIES (1864-65) 



Headquarters, Armies of the United States, 
Washington, D. C, July 22, 1865. 

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War. 

Sir : I have the honor to submit the foHowing report of the opera- 
tions of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appoint- 
ment to command tlie same. 

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with 
the idea that active and continuous operations of aU the troops that 
could be brought into the field, reg-ardless of season and weather, 
were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources 
of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours ; 
but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population 
hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and 
railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the oper- 
ating armies. 

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without 
concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the 
enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication 
for transpoi-ting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most 
vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of 
inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of pro- 
ducing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether 
our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced 
by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. 

From the first I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be 
had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the peo- 
ple, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion 
was entirely broken. 

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops 
])racticable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him 
from using the same force at different seasons against first one and 
then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting 

397 



398 APPENDIX 

and procliieiiii? necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, 
to hainnier continuously against the armed force of the enemy and 
his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should 
be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section 
of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land. 

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given 
and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have 
been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn 
the loss of friends fallen, and Avho have to jjay the pecuniary cost, to 
say. All I can say is that what I have done has been done conscien- 
tiously, to the best of my abihty, and in what I conceived to be for 
the best interests of the whole country. 

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contend- 
ing forces was about as follows : The Mississippi River was strongly 
garrisoned by Federal troops, from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. 
The line of the Ai-kansas was also held, thus giving us armed posses- 
sion of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points 
in southern Louisiana, not remote fi-om the river, were held by us, 
together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio 
Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisi- 
ana, and Texas was in the abnost undisputed possession of the enemy, 
with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective 
men, that could have been brought into the field had there been suffi- 
cient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone policy 
had demoralized this force so that probabl}^ but little more than one 
half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one 
half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered 
through Missouri, Ai'kansas, and along the Mississippi River, and the 
disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a 
large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to 
protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Miss- 
issippi we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Hol- 
ston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the State of 
Tennessee. South of Chattanooga a small foothold had been obtained 
in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from 
the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substan- 
tially within oui' lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern 
border, the Potomac River, a small area about the mouth of James 
River, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the 
territory covered by the Army of the Potomac lying along the Rapi- 
dan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast foot- 
holds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and New Berne, 
in North Carolina ; Beaufort, Folly and Morris islands, Hilton Head, 
Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina ; Fernandina and 
St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our 
possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. 



APPENDIX 399 

The accompanyine^ map,^ a copy of which was sent to General Sher- 
man and other commanders in March, 18G4, shows by red Unes the 
territory occnpied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the 
opening of the campaign of 18G4, while those in blue are i\w lines 
wliich it was proposed to occupy. 

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of gueri'illas and 
a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary 
to guard every foot of road or river used in sn}»plying our armies. 
In the South a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made 
every man and boy capable of beaiing arms a soldier, and those who 
could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting de- 
serters and returning them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost 
his entire strength into the field. 

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the 
Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and 
J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded 
by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine 
Run westwai'd, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Rich- 
mond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army 
under Johnston occupied a strougly intrenched position at Daltou, 
Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, — a place of great 
importance as a railroad center, — against the armies under Major- 
Geueral W. T. Shei-man. In addition to these armies he had a large 
cavalry force, under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi ; a considerable 
force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Vall(^y and in the western part 
of Virginia and extreme eastern part of Tennessee ; and also con- 
fronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where 
we had no foothold upon laud. 

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, 
were the main objective points of the campaign. 

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies 
and territory east of the Mississippi River to the Alleghanies, and the 
Dej>artment of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate 
command of the armies operating against Johnston. 

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the 
Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of 
the movements of all our armies. 

Genei-al Sherinan was instructed to move against Johnston's army, 
to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's eountry as 
far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war 
resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to 
follow him up to the fuU extent of his ability, while I would prevent 
the concentration of Lee upon him, if it was in the power of the 

1 This allusion is to a map wliich is fully described in the "Official Records of 
the War of the Rebellion," vol. xxxii, part 3, p. 261.— F. D. G. 



400 APPENDIX 

Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions 
were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the 
plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them 
and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. 

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red River 
against Shreveport, Louisiana (wliieh had been organized previous 
to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of 
March of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at 
the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it 
would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sher- 
man had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would 
send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it 
led to the abandonment of the main object of the Red River expedi- 
tion, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Missis- 
sippi; that should his expedition prove successful he would hold 
Shreveport and the Red River with such force as he might deem 
necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood 
of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of 
territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily 
held ; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against 
Mobile ; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained 
to make it without embarrassing other movements ; that New Orleans 
would be the point of departure for such an expedition ; also, that I 
had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as 
suggested by him (General Banks), instead of a demonstration, as 
Steele thought advisable. 

On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and 
directions, he was instructed as follows : 

1st. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn 
over the defense of the Eed River to General Steele and the navy. 

2d. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold 
upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they 
will turn their attention immediately to fortifying- then- positions. At least 
one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the col- 
ored troops. 

3d. By properly fortif jing on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it 
from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if 
not to a less number. Six thousand more would tlien hold all the rest of 
the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed 
west of the river. According to your last return, this would give you a force 
of over thirty thousand effective men with wliich to move against Mobile. 
To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If,, however, you 
think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as neces- 
sary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five 
thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. 
With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no 
time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon ]\Iobile. 
Two or more ironclads wiU be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. 



APPENDIX 401 

This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make 
your own arrangements with the admiral for his cooperation, and select 
your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula 
should be your base ; but, from your long service in the Oulf Department, 
you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements 
shall be cooperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start 
too soon. AH I would now add is, that you commence the concentration 
of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend 
doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 
Major-General N. p. Banks. 

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his 
objective point ; that wiierever Lee went he would go also. For his 
movement two plans presented themselves : one to cross the Rapid an 
below Lee, moving by his right flank ; the other above, moving l>y 
his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with correspond- 
ing objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all 
chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we 
took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations 
we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so 
that he could not be directed how to cooi)erate. If we took the other 
route. Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until an- 
other was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, how^ever, 
it was decided to take the lower route. 

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General 
B. F. Butler : 

Fort Monroe, Virginia, 
April 2, 1864. 

General : In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence 
at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action 
of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. 

It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to 
act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the 
territory ah-eady taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concen- 
tration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the 
enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement 
they interpose themselves between the enemy and the comitry to be guiirded, 
thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at 
least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object 
is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects toward 
which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable 
to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering 
Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your depart- 
ment with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the be- 
ginning of any move. I pi'opose, therefore, what comes nearest this of any- 
thing that seems practicable : The Army of the Potomac will act from its 
present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the 
forces from vour command that can be spared from garrison dutv — I should 

Vol. IL— 26 



402 APPENDIX 

say not less than twenty thousand effective men — to operate on the south 
side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force 
you aheady have will be added about ten thousand men from South Caro- 
lina, under Major-Greneral Gillmore, who will command them in person. 
Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the 
troops sent into the field from your own department. 

General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, 
with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter 
as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you 
will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem 
best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. 

When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as 
possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all yom- 
troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions 
cannot be given at this time for yoiu- fui-ther movements. 

The fact that has already been stated — that is, that Richmond is to be 
your objective point, and that there is to be cooperation between your force 
and the Army of the Potomac — must be your guide. This indicates the 
necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James River as you 
advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intvenchments in 
Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would foUow, and by means of trans- 
ports the two armies would become a unit. 

All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. 
If, however, you think it practicable to use your eavah-y south of you, so 
as to cut the railroad about Hicksford, about the time of the general advance, 
it would be of immense advantage. 

You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable 
day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of 
this order. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-General B. ¥. Butler. 

On the 16th these instnictions were substantially reiterated. On 
the 19th, in order to secure full cooperation between his army and 
that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move 
from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from 
Culpeper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was 
fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of April ; that it 
was my intention to fight Lee between Culpeper and Richmond, if he 
would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would 
follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on 
the James River ; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest 
Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the 
James, above the city, I would form the junction there ; that circum- 
stances might make this course advisable anyhow ; that he should 
use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the 
river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders 
to move ; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain 
as large a force there as possible. 



, ArPENDix 403 

In cooperation with the main movements aj^ainst Lee and Johnston, 
I was desirous of using all other troops neeessarily kept in depart- 
ments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those 
kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines be- 
tween the loyal States and the armies operating against them. 

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, 
was so held for the protectiou of West Virginia and the frontiers of 
Maryland and Pennsylvania. Whilst these trof)ps coidd not be with- 
drawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by 
comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act dire(;tly to 
their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. 
By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detacli 
largely for the protection of his supplies and Hues of comnmnicatiou, 
or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to or- 
ganize all bis available force into two expeditions, to nu>ve from 
Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, 
against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, 
General Ord having been relieved at his own request. General Sigel 
was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by 
Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the 
Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shen- 
andoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the 
Shenandoah to assemble between Cumlierland and the Shenandoah, 
and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such 
cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the 
enemy in the Sheuandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; 
while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part 
of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much 
damage as he could, destroying the New River Bridge and the salt- 
works at Saltville, Vh-ginia. 

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations 
were delayed until the 1st of May, when, everything beiug in readi- 
ness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general move- 
ment of all the ai-mies not later than the 4tli of May. 

My first object, being to break the mihtary power of the rebellion 
and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous 
that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Rich- 
mond, as that would tend more than anything else, imless it were the 
capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. 
If he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to com- 
pel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a 
large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defense of 
Richmond. It was well understood l)y both Generals Butler and 
Meade before starting on the campaign that it was my intention to 
put both their ai-mies south of the James River, in case of failure to 
destroy Lee without it. 



404 APPENDIX 

Before giving General Butler his instructions I visited him at Fort 
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of 
getting possession of Petersburg, and destroying raih-oad communi- 
cation as far south as possible. Believing, however, iu tlie practica- 
bility of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that 
the objective point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac 
was to move simultaneously with him, Lee coukl not detach from his 
army with safety, and the enemy did not have troo})s elsewhere to 
bring to the defense of the city in time to meet a rapid movement 
from the north of James River. 

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried 
as far as possible to leave General Meade in independent command 
of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were 
all through him, and were general in their natui'e, leaving all the de- 
tails and the execution to him. The campaigns that followed proved 
him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always 
in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank has drawn from 
him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle 
him to, and which he would otherwise have received. 

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on 
the morning of the 4th of May, under the immediate direction and 
orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before 
night the whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth and Sixth 
corps crossing at Germanna Ford, and the Second Corjjs at Ely's Ford, 
the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with 
the greater part of its trains, numbering aboiit four thousand wagons, 
meeting with but shght opposition. The average distance traveled 
by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as 
a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious 
apprehensions I had entertained — that of crossing the river in the 
face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, 
and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, 
and protected. Early on the 5th the advance corps (the Fifth, Major- 
General G. K. Warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy out- 
side his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiouslv 
all day, the whole army l^eing brought into the fight as fast as the 
corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of 
the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable 
promptness. 

General Burnside, with the Ninth Corps, was, at the time the Army 
of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing 
of the Rappahannock River and Alexandria railroad, holding the 
road back to BuU Run, with instructions not to move until he re- 
ceived notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to 
move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing 
he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. By six o'clock of 



APPENDIX 405 

the morning of the Gth he was leading his corps into action near the 
Wilderness Tavern, some of Lis troops having marched a distance of 
over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan 
rivers. Considering that a large proportion — probahly two thirds 
— of his command was composed of new troops nnac(nistomed to 
marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a re- 
markable march. 

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by ns at five o'clock on 
the morning of the 6tli, and continued with unabated fury until dark- 
ness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that 
they had on the evening of the 5th. After dark the enemy made a 
feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several huncb'ed 
prisoners and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness 
of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded 
that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the 
morning of the 7th reconnaissances showed that the enemy had fallen 
behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part 
of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the 
two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inal:)ility to fiu'ther main- 
tain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of 
position, and that he would wait an attack "behind his works. I 
therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between 
liim and Richmond, and orders were at once issued for a movement 
by his right flank. On the night of tlie 7th the march was commenced 
toward Spottsylvania Coin-t House, the Fifth Corps moving on the 
most direct road. But the enemy, having become apprised of our 
movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there 
first. On the 8th General Warren met a force of the enemy, which 
had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to 
fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily 
driven back on the main force within the recently constructed works, 
after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On 
the morning of the 9th General Sheridan started on a raid against 
the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The 9th, 10th, 
and 11th were spent in manoeuvering and fighting, witliout decisive 
results. Among the killed on the 9tli was that able and distinguished 
soldier, Major- General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Ai-my- 
corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. 
Early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the 
enemy in position. The Second Corps, Major-General Hancock com- 
manding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnson's 
division of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the re- 
sistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove 
decisive. The 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th w^ere consumed 
in manoeuvering and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from 
Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack 



406 APPENDIX 

upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Com-t House, orders were issued on 
the 18th with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence 
at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. Late in the afternoon of 
the 19th, Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right 
flank ; but the attack was promptly repulsed with heavy loss. This 
delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the 21st, 
when it was commenced. But the enemy again, having the shorter 
line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach 
the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The 
Fifth Corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the 23d, 
closely followed by the Sixth Corps. The Second and Ninth corps 
got up about the same time, the Second holding the railroad-bridge, 
and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho Ford. General Warren 
effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without 
much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently 
attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the 25th 
General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid 
on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots 
at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large sup- 
plies of rations, and many miles of railroad track; recaptured about 
four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of 
war ; met and defeated the enemy's cavahy at Yellow Tavern ; carried 
the first line of works around Richmond, but (finding the second line 
too strong to be carried ])y assault), recrossed to the north bank of 
the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge under heavy fire ; and moved 
by a detom- to Haxall's Landing, on the James River, where he com- 
municated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing 
off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively 
easy to guard oiu* trains. 

General Butler moved his main force up the James River, in pur- 
suance of instructions, on the 4th of May, General Gillmore having 
joined him with the Tenth Corps. At the same time he sent a force 
of eighteen hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junc- 
tion with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three 
thousand cavahy, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate 
against the road south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the 5th he 
occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, 
his movement being a complete surprise. On the 6th he was in posi- 
tion with his main ni'vay, and commenced intrenching. On the 7th 
he made a reconnaissance against the Petersburg and Richmond rail- 
road, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the 9th he 
telegraphed as follows : 

Headquarters near Bermuda Landing, 
May 9, 1864. 
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War: 

Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With seventeen 
himdred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chicka- 



Al^PENDIX 407 

hominy, and have safely brought them to then- present position. These 
were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets toward 
Richmond. 

General Kautz, with three thousand cavahy from Suffolk, on the same 
day with our movement up James River, forced the Black Water, burned 
the railroad-bridge at Stony Creek, below Petersburg, cutting into Beaure- 
gard's force at that point. 

We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of 
railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out 
against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies. 

Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cut- 
ting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg 
under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking 
many prisoners, after a severe and well -contested fight. 

General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to 
Lee from Beauregard's force. 

Benj. F. Butler, 

Major- General. 

On the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a 
portion of the enemy's first line of defenses at Drnry's Bluff, or Fort 
Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the 6th lost 
to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Peters- 
burg, enabhng, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in 
North and South Carohna, and bring them to the defense of those 
places. On the IGth the enemy attacked General Butler in his posi- 
tion in front of Drnry's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, 
into his intrench ments between the forks of the James and Appo- 
mattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus cov- 
ering his raih-oads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His 
army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as com- 
pletely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond 
as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It reqnu-ed but a com- 
paratively small force of the enemy to hold it there. 

On the 12th, General Kautz, with his cavahy, was started on a raid 
against the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, 
and Chula stations, destroying them, the railroad track, two freight- 
trains, and one locomotive^ together with large quantities of commis- 
sary and other stores ; thence, crossing to the South Side road, struck 
it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black's and Wliite's stations, destroy- 
ing the road and station-houses ; thence he proceeded to City Point, 
which he reached on the 18th. 

On the 19th of April, and prior to the movement of General But- 
ler, the enemy, with a land force under General Hoke and an iron- 
clad ram, attacked Plymouth, North Carolina, commanded by General 
H. W. Wessells, and om- gunboats there ; and after severe fightmg 
the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and arma- 
ment captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami 
disabled. 



408 • APPENDIX 

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically 
sealed itself \i\) at Bermuda Hundred, tlie enemy was enabled to l)ring- 
the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south l)y 
Beauregarti against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this 
reinforcement a very considerable one — probably not less than fifteen 
thousand men — was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under 
Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia. 

The position of Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was 
difficult to oi)erate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, 
to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure 
what had been gained ; and accordingly, on the 22d, I directed that 
they be sent forward under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, 
to join the Army of the Potomac. 

On the 2-lth of May the Ninth Army-corps, commanded by Major- 
General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, 
and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General 
Meade's command. 

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than 
either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the 26Ui to the 
north bank of the North Anna, and moved via Hanover Town to turn 
the enemy's position by his right. 

Generals Torbert's and Merritt's divisions of cavahy, under Sheri- 
dan, and the Sixth Corps, led the advance, crossed the Paniunkey 
River at Hanover Town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th 
the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement 
with the enemy at Hawes's Shop. On the 29th and 30th we ad- 
vanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court House and 
Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the 
Chiekahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came 
out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable 
loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along 
his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of 
his intrenched skirmish-line. 

On the 31st General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the 
railroad-lu-idges over the South Anna River, after defeating the ene- 
my's cavalry. General Sheridan on the same dayreached Cold Harbor, 
and held it until relieved by the Sixth Corps and General Smith's 
command, which had just arrived, via White House, from General 
Butler's arnl3^ 

On the first day of June an attack was made at 5 r.M. by the Sixth 
Corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being 
held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted 
in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front 
of the right of the Sixth Corps, and in front of General Smith. 
During the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the 
corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy 



APPENDIX 409 

loss in every instance. That niglit he made several assaults to re- 
gain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The 2d was spent in 
getting" troops into position for an attaclv on the 3d. On the 3d of 
June we again assaulted tlie enemy's works, in the hope of driving 
him from his })Osition. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while 
that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was eoniparatively light. 
It was the only general attaek made from the Kapidan to the James 
which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for oui" 
own losses. I would not be understood as saying thtit all previous 
attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much 
as I had hoped f ro2n them ; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe 
losses, which tended in the end to the complete overthrow of the re- 
bellion. 

From the proximity of the enemy to his defenses around Richmond, 
it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him 
and the cit3^ I was still in a condition to either move by his left 
flank, and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my 
move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the 
former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a 
full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would l)e impracti- 
cable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect 
the Fredericksburg raih-(jad — a long, vulnerable line, which would 
exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be 
protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all 
his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea 
from the start had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond, if 
possible ; then, after destroying his lines of communication north 
of the James River, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege 
Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After 
the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed 
it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. 
He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on 
the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of re- 
pulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice 
of life than I was willing to make, all could not he accomplished that 
I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to con- 
tiniie to hold substaiitially the ground we then occupied, taking 
advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present them- 
selves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Clor- 
donsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between 
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and when 
the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the 
James River^ by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off 
all his sources of supply, except by the canal. 

On the 7th two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got 
off on the expedition against the Vu-ginia Central raih-oad, with in- 



410 APPENDIX 

structions to Hunter — wliom I hoped he would meet near Charlottes- 
ville — to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out 
for them was thoroughly done, to join the Ai-my of the Potomac by 
the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions. 

On the 10th of June General Butler sent a force of infantrj^ under 
General Gillmore, and of cavahy under General Kautz, to capture 
Petersbvu'g, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges 
across the Appomattox. The cavahy carried the works on the south 
side, and penetrated well in toward the town, but were forced to re- 
tire. General Gillmore, finding the works which he approached very 
strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda 
Hundi'ed without attempting one. 

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersljurg, I sent 
back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command 
by water via the White House, to reach there in advance of the Ai-my 
of the Potomac. This was for the express' purpose of secui'ing Peters- 
burg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could rein- 
force the place. 

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the 
evening of the 12th. One division of cavalry, under General Wilson, 
and the Fifth Corps, crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and 
moved out to White Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other 
corps. The advance corps reached James River, at Wilcox's Land- 
ing and Charles City Court House, on the night of the 13th. 

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern 
Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had 
fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to 
the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the van- 
tage-ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more 
shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had 
failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they 
had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their 
capital and Southern territory. Hence Antietam, Gettysburg, and all 
the other battles that had been fought, were by them set do^\m as 
failures on our part, and victories for them. Their ai-my believed 
this. It produced a morale which could only be overcome by des- 
perate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, 
Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as 
they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and 
so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offen- 
sive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact 
that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attack- 
ing party ; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. The de- 
tails of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of 
the soldiery have rarely })een surpassed, are given in the report of 
Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. 



APPENDIX 411 

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the 
James River, the army had to be snppHed from an ever-shifting base, 
by wagons, over narrow roads, tlirough a densely wooded eountiy, 
with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently 
discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot, therefore, Ix^ awarded to 
the quartermaster and commissary departments for the z(!al ;ind tiffi- 
ciency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the chief 
quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to 
occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base,' 
and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. 

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah valleys, under 
General Sigel, commenced on the 1st of May. General Crook, who 
had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his 
forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General 
Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell 
struck the Tennessee and Virginia raih-oad, near Wytheville, on the 
lOth, and proceeding to New River and Christiansburg, destroyed the 
road, several important bridges and depots, including New River 
Bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union oh the 15th. Gen- 
eral Sigel moved up the Shenandoah VaUey, met the enemy at New 
Market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated 
with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the 
operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from 
command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede 
him. His instructions were embraced in the followhig despatches 
to Major-General H. W. Halleek, chief of staflP of the army : 

Near Spottsylvania Court House, Virginia, 
May 20, 18G4. 

********* 
The enemy are evidently relying for supphes greatly on such as are 
brought over the branch road running through Staunton, On the whole, 
therefore, I thmk it would be better for General Hunter to move m that 
direction ; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charh>ttesville, if he does 
not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his 

own, he will be doing good service. ... ^r r. ^ 

' U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 

Major-Genekal H. W. Halleck. 

Jericho Ford, Virginm, 

May 25, 1864. 

If Himter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should 
do so living on the country. The raih-oads and canal should be destroyed 
beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his 
wav back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army. 
"^ U. S. Grant, 

lAeutenant- General. 
Major-General H. W. Halleck. 



412 APPENDIX 

General Hiintev immediately took up the offensive, and, moving 
up the iShenaudoali A^alley, met the enemy on the 5th of June at 
Piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, 
capturing on the field of battle fifteen hundi'ed men, three pieces of 
artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. On the 8th of the 
same month he formed a junction with Crook and AvereU at Staun- 
ton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg via Lexington, 
which place he reached and invested on the sixteenth day of June. 
Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of 
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march 
thi'ough a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that, 
to the enemy important, point. The destruction of the enemy's sup- 
plies and manufactories w^as very great. To meet this movement 
under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a 
corps, a part of which readied Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. 
After some skirmishing on tlie 17th and IStli, General Hunter, owing 
to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. 
Unfortunately this want of ammunition left him no choice of route 
for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of 
his troops for several weeks from tlie defense of the North. 

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville instead of 
Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in 
a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, 
should the force lie met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not 
he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, 
on the main line of communication between Lynchburg and the force 
sent for its defense. I have never taken exception to the operations 
of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, 
for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit 
of his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude 
of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the com- 
mendation of his country. 

To return to the Army of the Potomac. The Second Corps com- 
menced crossing the James River on the morning of the 14th by 
ferry-boats at Wilcox's Landing. The laying of the pontoon-bridge 
was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the 
balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and 
ferry. 

Aiter the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to 
Bermuda Hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate 
capture of Petersburg. 

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him 
to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops 
he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. I 
told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, 
hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions 



s 



APPENDIX 413 

as rapidly as it could be done ; that we conld reinforce our armies 
more rapidly there than the enemy could bring- troops against us. 
General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets 
near Petersburg before dnylight next morning, but, for some reason 
that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get 
ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part 
of his command only, he made the assaidt, and carried the lines north- 
east of Petersburg from the Appomattox Kivc^r for a distance of 
over two and a half miles, capturing fiftecm pieces of artillery and 
three hundi-ed prisoners. This was about 7 p.m. Between the line 
thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there 
was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersl)urg with a 
single bi-igade from any source. The night was cleai- — the moon 
shining brightly — and favorable to further operations. General 
Hancock, with two divisions of the Second Corps, reached General 
Smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he 
(Smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he 
naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do 
with the troops. But instead of taking these troops and pusldngat 
once into Petersburg, he recjuested General Hancock to relieve a part 
of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. 

By the time I arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. 
An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the 
troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It required 
until that time for the Ninth Corp^ to get up and into position. The 
attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little 
intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our 
carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to 
the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, 
several pieces of artillery, and over fom* hundred prisoners. 

The Fifth Corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and per- 
sisted in with great vigor on the ITtli and 18th, but only resulted in 
forcing the enemj^ into an interior line, from which he could not be 
dislodged. The advantages of position gained by us were very great. 
The army then proceeded to envelop Petersljurg toward the South 
Side railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications. 

On the 16th the enemy, to reinforce Petersl)urg, withdrew from 
a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, 
no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of 
those withdrawn before we coidd discover it. General Butler, taking 
advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between 
Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advan- 
tage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth 
Corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's 
Landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler at 
Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the 



414 APPENDIX 

importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged 
upon him. 

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back 
to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General 
Wright, with liis two divisions, joined General Butler on the fore- 
noon of the ITtli, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line 
the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the 
enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some 
distance in the rear of his owai line. Between four and five o'clock 
in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re- 
occupied his old line. 

On the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was 
effected by General Butler, with one bi-igade of infantiy, on the iioi'th 
bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge 
with Bermuda Hundred. 

On the 19th General Sheridan, on his retiu'n from his expedition 
against the Virginia Central raih-oad, arrived at the White House just 
as the enemy's cavahy was about to attack it, and compelled it to 
retire. The result of this expedition was that General Sheridan met 
the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station, on tlie morning of the 
11th of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove 
from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his 
wounded in our hands, and about four hundi'ed prisoners and several 
hundred horses. On the 12tli he destroyed the railroad from Trevil- 
lian Station to Louisa Court House. This occupied until 3 p. m., 
when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the 
enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about 
five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. 
On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the ene- 
my's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. 
Night closed the contest. Not having sufficient ammunition to con- 
tinue the engagement, and his annuals being wdthout forage (the 
country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from 
General Hunter, he withdi-ew his command to the north side of the 
North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House 
at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place, 
he moved to the James River, which he reached safely after heavy 
fighting. He commenced crossing on the 25tli, near Fort Powhatan, 
without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac. 

On the 22d General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of 
the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of 
the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south 
of Richmond. Striking the Weldon railroad at Reams's Station, de- 
stroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the South Side 
road about fifteen miles from Petersburg to near Nottoway Station, 
where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. He 



APPENDIX 415 

reached Burkesville Station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from 
there destroyed the Danville raih-oad to Roanoke Bridge, — a distance 
of twenty-five miles, — where he found tlie enemy in force and in a 
position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced 
his retm-n march, and on the 28tli met th(; enemy's cavahy in force 
at the Weldon railroad crossing- of Stony Creek, where he had a severe 
but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a detour from his 
left with a view of reaching Reams's Station (supposing it to be in 
our possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, 
supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artil- 
lery and trains. In this last encounter General Kautz, with a part 
of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. 
General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in cross- 
ing the Nottoway River and coming in safely on our left and rear. 
The damage to the enemy in this expedition moi-e than compensated 
for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad 
with Richmond for several weeks. 

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond 
to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his 
army in the Shenandoah ; and, in the event of faihire in this, to take 
advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to 
explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the Ninth Corps 
and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th 
of July the Second Corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and 
Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James River, 
and joined the force General Butler had there. On the 27th the ene- 
my was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four 
pieces of artillery. On the 28th our hues were extended from Deep 
Bottom to New Market road, but in getting this position were at- 
tacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several 
hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. The first object 
of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown 
there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion 
made, by assaidting Petersburg before he could get his force back 
there. One division of the Second Corps was withdrawn on the 
night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 
Eighteenth Corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be 
foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the 
Second Corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night 
of the 29th and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of 
the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blow- 
ing up a battery and most of a regiment ; and the advance of the as- 
saulting column, formed of the Ninth Corps, immediately took pos- 
session of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some 
distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of 
it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. 



41G APPENDIX 

Had they done this I have everj^ reason to believe that Petersburg 
would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, 
but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to 
rally from his surprise (which had been complete) and get forces to 
this point foi' its defense. The captured line thus held being unten- 
able and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not 
without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to 
be the most successful assault of the campaign. 

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter 
was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha River, thus 
laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland and 
Pennsylvania, he retm-ned northward and moved down that valley. 
As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General 
Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha River, was directed to move 
his troops without delay, by river and raili-oad, to Harper's Ferry ; 
but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and 
breaks in the railroad, great delay was exi)erienced in getting there. 
It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this move- 
ment of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth Corps was taken 
from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added 
the Nineteenth Corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hamp- 
ton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immedi- 
ately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red Ri^^er expedi- 
tion. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time 
made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days' men, and de- 
tachments from the invalid corps. One di\dsiou, under command of 
General Ricketts, of the Sixth Corps was sent to Baltimore, and the 
remaining two divisions of the Sixth Corps, under General Wright, 
were subsequently sent to Washington. On the 3d of July the ene- 
mj^ approached Martinsburg. General Sigel, who was in command 
of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Shepherdstown, 
and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river 
and occuj)ied Maryland Heights. On the 6th the enemy occupied 
Hagerstown, moving a strong colunui toward Frederick City. Gen- 
eral Wallace, with Ricketts's division and his own command, the latter 
mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore 
with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, 
near the crossing of the railroad-bridge. His force was not sufficient 
to ensure success ; but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although 
it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and 
thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with 
two divisions of the Sixth Corps, and the advance of the Nineteenth 
Corps before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washing- 
ton, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the 
10th. On the 12th a reconnaissance was thrown out in front of Fort 
Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skir- 



APPENDIX 417 

iiiish ensued, in wliicli we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed 
and wounded. The enemy's loss was prol)al»ly greater. lie com- 
menced retreating dm-ing the night. Learning the exact condition 
of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraj)h, at forty-five min- 
utes past 11 P.M., on the 12th, the assignment of Major-General H. (1. 
Wright to the command of all the troops that could be nuide avail- 
able to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he 
should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and 
push Early to the last moment. General Wright connnenced the 
pursuit on the 13th ; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at Snick- 
er's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred ; and 
on the 20tli General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of 
the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and 
several huntli'ed prisoners. 

Learning that Early was retreating south toward Lynchburg or 
Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth corps be got 
back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might 
be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops 
sent by him into the Valley ; and that Hunter should remain in the 
Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and 
Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt 
that if the enemy had any notion of i-eturning, the fact would be 
developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth corps could leave Wash- 
ington. Subsequently the Nineteenth Corps was excepted from the 
order to return to the James. 

About the 25 th it became evident that the enemy was again ad- 
vancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth Corps, then 
at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. 
The rebel force moved down the Valley, and sent a raiding party into 
Pennsylvania, which on the 30th burned Chambersburg, and then 
retreated, pursued by our cavahy, toward Cumberland. They were 
met and defeated by General Kelley, and with diminished numbers 
escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the 
first raid the telegraph-wires were frequently down between Wash- 
ington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a 
part of the way by lioat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six 
hours to get despatches through and return answers back ; so that 
often orders would be given, and then information would be received 
showing a different state of facts from those on which they were 
based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that 
must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, 
and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they 
otherwise would have heen. To remedy tins evil it was evident to 
my mind that some person should have the supreme command of aU 
the forces in the Departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susque- 
hanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended. 
Vol. IL— 27 



418 APPENDIX 

On the 2d of August I ordered General Sheridan to report in per- 
son to Major-General HaUeck, chief of staff, at Washington, with a 
view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against 
Early. At this time the enemj' was concentrated in the neighbor- 
hood of Winchester, while ovu- forces, under General Hunter, were 
concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and 
Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western Maryland and 
southern Pennsylvania. From where I was I hesitated to give posi- 
tive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so 
doing I should expose Washington. Therefore on the 4th I left City 
Point to visit Hunter's command and determine for myself what was 
best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with Gen- 
eral Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions : 

Monocacy Bridge, Maryland, 
August 5, 1864, 8 p.m. 

GeneraIi : Concentrate all your available force without delay ia the vicin- 
ity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for 
public property as may be necessary. Use, in this coucentratiug, the rail- 
road, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, it it is found 
that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac m large force, push north, 
following him and attacking him wherever found ; follow him, if driven 
south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained 
that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push 
south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a suf- 
ficient force to look after the raiders and drive them to their homes. In 
detaching such a force, the brigade of cavali'y now en route from Washing- 
ton via Rockville may be taken into account. 

There are now on "their way to join you three other brigades of the best 
cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be 
instructed, in the absence of fiirther orders, to join you by the south side 
of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start to-morrow. In pushing 
up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or 
last, it is desirable that nothing shoidd be left to innate the enemy to return. 
Take all pro^dsions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your comniand ; 
such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings 
should be destroyed — they should rather be protected ; but the people should 
be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences 
of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at aU 
hazards. 

Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south ; and to do tliis, 
you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the 
coirrse he takes. 

Make your own arrangements for supplies of aU kinds, giving regular 
vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the coimtry through 
which you march. 

U. S. Grant, 

Major-General D. Hunter. Lieutenant- General, 

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance 
reached Halltown that night. 



APPENDIX 419 

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willing- 
ness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General 
Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry, by the morn- 
ing train, with orders to take general command of all the trooi)s in 
the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would 
turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy 
until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th ; and after 
a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, 
I retm-ned to City Point by way of Washington. 

On the 7th of August the Middle Department and the Departments 
of West Virginia, Washington, and Susquehanna were constituted 
into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan 
was assigned to temporary command of the same. 

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and 
Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Ai-niy of the Potomac. The 
first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the 11th of August. 

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of 
September were both of an offensive and defensive character, residt- 
ing in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which 
we were generally successfid ; but no general engagement took place. 
The two armies lay in such a position — the enemy on the west bank 
of the Opequan Creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front 
of Berry viUe — that either could bring on a battle at any time. De- 
.feat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and 
Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be inter- 
posed to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated about 
allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally the use of the Baltimore 
and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, which were 
both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessaiy to 
us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from 
continuously threatened invasion so great, that I determined the risk 
should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack 
without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as 
to what would be the ])rol)able result, I left City Point on the IGth 
of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after con- 
ference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charlestown, 
and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay, what he coidd 
do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of 
success, that I saw there were but two words of instruction neces- 
sary — Go in ! For the convenience of forage the teams for sup- 
plying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he 
could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on 
the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was that he could before 
daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here 
add that the result was such that I have never since deemed it neces- 
sary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders. 



420 APPENDIX 

Early on the moruiug of the 19th General Sheridan attacked Gen- 
eral Early at the crossing on the Opequan Creek, and after a most 
sangiiiuary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the even- 
ing, defeated liiui with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from 
Oi)equaii Creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners 
and five pieces of artillery. The euemy rallied, and made a stand in 
a strong position at Fisher's Hill, vi^here he was attacked and again 
defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. Sheridan pursued him 
with great energy through Harrisonbu]'g, Staunton, and the gaps of 
the Blue Ridge. After stripping the upper valley of most of the sup- 
phes and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, 
and took position on the north side of Cedar Creek. 

Having received considerable reinforcements. General Early again 
returned to the Valley, and on the 9th of October his cavalry encoun- 
tered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the 
loss of eleven pieces t)f artillery and three hundred and fifty prison- 
ers. On the night of the 18th the enemy crossed the mountains 
which sej^arate the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the North 
Fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the dark- 
ness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured 
the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back 
with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied be- 
tween Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture General Sheri- 
dan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on 
the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of 
the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in 
turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter 
and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he 
had captm-ed in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped dur- 
ing the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. 
Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this the enemy's 
last attempt to invade the North via the Shenandoah Valley. I was 
now enabled to return the Sixth Corps to the Army of the Potomac, 
and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the 
James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new 
acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him 'to move without 
detaching from his force for that purpose. 

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had 
detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the 
Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second Corps and Gregg's 
division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of Gen- 
eral Butler's army, on the night of the 13th of August, to threaten 
Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from 
sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In 
this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred 
prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and as- 



APPENDIX 421 

certained that but one division (Kershaw's) of the three reputed de- 
tached had gone. 

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist 
this movement, the Fifth C'orps, General Warren conmianding, was 
moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the Weldon raili'oad. 
During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession 
of the road the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was 
each time repidsed with great loss. On th(^ night of the 20th the 
troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock 
and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg. On the 25th the 
Second Corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams's Sta- 
tion destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fight- 
ing a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into 
the hands of the enemy. 

By the 12th of September a branch railroad was completed from 
the City Point and Petei'sljurg raih-oad to the Weldon railroad, en- 
abling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in 
front of Petersburg. 

The extension of our lines across the Weldon railroad compelled 
the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he coidd have but few 
troops north of the James for the defense of Richmond. On the 
night of the 28th the Tenth Corps, Major-General Birney, and the 
Eighteenth Corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General But- 
ler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced 
on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications 
and intrenchments below Chaffin's Farm, known as Fort Harrison, 
captm-ing fifteen pieces of artillery and the New Market road and 
intrenchments. This success was foUowed up by a gallant assault 
upon Fort Gilmer, immediately in front of the Cliaffin Farm fortifi- 
cations, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry 
was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by in- 
fantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unaljle to get 
farther. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening 
to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several 
desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, 
and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the 30th General 
Meade sent out a reconnaissance, with a view to attacking the ene- 
my's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of 
troops to the north side. In this reconnaissance we captured and 
held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the after- 
noon troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were at- 
tacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until 
supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry 
under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great 
loss. 

On the 7th of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north 



422 APPENDIX 

of the James, and di'ove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery — eight or nine pieces. 
This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, 
but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the 13th a reconnais- 
sance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the ene- 
my from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very 
heav}^ loss to us. 

On the 27th the Ai-my of the Potomac, leaving onlj- sufficient men 
to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The 
Second Corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth Corps, with the 
cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of 
Hatcher's Eun, and moved uj) the south side of it toward the South 
Side raih'oad, until the Second Corps and part of the cavalry reached 
the Bo^-dton plank road where it crosses Hatcher's Run. At this 
point we were six miles distant from the South Side railroad, which 
I had hoped by this movement to reach aiul bold. But finding that 
we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place 
presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled 
up and shortened, I determined to withdraw to within oiu' fortified 
line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving 
a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, 
I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved 
out across Hatcher's Run, in the gap l)etween Generals Hancock and 
Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desjDerate at- 
tack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock imme- 
diately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove 
the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old po- 
sition. 

In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstra- 
tion on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the 
Williamsbui'g road, and also on the York River raih-oad. In the 
former he was unsuccessful ; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a 
work, which was afterward abandoned and his forces withdrawn to 
their former positions. 

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and 
Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the 
defense and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for 
crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his de- 
taching an}' considerable force to send south. By the 7th of Febru- 
ary our lines were extended to Hatcher's Run, and the Weldon rail- 
road had been destroyed to Hicksford. 

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the Gth of May, with 
the Armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded re- 
spectively by Generals Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, upon John- 
ston's army at Dalton ; but finding the enemy's position at Buzzard's 
Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPher- 



APPENDIX 423 

son was sent throngb Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas 
and Schofleld threatened it in front and on the north. This move- 
ment was successfnl. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut 
off, fell back to his fortified position at Kesaca, where \w was atta(;ked 
on the afternoon of May 15th. A heavy battle ensued. During the 
night the enemy retreated south. Late on the 17th his rear-guard 
was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. 
The next morning, however, he had again disappeared, lie was vig- 
orously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on tlie 19th, but 
during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these 
operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis's division of 
Thomas's army was sent to Rome, capturing it, with its forts and 
artillery and its valual)le niills and foundries. General Slierman, 
having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in 
motion on the 23d for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult 
pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the 25th the advance, under 
General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him 
back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters 
oceiu-red at this point. The most important was on the 28th, when 
the enemy assaulted General McPlierson at Dallas, but received a 
terrible and liloody repulse. 

On the 4th of June Johnston abandoned his intrenched position at 
New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kenesaw, 
Pine, and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named 
places and concentrate his army on Kenesaw, where, on the 27th, Gen- 
erals Thomas and McPlierson made a determined but unsuccessful 
assaidt. On the night of the 2d of July Sherman commenced moving 
his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d found that 
the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kene- 
saw and retreated across the Chattahoochee. 

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee, to give his men 
rest and get up stores, until the 17tli of July, when he resumed his 
operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of 
the raih-oad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At 
this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of 
the reliel army, and assundng the offensive-defensive policy, made 
several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the 
most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of July. 
About 1 P.M. of this day the brave, accomplished, and nobleJiearted 
Mi^Pherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and com- 
manded the Army of the Tennessee, through this desperate battle 
and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the 26th, 
with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the 
command of a corps or division. 

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Find- 
ing it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after 



424 APPENDIX 

securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved 
his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery 
and Macon roads, to di-aw the enemy from his fortifications. In this 
he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough-and-Ready, 
Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 
2d of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his cam- 
paign. 

About the time of this move the rebel cavalry, under Wheeler, at- 
tempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repiilsed at 
Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to 
McMinn\dlle, Murfreesboro', and Franklin, and was finally driven 
south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired 
in a few days. 

During the partial investment of Atlanta General Rousseau joined 
General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made 
a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its 
branches near Opelika. Cavah-y raids were also made by Generals 
McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman, to cut the remaining raikoad com- 
munication with Atlanta. The fii-st two were successful, the latter 
disastrous. 

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was 
prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements 
and battles dm*ing that memorable campaign will ever be read with 
an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. 

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accom- 
panying it, give the details of that most successfid campaign. 

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track 
raih'oad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This 
passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot 
of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy 
under Forrest, in northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for 
Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to 
make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond 
the possibility of further use. To guard against this dangei', Sher- 
man left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against 
Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who 
commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in com- 
mand of this force to attack him. On the morning of the 10th of 
June General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was 
badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Mem- 
phis, — a distance of about one hundred miles, — hotly pursued by 
the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs 
upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which 
he followed up this success exliausted him, and made a season for 
rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time Major-General A. J. 
Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been 



APPENDIX 



425 



sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on 
their retm-n from Red River, where they had done most excellent 
service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take 
the ofeensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and 
eiTect which has characterized his whole military career. On the 
l-tth of Jidy he met the enemy at Tnpelo, Mississippi, and whipped 
him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss 
was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished 
the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis. 

Dm-ing the months of March and April this same force under 
Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the 24th of March it captured 
Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked 
Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois Volun- 
teers. Colonel Hicks, having but a small force, withdrew to the 
forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove 
him from the place. 

On the 13th of April part of this force, under the rebel General 
Buford, summoned the garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to sm-render, 
but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence, Thirty-fourth New 
Jersey Volunteers, that, being placed there by his government with 
adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, sur- 
render was out of the question. 

On the morning of the same day Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, 
Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavah-y and the 
First Regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. 
The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the after- 
noon, when the enemy carried the works by assault, and, after our 
men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless 
massacre of the garrison. 

On the 14th, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared 
before Paducah, but was again driven o&. 

Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's opera- 
tions, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these 
was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavahy 
he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. 
On the 11th of June thev attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its 
entire garrison. On the i2th he was overtaken by General Burbridge, 
and completelv routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of 
the State. Tliis notorious guerrilla was afterward surprised and 
killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and 
dispersed by General Gillem. 

In the absence of official reports of the commencement of the Red 
River expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the 
troops sent by General Sherman under General A. J. Smith, I am 
unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General 
Smith comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detachment 



426 APPENDIX 

of the Seventeenth Army-corps, left Vicksburg on the 10th of March, 
and reached the designated point on Red River one day earlier than 
that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort de Russy, 
thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle 
in the open field ; bnt, wliile occnpying the enemy with skirmishing 
and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort de Russy, Avliich 
had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison 
— about three hundred and fift}^ men, eleven pieces of artillery, and 
many small arms. Our loss was but slight. On the 15th he pushed 
forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. On the 
21st he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson's HiU, in 
which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and 
fom- pieces of artillery. 

On the 28tli he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the 
rebel General Taylor, at Cane River. By the 26th General Banks 
had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to 
Grand Ecore. On the morning of April 6th he moved from Grand 
Ecore. On the afternoon of the 7th he advanced and met the ene- 
my near Pleasant Hill, and drove him from the field. On the same 
afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, 
but was again compelled to retreat. On the 8th, at Sabine Cross 
Roads and Peach HiU, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, 
captm'ing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of 
transportation and stores. During the night General Banks fell back 
to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the 
enemjr repulsed with great loss. During the night General Banks 
continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to 
Alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of April. Here a serious 
difficulty arose in getting Admii-al Porter's fleet, which accompanied 
the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since 
they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of 
Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his supeiinten- 
dence, wing-dams were constructed, by ^^'llich the channel was con- 
tracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. 

The army evacuated Alexandria on the 14tli of May, after consid- 
erable skii'mishing wdth the enemy's advance, and reached Morganzia 
and Point Coupee near the end of the month. The disastrous termi- 
nation of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered 
impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force 
sufficient to ensure the capture of Mobile. 

On the 23d of March Major-General Steele left Little Rock with 
the Seventh Army-corps, to cooperate with General Banks's expedi- 
tion on the Red River, and reached Arkadelphia on the 28th. On 
the 16th of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined 
near Elkin's ferry, in Washita County, by General Thayer, who had 
marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes^ in which 



APPENDIX 427 

tlie enemy was defeated, Genei-al Steele reaelied Camden, which he 
occupied about the middle of April. 

On learuing- the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks 
on Red River, and the loss of one of his own traius at Mark's Mill, 
in Dallas County, General Steele dcMermiiied to fall back to the 
Arkansas River. He left Camden on the 2()th oi' April, and reached 
Little Rock on the 2d of May. On the oUth of April tlie enemy at- 
tacked him while crossing Saline Rivei- at Jenkins's fei'ry, but was 
repulsed with considerable loss. Oiu' loss was about six huudr(Hl in 
killed, wounded, and prisoners. 

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of 
the "Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed 
to send the Nineteenth Army-corps to join the armies operating 
against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his commaiul to 
such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and 
lines of comnniui(;ations he then occu])ied. 

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops back to Sherman, Gen- 
eral Canby sent a part of it to disperse a foi'ce of the enemy that was 
collecting near the Mississippi River. General Smith met and de- 
feated this force near Lake C'liieot on the 5th of June. Our loss was 
about forty killed and seventy wounded. 

In the latter part of July General Canby sent Major-General Gor- 
don Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate with 
Admiral Farragut against the defenses of Mobile Bay. On the 8th 
of August Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land 
forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned. 

On the 9th Fort Morgan was invested, and after a severe bombard- 
ment surrendered on the 23d. The total captures amounted to four- 
teen hundred and sixty-four prisoners and one hundi*ed and four 
pieces of artillery. 

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General 
Price, with a force of alK)ut ten thousand men, had reached Jack- 
sonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's com- 
mand, then en route from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to 
Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from 
Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General 
Rosecrans's forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was 
entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back, while 
the forces under General Steele, at Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. 
On the twenty-sixth day of September Price attacked Pilot Knob, 
and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the 
Missoiu'i River, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General 
Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, immediately collected 
such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while Gen- 
eral Rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. 

The enemy was broiight to battle on the Big Blue and defeated, 



428 APPENDIX 

with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number 
of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to northern Ai'kansas. 
The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State 
of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by 
him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. 
There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concen- 
trated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached 
Pilot Knob. 

September 20th the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the 
Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the 23d attacked the 
garrison at Athens, consisting of six liuudi-ed men, which capitulated 
on the 24th. Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforce- 
ments arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. 
Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at 
Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on 
the 27th, and on the same day cut the Nashville and Chattanooga 
railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the 30th 
one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before 
Huntsville and summoned the sm-render of the garrison. Receiving 
an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place 
until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and re- 
ceived the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the 
direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked 
it on the afternoon of the 1st of October, but without success. On 
the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely 
repulsed. 

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the 
morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. On the morning of 
the 3d he moved toward Mount Pleasant. While these operations 
were going on, every exertion was made by Ceneral Thomas to de- 
stroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennes- 
see, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi, 

In September an expedition, under General Burbridge, was sent 
to destroy the salt-works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy 
on the 2d of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and 
drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt- 
works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night 
he withdrew his command and returned to Kentucky. 

General Sherman, inmiediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his 
armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations 
for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length 
of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland River, however, which had 
to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. 

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, 
which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became 
known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus 



APPENDIX 429 

enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the 
weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fear- 
fully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive could successfully 
undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. 

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon i-eported 
to the southwest of Atlanta. Bloving far to Sherman's right, he suc- 
ceeded in reaching the raili-oad about Big Shanty, and moved north 
on it. 

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the re- 
mainder of his army fell upon him and di-ove hiju to Gadsden, Ala- 
bama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads 
to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman pro- 
posed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the 
railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows : 

Centreville, Georgia, 

October 10, noon. 

Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa River, 
twelve miles below Rome, boimd west. If he passes over the Mobile and 
Ohio road, liad I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel 
Porter, and leave General Thomas with the troops now in Tennessee, to de- 
fend the State ? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements or- 
dered reach NashviUe. 

W. T. Sherman, 

Major- General. 
Lieutenant-Genkral Grant. 

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, 
I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter : " I will therefore give 
my opinion : that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the 
maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah 
and the river ; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi River, 
and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the 
Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and 
put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and 
Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to com- 
merce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in 
reply to a letter of mine of date September 12th, in answer to a des- 
patch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in 
which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, 
and of the situation in Vii'ginia, etc. 

City Point, Virginia, 
October 11, 1864, 11 a.m. 

Your despatch of October 10th received. Does it not look as if Hood 
was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile 
and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the 
Tennessee River about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to 



430 APPENDIX 

be met and prevented from getting' north of the Tennessee River. If you 
were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would 
be busliwhaeked l)y all the old meu and little boys, and such railroad guards 
as are still left at home. Hood would prolmbly sti'ike for Nashville, think- 
ing that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we 
could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at 
Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your own judgment. 
I find I shall not be able to seud a foi'ce from here to act with you on 
Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine— at 
least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with 
such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going- 
north. "With Wilson turned loose with all your cavalry, you will find the 
rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

Kingston, Georgia, 

October 11, 11 a.m. 

Hood moved his army from Palmetto Station across by Dallas and Cedar- 
town, and is now on the Coosa River, south of Rtjme. He threw one corps 
on my road at Aeworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with 
the Twentieth Corps, and have strong detachuients along my line. This re- 
duces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain 
here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men and the bold 
cavahy he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely pre- 
fer to make a wreck of the road and of the country from Chattanooga to 
Atlanta, including the latter city ; send back all my wounded and worth- 
less, and with my effective army move through Georgia, smashing things, 
to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he 
will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I woidd 
be on the offensive ; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would 
have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per 
cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. 

Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long. 

W. T. "Sherman, 

Major- General. 

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT. 

City Point, Virginia, 

October 11, 1864, 11:30 p.m. 

Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the 
sea-coast can be made, holding the hue of the Tennessee River fii-mly, you 
may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as 
you think best. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman. 

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting tbroiigh 
to the coast, witb a p-nrrison left on the sonthern railroads, leading 
east and west, throngli (leorgin, to effectually sever the East from the 
West ; in other words, cut the would-be Confederacy in two again, 



APPENDIX 431 

as it had been eiit once by our gainino^ possession of tlie Mississippi 
River. General Shernian^'s ])lan virtually cifccted tliis object. _ 

General Sherman connneneed at once his preparations for his pro- 
posed movement, keeping his army in position in the mean time to 
watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward 
from Gadsden across Sand Mountain, (Jeueral Shernum sent the 
Fourth Corps, Major-General Stanley comnuinding, and the Twenty- 
third Corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, l)ack to Chatta- 
nooga to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, ^yhom he 
had'placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save 
the four army-corps and cavalry division he designed to move with 
through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal there 
was little doubt that General Thomas could hold the line of the Ten- 
nessee, or, in the event Hood should fVn-ce it, would ])e able to con- 
centrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented 
to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast. 

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the 14th of Novem- 
ber, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. 
His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather 
his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not im- 
possible that a force inferior to his o^vn might compel him to head 
for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. 
The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and 
sending Hood's army — the only considerable force he had west of 
Richmond and east of the Mississippi River— northward on an of- 
fensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route 
to his own choice. 

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met 
with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, 
the capture of Fort McAlhster oii the Savannah River, and the occu- 
pation of Savannah on the 21st of December, are aU clearly set forth 
in General Sherman's admirable report. 

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, 
two expeditions — one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from 
Vicksburg, Mississippi— were started by General Canby to cut the 
enemy's lines of communication with Mobile and detain troops in 
that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, 
also sent an expedition, via Broad River, to destroy the raih-oad 
between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg 
under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (colonel 
Third United States Colored CWalry), captured on the 27th of No- 
vember, and destroyed, the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and 
trestle-work over Big Black River, near Canton, thirty miles of the 
road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The ex- 
pedition from Baton Rouo-e was without favoral)le results. The ex- 
pedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate 



432 APPENDIX 

command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about 
live tlionsand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, 
proceeded up Broad River and debarked at Boyd's Neck on the 29th 
of November, from where it moved to sti'ike the railroad at Grahams- 
ville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from GrahamsvUle, the 
enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which 
resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven 
hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. During the 
night General Hatch withdrew. On the 6th of December General 
Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah 
railroad between the Coosawhatchie and Tulifinny rivers. 

Hood, instead of following Sherman, continued his move north- 
ward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all 
events, had I had the power to command both armies, I slioidd not 
have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On 
the 26th of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garri- 
son at Decatur, Alabama, but, failing to carry the place, withdrew 
toward Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in efi'ect- 
ing a lodgment on the north side of the Tennessee River, near Flor- 
ence. On the 28th Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, 
and captured a gunboat and three trausjiorts. On the 2d of Novem- 
ber he planted batteries above and below Johnson ville, on the oppo- 
site side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. 
On the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was 
replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats, be- 
coming disabled, were set on fire, as also were the transports, to pre- 
vent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and 
a half dollars' worth of stores and jjroperty on the levee and in store- 
houses was consumed by fii"e. On the 5tli the enemy disappeared 
and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee River, above Johnson- 
ville, moving toward Clifton, and sulisequently joined Hood. On 
the night of the 5th General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty- 
third Corps, reached Johnson ville ; but, finding the enemy gone, was 
ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with 
instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, 
but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of Genei'al 
A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could' 
get his cavalry remounted. 

On the 19th General Hood continued his advance. General Thom- 
as, retarding him as much as possible, fell back toward Nashville for 
the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the 
arrival of reinforcements. The enemy, coming up with our main 
force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the 30th, as- 
saulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, 
but was in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one 
thousand seven hundred and fifty killed^ seven hundred and two 



APPENDIX 



433 



prisoners, and three tliousaiid eight hundred wounded. Among his 
losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. 
Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first 
serious opposition the enemy met with, and, I am satisfied, was the 
fatal blow to all his expectations. During the niglit General Scho- 
field fell back toward Nashville. This left the field to the enemy,— 
not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned, — so that General Thom- 
as's whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed 
up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nash- 
ville on the 2d of December. 

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was crossing the Tennes- 
see River, and that Price was going out of Missouri, Genertd Rose- 
crans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General 
A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. 
The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the 30th of 
November. 

On the morning of the loth December General Thomas attacked 
Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and 
drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our 
hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including 
four general officers. 

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it 
appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was in- 
creased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavahy 
across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross 
his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urghig upon 
General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the ofeensive, 
I started West to superintend matters there in person. Reaching 
Washington city, I received General Thomas's despatch announcing 
his attack upon the enemy, and the residt as far as the battle had 
progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dis- 
pelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immedi- 
ate! v upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he 
had^^time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and 
given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which 
delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracti- 
cable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood 
was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that dis- 
tinguished officer's judgment. 

After Hood's defeat at Nash\ille he retreated, closely pursued by 
cavahy and infantry, to the Tennessee River, being forced to aban- 
don many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the 
28th of Deeend^er our advanced forces ascertained that he had made 
good his escape to the south side of the river. 

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and 
North Alaliama, making it difficult to move army transportation and 
Vol. II.— 28 



434 APPENDIX 

. artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at 
the Tennessee River. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. 
Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania Voluuteers, continued to follow Hood 
for some distance, capturing" considerable transportation and the ene- 
my's pontoon-bridge. The details of these operations will be found 
clearly set forth in General Thomas's report. 

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started 
from Memphis on the 21st of December. On the 25th he surprised 
and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississijipi, on 
the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the raih-oad, sixteen cars 
loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, fom- thousand 
new English carbines, and large amounts of public stores. On the 
morning of the 28th he attacked and cnptured a force of the enemy 
at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars. Thence turning 
to the southwest, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, 
destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and 
the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicks- 
burg January 5th. 

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a 
force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the 
13th of November he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, 
capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with 
what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following 
up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew 
on the 18th, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of 
General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of 
Generals Bm-bridge and Gillem near Bean's Station, to operate against 
Breckinridge and destroy or drive him into Virginia ; destroy the 
salt-works at Saltville, and the raih-oad into Virginia as far as he 
could go without endangering his command. On the 12th of Decem- 
ber he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the ene- 
my's forces wherever he met them. On the Ifith he struck the enemy, 
under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to 
Wytheville, capturing aU his artillery, trains, and one hundred and 
ninety-eight prisoners ; and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and 
supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to 
Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other 
troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He 
at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning ; but morn- 
ing found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, 
and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount 
of stores, and captui-ed eight pieces of artillery. Having thus suc- 
cessfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge 
to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville. 

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast 
port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad and 



APPENDIX 435 

send cotton and other products out l)y blockadc-riiiniers, besides 
being a place of great strategic; value. Tlie navy had been making 
strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only 
partial effect. The nature of the outlc^t of Cnpe Fear Kiver was such 
that it rec|uired watching for so great a distauce that, witliout posses- 
sion of the land north of New Inlet, oi" Fort Fisher, it was impossible 
for the navy to entii'ely close the harbor against the entrance of 
blockade-runners. 

To secure the possession of this land required the (jooperatiou of 
a land force, which I agreed to furnish. Immediately commenced the 
assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the 
juost formidal)le armada ever collected for concentration upon oue 
given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the em;my, 
as well as that of the loyal North ; and through the imprudence of the 
public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, 
the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common dis- 
cussion in the newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus 
warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the ex- 
pedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called 
upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I agreed 
to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company 
with Major-Gen eral Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a con- 
ference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of 
starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men v.as regarded 
as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but 
it was tlKJuglit all would be ready by the 6th of December, if not 
before. Learning, on the 30th of November, that Bragg had gone 
to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about V/ibnington, I 
deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach 
its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General But- 
ler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General 
Weitzel, who had been designated to command the .land forces, so 
that the navy might not be detained one moment. 

On the 6th of December the following instructions were given : 

City Point, Virginia, 

December 6, 1864. 

General: The first object of the expedition under General "Weitzel is to 
close to the enemy the port of Wilmington, If successful in this, the sec- 
ond will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds 
to hope for success, il: advantaj^e can be taken of the absence of the gTeatcr 
part of the enemy's forces, now looking after Sherman in Geoi-gia. The 
dii'ections you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedi- 
tion are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark 
and the amount of intrenching--tools to bo taken. Tlie object of tfte expe- 
dition wiU be gained by effecting a landing- on the mainland between Cax)e 
Fear River and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. 



436 APPENDIX 

Shoiild sueli landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher 
and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should 
intrench themselves, and, by cooperating with the navy, effect the reduction 
and captm-e of those places. These in our hands, the navy coiild enter the 
harbor, and the port of Wdming-ton woidd be sealed. Should Fort Fisher 
and the point of laud on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops 
imniediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wil- 
mington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining 
the first object of the expedition, the second wUl become a matter of after- 
consideration. 

The details for execution are intrusted to you and the of&cer immediately 
in command of the troops. 

Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or 
near Fort Fisher, they wUl be retui-ned to the armies operating against 
Richmond without delay. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-General B. F. Butler. 

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were 
taken for this enterprise, and the territory witliin which they were to 
operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions 
should g'o through him. The_y were so sent ; but General Weitzel has 
since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing in- 
structions, nor was he aware of their existence until he read General 
Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my 
indorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General 
Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got 
off from Bermuda Hundi-ed, and then did not dream but that General 
Weitzel had received all the instructions and would be in command. 
I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a de- 
sire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The 
expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting 
the loading of the powder-boat. 

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without 
any delay, with or ^vithout the powder-boat, had been urged upon 
General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter. 

The expedition finally got off on the 13th of December, and arrived 
at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the 
evening of the 15th. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the 
18th, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. 
The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the 
supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet 
put back to Beaufort to replenish ; this, with the state of the weather, 
delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. The 
powder«boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the 
return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from 
the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy 



APPENDIX 437 

were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion nntil they 
were informed by the Northern press. 

On the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a 
reconnaissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up 
toward the fort. But before receiving a fidl report of the result of 
this reconnaissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instruc- 
tions given, ordered the reembarkation of the troops and the return 
of the expedition. The reembarkation was accomplished by the 
morning of the 27th. 

On the return of the expedition, officers and men — among them 
Brevet Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) N. M. Curtis, 
First Lieutenant G. W. Ross, One Hundred and Seventeenth Regi- 
ment New York Volunteers, First Lieutenant William H. Walhng and 
Second Lieutenant George Simpson, One Hundred and Forty-second 
New York Volunteers — voluntarily reported to me that when recalled 
they were nearly into the fort, and, in their oj)inion, it could have 
been taken without much loss. 

Soon after the return of the expedition I received a despatch from 
the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, inform- 
ing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the 
conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. 
The natural supposition with me was that when the troops abandoned 
the expedition the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, how- 
ever, I answered on the oOtli of December, advising Admiral Porter 
to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt 
to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now 
Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops 
composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with 
the addition of a small brigade, numbering about fifteen hundred, 
and a small siege-train. The latter it was never found necessary 
to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition 
the following instructions : 

City Point, Virginia, 

January 3, 1865. 

General : The expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted 
out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, North Carolina, and Wil- 
mington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will then proceed with as little 
delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear River, and report 
the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should 
exist between yoru-seU! and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, 
that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to 
be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be 
imity of action. It would be weU to have the whole programme laid down 
in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely 
on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would 



438 APPENDIX 

therefore defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibiU- 
ties. The first object to be attained is to get a hrm position on tlie spit of 
land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that 
fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, 
and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any 
of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, 
the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accom- 
plished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. 

My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a 
portion of then* fleet into Cape Fear River, whUe the balance of it operates 
on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or ciit it off from 
supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. _ 

A siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in 
readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn 
from Beaufort as you need them. 

Keep the fleet of vessels with you until yoiu- position is assured. When 
you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can 
spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders. 

In ease of failure to effect a landing, hving your command back to Beau- 
fort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will 
not debark at Beaufort until so directed. 

General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Balti- 
more and place them on sea-going tessels. These troops will be broiight 
to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. 
Should you require them, they will be sent to you. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Brevet Major-General A. H. Terry. 



Lieutenaut-Colonel C. B. Comstoek, aide-de-camp (now brevet briga- 
dier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, 
in orders, as chief engineer to this. 

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially 
from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance 
was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left 
entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. 

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the 6th, 
arriving at the rendezvous off Beaufort on the 8th, where, owing to 
the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, 
when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. 
Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops com- 
menced on the morning of the 13th, and by 3 p.m. was completed 
without loss. On the 14th a reconnaissance was pushed to witbin 
five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance- work taken 
possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt 
that might be made from the fort. This reconnaissance disclosed 
the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the 
navy fire. In the afternoon of the ir)th the fort was assaulted, and 
after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison 



APPENDIX 439 

and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the 
navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our 
loss was : killed, one hundred and ten ; wounded, five hundred and 
tliirty-six. On the IGth and 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up 
Fort Caswell and the works on Smith's Island, which were immedi- 
ately occupied l)y us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of 
the Cape Fear River. 

At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major- 
(leneral E. O. C. Ord assigned to the Department of Virginia and 
North Carolina. 

The defense of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the 
force which had beaten and nearly desti-oyed the only army now 
threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for (Gen- 
eral Thomas's surplus troops — fields from which they would coiiper- 
ate with other movements. General T]i<>mas was therefore directed 
to collect all troops not essential to hold his communications at East- 
nort in readiness for orders. On the 7th of January General Thomas 
was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from 
Corinth, to send General Schofield with his corps east with as little 
delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and 
the advance of the corps reached Washington on the 23d of the same 
month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and New Berne. On the 
26th he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a 
division of cavalry to report to General Canity. By the 7th of Febru- 
ary the whole force was en route for its destination. 

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military de- 
partment, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed 
under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following instruc- 
tions were given him : 

City Point, Virginia, 

January 31, 18G5. 

GeneraIi : , . . Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sher- 
man's tliroucfh the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to 
be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objec- 
tive point, moving" either from Wilming'ton or New Berne, or both, as you 
deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance 
on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast — 
as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The entei-prise 
under you has two objects : the first is to give General Sherman material 
aid, if needed, in his march north ; the second, to open a base of suppUes 
for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can detei-mine 
which of the two points, Wilmington or New Berne, you can best use for 
throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation 
of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty 
thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and 
protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I be- 
lieve General Palmer has received some instructions direct from General 
Sherman on the subject of seciiring supplies for his army. You will learn 



440 APPENDIX 

what steps he has taken, and be governed in your reqmsitions accordingly. 
A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. 

Make aU requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in 
the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by eveiy opportu- 
nity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to 
Fortress IMonroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. 

The supphes referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those re- 
quired for your own command. 

The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your impera- 
tive duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid 
Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting 
for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The 
details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I 
would urge, however, if I did not know that yoii are ah'eady fullj' alive to 
the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the 
neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of February ; 
this hmits youi- time very materially. 

If rolling-stock is not seciu'ed in the capture of Wilmington, it can be 
supphed from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already 
been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Foi^t Fisher in a day 
or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph. 

U. S. Grant, 
lAeutenan t- Genera I. 

Major-General J. M. Schofield. 

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, 
accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for my- 
self the condition of things, and personally conferring with General 
Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done. 

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah, — his 
army entu'cly foot-loose. Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, 
the Southern raih"oads destroyed, so that it would take several months 
to reestablish a through line from west to east, and regarding the 
capture of Lee's army as the most important operation toward clos- 
ing the rebellion, — I sent orders to General Sherman, on the 6tli of 
December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with neces- 
sary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by 
water to City Point with the lialance of his command. 

On the 18th of December, having received information of the de- 
feat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, 
owing to the great difficulty of procming ocean transportation, it 
would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and 
doubting whether he might not contribute as much toward the de- 
sired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that 
effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. 
A few days after this I received a communication from General Sher- 
man, of date 16th December, acknowledging the receipt of my order 
of the 6th, and informiug me of his preparations to carry it into 
effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had ex- 



APPENDIX 



441 



pected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, 
South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me ; but 
that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savan- 
nah, whereas by sea he could probal)ly reach me by the middle of 
January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of bemg able 
to march up and join me pleased me, and without waiting for a reply 
to my letter of the 18th, I directed him, on the 28th of December, to 
make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break 
up the railroads in North and South Carohna, and join the armies 
operatino- against Richmond as soon as he could. 

On the 2ist of January I informed General Sherman that I had 
ordered the Twenty-third Corps, Major- General Schofield command- 
ing, east ; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men ; that 
we had at Fort Fisher al)out eight thousand men; at New Berne 
about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captm-ed General 
Schofield would go there ; if not, he would be sent to New Berne ; that 
in either event all the surplus force at both points would move to 
the interior toward Goldsboro', in cooperation mth his movement ; 
that from either point railroad communication could be run out ; ' 
and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came 
into communication with them. 

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to 
reduce Wilmington, North Carohna, in cooperation with the navy 
under AdmirarPorter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape 
Fear River. Fort Anderson, the enemy's' main defense on the west 
bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the ene- 
my having evacuated it after our appearance before it. 

After fi'ghting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered Wilmington 
on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated toward Golds- 
boro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a move- 
ment on Goldslioro' in two columns,— one from Wilmington, and the 
other from New Berne, — and to repair the railroad leading there from 
each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear River, 
toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from New 
Berne was attacked on the 8th of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven 
back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the 11th the 
enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was 
repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. On the 
14th the Neuse River was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the 
21st Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached 
Cox's Bridge, on the Neuse River, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the 

22d. 

By the 1st of February General Sherman's whole army was in mo- 
tion" from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the 
17th ; thence moved on Goldslwro', Nortli Carohna, via Fayetteville, 
reaching the latter place on the 12th of March, opening up communi- 



442 APPENDIX 

cation with General Scliofield by way of Cape Fear River. On the 
15th he resumed his march on Goldsboro', He met a force of the 
eueniy at xVverysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and com- 
pelled it to retreat. Our loss in this engagement was about six huu- 
di'ed. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the 18th the com- 
bined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance 
at Bentonville, capturing three guns and diiving it back upon the 
main body. General Slocum, vv^ho was in the advance, ascertaining 
that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his 
troops on the defensive, intrenched himself, and awaited reinforce- 
ments, which were pushed forward. On the night of the 21st the 
enemy retreated to Smitlrfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our 
hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsljoro', which place 
had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the 
Neuse River ten miles above there, at Cox's Bridge, where General 
Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon -bridge on the 22d), 
thus forming a junction with the columns from New Berne and Wil- 
mington. 

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of 
Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the 
night of the 17th of Februarv, and occupied by our forces on the 
18th. 

On the morning of the 31st of January General Thomas was di- 
rected to send a cavalry expedition, under Genex'al Stoneman, from 
East Tennessee, to penetrate South Carolina well down toward Co- 
lumbia, to destroj^ the railroads and military resoiu'ces of the country, 
and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, 
North Carolina, releasing our prisoners tliere, if possible. Of the 
feasibility of this latter, however. General Stoneman was to judge. 
Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention 
of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution 
of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this 
expedition (and Sherman ha,ving passed out of the State of South 
Carolina), on the 27th of February I directed General Thomas to 
change his course and ordered liim to repeat his raid of last fall, de- 
stroying the railroad toward Lynchburg as far as he could. This 
would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the 
enemy. I regarded it not impossil)le that in the event of the enemy 
being driven from Richmond he might fall back to Lynchburg and 
attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the 14th of Feb- 
ruary the following communication was sent to General Thomas : 

City Point, Virginia, 

February 14, 1865. 

General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against Moliilc^ 
and the interior "of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thou- 



APPENDIX 443 

sand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to 
Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavab-y 
ah-eady in that section, will move from tlu-re eastward, ui cooperation. 
Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave 
it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeiit, and now by the 
withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion 
of the infantry has' been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond 
papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since, in a 
speech, that one half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose 
Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement 
will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your 
standpoint easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much 
of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. 
The object "would be threefold : Jirst, to attract as much of the enemy's force 
as possible, to insui-e success to Canby ; second, to destroy the enemy's hue 
of communications and military resom-ces ; thkd, to destroy or capture 
their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selraa would probably 
be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not 
be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Dis- 
cretion shoidd be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, 
according to the information he may receive, he will best seciu-e the objects 

named above. 

Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what 
number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand 
men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable 
that' you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksbui;g has 
been 'three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will 
start, but will inform you by telegi'aph as soon as I learn. If you should 
hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the in- 
formation received. 

To insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-tram as 
possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the 
number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra 
teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less 

than eight horses. , « .i,- i 

Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what torce you thmk 
vou will be able to se'nd under these directions. 
^ U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 

Major-General G. H. Thomas. 

On the 15th he was directed to start the expedition as soon after 
the 20th as he could get it off. 

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement 
of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications 
with the city north of Janies River should be cut off. The enemy 
having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valh-y 
and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from Richmond, and desir- 
ing to reinforce Sherman, if practical)le, whose cavalry was greatly 
inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a 
move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish 



444 APPENDIX 

the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore 
telegraphed General Sheridan as follows : 

City Point, Virginia, 

February 20, 1865, 1 p.m. 

General : As soon as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no 
difficulty about reachino- Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From 
there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every du'ection, so as to 
be of no further use to tlie rebelhon. Suflicient cavalry slioidd be left be- 
hind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you 
might get there wotdd justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams 
in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General 
Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East 
Tennessee under Stoneman, numbering four or five thousand cavalry, one 
from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand eavahy, one from 
Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile Bay, with 
about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these thi-ee latter pushing for 
Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating 
out the \dtals of South Carolina, is all that Avill be wanted to leave nothing 
for the rebeUion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great ob- 
stacles to aceomphsh this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-General p. H. Sheridan. 

On the 25th I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inqnir- 
ing where Sherman was aiming for, and if I conld give him definite 
information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this 
side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer the following telegram 
was sent him : 

City Point, Virginia, 

February 25, 1865. 

General : Sherman's movements wiU depend on the amount of opposi- 
tion he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly 
have to fall back to Georgetown, South Carolina, and tit out for a new 
start. I think, however, ah danger for the necessity of going to that point 
has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville 
on his way to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be 
guided m youi" after-movements by the information you obtain. Before 
you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from 
Goldsboro' toward Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one 
or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his 
army to Wilmington or New Berne. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-General p. H. Sheridan. 

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the 27th of February 
with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. 



APPENDIX 445 

On the 1st of March he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted 
to destroy, across the middle fork of tlie Shenandoah, at Moimt Craw- 
ford, and entered Staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated 
on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he 
found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General 
Early. Without stopping to make a reconnaissance, an immediate 
attack was made, tlie position was carried, and sLxteen hundred pris- 
oners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, 
two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seven- 
teen battle-flags were captiu-ed. The prisoners, under an escort of 
fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Win(*hester. Thence he 
marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and 
bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. Here he 
remained two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and 
Lyncldjurg, including the large iron bridges over the north and 
south forks of the Rivanua River, and awaited the arrival of his 
trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of cap- 
turing Lynchburg. On the morning of the Gth, cUviding his force 
into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched np 
the James River Canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in 
many places the l)ank of the canal. From here a force was pushed 
out from this column to Duguidsville, to ol)tain possession of the 
bridge across the James River at that place, but failed. The enemy 
burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge 
across the river at Hardwicksville. The other cohmin moved down 
the railroad toward Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Andierst 
Court House, sixteen miles from L.ynchburg ; thence across the coun- 
try, uniting w^ith the column at New Market. The river being very 
high, his pontoons would not reach across it ; and the enemy having 
destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and 
get on the South Side railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to 
Appomattox Court House, the only thing left f(n- him was to return 
to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he 
chose the latter. From New Market he took up his hue of march, 
following the canal toward Richmond, destroying every lock upon it 
and cutting the l)anks wherever practical)le, to a point eight miles 
east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the 
10th. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts informa- 
tion of his whereabouts and 'purposes, and a request for supplies to 
meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the 12th. 
An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White 
House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a 
direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland Station, he crossed 
the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles 
of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to 
White House, which place he reached on the 19th. 



446 APPENDIX 

Previous to this tlie following communication was sent to General 
Thomas : 

City Point, Virginia, 
March 7, 1865, 9:30 a.m. 

General : I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad 
in East Tennessee and thi'ow a good force up to Bidl's Gap and fortify there. 
Supphes at Knoxville coidd always be got forward as required. With BuU's 
Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about aU of East Tennessee, and 
be prepared, if it should be requiied of you La the spi'ing, to make a cam- 
paign toward Lynchburg- or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman 
shoidd break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut 
oft' rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-Gteneral G. H. Thomas. 

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Caiiby M^as mov- 
ing an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it 
under General Dick Taylor ; Thomas was pushing out two large aud 
well-appointed cavalry expeditions — one from Miudle Tennessee, 
under Brevet Major-General Wilson, against the enemy's vital points 
in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee, under Major-General 
Stoneman, toward Lynchburg — and assembling the remainder of his 
available forces, preparatory to connneiiee offensive operations from 
East Tennessee ; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House ; 
the Armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, 
under Lee, in his defenses of Richmond and Petersburg; General 
Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of General Schofield, 
was at Goldsboro' ; General Pope was making preparations for a 
spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, 
west of the Mississippi ; and General Hancock was concentrating a 
force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against inva- 
sion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. 

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter 
roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at White House. At this 
time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the 
enemy would leave his strong lines about Petersburg and Richmond 
for the purpose of uniting with Johnston, liefore he was driven from 
them by battle, or I was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. On 
the 24tli of March General Sheridan moved from White House, 
crossed the James River at Jones's Landing, and formed a junction 
with the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg on the 27th. 
During this move General Ord sent forces to cover the crossings of 
the Chickahominy. 

On the 24th of March the following instructions for a general 
movement of the armies operating against Richmond were issued : 



APPENDIX 



447 



City Point, Virginia, 
March 24, 1865. 

General: On the 29th instant the armies operating against Richmond 
wiU be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turnmg the enemy out 
of his present position around Petersburg, and to insure the success ot the 
cavalry under General Sheridan, which will start at the same tirae, in its 
efforts to reach and destroy the South Side and Danville raih-oads. two 
corps of the Anny of the Potomac will be moved at first m two columns, 
taking the two roads crossing Hatcher's Run, nearest where the present 
line lield by us strikes that stream, both moving toward Dmwiddie Court 

House. . , 1 T • • 1 

The cavalry under General Sheridan, joined by the di\asion now luicler 
General Davies, will move at the same time by the Weldou road and the 
Jerusalem plank road, turnmg west from the latter before crossing the 
Nottoway, and west with the whole column before reachmg Stony Creek. 
General Sheridan wUl then move independently, imder other instructions 
which wall be given him. All dismounted cavalry belonging to the Army 
of the Potomac, and the dismounted cavah-y from the Middle Military Divi- 
sion not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, 
will report to Brigadier-General Benham, to be added to the defenses ot 
City Point. Major-General Parke will be left in command of all the army 
left for holding the Imes about Petersburg and City Point, subject, of eoui-se, 
to orders from the commander of the Ai-my of the Potomac. The Ninth 
Army-corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as 
the whole line now occupied bv us is held. If, however, the troops to the 
left of the Ninth Corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be 
thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the 
captui'e of the Weldon road. All troops to the left of the Ninth Corps will 
be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may 
be desiguiited when the order is given. 

General Ord Avill detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so 
much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the pres- 
ent left of the Anny of the Potomac. In the absence of further orders, or 
until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column 
of the Army of the Polomac, and the colored division the right column. 
During the movement Major-General Weitzel will be left in command of 
all the forces remaining behind from the Army of the James. 

The movement of troops from the Ai-my of the James will commence on 
the night of the 27th instant. General Ord will leave behind the minimum 
number of cavalrv necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the mam 
army. A cavalry expedition, from General Ord's command, will also be 
started from Suffolk, to leave there on Saturday, the 1st of Aprd, under 
Colonel Sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad aljout Hicksford. 
This, if accompUshed, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three 
to five hundred men will be sufficient. They should, however, be supported 
by all the infantry that can be spared from Norfolk and Portsmouth, as far 
out as to where the cavalry crosses the Blackwater. The crossing should 
probably be at Uniten. Should Colonel Sumner succeed m reaching the 
Weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the 
triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and Gaston. The railroad- 
bridge at Weldon being fitted up for the passage of caiTiages, it might be 



448 APPENDIX 

practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have 
collected south of the Roanoke. All the troops will move with four days' 
rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. To avoid as much haid- 
ing as possible, and to give the Army of the James the same number of 
days' suppUes with the Army of the Potomac, General Ord will direct his 
commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the 
terminus of the road to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds of aminunition per 
man wiU be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on 
hand will carry, after taking the specified amomit of other supphes. The 
densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use 
of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army wiU be 
reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army 
commanders. 

All necessary preparations for can-ying these directions into operation 
may be commenced at once. The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be 
massed as much as possible. While I would not now order an uncondi- 
tional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should 
make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their fi'ont, without wait- 
ing for orders. In case they carry the line, then the whole of the Ninth 
Corps could follow up so as to Join or cooperate with the balance of the 
army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps will have rations issued to 
them, same as the balance of the army. General Weitzel will keep vigilant 
watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at 
any point, he will do so. A success north of the James should be followed 
up with great promptness. An attack will not be feasible unless it is found 
that the enemy has detached largely. In that case it may be regarded as 
evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for 
the defense of Eichmond. Preparations may be made for abandoning all 
the line north of the James, except inclosed works — only to be abandoned, 
however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. 

By these instructions a large part of the armies operating against Rich- 
mond is left behind. The enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, 
strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being 
taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and re- 
turn. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops 
left in the trenches not to allow this to occm' without taking advantage of 
it. The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might 
be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. 
I would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case 
of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders 
from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that 
they will move promptly, and notify the commander of theii- action. I 
would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders 
when other parts of their corps are engaged. In like manner, I would urge 
the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 

Major-Genekals Meade, Ord, and Sheridan. 

Early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assanlted onr lines in 
front of the Ninth Corps (which held from the Appomattox River 
toward oiu" left), and carried Fort Stedman and a part of the line to 



APPENDIX 449 

the right and left of it, established themselves, and tnrned the guns 
of the fort against us ; but oiu- troops on either flank held their 
ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was 
driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded and nine- 
teen hundred prisoners. Our loss was sixty-eight killed, three 
hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six miss- 
ing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and 
feel the enemy in their respective fronts. Pushing forward, they 
captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in 
front of the Second and Sixth corps, and eight hundred and thirty- 
four prisoners. The enemy made desperate attempts to retake this 
line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was fifty-two 
killed, eight hundi-ed and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and 
seven missing. The enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far 
greater. 

General Sherman, having got his troops all quietly in camp about 
Goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them per- 
fected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that 
he woidd be ready to move, as he had previously wi-itten me, by the 
10th of April, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it 
should become necessary to bring his command to bear against 
Lee's army, in cooperation with oui- forces in front of Richmond and 
Petersburg. General Shennan proposed in this movement to threaten 
Raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the Roan- 
oke at Gaston or thereabouts, whence lie coidd move on to the Rich- 
mond and Danville raih-oad, striking it in the vicinity of Burkesville, 
or join the armies operating against Richmond, as might be deemed 
best. This plan he was directed to carry into execution if he received 
no further directions in the mean time. I explained to him the move- 
ment I had ordered to commence on the 29th of March ; that if it 
should not prove as entirely successfid as I hoped, I would cut the 
cavalry loose to destroy the Danville and South Side raih-oads, and 
thus deprive the enemy of further supphes, and also to prevent the 
rapid concentration of Lee's and Johnston's armies. 

I had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the 
report that the enemy had retreated the night beiore. I was thiidy 
convinced that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke would be the signal 
for Lee to leave. With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, 
and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might be- 
come necessary. By moving out I woidd put the army in better con- 
dition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Dan- 
ville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of Lee and 
Johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he 
might otherwise save. I therefore determined not to delay the 
movement ordered. 

On the night of the 27th Major-General Ord, with two divisions 
Vol. II.— 29 



450 APPENDIX 

of the Twenty-fonrtli Corps, Major-General Gibbon commanding, and 
one division"^of the Twenty-Mth Corps, Brigadier-General Birney 
commanding-, and Mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in 
pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position as- 
signed liim near Hatcher's Run on the morning of the 29th. On the 
28th the following instructions were given to General Sheridan : 

City Point, Vieginia, 

Marcli 28, 1865. 

General : The Fifth Army-corps will move by the Vaughn road at 3 a.m. 
to-moiTOW morning. The Second moves at about 9 a.m., having but about 
three lailes to march to reach the point desigTiated for it to take ou the right 
of the Fifth Corps, after the latter reaching Dinwiddle Court House, Move 
your cavalry at as early an hour as you cau, and without being confined to 
any particidar road or roads. You may go out by the nearest roads in rear 
of 'the Fifth Corps, pass by its left, aud passing near to or through Dm- 
widdie, reach the right aud rear of the enemy as soon as you can. It is 
not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to 
force him out, if possible. Shoukl he come out and attack us, or get him- 
self where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in yom- own 
way, and with the full reliance that the army wiU engage or follow, as cir- 
cumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able 
to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy 
keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose aud push for the 
DanviUe road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the 
South Side road, between Petersburg and Burkesville, and destroy it to 
some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, untd you reach 
the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomat- 
tox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possi- 
ble. You can then pass on to the South Side road, west of Burkesville, and 
desti'oy that in like manner. , 

After having accomphshed the destruction of the two radroads, which 
are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this 
army, selecting your road farther south, or you may go on into North Caro- 
lina" and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get 
the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to 

meet vou at Goldsboro'. 

U. S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- General. 
Major-General P. H. SHERn)AN. 

On the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. At night 
tlie cavah-y was at Dimviddie Court House, and the left of our hi- 
fantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with 
the Boydton plank road. The position of the troops from left to 
right was as follows : Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, 
Parke. 

Everything looked favoralde to the defeat of the enemy and the 
capture of Petersburg and Eiclimond, if the proper effort was made. 
I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheri- 



APPENDIX 451 

clan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for 
the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me 
to do so : 

Gravelly Creek, March 29, 1865. 

General : Qui* line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddle. 
We are all ready, however, to crive up all, from the Jerusalem plank road to 
Hatcher's Run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After 
getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's 
position. General GriflS.n was attacked near where the Quaker road inter- 
sects the Boydton road, but repidsed it easily, capturing about one hunch'ed 
men, Humphi'eys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing on when last 
heard from. 

I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going 
back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's 
roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and 
get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of 
course, modify your action. We will act altogether as one army here, until 
it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal-of&eer at Cobb's 
Hill reported, at half-past 11 a.m., that a cavahy column had passed that 
point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. 

U. S. Grant, 
Ideutenant- General. 

Major-General p. H. Sheridan. 

From the night of the 29tli to the morning of the 31st the rain 
fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled 
vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During 
the 30th Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddle C-ourt House toward 
Five Forks, where he found the enemy in full force. General War- 
ren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank road 
to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter ; 
but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his 
left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. General 
Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on 
the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and Parke 
made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of 
an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. 
The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Kichmond 
to our extreme left, I conceived his Hues must be weakly held, and 
could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I de- 
termined, therefore, to extend oiir line no farther, but to reinforce 
General Sheridan with a corps of infantrj*, and thus enable him to cut 
loose and turn the enemy's riglit flank, and with the other corps as- 
sault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the ene- 
my the week before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly 
favored this. The enemy's intrenched picketdine cai)tured by us at 
that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together 
at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. 



452 APPENDIX 

Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys's 
corps, to report to General Sheridan ; but the condition of the roads 
prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the olst Gen- 
eral Warren reported favorably to getting possession of tlie White 
Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this, he moved 
with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by 
the enemy in superior force and driven back on the second division 
before it had time to form, and it in turn forced back upon the third 
division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second 
Corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back 
with heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak road gained. 
Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavahy got possession 
of the Five Forks ; but the enemy, after the affair with tlie Fifth 
Corps, reinforced the rebel cavahy, defending that point with infan- 
try, and forced him back toward Dinwiddie Court House. Here 
General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating 
with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of su- 
perior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving 
only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This com- 
pelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken 
country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched 
to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly 
on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavahy and one 
division of the Fifth Corps were immediately ordered to his assis- 
tance. Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Hum- 
phreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the 
other two divisions of the Fifth Corps could go to Sheridan, they 
were so ordered at once. Thus tlie operations of the day necessitated 
the sending of Warren, because of his accessibihty, instead of Hum- 
phrej^s, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On 
the morning of the 1st of April General Sheridan, reinforced by Gen- 
eral Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where late in the 
evening he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, cap- 
turing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. 
About the close of this battle Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin 
relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth Corps. 
The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions 
filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, 
and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reacli 
him, (h'ive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To 
guard against this. General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps 
was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and 
kept up until fom* o'clock in the morning (April 2d), when an assault 
v/as ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the 
lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to 



APPENDIX 453 

his left toward Hatcher's Run, capturing many guns and several 
thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of 
General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General 
Ord's, that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's 
Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and 
closed all of the enemy on tliat side of them in Peterslmrg, while 
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions, and joined 
General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying 
the enemy's main-line, capturing guns and prisoners, bxit was unable 
to carry his inner line. General Sheridan, being advised of the con- 
dition of affairs, retui-ned General Miles to his proper command. 
On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, 
a portion of General Gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, cap- 
tm*ed two strong inclosed works, — the most salient, and cominand- 
ing south of Petersburg, — thus materially shortening the line of 
investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of 
Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station, where 
they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement en- 
sued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened 
by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's 
Station toward Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade 
from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, 
leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force re- 
treated by the main road along the Appomattox River. During the 
night of the 2d the enemy evacuated Peterslmrg and Richmond, and 
retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the 3d pursuit was 
commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keep- 
ing near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Sec- 
ond and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville, along 
the South Side road ; the Ninth Corps stretched along that road be- 
hind him. On the 4th General Sheridan struck the Danville road 
near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court 
House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival 
of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord 
reached Burkesville on the evening of the 5th. 

On the morning of the 5th I addressed Major-General Sherman 
the following communication : 

Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865. 

General : All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Dan- 
ville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last 
night, reports all that is left — horse, foot, and dragoons — at twenty thou- 
sand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall 
push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very 
few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push ou from where you are, 
and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. 



454 APPENDIX 

Whether it wdll be better for you to strike for Greensboro' or nearer to Dan- 
ville, you will be better able to judge Avhen you receive this. Rebel armies 
now are the only strategic points to strike at. 

U. S. Grakt, 

Lieutenant- General. 
Major-General W. T. Sherman. 



On the morning of the 6th it was found that General Lee was mov- 
ing west of Jetersville, toward Danville. General Sheridan moved 
with his cavalry (the Fifth Corps having- been returned to General 
Meade on his reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 
Sixth Corps, while the Second and Fifth corps pressed hard after, 
forcing liim to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces 
of artillery. General Ord advanced from Buikesville toward Farm- 
ville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavahy, 
under Brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy 
the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farm- 
ville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read 
was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in 
the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with 
the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately 
intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the 
enemy south of Sailor's Creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery 
and about four liundi-ed wagons, and detained him until the Sixth 
Corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavahy was 
made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand pris- 
oners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of 
the Second Corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly 
to the day's success. 

On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, 
except one division, and the Fifth Corps moving by Prince Edward's 
Court House ; the Sixth Corps, General Ord's command, and one divi- 
sion of cavaliy, on Farmville ; and the Second Corps by the High 
Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the 
north side of the Appomattox ; but so close was the pursuit that the 
Second Corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge 
before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. 
The Sixth Corps and a division of cavahy crossed at Farmville to 
its support. 

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hope- 
less, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville : 

April 7, 1865. 

General : The result of the last week must convince you of the hopeless- 
ness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in 
this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from my- 



APPENDIX 



455 



self the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the 
surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the 

Army of Northern Virginia. 

U. S. Grant, 
General E. E. Lee. Lieutenant- General. 

Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at 

Farmville the following: 

April 7, 1865. 

Generai.: I have received your note of this date. Though not enter- 
taining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance 
on the^part of tlie Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire to 
avoid useless effusion "of blood, and therefore, before considering yom- 
proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. 

R. E. Lee, 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. 

To this I immediately replied : 

April 8, 1865. 

General : Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, ask- 
ing the condition on which I will accept the sm-render of the Army of 
Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I wovdd say that, peace being 
my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely, 
that the men and officers surrendered shall be disquahfied for taking up 
arms again against the government of the United States until properly ex- 
changed. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers 
you may name for the^ same pui-pose, at any point agi-eeable to you, for 
the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of 
the Army of Northern Virginia will be received, 

U. S. Grant, 

General R. E. Lee. Lieutenant-General. 

Early on the morning of the 8th the pnrsnit was resumed. Gen- 
eral Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, 
with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, fol- 
lowed by General ()rd's command and the Fifth Corps. During the 
day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the 
enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engage- 
ment. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad 
at Appomattox Station, drove the enemy from there, and captured 
twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital-train, and four trains of 
cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accom- 
panied General Meade's column, and al)out midnight received the 

following communication from General Lee: 

^ April 8, 1865. 

General: I received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. In mine of 
yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Ncv tli- 
ern Virginia, but to ask the terms of yom- proposition. To be frar,k, .i do 
not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army ; 



456 APPENDIX 

but, as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to 
know whether your proposals Vv'ould lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, 
meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia ; but as 
far as yoiu- proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my 
command, and tend to the restoration of j^eace, I should be pleased to meet 
you at 10 A.M. to-mon-ow on the old stage-road to Richmond, between the 
picket-lines of the two armies. 

R. E. Lee, 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. 

Early on the moruing of the 9tli I returned Lim an answer as fol- 
lows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appo- 
mattox : 

April 9, 1865. 

Genbral : Youl* note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to 
treat on the subject of peace ; the meeting proposed for 10 a.m. to-day could 
lead to no good. I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious 
for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. 
The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the 
South laying down tlieir arms they will hasten that most desirable event, 
save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of propertj- not 
yet destroyed. Sei'iously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled 
without the loss of another life, 1 subscribe myself, etc., 

U. S. Grant, 

General E. E. Lee. Lieutenant-General. 

On the morning of the 9th General Ord's command and the Fifth 
Corps reached Appomattox Station just as the enemy was making a 
desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry wjis at 
once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a 
suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. 

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters I received the 
following from General Lee : 

April 9, 1865. 

GeneraIi : I received your note of this morning on the picket-line, 
whither I had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were 
embraced in your proposal of yesterday with refei'ence to the surrender of 
this arm}'. I now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained 
in vour letter of yesterdav, for that purpose. 

R. E. Lee, 

Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. General. 

The interview was held at Appomattox Court House, the result of 
which is set forth in the followdng correspondence : 

Appomattox Court House, Virginia, 
April 9, 1865. 

General : In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 
8th instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern 
Virginia on the following terms, to wit : Rolls of aU the officers and men 



APPENDIX 457 

to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated 
by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may desig- 
nate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take \\p arms 
against the government of the United States until properly exchanged ; and 
each company or regimental cominander sign a like parole for the men of 
their commands. The arms, artillery, and pul)lic pi'operty to be parked 
and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by rae to receive 
them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their pri- 
vate horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to 
return to liis liome, not to he disturbed by United States authority so long 
as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. 

U. S. Grant, 
Lieutenant- General. 
General R. E. Lee. 



Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
April 9, 1865. 

General : I have received your letter of this date containing the terms 
of sui-render of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As 
they are suljstantially the same as those esi)ressed in your letter of the 8th 
instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers 
to carry the stipulations into effect. 

R. E. Lee, 
General. 
Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 

The eommaud of Major-General Gibbon, the Fifth ^Vi-my-corps 
under Griffin, and Mackenzie's cavaliy were designated to remain at 
Appomattox Court House until the paroling of the surrendered army 
was comx)leted, and to take charge of the public property. The re- 
mainder of the army immediately retui-ned to the vicinity of Biu-kes- 
ville. 

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused 
his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies 
lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and 
quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. 

On the receipt of my letter of the 5th General Sherman moved 
drrectly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through 
Raleigh, wdiich place General Sherman occupied on the morning of 
the 13th. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee 
reached him at Smithiield. 

On the 14th a correspondence was opened between General Sher- 
man and General Johnston, which resulted on the ]8th in an agree- 
ment for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for 
peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was 
disapproved by the President on the 21st, wdiich disapproval, together 
with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by 
me in person on the morning of the 24th, at Raleigh, North Caro- 



458 APPENDIX 

Una, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once given by him 
to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been 
entered into. On the 25th another meeting between them was 
agreed upon, to take place on the 2Gth, which terminated in the sur- 
render and disbandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the 
same terms as were given to General Lee. 

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got 
off on the 20th of March, moving by way of Boone, North CaroUna, 
and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersbui"g, and Big Lick. 
The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of 
Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main 
force he effectually destroyed it between New River and Big Lick, 
and then turned for Greensboro', on the North Carolina railroad ; 
struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and 
Greensboro', and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with 
the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. 
At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under 
General Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one 
thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed 
large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen 
miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence he 
moved to Slatersville. 

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make prepa- 
rations for a movement from Mobile Bay against Mobile and the in- 
terior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of March. 
The Sixteenth Corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved 
from Fort Gaines by water to Fish River; the Thu'teenth Corps, 
under Major-Geueral Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and 
joined the Sixteenth Cor23s on Fish River, both moving tlience on 
Spanish Fort and investing it on the 27th ; while Major -General 
Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading 
from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and par- 
tially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Span- 
ish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of April. Dui-ing 
the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried 
by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured ; our loss was 
considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama 
River, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the 
night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession 
of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. 

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, 
consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was de- 
layed by rains until March 22d, when it moved from Chickasaw, Ala- 
bama. On the 1 st of April General Wilson encountered the enemy 
in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove liim in confu- 
sion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed 



APPENDIX 459 

the central bridge over the C^ahawba River. On the 2d he attacked 
and captnred the fortified city of JSelnia, defended by Forrest, with 
seven thonsaud men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, ar- 
mory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and 
captured three thousand prisoners. On the 4tli he captured and de- 
stroyed Tuscaloosa. On the 10th he crossed the Ala})ama River, and 
after sending information of his operations to General Canby , marched 
on Montgomery, which place he occuj)ied on the 14tli, the enemy 
having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steam- 
boats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched du-ect on Colum- 
bus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted 
and captured on the 16th. At the former place we got fifteen 
hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, 
the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other 
public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, 
four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred 
cars. On the 20th he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty 
field-guns, twelve hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by 
General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jefi". Davis was 
trying to make his escape, sent forces in i:>m-suit, and succeeded in 
capturing him on the morning of May 11th. 

On the fourth day of May General Dick Taylor siu'rendered to 
General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi. 

A force sufficient to ensure an easy triumph over the enemj^ under 
Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion 
for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate 
command ; but on the twenty-sixth day of May, and before they 
reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his en- 
tire command to Major-General Can1>y. This surrender did not take 
place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and 
Vice-President ; and the liad faith was exhibited of fii'st disbanding 
most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public 
pi'operty. 

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the 
government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with 
them arms rightfully l^elonging to the United States, which had been 
surrendered to us by agreement, — among them some of the leaders 
who had surrendered in person, — and the disturbed condition of 
affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas 
were not changed. 

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and move- 
ments to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of 
them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed 
greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of 
these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith sub- 
mitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing 



460 APPENDIX 

them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially re- 
ported. 

For information touching our Indian difficulties I would respect- 
fully refer to the reports of the conmianders of departments in 
which they have occurred. 

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and 
the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no 
difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for 
men to do in battle they have done. The Western armies commenced 
their battles in the Mississippi VaUey, and received the final surrender 
of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Caro- 
lina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river 
from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received 
the final surrender of their old antagonists at Appomattox Court 
House, Virginia. The splendid achievements of each have national- 
ized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have 
unfortunatel}^ experienced too much), and the cause of crimination 
and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed 
in its dut}/'. All have a proud record, and aU sections can well con- 
gratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share 
in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belong- 
ing to the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and har- 
mony with that enemy whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, 
drew forth such lierculean deeds of valor. 
I have the honor to be, 

Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

U, S. Grant, 

Lieutenant- Oeneral. 



INDEX 



INDEX 

The asterisks indicate the location of tfie iiograpMcal notes. 



Abercrombie, J. J., II, *m, 178 
Abolitionists, I, 170, 171 
Acworth, Ga., II, 130 
Adairsville, Ga., tislitius near, II, 423 
Adams, Silas, iu Stoueman's raid, II, 91 
Adamsville, Tenn., I, 289 
Adjutant-General, U. S. A. See THOMAS, L. 
Agriculture. See Farming 
Aiken's Landing, Va., 1,469 
Alabama, secessiou. See Arkansas I, 83; 
KoHSseau's raid iuto, II, 89 ; Sherman asks 
to have Thomas campaisn in, 274; Tlio- 
maa's orders countermanded, 281 ; For- 
rest'sraidsin, 428; piirsuitof Hoodstopped 
by rains in, 433, 434 ; Oanby's movements in, 
442, 443, 458; Wilson's expedition into, 446 
Alabama River, the, Canby to move on, II, 
429 ; opened to Union troops, 458 ; Wilson 
crosses, 459 
Alameda, the, I, 125 
Alamo, massacre at the, I, 34, 49 
Albertis, William, killed at Vera Cruz, I, 96 
Aldrich's, Va., II, 101, 123, 126 
Alexander, E. P., II, 103 
Alexandria, La., Banlis assembles his army 
at, II, 426 ; retreat of Banlis to, and evacu- 
ation of, 426 
Alexandria railroad, Va., Bnmside on the, 

II, 404 
AUatoona, Ga., Johnston abandons, II, 86; 
capture and fortilication of, 86 ; defense 
of, 237 ; Sherman moves against, 423 
Alleghany Mountains, railroad over the, I, 
19 ; boimdarv of the Military DiAasion of 
the Mississippi, 191, II, 54, 81, 399 ; Crook 
and Averell cross, 73 
" Alps," steamer, at Fort Donelson, I, 246 
Alsop's, Va., II. 101, 119. 120 
Ameca Ameca, Mex., I, 144, 145 
Amelia Court House, Va., Lee at, II, 316, 
323-325, 453 ; Meade orders an advance on, 
327 ; Lee's movement from, 328, 329 
American citizens, rights of native-bom, I, 

169 
American Party, rise of the, I, 169 
Ames, Adelbert, at Fort Fisher, II, *265, 269 ; 

reinforced by Terry, 270 
Amherst Court House, Va., destruction of 

railroad at, II, 445 
Ammen, Jacob, drives Breckinridge from 

Knoxville, II, 434 
Ammunition-train, a motley, I, 407, 408 
Amozoque, Mex.. occupation of, I, 104 
Ampudia, Gen., strength of his army at 

Monterey, I, 80 ; surrenders the city, 88 
Anderson, G. T., II. 101, 216 
Anderson, J. B., military manager of rail- 
roads, 1,515 



Anderson, Richard H., at Spottsylvania, I, 
142, II, 122, 123, 127 ; visit to Popocatepetl, 
I, 142-145 ; liis command, II, 101, *121 ; in 
battle of the Wilderness, 113 ; beats Grant 
to Spottsylvania, 122 ; reasons for his cap- 
ture of Spottsylvania, 122, 123 ; intrenches, 
123 ; assaulted by Warren, 123 ; Grant's 
anxiety to crush, 123 ; on the Po, 128, 129 ; 
commanding Lee's left at Cold Harbor, 
163 ; movement along Warren's front, 163 ; 
pressed by Wright and Smith, 164 
Andersonviile, Ga., attempt to release pris- 
oners at, II, 91 
Annapolis, Md., Burnside's corps at, II, 56, 
57: Burnside's advance from, 65; Scho- 
field ordered to, 274, 280 
Antietam, Md., Southern view of the battle 

of, II, 410 
Anton Lizardo, the harbor of, I, 95 
Appalachicola River, Canby to move on, II, 

429 
Appomattox Court House, Va., Grant's ride 
to, II, 338 ; the surrender at, 340-349, 4.56, 
457, 460 ; number of ti'oops surrendered av,, 
351 
Appomattox River, the, Butler's position 
between the James and, II, 74, 407 ; de- 
fenses of Petersburg on, 187 ; thi-eatened 
assault on Petersburg between the James 
and, 200; Union lines on, 231, 311, 313, 
448, 451 ; Merritt drives the enemy to, 312, 
322; proposed movements on, 315, 316; 
Lee's fugitives cross, 321, 453, 454; its 
course, 328 ; raid against bridges on, 410 ; 
W. F. Smith's assault on Petersburg lines 

on , 413 , . J 

Appomattox Station, Va., Sheridan pushes 
to to capture Lee's trains, II, 333, 335, 
455; Custer ordered to, 335; engagement 
at, 336, 456 
Archer, J. J., II, 102 

Arkadelphia, Ark., Steele reaches, II, 426 
Arkansas, secession of, 1, 183 ; Confederate 
movement in, 219 ; Halleck commanding 
iu 231; Steele commanding in, 488, II, 65; 
embraced in Sherman's military division, 
81 • in the enemy's hands, 398 ; guerrilla 
warfare in, 398: Steele ordered to move 
from, 400 : Price's retreat to, 428 
Arkansas Post. Ark., capture of, I, 366 
Arkansas River, operations on the, 1, 366, 

II 427 ; Union holdings on the, 53, 398 
Army of Northern Virginia, defeats Pope 
and invades Maryland, 1, 336 : driven from 
Pennsylvania, 478; on the Rapidan, II, 
55, 57 ; organization, 101-104 ; respect for 
Army of the Potomac, 172 ; preference for 
breastwork fighting, 172, 174, 409 ; a chan- 

463 



464 



INDEX 



nel of supply for, 177; compared with 
Army of the Potomac, 185; Sheridan 
avers the possibUlty of its capture, 3-2i; 
demoralizatiou, 325, 350 ; in desperate 
plight, 339 ; long struggle with the Army 
of the Potomac, -tlO ; surrender of, see Lee 

Army of the Cumberland, depletion and 
peril of, I, 493 ; peril at Chattanooga, 495 ; 
Thomas assigned to command, 497 ; be- 
sieged in Chattanooga, 503 ; expedition to 
Brown's Fei-ry, 504 ; imi)roving its condi- 
tion, 511 ; troops from, in Lookout Valley, 
519 ; plan of assault at Chattanooga. 520 ; 
strength of position at Chattanooga, II, 2 ; 
captures at Missionary Ridge, 17 ; parti- 
cipation iu battle of Chattanooga, 20 ; its 
work at Chattanooga planned beforehand, 
23 ; at Chattanooga, 82 ; engagement be- 
fore Atlanta, 88; in Sherman's march 
against Johnston, 422 

Army of the Gulf, united with. Army of the 
Tennessee, I. 478. 

Army of the James, the left wing of the 
united armies, II, 56; commanded by 
Gen. Butler. 56; reinforcements for, 56; 
protection to Washington, 57 ; proposed 
junction between Army of the Potomac 
and, 73, 402 ; crippled at Drm-y's BluflF, 74 ; 
united with Army of the Potomac, 74-76, 
447 ; holds Bermuda Hundred, 190, 191, 
299 ; in battle of White Oak Road, 299 ; in 
action of AprLl2, 1865, 308; ordered to 
Burke's Station, 316, 317 ; Parke ordered to 
protect its rear, 322, 323 ; in engagement 
at Appomattox Station, 336 ; ordered into 
camp at Burkesville Station, 362; moves 
simultaneously with the Army of the Po- 
tomac, 404 ; Sheridan reinforces the, 420 

Army of the Mississippi, left wing of Ilal- 
leck's army at Pittsburg Landing. I, 307 ; 
proposed movement, 314; reinforcements 
sent to Buell from, 333 ; Sheridan's com- 
mand in, 334; dispositiou, Sept. 4, 1862, 
335, 336 ; depletion of, 336 ; i)ut on the de- 
fensive, 344 ; strength after Corinth, 349 

Army of the Ohio, ordered to reinforce 
Grant, I, 273 ; arrangements for, at Ham- 
bvu-g Landing, 273 ; in battle of Shiloh, 301, 
302 ; center of Halleok's army at Pittsburg 
Landing, 307 ; reports of Shiloh .sent to 
Halleok from, 308 ; to repair Memphis 
and Charleston railroad, 317,318,326; pos- 
sibilities of early capture of Chattanooga 
by, 333 ; plight of animals belonging to tlie, 
II, 34 ; strength, 238 ; ordered to reinforce 
Thomas, 238 ; Morgan's raids in rear of, 
354 ; commanded by Burnside, 382 ; in 
Sherman's movement against Johnston, 
422 

Army of the Potomac, the " regular brig- 
ade " in the, I, 231 ; Grant's interest in its 
movements, 382, 383 ; in battle of Chatta- 
nooga, II, 20; visit to, at Brandy Station, 
45-47 ; changes in, 46 ; Meade in command, 
47, 399, 404 ; an independent command, 55 ; 
position on the Rapidan, 55 ; difflcultv of 
provisioning, 55 ; center of the united" ar- 
mies, 56, 71 ; supported by the Ninth 
Corps, 56 ; principal protection of Wash- 
ington, 57, 401 ; confronted by Lee on the 
Rapidan, 57 ; reinforced by Burnside, 58. 
62, 408 ; Grant to stay with, 58 ; Sheridan 
to command the cavalry, 60; question of 
moving by right or left flank, 61 ; reduc- 
ing transportation, 63 ; question of mov- 



ing by water to the James, 66 ; Mosby's 
operations in rear of, 67; junction with 
Army of tlie James, 73-76,402; Sheridan 
rejoins, 79, 80, 406 ; grand movement, 95 
et seq., 404; organization, 96-100; rations, 
forage, and supplies, 96; surplus of artil- 
lery, 97 ; quartermaster's corps, 104, 105, 
411 ; ordered to march light, 105 ; position. 
May 5, 1864, 106 ; skill in intrencMng, 116, 
117 ; movement by the left flank, 119, 120; 
orders for night marches, 119, 120; Lee 
assumes its retreat, 121, 124 ; possible race 
to Richmond, 122; Sheridan ordered to 
cut loose from, 133 ; reducing the artillery, 
144, 183 ; Sheridan again with, 153 ; moving 
right wing from position south of the 
North Anna, 154 et seq.; respect of Army 
of Northern Virginia for, 172; disheartened 
at Cold Harbor, 172 ; attempt to get south 
of the James, 174 et seq.; sti-ength at 
opening of Wilderness campaign, 182 ; 
reinforcements for, 182; strength at 
crossing of the James, 182, 183 ; advance 
reaches the James, 185 ; compared with 
Army of Northern Virginia, 185; Grant 
rejoiiis, 186, 187 ; invests Petersburg, 190, 
191, 412 : Hunter ordered to return to, 192 ; 
Wright ordered back to, 224, 420 ; loses its 
chief of stafl', 226 ; length of lines, 231 ; 
cavalry operating norfli of the James, 
293; provision for Sheridan's cutting 
loose from the, 301, 419 ; ordered to move 
on Danville road, 316 ; its record, 319, 320 ; 
forced march ordered, 322 ; ordered into 
camp at Burkesville Station, 362; com- 
manded by Burnside, 382 ; commanded by 
Hooker, 382; territory covered by, 398; 
Lee's army its obiective, 401; to move 
simultaneously with the Army of the 
James, 404 ; Beauregard brings reinforce- 
ments against, 408 ; W. F. Smith ordered 
to reinforce, 408 ; long struggle with Army 
of Northern Virginia, 410, 460 ; moves by 
the enemy's right flank, 422 ; Sheridan re- 
joins, Mar. 27, 1865,446; dismounted cav- 
alry ordered to City Point, 447; move- 
ments, Mar. 29, 447 

Army of the Tennessee, Sherman's com- 
mand in the, I, 273 ; reinforcements for, 
274; commanders of, 274; losses on first 
day at Shiloh, 286 ; share in the battle, 301 ; 
right wing of Halleck's army at Pittsburg 
Landing, 307; reports of the battle of 
Sliiloh, 308 ; dissatisfaction at capture of 
Corinth, 316; confi'outed by Van Dorn, 
327 ; weakness at Corinth, 328 ; unites with 
Army of the Gulf, 478 ; Shennan assigned 
to command, 500; in battle of Chattanoo- 
ga, II, 20 ; losses at Atlanta, 89 ; enthusi- 
asm at Vicksburg, 172, 173; Logan's ser- 
vice with, 235, 423 ; Howard appointed to 
command, 235; in Sherman's movement 
against Johnston, 422 ; part returned by 
Banks to Sherman, 424, 425 

Army of the Valley District, organization, 
II, 101 

Artillery, surplus of, in Army of the Poto- 
mac, II, 97, 144, 183 

Ashland, Va., Sheridan destroys railroad 
and supplies at, 11, 78, 406, 445; Sheridan 
attacked at. 295 

Aspinwall, Colombia, I, 154 

Athens, Ala., captured by Forrest, 11, 428 ; 
Buford's unsuccessful attack on, 428 

Athens, Tenn., Gen. Dodge halted at, I, 513 



INDEX 



465 



Atkinson, E. N., IT, 101 

Atlanta, Ga., possibilities of a bloodless ad- 
vance to, I, 318 ; prcparatious for cam- 
paign against, II, 3a; defended by Joliiis- 
tou, 48, 399 ; importance of captiiring, 48, 
49, 71, 227, 399; Sherman's cami)aign 
against, 49, 58, 210, 213; country between 
Dalton and, 83; time occupied in cap- 
ture, 85 ; commencement of final move- 
ment toward, 87; Hood abandons his outer 
lines at, 88; strength, 88; battles before 
and at, 88-93, 423; railroad cut between 
Augusta and, 89 ; operations between De- 
catiir and, 90: movement by right flank, 
90; close investment, 90; Sherman's final 
movement, 92, 423, 424; Kilpatrick's raid 
around, 92 ; Gen. Slocum takes possession, 
93; expulsion of citizens from, 93; tiu-ned 
into a military base, 93: Hood's retreat 
from, 229, 429 ; weakness of Sherman's 
communications with, 230; Hood breaks 
railroad back from, 236 ; Sherman autiio- 
rized to give up, 238 ; Sherman starts back 
to, 240; destruction of, 2-11 ; Sherman sug- 
gests destruction of railroad to Chatta- 
nooga from, 252, 430; Sherman drives the 
enemy to, 423; Sherman puts troops into 
camp at, 428 ; guarding road to the Cum- 
berland from, '428; Sherman proposes to 
abandon, 429, 431 ; original design to hold, 
430 ; Sherman holds, with the Twentieth 
Corps, 430 ; Sherman concentrates troops 
at, 431 

Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, Rous- 
seau's raid on the, II, 424 

Atlanta campaign, Sheraian's preparations 
for the, II, 82, 83 ; skill in its management, 
85, 424 ; rebuilding railroads in, 85 ; its im- 
portance, 93; news of its success in the 
2s"orth, 94 

Atlee's Station, Va., Lee's position near, II, 
IGl 

Auburn, Miss., Sherman at, I, 413 

Augur, C. C, excursion with, I,*50, 51 

Augusta, Ga.,the railroad cut between At- 
lanta and. II, 89, 423 ; proposed movement 
against, 231, 232, 429 ; threatened by Slo- 
cum, 240; Sherman's apparent objective, 
248, 247 ; importance of capturing, 250 ; 
threatening, 277, 431 

Austin, Tex., paying off troops at, I, 47 

Austria, a prince of, on the Mexican throne, 
II, 388 

"Autocrat," transport steamer at Nash- 
ville, I, 264 

Averell, W. W., operations against the Vir- 
ginia and Tennessee railroad, II. 58, *72, 
411 ; reports operations in West Virginia, 
140, 411; junction with Crook, 181, 411; 
Hunter's junction with, 192,195,412; vic- 
tory at Winchester, 417 

Averysboro, N. C, fighting between John- 
ston and Sherman at, II, '285, 442 

Axioms of war, I, 353 

Aylett, W. R., II, 101 

Aylett's, Va., Sheridan at, II, 79 

Ayotla, M2X., Gen. Scott's position at, 1, 109 

Ayres, Romeyn B., his command, II, 98; 
in action. May 14, 1864, 140 ; in b.attle of Five 
Forks, 305 

Aztec town, an old, I, 146, 147 

Babcock, O. E., report of meeting with Lee 

at Appoinattox, II, *341 
Badeau, Adam, discovers Grant's offer of 

Vol. II.— 30 



services to the government, I, "192, 193; 
sheds new light on history, 270; report of 
capture of Prentiss's division, 280; injus- 
tice to McCook, 292; accuracy of liis ac- 
count of Sliiloh, 305; jireserves story of 
Sherman's opposition to the Vickshurg 
cauipaign, 454; mentions Butler and his 
" bottle," Tl, 76 

Bailey, Bartlett, I, 14, 15, 18 

Bailey, Dr., I, 14, 15 

Bailey, Joseph, constructs dams on Red 
River, I r, 426 

Baird, Absalom, in Chattanooga campaign, 

IL *3, 14, 18 
Baker's Creek, Miss., I, 427, 429, 431, 432 
Baldwin's Ferry, Miss., I, 442, 457 
Ballot, its exercise in tlie South, 1, 178, 179 
Baltimore, Md., troops ordered to, II, 196, 
416, 438 ; Hunter advised to establish head- 
quarters at, 207; Grant visits, 215; Wal- 
lace moves on the enemy from, 416 
Baltimore and Ohio railroad, operations 
on the, II, 195, 207, 215, 216, 418; import- 
ance, 419 
Banks, Nathaniel P., on the Red River. I, 
* 410, 419; correspondence with, concerning 
Port Hud.son. 410, 419, 439, 440, 455 ; plan to 
bring his forces against Vicksburg, 440; 
Grant ordered to cooperate with, 440, 4H6; 
informed of the fall of Vicksburg, 475 ; re- 
lief to be sent to, 475; Grant resolves to 
unite with, 481 ; fails to unite with Grant, 
481 ; reinforcements for, 485, 486, II, 42, 

58, 65, 84, 198, 400, 426 ; visit to, at New 
Orleans, I, 486; Grant reviews his army, 
487 ; his command coterminous with the 
Military Division of the Mississivipi, 491; 
expectation of his clearing the west shore 
of the Mississippi, II, 39 ; proposed coop- 
eration with Sherman, 42, 49 ; letter from 
Grant to, 49 ; expected to move upon Mo- 
bile, 49 ; orders to, for spring of 1864, 58, 

59, 61; ordered to turn over defense of 
Red River to Steele, 58, 61, 65, 400 ; ordered 
to return trooiis to Sherman, 58, 400; or- 
dered to abandon Texas, 58, 400 ; to assem- 
ble troops at New Orleans, 61; to move 
against Mobile, 61; to cooperate with 
Sherman in securing raili'oad between 
Mobile and Chattanooga, 61 ; operations 
on the Red River, 64, 65, 72, 400, 426, 427 ; 
opposes the Red River expedition, 65 ; to 
take and hold Shreveport, 65, 400; suc- 
ceeded by Canby, 81, 142; operations in 
Louisiana, 142, 426; suggests that Steele 
move from Arkansas, 400 ; to return troops 
to New Orleans, 400 ; Farragut to cooper- 
ate with, 400, 401 ; returns troops to Sher- 
man, 425; Steele's cooperation with, 426, 
427 

Bankston, Miss., Grierson's raid at, II, 434 
Barlow, Francis C, his command, II, 97 ; in 
battle of the Wilderness, *110 ; in battle of 
Spottsylvauia, 129-132, 135, 136 ; assault at 
Cold Harbor, 166, 167 
Barnard, J. G., sent to investigate Butler's 
position, II. *74 ; his report, 75 ; communi- 
cates with Sherman as to northward 
campaign, 271, 273 
Barnett's, Miss., Rosecrans at, I, 342 
Barrett, Major, attempts to capture Grant, 
I, 217 

Barringer, Rufus, his command, II, 102 ; en- 
counters Russell's command, 156 
Bartlett, J. J., II, 98 



466 



INDEX 



Barton. Seth M., II, 101 

Base of supplies, question of operating with 
or without a, I, 353, 359, 360, 411, 417, 427, 
454 

Baton Rouge, La., fall of, I, 317 ; Grierson's 
raid at, 408; Cauby's expedition from, II, 
431 

Battery No. lo, Gordon's assault at, II, 296- 
298 

Battery No. ii, capture and recapture of, II, 
297, 298 

Battery No. i2, capture and recapture of, II, 
297, 293 

Battle, C. A., II, 101 

Baxter, A. S., sent to order Wallace to Pitta- 
burg Landing, I, 277 ; Wallace's interpre- 
tation of bis orders, 278 

Baxter, Henry, his command, II, 98 ; in 
battle of the Wilderness, *108 

Bayou Baxter, I, 373, 374 

Bayou Macon, I, 373,374 

Bayou Pierre, I, 401, 402, 405, 406, 408 

Bayou Vidal, I, 388 

Bean's Station, Tenn., concentration of 
troops aa;ainst Breckinridge at, II, 434 

Bear Creek, I, 340, 352 

Beaufort, N. C, the Fort Fisher expeditions 
at. II, 263, 268. 436, 438 

Beaufort, S. C, Union possession of, II, 53, 
398; Sherman moves his right wing to, 
276 

Beauregard, P. G. T., atCerro Gordo, 1, 100; 
at Shiloh, 298, *299, 302, 303; at Corinth, 
310, 312 ; evacuates Corinth, 315 ; supersed- 
ed by Bragg, 332 ; danger of his coming to 
Lee's assistance, II, 66; attacks Butler, 
74 ; separated from Richmond, 133 ; sent 
to guard Richmond, 144; commanding 
south of Richmond, 188; reinforced by 
Hoke, 188 ; fortifies Petersburg, 189, 203 ; in 
general command, 239 ; appeals to citizens 
of Georgia, 239 ; confronting Sherman, 
283 ; attacked by Kautz, 407 ; brings rein- 
forcements against the Army of the Poto- 
mac, 408 

Beaver Dam, Va., recapture of Federal 
prisoners by Sheridan at, II, 78 ; plan to 
destroy the Virginia Central railroad 
west of, 175 ; Sheridan desti-oys depot at, 
406 

Belen garita, the, I, IIT, 120 

Belfry, the gun in the, I, 123, 124 

Belknap, W. G., member of court of in- 
quiry in Gen. Scott's case, I, *135 

Bell, Louis, in assault on Fort Fisher, II, 
269 * killed *270 

Belle' Plain, 'Va., getting supplies from, II, 
133 

Belleville, 111., mustering in troops at, I, 187 

Belmont, Mo., contemplated attack on, I, 
211 ; the battle of, 219-229 

Beniiam, H. W., his command, II, 100; su- 
perintends bridge-work at the crossing of 
tbe Chickahominy, *182 ; dismounted cav- 
alry to report to, at City Point, 447 

Benicia Barracks, Cal., tlie Fourth Infantry 
at, I, 161 

Benjamin, Calvin, I, *50-53 

Benning, Henry L., II, 101 

Benton, Thomas H., attempt to supersede 
Scott by, I, 92, 93, 135 

" Benton," the. Porter's flagship, running 
the batteries at Vicksbvirg, I. 386 

Bentonvills, N. C, lighting between John- 
ston and Sherman at, II, 285, 442 



Bermuda Hundred, Va., seizure of, by But- 
ler, II, 73, 406; question of marching the 
army toward, 180; visit to Butler at, 185, 
186, 412; supplies ordered lor Hancock 
from, 187 ; held by the Army of the James, 
190, 191, 299; report of engineers at, 200; 
reinforcements for Meade fi'om, 200, 408 ; 
troops at, informed of capture of outer 
works of Petersburg, 310; Butler's posi- 
tion at, 406-408; the enemy partially re- 
tii-es fi'om, 413 ; Wright to send troops to, 
413 

Berry ville, Va., Sheridan near, II, 419 

Bethel, O.. Jesse R. Grant removes from 
Georgetown to, I, 21 ; a humiliating inci- 
cident in. 24 ; visit to parents at, 27 

Bethel, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march to- 
ward, I, 278 ; Ord's command at, 335 

Bethesda Church, Va., II, 165, 166 

Beverly, Va., proposed expedi tion against 
Virginia and Tennessee railroad from, II, 
58, 61, 403 

Big Black River, the dangers of attack on, 

I, 400; reconnaissances ordered toward, 
412 ; McPherson crosses, 413 ; McCler- 
nand's position on, 414, 415 ; guarding the 
crossing of, 419; the enemy's design to 
cross, 425 ; piu'sitit of the enemy to, after 
Champion's Hill, 433; Pemberton falls 
back to, 435 ; possibilities of Pemberton's 
crossing, 437 ; Sherman ordered to, 437 ; 
hopes of crossing, at Bridgeport, 438; bat- 
tle of, 438-440 ; destruction of tlie bridge 
over. 440; rebridging, 440, 441; demoral- 
ization of the cneiiiy at, 443 ; Federal 
losses and Confederate strength at, 447; 
need of cavalry on, 448; Blair's work on, 
455 ; troops on, 457 ; Sherman assigned to 
command at, 458; .Johnston crosses, 4'58; 
Johnston between Brownsville and, 464 ; 
Sherman crosses, 482. II. 41; Sherman's 
troops on, 1, 482, 484; Osband's operations 
on, II, 431 

Big Black River Bridge, successof the Army 

of the Tennessee at, II, 173 
Big Blue, battle of the, II, 427, 428 
Big Lick, N. C, Stoneman destroys the rail- 
road at, II, 458 
Big Sandy, McClernand at, 1, 413 ; Sherman 

moves to, 413 
Big Shanty, Ga., Hood reaches, II, 429 
Big South Fork, Cumberland River, I, 511 
Big Sunflower River, water communications 

of, I, 377 
Bird's Point, Mo., orders to troops at, I, 
211 ; Col. Oglesby appointed to command 
at. 214 
Birney, D. B., in battle of the Wilderness, 

II, 108; in battle of Spottsylvania, *129, 
131, 135, 136; Mott's brigade assigned to, 
139 ; sent to Tyler's assistance, 143 ; in 
battle of Cold Harbor, 166; returns to 
Hancock, 177 ; commanding Hancock's 
corps, 190 ; in investment of Petersburg, 
191 ; threatening movements against Rich- 
mond, 209, 218 ; captures Fort Harrison, 
421 ; moves to Hatcher's Run, 450 

Black Bayou, water communications of, I, 

377 ; Sherman's expedition on. 378, 379 
Black Fort, Monterey, the, I, 80, 82 
Black River. See Big Black River. 
Black's Station, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 

407 
Blackwater River, the, II, 407, 447 
Blair, Austin, governor of Michigan, I, 



INDEX 



467 



*334 ; appoints Sheridan colonel of 2d Mi- 
cliigau Cavalry, 334 

Blair, Frank P., leader of the Free-Soil 
Democracy in St. Louis, I, *169, 188 ; raises 
a regiment, 188; ordered to Grand Gulf, 
412 ; arrival before Jackson, *42() ; .joins 
McClernand, 423 ; reaches Now Auburn, 
423 ; ordered to Bolton,425 ; near Kay moiid, 
426 ; near Auburn, 420 ; his command 
turned over to McClernand, 428 ; ordered to 
Edward's Station, 428 ; at Champion's Hill, 
428, 431, 432, 435, 447 ; ordered to Bridge- 
port, 437, 438, 441 ; raid up the Yazoo, 454, 
455; troops sent to MechanicsViurg, 455; 
character and military ability, 480 ; crosses 
the Tennessee at Eastport, 512 ; reinforces 
Sherman, II, 86 ; commanding the Seven- 
teenth Corps, 234 ; quits the field for po- 
litical purposes, 234; returns to his com- 
mand, 235 

Bliss, AV. W. S., adjutant-general to Gen. 
Taylor, I, 58 ; death of, 164 

Bliss, Zenas R., II, 100 

Blockade, Great Britain insists on effective, 
II, 261 ; the naval, 398 

Blockade-runners, capture of one at Savan- 
nah, II, 252; principal inlet for, 261, 435; 
capture of, at Fort Fisher, 262 

Blue Ridge, boundary of Union holdings, II, 
53 ; operations in the, 152, 216, 220, 226, 420 

Boggs, Harry, in business with, I, 168 

Boggs & Grant, the firm of, I, 168 

Bolivar, Tenn., threatened by the enemy, 
I, 327, 332, 344; guarding the Mississippi 
Central raUroad at, 327, 352; skirmishing 
near, 329; repulse of the enemy at, 332; 
Ord's command at, 335 ; reinforcing Coi-- 
inth from, 336, 338; reinforced, 330, 344; 
repairing the railroad at, 352 ; movement 
on Grand Junction from, 352 

Bolton, Miss., troops ordered to, I, 425, 428; 
Hovey at, 426 ; capture of, 426 ; Steele en 
route to, 428 ; Sherman's march fi'om Jack- 
son to, 437 ; Sherman concentrates at, 482 

Boone, N. C, Stoneman's movement via, II, 

458 

Boonville, Mo., Grantorderedto secure cash 
from l)anks in, I, 209 ; Sheridan's victory 
at, II, 334 

Booth, L. F., colonel Ist Alabama colored 
regiment, II, 425 

Bottom's Bridge, Va., Sheridan at, II, 79; 
Wright ordered to send troops to, 177 

Bourbon County, Ky., early visit to, I, 16 

Bowen,John S., commanding at Port Gib- 
son, I, *402, 403 ; bearer of Pemberton's 
proposals at Vicksburg, 465; Grant re- 
fuses to meet, 466 ; conference with A. J. 
Smith, 467 ; anxiety for complete surren- 
der, 467 

Bowers, T. S., on Grant's staff, II, *69; de- 
tects William Swinton eavesdropping, 69, 
70 ; letter to, April 2, 1865, 313 

Bowles, P. D., II, 101 

Bowling Green, Ky., the Confederate line 
at, I, 232 : Buell confronting Buckner at, 
233 ; fortifications of, 265 ; Johnston's re- 
treat from, 266; capture of, 304 

Bowling Green, Va., Hancock's march to, 
II. 146 

Boyd's Neck, S. C, Hatch's expedition at, 
II, 432 

Boydton plank road, movements on the, 
II, 422 ; Union line at, 450-452 ; Grittin at- 
tacked near, 451 



Bragg, Braxton, possibilities of Ipjuring, 
alter Corinth, 1,318; at Rome, Ga., *329; 
supcrsecb's Beauregard, 332; despaUdics 
troops from Tupelo to Chattanooga, 332; 
march to the Ohio Kiver, 336 ; aiming to pre- 
vent reinforcement of, in Middles Tennes- 
see, 336, 337 ; reinforces Johnston, 448, 492; 
proposetl movement against, from Mobile 
as a base, 484, 485 ; Rosecrans ordered to 
move against, 492; confronting Rosecrans 
at Mui'froesboro, 492 Roseiirans's tactical 
skill aga inst, 493; moves against Rosecrans, 
494; takes possession of Missionary Ridge 
and Lookout Mountain, 494 ; jjosscssion of 
roads into Chattanooga, 495; report of 
condition of the Union gairison at Chat- 
tanooga, 507; Pres. Davis's visit to, 507, 
II, 20,' 21 ; preparations for attacking, I, 
520,524; reported withdrawal fiom Chat- 
tanooga, II, 1 ; advises withdrawal of non- 
combatants from Chattanooga, 1 ; designs 
concerning Knoxvillc, 2; in battle of Chat- 
tanooga, 12 ; operations against Sherman, 
13; threatens Baird's advances 14; loses 
control of his men at Missionary Ridge, 
17; mistakes at Chattanooga, 20, 29, 30; 
difference between Louj^street and, 21; 
personal acquaintance with, 21 ; personal 
characteristics, 21, 22 ; danger of his at- 
taclung Burnside, 25 ; retreat toward Dal- 
ton, 25; completeness of his rout, 25; 
strength at Chattanooga, 29 ; disliked by 
his soldiers, 31 ; superseded by J. E. John- 
ston, 42 ; leaves Wilmington, 249, 435 ; com- 
manding at Wilmington, 264 ; caUs for re- 
inforcements, 264 
Branchville, Ga., importance of capturing 

ports to the east of, II, 250 
Brandon, Miss., Steele ordered to, I, 483; 

Sherman reaches, II, 41 
Brandy Station, Va., visit to Army of the 
Potomac at, II, 45-47 ; as base of supplies; 
62, 401 ; Meade to collect strength at, 63 
Brannan, J. M., operations on the Chicka- 

mauga, II, *5 
Bratton, John, II, 101 
Brazos Santiago, I, 59, 64, 93. See also POINT 

Isabel. 
Breckinridge, John C, the contest between 
Lincoln and, I, *172; reinforces Lee, II, 
151 ; ordered to the defense of the Shen- 
andoah Valley, 193 ; reinforcements called 
for, from, 408 ; operations in East Tennes- 
see. 434 
Breese, K. R., commands naval brigade at 

Fort Fisher, II, *269 
Brevet rank, ditflculty between Twiggs and 

Worth concerning, I, 73, 74 
Brewster, W. R., II, 97 

Brice's Cross Roads, Miss., battle of, 11, 197 
Bridge Creek, I, 309 

Bridgeport, Ala., troops ordered to, I, 437, 
438 ; arrival of Sherman and Blair at, 441 ; 
Rosecrans loses the river road to, 494; 
terminus of Union possession of railroad 
between NashviUe and Chattanooga, 495 ; 
Grant at, en route for Chattanooga, 498 ; 
opening the "cracker line" to, 501; con- 
centration of reinforcements at, 504; the 
Tennessee opened from Lookout VaUey to, 
505; transportation and supplies at, 506, 
513 ; navigation of the Tennessee between 
Kelly's Ferry and, 506 ; Sherman arrives 
at, 516-518; Sherman's trip from Chatta- 
nooga to, 523 ; communication with Chat- 



468 



INDEX 



tauooga, II, 29 ; garrisoned by Thomas, 

238, 2,16 
Bridgeport, Miss., Federal losses at, I, 447 
Bridges, crossing the bayous by, I, 389, 394, 

405 

Broad River, Foster's expedition on, II, 431 

Brock road, Va., operations ou the, II, 101, 
102, 109, 111, 120, 126, 127 

Brooke, John R., his command, II, 97; in 
biitllo of the Wilderness, *111 

Brooks, Horace, at capture of San Cosme 
iiarita, I. '"122 

Brooks, VV. T. H., in battle of Cold Harbor, 
II, 1G7 

Brough, John, governor of Ohio, meeting 
^sntb, I, *490 

Brown, B. Gratz, commanding at Ironton, 
I, *207 

Brown, George, commanding the " Indian- 
ola," I, 387 

Brown, Henry W., II, 99 

Brown, Jacob, occupies Fort Brown, I, 64 ; 
killed, 72 

Brown, John, character, I, 4 

Brown, Joseph E., governor of Georgia, II, 
*228 ; denounced by Pres. Davis, 228 ; flight 
from Milledgeville, 244 

Brown, Owen, .lesse R. Grant works for, 1, 4 

Brown County, O., the Grants in, I, 7 

Brown's Ferry, Tenn., operations, naviga- 
tion, roads, etc., at, I, 501, 504-506, 508, 509, 
520, 522, 523, II, 1, 4, 8, 29, 30 

Brownsville, Tenn., I, 335, 336, 464 

Brownsville, Tex., first settlement of, I. 63, 
72 ; probable effect of garrisoning. 484 

Bruinsburg, Miss., operations at, I, 398,400- 
402, 411, 446, 4f.4, 483 

Bryan, Goode, II, 101 

Bryan, T. M.,Jr., II, 99 

Buchanan, James, Grant votes for, I, *171 ; 
helplessness of his administration, 180, 
181 ; secessionists leave his Cabinet, 181 ; 
Floyd's actions in the Cabinet of, 253 

Buckland, Ralph C, I, *275 

Buckner, Simon B., trip to Popocatepetl, I, 
142-145; confronting Buell, *233; com- 
mand at Fort Douelson turned over to, 
254 ; correspondence with, touching sur- 
render of Fort Donelson, 255, 256 ; sent to 
reinforce Longstreet at Knoxville, II, 2, 
30 

Buell, Don Carlos, commandingDepartment 
of the Ohio, I, *233; confronting Buckner 
atBowliug Green, 233 ; reinforcesGrautat 
Fort Donelson, 243; notified by Halleck of 
movement against Fort Donelson, 244; ad- 
vance on Nashville, 262, 263 ; letter to C. F. 
Smith from, 263 ; letter from Grant to, 264 ; 
meeting witb Grant, 264 ; calls upon Smith 
for assistance, 264; delayedmarohouNash- 
ville, 266 ; ordered to reinforce Grant, 273 ; 
at Columbia, Tenn., 274 ; en route to rein- 
force the Army of the Tennessee, 274; 
awaiting his arrival, 275-277 ; arrival of, 
277 ; meeting with, at Pittsburg Landing, 
283 ; berates stragglers at Shiloh, 283 ; con- 
dition of affairs at Shiloh before arrival 
of, 285, 286 ; loss on the first day, 286 ; rein- 
forcements for, at Pittsburg Landing, 287 ; 
position on the morning of April 7, 288; 
cliaracter, 295, 296 ; charges of disloyalty 
against, 295, 296 ; Grant's reply to, 296 ; re- 
torts on Grant in the New York " World," 
296 ; subsequent attempt to restore him to 
command, 296, II, 48, 50; A. 8. Johnston's 



plan to crush, I, 298 ; strength at Shiloh, 
302 ; his report of Shiloh concealed from 
Grant, 306; commanding center of Hal- 
leck's army at Pittsburg Landing, 307; 
transmits reports of Shiloh direct to Hal- 
leck, 308 ; sent in pursuit from Corinth, 
316 ; ordered to repair the Memphis and 
Charleston railroad, 317, 318, 326, 333 ; dith- 
culties of his march through a hostile 
country, 329 ; reinforcing, 329, 330, 332, 336, 
344 ; march to Chattanooga, 332, 333 ; pos- 
sibilities of his early capture of Chatta- 
nooga, 333 ; march to Louisville, 336 ; suc- 
ceeded in command by Rosecrans, 349 ; 
declines to serve under Sherman or Can- 
by, II, 50 

Buena Vista, Mex., T, 92, 93, 102 

Buffalo, the southern herd of, I, 62 

Buford, Abram, raids in Kentucky, II, 425; 
in Alabama, 428 

Bull-fights, Mexican, I, 137-140 

Bull Gap, II, 282, 446 

Bull Run, Va., II, 63, 65, 99, 404 

Bulwer, Grant's fondness for works of, 1,20 

" Bummers," Sherman's, II, 242-244 

Bunker Hill, Mass., Capt. Noah Grant in 
battle of, I, 2 

Burbridge, S. G., drives Morgan out of Ken- 
tucky, II, 425; expedition against Salt- 
ville, 428; operationsagainst Breckinridge, 
434 

Burgess's Mills, Va., Humphreys's success 
at, II, 451 

Burke's Station, Va., the Army of the James 
ordered to, 316, 317 

Burkesville, Va., Crook sent toward, II, 
322; Sheridan's operations at and near, 
323, 324, 449, 450 ; Lee's army intercepted 
at, 324 ; Ord's operations near, 330, 332, 453, 
454 ; Grant at, 332, 349, 357 ; the Armies of 
the James and of the Potomac ordered 
into camp at, 362 ; Wilson destroys the 
railroad at, 415 ; Grant determines to push 
to, 453 ; the army retui-ns to, 457 

Burlington, N. J., visits to, II, 215, 357-359 

Burnham, Hiram, killed in assault on Fort 
Harrison, II, *218 

Burnside, A. E., possibilities of avoiding his 
imprisonment at Knoxville, I, 318; rein- 
forcements from, at Vicksburg, 456; the 
Ninth Corps to be returned to, 475; at Knox- 
ville, *497 ; instructions to, 437, 498 ; draws 
supplies from East Tennessee, 511, II, 
28, 29 ; desperate condition of, I, 511, 515; 
question of getting siipplies to, 513 ; fears 
for his safety, 515, 516, 523, n, 2, 11, 24, 32 ; 
Wheeler and Longstreet move against, I, 
515-518 ; advice to, 516, 517 ; encouragement 
for, 516, II, 12, 19 ; confidence of, 1, 516, 523 ; 
despatch from, 517 ; cut off from tele- 
graphic communication. 523 ; message to, 
concemins: attack on Bragg, 524 ; mea- 
sures for relief of, II, 2, 4, 19, 24, 25, 27 ; lack 
of supplies at Knoxville, 26, 27 ; peril of, 
27; J. H. Wilson and C. A. Dana work 
through to, 28; pursuit of Longstreet 
by, 32 ; superseded by Foster, 32, 43 ; de- 
clines Sherman's oft'er of assistance, 37 ; 
question of his restoration to dutv, 48; 
commanding the Nintli Corps. 56, 100 ; at 
Annapolis, 56, 57 ; reinforces the Army of 
the Potomac, 58, 62, 408; assigned to defense 
of road south from Bull Run, 63 ; advances 
fi'om Annapolis, 65 : orders Swinton to be 
shot, 70 ; guarding the railroad at Warren- 



INDEX 



469 



ton, 99; notified of the successftil crossing 
of the Rapidan, 99, 404 ; crosses the Rapi- 
dan. 107 ; m battle of the Wilderness, 109- 
111, 113, lU, 405; loses a colored division, 
110; orders for movement, May 7, 1H64, 
120; ordered to support Warren, 123; 
crosses the Ny, 12G, 127 ; in battle of 
Spottsylvania, 126, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 
136, 137 ; orders to, for cooperation with 
Hancock, 134, 135 ; movement of Warren 
and Wright to left of, 140; ordered to 
draw Lee from his intrenchments, 145 ; 
attacks on, 147; held at Spottsylvania, 
147; Lee'8 policy to attack Wright and, 
147 ; at Guiney's Station, 148 ; ordered to 
Jericho Bridge, 148 ; sent to New Bethel 
Church, 148; moves to the North Anna. 
150, 151; movement. May 27, 1864, 156; on 
the Pamunkey, 157, 158 ; position. May 30, 
1864, 158, 161 ; attack on, June 1, 1864, 164 ; 
movement to Bethesda Church, 165; at- 
tack on, June 2, 1864, 165 ; failure to follow 
up advantaare, 165 ; orders for Juno 3, 1864, 
166 ; in battle of Cold Harbor, 167 ; opin- 
ion of the situation at Cold Harbor, 168 ; 
movement, June 4, 1864, 177 ; crosses the 
Chickahominv, 181, 182 ; in investment of 
Petersburff, 191, 198-203; his division 
commanders at Petersburg, 202 ; his 
commands, 382; military and personal 
characteristics, 383; at crossing of the 
Rappahannock and the Alexandria rail- 
road, 404 ; remarkable march of his troops, 
405 
Burnsville, Miss., operations at, I, 273, 338, 

340, 341, 342 
Burton, H. S., 11, 100 

Butler, B. F., commanding the Army of the 
James, II, *56 ; reinforced by GiUiuore, 58, 
62, 406; Strength on the James, 58, 62; to 
operate on the south side of the James, 58, 
62, 402, 403; to move on Richmond via the 
James River, 59, 62 ; movements against 
Petersburg, 59, 142, 410; visits to, 60, 185, 
186, 404 ; to seize City Point, 62, 402 ; coop- 
eration with Meade, 63, 401, 402, 408 ; moves 
up the James, 65, 66, 73, 406 ; embarks at 
Fort Monroe, 73 ; seizes City Point and 
Bermuda Hundred, 73, 119, 406 ; his objec- 
tive point, 73, 402 ; neglects to attack Pe- 
tersburg, 73; sends cavalry against the 
Woldon railroad, 73, 133, 406; operations 
at Dniry's Bluff, 73, 74, 140, 142. 144, 407 ; 
reduction of his force, 74 ; his position 
likened to a " bottle," 74-76, 407, 408 ; his 
services in the war, 76; Sheridan ordered 
to draw supplies fi-om, 77 ; Sheridan com- 
municates with. 78, 79, 406 ; moves accor- 
ding to programme of spring campaign, 
106; fears that Lee would crush, 119, 121, 
175; cooperation of W. F. Smith's (18th) 
corps with, 154, 178. 179. 185. 186, 402 ; rem- 
forcements fi-om, at Cold HarV)or, 163; m- 
quiries about his position, 178; Abercrom- 
bie ordered to send troops to, 178 ; letter 
to, Jvme 11, 1864, 178 ; reinforcements for, 
179, 402, 413-415; instructions to. concern- 
ins: movement on Petersburg, 179; di- 
rected to provide for crossing of the army 
at City Point, 179, 185 ; sinks stone boats 
in the James. 182, 185 ; movement agamst 
Petersburg, 186, 413 ; informed as to Han- 
cock's movements, 186 ; bridges the James 
at Deep Bottom, 199, 414 ; warned to expect 
attack from Lee, 199 ; failure of movement 



on north side of the James, 225, 422 ; defeat 
of, Oct. 13, 1864, 225, 422 ; operations against 
Fort Fisher, 249, 262-267, 435-437 ; returns to 
FortMonroe,267; Adm. Porter's bitter com- 
plaints of, 267 ; on the Confederate army, 
292 ; instructions to, for spring campaign, 
1864, 401 ; proposed investment of Rich- 
mond by, 402; importance of his suc- 
ceeding in movement against Richmond, 
403; sends cavalry to West Point, 406; 
reconnoiti'rs toward the Petersburg and 
Richmond railroad, 406 ; sums up his oper- 
ations, 406, 407 ; forces the Chickahominy, 
406, 407 ; telegram to Stanton, May 9, 1864, 
406, 407 ; engagement with Hill, 407 ; forced 
back, 414 ; threatens Richmond, 420; letter 
to, Dec. 6, 1864, 435, 436; superseded by 
Ord, 439 

Butler, M. C, II, 102 

Butler, W. O., at Monterey, I, *80, 82,85 ; suc- 
ceeds Geu. Scott, 135 

Buzzard's Roost, Ga., operations against 
Johnston at, II, 422, 423 

Cahawba River, Wilson destroys bridge 
over, II, 459 

Cairo, 111., Grant's headquai-ters at, I, 211, 
213; expedition to Paducali from, 214; ex- 
chaua;ing prisoners at, 216, 217; movement 
against Belmont from, 219 ; return to, 227 ; 
meetings with rebel officers at, 230 ; for- 
mation of the District of, 233; securing 
flotilla at, 235, 236 ; pro\n8ioniug Fort Don- 
elson prisoners at, 258; Nelson sends 
troops to, 262 ; Gen. CuUum at, 267 ; tel- 
egraphic coramvtnication with Paducah 
and Smithland, 268 ; holding: the Missis- 
sippi at, 352 ; Grant ordered to, 489, 490 ; 
Adm. Porter at, 498 

California, nea;otiations for cession of, I, 
115 ; purchase 134 ; flush times in, 159-161 ; 
the journey to, in 1852, 160 ; gambling in, 
161, 165, 166 

Camargo, Max., arrival of troops at, I, 76, 
77 79 93 

Carnden, Ark., Steele at, II, 427 

Campbell, J. A., Confederate Assistant Sec- 
retary of War, II, *287; Peace Commis- 
sionei-, 287 

Camp Jackson, Mo., seizure of, 1,187-190; 
exchange of prisoners fi'om, 216, 217 

Camp Salubrity, I, 31, 32, 34-36 

Canby, E. R. S., Buell declines to serve 
under, II, 50; succeeds Banks in com- 
mand, *81, 142 ; commanding Department 
of the Gulf, 81 ; proposed movement on 
Savannah, 230, 231 ; hampered by Price's 
movements, 232 ; strength, 274; reinforced 
by Thomas, 274, 279, 443; ordered to 
move against Mol)ile. Montgomery, and 
Selma, 274, 277, 279, 444 ; to campaign in 
the interior from the Gulf, 275; com- 
manding at New Orleans, 277 ; movement 
from Mobile Bay, II, 278, 367, 442, 444, 446, 
448; dilatoriness of, 278-280, 366; letter 
fi-ora Grant to, 279, 280 ; asks the War De- 
partment to assign Granger to command, 
279 ; advised not to put Granger in com- 
mand, 279; lu-ged to destroy railroads, 
280 ; military character, 372 ; killed in the 
Lava Beds, 372 ; commanding MiUtary 
Division of the West Mississippi, 427; 
orders A. J. Smith to dis]>erse rebels on 
the Mississippi, 427 ; sends Granger to 
cooperate with Farragut at Mobile, 427 ; 



470 



INDEX 



ordered to reinforce the armies before 
liiclimoud, 4'27 ; proposal to reinforce, 429 ; 
proposal that lie hold the Mississippi 
River, 429 ; proposal that he get Coliun- 
Ijiis Ga., 429; expeditions from Baton 
Koujre and Vicksburg, 431; A. J. Smith 
ordered to report to, 439; informed of 
Wilson's operations, 459 ; Taylor and Kir- 
h\ Smith surrender to, 459 

Caiie River, battle of, II, 426 

Canton, Miss., the enemy's strength at, I, 
4i',i; Osbaud's operations near, II, 481 

Cape Fear River, defenses of the, II, 2G1, 
2(;4; operations on, 280, 281, 435, 437, 441, 
442 ; dirticulty of blockading, 435 ; in Union 
control, 439 

Cape Girardeau, Mo., headquarters at, I, 
211 ; meeting (ien. Prentiss at, 212 

Capron, Horace, reports Stoneman lost, II, 
*91 

Carlin, W. P., reports to Hooker at Lookout 
Mountain, II, *10 

" Carondelet," the, at Fort Donelson, 1, 24G ; 
riuiiiing the batteries at Vicksburg, 386 

Carr, E. A., at battle of Port Gibson, I, 
*403; advances to Bolton, 426; at Cham- 
pion's Hill, 428, 433; at Edward's Station, 
435 ; in battle of Black River Bridge, 438, 
439 

Carroll, Samuel S., Ms command, II, 97; 
wounded in the Wilderness, 108 : in battle 
of the Wilderness, 108,*113; recommended 
for brigadier-generalship, U. S. Vols., 139 

Carrollton, La., Grant reviews Banks's 
army at, I, 487 

Carruth, Sumner, II, 100 

Casey, Silas, at Chapultepec, I, ^120 

Casey, T. L,., report on the powder-boat at 
Fort Fisher, II, 263 

Cassville, Qa., pursuit of Johnston to, II, 
423 

Catharpin Furnace, Va., operations at, II, 
115, 126 

Catharpin road, movements on the, II, 110, 
126, 127 

Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac, or- 
ganization of, II, 99 

Cedar Creek, movements, engagements, etc., 
at, II, 144, 222, 223, 403, 411, 420 

Cedartown, Ga., Hood's movement by, II, 
430 

Cerralvo, Mex., Taylor's troops at, T, 79 

Cerro Gordo, Mex., battle of, I. 99-102 

Chaffin's Bluff (Farm),Va., Ord's action at, 
II, 218, 421 

Chagres River, tl-avel on the. I, 154, 155 

Chalco, Lake, I, 108, 109 

Chamberlain, J. L., wounded before Peters- 
burg, and commissioned brigadier-gen- 
erar, II, 189 

Chambersburg, Pa., battle of, 11,54; Mc- 
Causland destroys, 204, 283, 417 

Chambersburg, Va., Stoneman at, II, 458 

Chambliss, J. R., II, 102 

Champion's Hill, Miss., topography, I, 426, 
429, 431 ; battle of, 428-436, 443, 447, II, 173 

Chancellorsville, Va., movements and inci- 
dents at, II, 101, 103, 111, 120 

Chandler, Zachariah, I, 153 

Chapman, George H., II, 90 

Chapultepec, capture of, I, 116, 118, 120; 
Mexican celebration of its capture, 131 

Charles City Court House, Va., movements 
at, II, 182, 410 

Charleston, S.C, firing on FortSumter from, 



I, 183 ; Sherman plans seizure of points 
near, II, 273 ; Sherman proposes to threat- 
en, 276, 429, 430; the hotbed of secession, 
276 ; threatening, 277 ; its defensive posi- 
tion, 277; Sherman passes by, 277 ; evacua- 
tion of, 278, 283, 442, 444; Foster's expedi- 
tion to destroy railroad between Savannah 
and, 431 

Charlestown, W. Va., expedition against 
Virginia and Tennessee railroad from, II. 
58, 61, 403; meeting of Sheridan and Grant 
at, 214, 215, 419 

Charlotte, N. C, movements near, II, 444, 

•458 
Charlottesville, Va., Sheridan's operations 
at, II, 77, 176, 221, 293, 294, 445 ; Hunter's 
operations at, 152, 176, 411, 412 ; proposed 
iuuctiou of Sheridan and Hunter at, 192, 
194, 410 ; necessity of breaking railroad 
communications at, 409 
Chattahoochee River, the, Johnston retreats 
across, II, 87, 423 , Sherman gains posses- 
sion of, 87, 423, 424; Sherman proposes tak- 
ing, 231, 430 
Chattanooga, Tenn., possibilities of early 
capture of, I, 261, 318, 333 ; abandoned by 
Johnston, 267 ; Confederate lines at, 304, 
502, .503 ; possibilities of avoiding the battle 
of, 318; boundary of HaUeck's district, 
326; Bragg's movement toward, 329, 332; 
Buell's march to, 332, 333 ; orders for the 
relief of, 487 ; Rosecrans driven into, 487, 
488, 494; C. A. Dana at, 491, II, 28; scheme 
to capture, T, 492; Bragg's possession of 
roads into, 495; strategic importance, 495 ; 
lack of supplies at, 495, 496, 503 ; to be held 
at all hazards, 497; desperate condition, 
497; Grant at, 499, II, 26, 42; building 
steamboats at, I, 499, II, 19, 34; personal 
inspection of the situation at, I, 501 ; the 
enemy's view of the garrison at, 501, 507 ; 
topography, 502 ; the Army of the Cumber- 
land besieged in, 503 ; securing the bridge 
at, 505 ; opening a line of supplies for, 505- 
509 ; the picket-line at, 509, 510 ; importance 
of expelling the enemy from the neigh- 
borhood of, 515 ; lack of draught animals 
at, 515, 516; meeting between Grant and 
Sherman at, 518 ; Grant's orders for bat- 
tle, 518, 519 ; plan of Thomas's assault at, 
520 ; Hooker's route to, 521 ; plans of the 
battle, 522 ; Sherman's trip to Bridgeport 
from, 523 ; Bragg advises withdrawal of 
non-combatants from, II, 1 ; battle of, 12 
et seq. ; the tunnel at, 13; Sheridan's and 
Wood's charge at, 15, 16 ; troops participa- 
ting in battle, 19 ; consideration of the vic- 
tory at, 20 ; Bragj?'s mistakes at, 20, 29, 30 ; 
the battle fought as planned, 23 ; secured 
to the National troops, 24, 53; Sherman's 
arduous services at, 27 ; numbers engaged 
at, 29 ; Union and Confederate losses, 29, 
31 ; communication between Bridgeport 
and, 29; importance of the victory, 30; 
perilous situation of the Union army, 
30 ; Thomas in command at, 32, 82, 238, 
256; trip from NashviUe to, 34; Sherman 
at, 54, 57 ; plans for Sherman's advance 
from, 58, 61 ; the Army of the Cumberland 
at, 82 ; Sherman accumulates supplies at, 
82, 83; Sherman sends troops to, 232, 431; 
Thomas ordered back to Nashville and, 
233; Sherman proposes to garrison, 237; 
reinforced, 238; Sherman authorized to 
give up the railroad from Atlanta to, 238, 



INDEX 



471 



430; Sherman sn^gCRta destrnction of rail- 
road from Atlauta to, 252, 430; giianliug 
the road from Nashville to, sso ; Thomas 
warned against losing the road to, 257 ; 
pontoon bridge wrongly sent to, 2{)(»; 
Hooker's aehievemeuts at, 382; Union 
holdings near, 398; Sherman moves 
against Johnston from, 422 
ChattanoogaCreek.theNatioual position on, 

I, 4y4, II, 10 ; topography, 502, 603, 50S) ; the 
picket-line at, I, 509, 510; Confederate hon- 
ors for the opposing General at, 509, 510 ; 
plans for crossing, 519, 522 ; position of 
Army of the Cumberland on, II, 2 ; opera- 
tions on, 9, 10 ; Hooker's detention at, 14, 
18; destruction of bridge over, 14, 18; 
Hooker crosses, 19 

Chattanooga Valley, the National troops in- 
trenched at, I, 494 ; Confederate lines in, 
503; orders to concentrate troops iu, 519 ; 
plan for Hooker to get into, 519, 520 ; plan 
to get Hooker past, 521, 522; the Federal 
lines in, II, 10; Hooker's work in, planned 
beforehand, 23; Hooker's achievements 
at, 383 

Cheatham, B. F., with Hood at Franklin, 

II, 254; pursues Stanley, *255 

Cheraw, S. C, valuable property stored in, 
II, 283, 284; Sherman marches from Co- 
lumbia to, 284 

Chesapeake and Ohio canal, necessity of 
securing the, II, 419 

Chesapeake Bay, as source of supplies, II, 
62; Batler's movements on, 73; country 
of the tributaries of, 96 ; breaking of tele- 
graph cable across, 204 

Chesterfield, Va., Sheridan rejoins the Army 
of the Potomac at, II, 80 

Chesterfield Ford, the Second Corps at, 
148, 153 

Chewalla, Tenn., movements at, I, 344, 348 

Chicago, 111., collecting boats fi-om, I, 386; 
treason in the Democratic Convention at, 

II, '217 

Chickahominy River, actions, movements, 
etc., on the, II, 54, 78, 79, 96, 157, 165, 160, 
174, 175, 177-179, 181, 182, 406-408, 410, 446 

Chickamauga, Ga., possibilities of avoid- 
ing the battle of, I, 318; battle of, 488; 
494; plan lor cavalry operations above, 

518 

Chickamauga Creek, 1, 502; operation^;, po- 
sitions, etc., on, 517, 519, II, 9, 10, 17, 18. 
Bee also NoiiTU Chickamauga; South 
Chickamauga. 

Chickamauga Station, Sherman's cavalry 
moves against, II, 7 „ „ , , 

Chickamauga Valley, plan of Hookers 
movements toward, 520 

Chickasaw, Ala., Wilson's expedition moves 

from, 458 ^ x i,o 

Chickasaw Bayou, road-making at, 1, 443, 

448 

Childs, Thomas, in battle of Palo Alto, I, 

Chillicothe, Mo., threatened by Price, 1, 208 ; 
Orant ordered to secure cash from banks 

ill- 209 . .. . ^ „ 

Chillicothe, O., early visit to, I, 9 
Cholera, outbreak on the Isthmus, I, 156, 

157 
Christ, Benjamin C, IT, 100 
Christian Association, at Vicksburg, I, 452 
Christiansburg, W. Va., Averell's oper- 
ations at, II, 411 



Chula, Va., Kautz's raid at, IT, 407 

Church, slavery supported in the, I, 17; 
treason in the, I, 17; "defilement" of a, 
in Menipliis, 324 

Church, Prof., favors Grant's seeking a 
ma1h('matic:il professorship, I, 30 

Churubusco, Mex., b.attle of, I, 109, 112 

Cigarettes, use of, in Mexico, I, 42 

Cincinnati, O., visits to, 1,9,24; failure to 
meet McClellan at, 193; trip fi-om Nasli- 
ville to, II, 48; Grant heaves Sheriium in, 
81; trail SI )orting Scliolicld's command to 
Annapolis from, 274 

Cipher despatches, trouble concerning, II, 
35-37 

Citico Creek, II, 2, 3, 7 

City Point, Va., Butler to seize, II, 62, 402; 
Butler captures, 73, 119, 406; iiontoons or- 
dered to, 159; Abercrombie to move to, 
177, 178; Halleck ordered to send rein- 
forcements to, 178 ; arrangements for the 
army to get below, 179, 180; W. F. Smith 
(18th Corps) sent to, via White House, 180, 
181, 185, 186, 410 ; Smith's action between 
Petei'sburg and, 186 ; Sheridan sends i)ris- 
ouers to, 193 ; Grant at, 215, 357, 419 ; Logan 
visits Grant at, 259; arrival of the Peace 
Commissioners at, 287 ; Meade at, cut oflf 
from communication with his headquar- 
ters, 297 ; the Engineer Brigade to remain 
at, 299; Sheridan reaches,300; the President 
at, 289, 290, 308, 310, 317, 320; meeting of 
Sherman and Lincoln at, 363; Kautz 
reaches, 407 ; the Sixth Corps ordered to, 
413; interruption of commuDication be- 
tween Washington and, 417; Grant leaves 
for Monocacy, 418; Grant leaves, on visit 
to Sheridan at Charlestown, 419 ; Scholield 
to draw upon, for supplies, 440 ; Shei-man 
ordered to go by water to, 440 ; dismounted 
cavalry sent to, 447; Parke commanding 
at, 447 ; Sherniau visits (jrant at, 449 

City Point and Petersburg railroad, con- 
struction of l)rauch between tiie Weldon 
railrood and, II, 421 

Claiborne Road, Va., Miles meets the en- 
emy at, II, 312 

Clarke, Newman S., at San Antonio, I, *111; 
at Churul)ueco, 112 

Clarksville, Tenn., proposal to take, I, 262; 
Confederate evacuation of, 262; visit to 
C. F. Smith at, 263, 264; capture of, 304 ; 
garrisoned liy Union troops, 317, 327 ; sur- 
render of, 330, 331 
Clay, Henry, Jesse R. Grant's admiration 

for, I, 5 
Cleburne, P. R., rear-guard for Bragg's re- 
treat, n, 25, 26 ; attack on, at Ringgold, 26 
Clermont County, O.. Jesse R. Grant set- 
tles in Point Pleasant, 1,4; the Simpson 
family in, 7 ; birth or U. S. Grant iu, 7 ; 
Jesse R. Grant removes to Bethel, 21 
Cleveland, Tenn. .movements near, 1, 512, 515, 

.517, 518, II, 25 
Clifton, Tenn., Fori'est moves toward, II, 

432 
Clinch, the river, II, 34 
Clinton, Miss., movements at, 1,419, 420,427 ; 

Grant goes to, 427 
Coalfield, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 407 
Cobb, Howell, Vice President, C. S. A., sur- 
renders at Macon, II, 459 
Cobb's Hill, Va., II, 451 
Coehorns, use of wooden, at Vicksburg, 1, 
452 



472 



INDEX 



Cold Harbor, Va., Swinton sentenced to be 
shot at. II, 70 ; march from the North Anna 
to, 80; Sheriilan's movements at, 159, 161, 
408 ; Lee's position near, 161 ; pursuit of 
the enemy toward, 161 ; importance of, 
162; advance on, 162-166; close proximitj' 
of the lines at, 163, 166; assault ordered 
for the 3d of June, 166; battle of, 166-172, 
408, 409; caring for the dead and wounded 
at, 169-171; regrets for the last assault at, 
171, 172; Warren withdraws to, 177; Union 
losses at battle of, 183 ; W. F. Smith sent 
to City Point from, 185, 186; dispropor- 
tion of Union and Confederate losses at, 
409; effect of the battle on the enemy, 410; 
movement from, 410 

Coldwater River, I, 375 

Cole's Ferrj^, Va., Ferrero crosses the 
Chickahomiuy at, II, 181 

Cole's Landing, Va., movement of troops to, 
II, 178, 180 

Colonies, the confederation of the, 1, 174 

Colorado River, Tex., early settlements on 
the, I, 48, 49 

Colored troops, behavior at Milllken's Bend, 
I, 456 ; massacre of, at Fort Pillow, II, 63, 
64, 425 ; Foi-rest's opinion of, 64 ; Biu-uside 
loses a division of, 110; at the Petersburg 
mine, 202 ; suggested for holding the Rio 
Grande, 400; cavalry expedition on the 
Peninsula, 407 ; First Regiment, Alabama, 
425 ; 3d U. S. Colored Cavalry, 431 

Columbia, S. C, Sherman's march on, II, 
277, 429, 441 ; Stoneman ordered toward, 
281, 442; Hampton abandons, 282 ; Sherman 
enters, 282. 441 ; burning of, 282, 283 ; Sher- 
man provides for the inhabitants of, 283; 
valuable property stored in, 283, 284; evac- 
uation of, 283 ; Sherman marches to Che- 
raw from, 284 

Columbia, Tenn., Buell's advance at, I, 274; 
Scholield falls back to, II, 254 ; skirmish at, 
254; pursuit of Hood to, 260; Forrest ap- 
pears before. 428 

Columbia, Va., Sheridan at, II, 294, 445 

Columbia River, ordered to the, 1, 161 ; Hud- 
son Bay Company's posts on, 162; over- 
flow of the, 162 ; mortality among Indians 
on the, 1C3, 164 

Columbus, Ala., capture of, II, 459 

Columbus, Ga., proposed movements 
against, II, 231, 429 

Columbus, Ky., troops sent from, to capture 
Paducah, I, 214; in Confederate posses- 
sion, 216; fortifications, 218, 265; Grant's 
desire to capture, 218 ; reported movement 
of enemy from, 219; C. F. Smith ordered 
against, 219; strength, 220; meetings with 
rebel officers at, 230 ; the Confederate line 
at, 232, 265 ; hindering reinforcements to 
Buckner from. 233; capture of, 304; re- 
pairing, holding, etc., railroads fi-om, 317, 
326-328, 352; meeting with Sherman at, 
355; Forrest's raid near, 3G0; abandoned 
as a base, 361 ; garrison at, 368 ; Grant re- 
ports to Stanton from. 489; Buford makes 
unsuccessful attempt to capture, II, 425 

Columbus, Miss., Hatch destroys the rail- 
road between Macon and, 1, 408 

Comstock, C. B., engineering work at Vick.s- 
burg, I, *450; entrusted with the cipher 
code II, -36 ; saves Grant and Meade from 
capture, 121 ; mission to Bermuda Hun- 
dred, 178, 180 ; chief engineer in Fort Fish- 
er expedition, 438 



Confederate Army, mode of estimating ita 
strength, I, 302, II, 183, 184 ; organization 
of, 101-104 ; desertions from, and demoral- 
ization in, 285, 286, 291-293, 297, 320, 321, 325, 
334, 335, 350, 351; Butler on the, 292. See also 

AkMY OrNOItTHERN VIRGINIA ; LEE, R. E. 

" Conestoga," the, action on the Tennessee, 
I, 240 ; at Fort Douelson, 247 

Confederate States of America, preliminary 
Congress of , 1, 180 ; organization of govern- 
ment, 181 ; the capital at Montgomery, 181 ; 
disclaim the Constitution of the United 
States, 183; military advantages compared 
with the North, 230, 479, II, 397,399; de- 
pression in, over fall of Fort Donelson, 
I, 260; lack of enthusiasm in the South- 
west, 261 ; examples of patriotism in, 320, 
321, 323-325; confiscation of debts due to 
Northern creditors, 325 ; northern advance 
of the armies of, 336; foreign powers and 
the, 484 ; the press in, II, 31. 54; claim vic- 
tories from the North, 54 ; importance of 
the Shenandoah Valley to, 204, 205, 207, 
209, 214, 220; importance of Vv'ilmington 
to, 261 ; mission of the Peace Commis- 
sioners from, 2S7-2SO; Grant refuses to 
recognize the government of, 288 ; impor- 
tance of the capital to, 291, 319, 320 ; hope- 
lessness of the cause after the Union 
army crossed the James, 332; morale of 
the armies of , 410 ; cutting the Confederacy 
in two, 430, 431. See also South. 

Congress. See UNITED STATES CONGRESS. 

Connecticut, the Grants in, I, 1, 5, 6 

Conner, David, visit to General Taylor, I, 
74, 75 

Conquest, a policy of, I, .304 

Conscription, resort to, in the North, I, 454 ; 
in the South, TI, 292, 352-354, 368, 399 

Constitution. See UNITED States Consti- 
tution. 

Consumption, in the Gr.ant familv, I, 23; 
Grant free from fears of, 36 ; death of S. 
S. Grant from, 172 

Contraband of war, what considered, 304 

Contreras, Max., battle of, I, 109-111; Gen. 
Pierce ininred at, 113, 114 

Cooke, John R., II, 102 

Cooper, J. F., Grant's fondness for works 
of, I, 20 

Coosa River, Hood on the, II, 429, 430 

Coosawhatchie River, Foster on the, II, 
432 

Corbin's Bridge, Va., Gregg and Wilson's 
action at, II, 109 ; Sheridan orders cavalry 
to occupy, 127 ; Early crosses, 127 

Cordova, Mex., I, 98 

Corinth, Miss., possibility of capture after 
the fall of Donelson, I, 261 ; importance 
of, 272, 309, 315 ; railroad communication 
with Jackson, 272; Confederate position 
at, 272,273, 312,314; contemplated advance 
on, 274; A. S. Johnston advances from, 
275,298; Johnston fortifies at, 298; Union 
advance on, 308, 312; topography, 309; 
delays in capturiug, 310; strengthening 
the troops at, 310; investment of, 313, 
314 ; Confederate evacuation of, 314, 315 ; 
Beauregard's device of cheering at, 315; 
Union occupation of, 315 ; the trophies of 
war at, 315; needless precautiem in ad- 
vancing on, 316 ; fortified by Halleck, 316 ; 
depletion of Halleek's army at, 317, 327 ; 
lost opportunities after its capture, 317, 
318 ; repairing railroad from Columbus to, 



INDEX 



473 



317; Grant's anomalous position at, 319 ; de- 
serted by its inhabitants, ;V2.i; Grant nt- 
called from Mempliis to, 325, 326 , retort i- 
fyinj?, 327 ; tlireati-ned li>y Van IJoru, 32'i ; 
minor battles in vicinity of, 328; coni- 
niuiiieation willi Columbus, 328; nieetinj^ 
Slieridan at, ;)o3 ; troops at, 335; advance 
of Van Dorii and Price on, 330 ; provisions 
for reinforcini^, 330-338; tlio enemy's de- 
termination to attaeli, 345 ; battle of, 315- 
3-19; value of tlie fortifications of, 31G; 
dani^er of rebel cajjlui-e of, :iiij; heavy 
losses at, 3iG, 318; resiUts of the battle, 
349; Grant's strength at, 349; movement 
on Grand Juuetiou from, 352; hoUlin.ii' 
Memphis and Charleston railroad a't, 352; 
Sherman starts from Memphis for, 511; 
Forrest escapes to, II, 428 
Corporal punishment in Ohio schools, 1, 13 
Corpus Christi, the Fourth Infantry arrives 
at, I. 39 ; a bath in the bay, 40, 41 ; the 
Mexican town of, 41, 42 ; assembling of thi^ 
armv of occupation, 44; military life at, 
47; trip to San Antonio from, 47-53; pre- 
parations for an advance from, 54 ; break- 
ing mules at, 54-57; advance of the army 
of invasion from, 59 ; review at, 73 
Corse, John M., in battle of Chattanooga, 

II, 13, 14 ; defense of AUatoona, 237 
Corse, M. D., II, 101 
Cortez, Hernan, road built by, at Cerro 

Gordo, I, 100 
Corwin, Thomas, attititdo toward the Mex- 
ican war, I, 45 
Cottage Hill, Miss., Sherman at, I, 350 
Cotton, demoralization of the troops by the 
trade in, I, 331, 332 ; working plantations 
for the N.ational benefit, 354 ; export of, 
from Wilmington, II, 435 
Cotton-gin, its intluence on slavery, I, 179 
Courtland, Ala., Hood relTeats toward, II, 

432 
Covington, Ky., visit to parents at, I, 193; 

plan of t )rd's operations near, II, 01 
Cox's Bridge, N. C, Sherman at, II, 442 
" Cracker line," establishing the, I, 505-509, 

II, 29 
Craig's Meeting-Kouse, Va., II, lOG 
Crawford, Samuel V/.,his command, II, 98; 
attacks Anderson at Spottsylvania, *123; 
sent to Tyler's assistance, 143 ; at .Tericho 
Ford, 149; iiinction with Crittenden, 150; 
in battle of Five Forks, 305, 306 
Criminal classes, dangers of the. North and 

South, II, 245 
Critics, a word about, 1, 128 
Crittenden, George, f)U excursion In Mcxi 

CO, 1, 142 et seq. 
Crittenden, T. L., at Shiloh, I, *287, 288; re- 
treats to Chattanooga, 494; question of 
his restoration to duty, II, 48; junction 
with Crawford and Warren, 150; crosses 
the North Anna, 150; engagement with 
Hill, 150 
Crocker, Marcellus M., promoted, brigadier- 
general, 1, 350 ; at Bruinsburg, 401 ; at Port 
Gibson, 400; at battle of Eajnnond, 415; 
as a commander, *416, 480; death of, 416; 
at battle of .Jackson, 421-423; near Bolton, 
426 ; in battle of Champion's Hill, 432, 433 
Crook, George, commanding in West Vir- 
ginia, II, *58, 403, 411 ; operations against 
the Virginia and Tennessee i-ailroad, 58, 
59, 61, 72, 403; moves according to pro- 
gramme of spring campaign, 106 ; junction 



with Avcrell, 181, 411; Hunter's junction 

Willi, 192, 195, 412 ; di'is en from Winchester 
by Early, 204; sent out between Jiurkes- 
viUe anil .relersville, 322; moves west of 
Farmville, 332; to tak<-. I,e\visbiiig, 403 

Cross, Trucman, killed b,\- Mexicans, I, '64 

Cruces, awaiting transportation at, [,155,156 

Cruft, Charles, supports Geary on Lo(djout 
(Ireek, II, '8; in battle of Lookout Moun- 
tain, 8, 9 ; serving under Hooker at Chat- 
tanooga, 20 

Crump's Landing, Tenn., operations at, I, 
272, 275, 277, 2S5, 290 

Cuautla, Mcx., visit to, 1, 145; arrested in, 
in; 

Cuernavaca, Mex., occupation of , 1, 133 ; visit 
to. 140, 147 

Cullum, G. "W., congratulates Grant on 
canture of Fort Donelson, I, 201 ; chief of 
stait'at Cairo, *267; Grant reports to, 267 

Culpeper Court House, Va., Grant's head- 
((uaiters at, il, 50, 52, 60; Grant leaves 
for the front, 105; troops ordered to 
Wasiiington via, 220; Grant's intention to 
tight Lee between Kiclimoiid and, 402 

Cumberland, Md., II, 204, 207, 417 

Cumberland Gap, I, 511, II, 32, 34 

Cumberland River, the, I. 215, 232-234, 242- 
244, 240, 254, 262, 265, 304, 317, 320, 511, II, 2.56, 
258, 428. 433 

Curtis, N. M., in expedition again.st Fort 
Fisher. II, "265, 200, 208 270, 437 

Curtis, S. R., put under Sherman's com- 
mand, I, *357 ; connnanding department 
of Kansas, II, 427 

Cashing, Caleb, member of court of inquiry 
in Gen. Scott's case, I, 135 

Custer, G. A., his command, 11,99: drives 
the enemy from Oatharpin Furnace to 
Todd's Tavern, '115 ; action at Hawes's 
Shop, 158; movement against Hampton, 
193; in battle of Ce;lar Creek, 223 ; com- 
mandin'j; cavalry division with Sheridan, 
294; ordered south of Appomattox Sta- 
tion, 335; engagement at Appomattox 
Station, 330 

Cutler, Lysander, his command, IT, 98; at- 
tacks Anderson at Spott^-ylvania, "123; 
fucceeds to command of Wadsworth'8 
corps, 123 ; his division transferred to 
Wright's corps, 138; at Jericho Ford, 149; 
driven back by Hill, 149 
Cynthiana, Ky., Morgan captures, II. 425 

Dabney's Mills, Va.. interview with Sheri- 
dan at, II, 301,302; Grant's headquartera 
at, 310 ; Humiihreys at, 451 

Dahlgren. J. A., connnanding on the South 
Carolina and Georgia coasts, II, '273; to 
seize points near Charleston, 273 

Dallas, Ga., operalions at and near, 11,86, 
423, 430 

Dalton, Ga., ])lan for operations between 
Cleveland and, 1, 517, 518 ; Bragg's retreat 
toward, II, 25 ; operations against rail- 
roads at, 27, 92,430; Thomas ordered to 
capture, 43; Johnston confronting Sher- 
man at, 48, 57,422; .lohnston's position at, 
83, 399 ; Schofleld's movenaent from Knox- 
ville to, S3; McPaerson's movement from 
Huntsville to, 83, 84; strength of, 84; 
abandimed by.Tohnston,85 ; Wneelercuts 
railroad between Kesaca .and, 92 ; Sherman 
drives Johnston out of, 140; repulse of 
Wheeler at, 424 



474 



INDEX 



Dana, Charles A., In the Vicksburff cam- 
paign, I, *40(i; sent to Rosecraus's head- 
quarters, 488 ; in Chattanooga, 491 ; com- 
nniuicatiou 1(> ^(tanton, 491, 492 ; despatch 
ti-om, 517 ; at Chattanooga during the bat- 
tle, II, 28 ; atvDUipauii's Wilsonfrom Chat- 
tanooga to Kuoxvllle, 28 

Daniel, j., II, 101 

Danville, Miss., troops at, I, 335 

Danville, Va., movements at and near, II, 
322, 32:5, 377, 444, 453, 454, 458 

Danville road, movements on and against 
the. If, 140, 231, 299, 301, 310,322,324,407, 
447,449,450,453; Lee's avenue of escape, 
291, 296, 303, 304, 315, 316 

Darby road, the, Kautz's movement on, II, 
218; Butler's mistalio on, 225 

Davies, H. E., Jr., his command, II, 99 ; cap- 
tures at PainesviUe, *324, 325, 447 

Davies, T. A., I, 335 

Davis, Jefferson, on the threatened war, I, 
*178 ; head of the Southern rebellion, 181 ; 
visit to Bragg, 507, II, 20, 21 ; letter to A. 
8. Johnston, I, 297 ; exalted opinion of his 
own military talents, II, 22 ; disappointed 
at Johnston's policy, 227 ; appoints Hood 
to succeed Joiiustou, 227; denounces Gov. 
Brown and Uen. Johnston, 228; speeches 
at Palmetto and Macon, 227-230, 428, 429 ; 
appeals to the people of Georgia, 228, 229 ; 
views of Sherman's position, 228-230, 429 ; 
plan of operations in Kentucky and Ten- 
nessee, 229,236; feeling between Johnston 
and, 236, 280 ; agrees with Lee to abandon 
Richmond and Petersburg, 296 ; abandons 
Richmond, 316 ; capture of, 368, 370, 371, 
459; feelings of Grant and Lincoln to- 
ward, 368. 369 ; question of his capture in 
female attire, 370, 371 

Davis, Jefferson C, relieves Grant at Jeffer- 
son City, I, *210; position, Nov. 24, 18G3, 
11,11; ordered to Chickamauga Station, 
18; serving under Sherman at Chatta- 
nooga, 20; commanding the Foui-teeuth 
Corps, 234 ; captures Rome, 423 

Davis, Joseph R., II, 102 

Davis's Mills, Miss., pursuing the enemy 
to, 1, 345 

Decatur, Ala., troops sent to Buell via, I, 
330; rebuilding railroad from Nashville 
to, 513-515; Sherman ordered to send 
troops to, II, 39; plan for McPherson to 
cross the Tennessee at, 83 ; operations be- 
tween Atlanta and, 90; Sherman's line at, 
93; garrisoned by Thomas, 238; Hood 
camps near, 239 ; Thomas aljandons, 250, 
250 ; Rousseau reinforces Sherman at, 424 ; 
Hood's base at, 429 ; Hood fails to captui'e, 
432 

Decatur, Miss., Sherman's narrow escape 
at, II, 41 

Dechard, Tenn., Forrest cuts the railroad 
at, II, 428 

Deep Bottom, Va., Butler bridges the James 
at, II, 199, 414; movements of troops at, 
199, 201 ; extent of the Union lines from, 
231, 415 ; Merritt sti'ikes the enemy at, 322 ; 
action, July 28, 1804, 415 

Deer Creek, Adm. Porter's explorations on, 
1,377 

Deerfield, O., the Grants in, I, 3 

Delano, Susannah, I, 2 

Delaware, represented in Confederate Con- 
gress, I, 180; fails to pass ordinance of 
secession, 180 



De Loche, , hospitality of, I, 321-323 

Democratic Convention of 1864, declares the 
war a failure, II, 217 

Democratic Party, the Simpsons and the, I, 
6 

Demopolis, Ala., Polk retreats toward, II, 
41 

Denison, Andrew 'W., II, 98 

Dennis, Elias S., defeats a force near Me- 
don, I, 332 

Dent, Ellen, I, 26 

Dent, Emma, I, 26 

Dent, Frederick T., early friendship with, 
I, 26 ; sent to make transportation ar- 
rangements for the Eigliteeuth Corps, II, 
178, 179 

Dent, Julia, early friendship and affection 
for, 1, 20, 29, 30 ; engaged to, 29, 30 ; mar- 
ried to, 153 

Department of Arkansas, embraced in Sher- 
man's command, II, 399. See also De- 

PART.-VIENT OF THE TRANS-MISSISSIPPI. 

Department of Kansas, 8. R. Ctirtis com- 
manding iu, II, 427 

Department of North Carolina, Schofleld as- 
signed to command the, II, 439 

Department of the Cumberland, merged in 
the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
I, 491, II, 81 ; Thomas commanding, 81 

Department of the Gulf, Banks command- 
ing, II, 01, 401 ; Banks succeeded by Can- 
by, 81 ; Department of the Trans-Missis- 
sippi transferred to, 81 ; constant demand 
for troops by, 84 ; concentration of stores 
in the, at New Orleans, 234 ; troops with- 
drawn from, 416 

Department of the James, II, 401 

Department of the Mississippi, Halleck 
commanding the, I, 320 

Department of the Missouri, Halleck com- 
manding the, 1, 231 ; sends reinforcements 
to Vicksburg, 456 

Department of the Ohio, Buell in command, 
I, 233; merged in the Military Division of 
the Mississippi, 491, II, 81 ; Foster com- 
manding, 34, 43; Schofleld commanding, 
81 

Department of the South, Foster conamand- 
ing, II, 431 

Department of the Susquehanna, necessity 
of a supreme commander in the, II, 417 ; 
merged in the Middle Military Division, 
419 

Department of the Tennessee, Grant in 
command of the, I, 350; Special Orders 
No. 110, 390-392; merged in the Military 
Division of the Mississippi, 491, II, 81; 
McPhei'Son commanding, 81 

Department of the Trans-Mississippi, Steele 
commanding, II, 81 ; transferred to the 
Department of the Gulf, 81 

Department of Virginia and North Carolina, 
Ord assigned to command, II, 439 

Department of 'Washington, necessity of a 
sujireme commander in, II, 417; merged 
in the Middle Military Division, 419 

Department of West Virginia, expedition 
from the, II, 59 ; necessity of a supreme 
commander in, 417 ; merged In the Middle 
Military Division, 419 

De Shroon's, La., I, 400 

" De Soto," the, Ellet loses ihe, I, 387 

Destiny, man's inability to control, I, 76 

Destruction of rebel property, policy of, I, 
304, 305 



INDEX 



475 



Detroit, Mich., in parriRon at, 1, 153; Zacha- 
riali Chaudler elected mayor, 153 

Devens, Charles, In battle of Cold Harbor, 
II, 107 

Devin, T. C, bis command, II, 09, *29l 

"Diana," steamer, at Nashville, I, 204 

Dinwiddie Court House, Va., movements at 
and near, II, i!03-305, 447, 45(», 451 

Discipline, lacli of, among troops, I, 202 

Dismounted Rifles, the, I, 27 

District of Cairo, I, 233 

District of West Tennessee, Grant in com- 
mand of, I, 320 

Divine institution, a, I, 173 

Dix, Roger S., I, *.'.0 

Dodge, G. M., ordered to rebuild the rail- 
road between Nashville and Decatur, I, 
*513; skill in railroad building, 513-515; 
providing food and forage for his army, 
514; report of battle of Atlanta, II, 89; re- 
commended for promotion, 139 ; wounded, 
leaves the army, 234 

Doles, George, his command, II, 101 ; cap- 
ture of his division, 138 

Donaldson, J. L., commanding organization 
at Nashville, II, 256 

Dorchester, Eng., Matthew Grant emigi-ates 
from, I, 2 

Dorchester, Mass., settlement of Matthew 
Grant at, I, 1 

Douglas, Stephen A., Grant's party aflilia- 
tious with, I, *172; acquaintance with, 
191; debates with Lincoln, II, 50 

Dover, Tenn., operations and incidents at, 

I, 212, 245, 247, 253, 250, 257, 323 

Draft, the, recourse to, 1, 369, 481 ; resistance 

to, II, 210 
Draper, Simeon, in charge of abandoned 

and captured i in iperty at Savannah, II, 271 
Drury's Bluff, Va., operations at, II, 73, 74, 

140, 14:, 144, 188, 407 
Dublin, W. Va., destruction of the Virginia 

and Tennessee railroad at. II, 72, 140 
Duckport, La., canal project, I, 380, 381; 

Sherman's troops at, 392 
Duck River, Hood destroys bridges over, 

II, 200 

Duelling, views on, I, 37 

Duguidsville, Va., Sheridan's operations at, 
11,445 

Duncan, James, placed under arrest, I, 
n34 ; hostility to Gen. Scott, 134, 135 ; re- 
leased from arrest, 135 

Dunn, William M., sent to Caii-o with des- 
patches, I, 474 ; sent with letters to Sher- 
man at Savannah, II, 249 

Dunovant, J., II, 102 

Dutch Gap, Va., depot for exchange of pris- 
oners at, I, 469 

Eagle Bend, I, 377. 378 

Early, Jubal A. his command, 11, 101 ; in the 
V/ilderaess, *114; admission concerning 
the battle. 114, 115 ; succeeds to command 
of Hill's corps, 124; follows Army of the 
Potomac, 124; crosses the Po, 127; con- 
fronts Hancock. 128 ; attacks Union right, 
143 ; attacks Warren at Huntley Corners, 
158; repulsed, 159; sent to the Valley, 181; 
moves against Hunter, 195; movement 
against Washington, 195-197, 417 ; retreat 
to Strasburg, 204; drives Crook from Win- 
chester, 204^ Wright's pursuit of, 204, 417 ; 
instructions to commanders operating 
against, 206 ; strength, 208 ; confiouts Sher- 



idan in the Valley, 208; compared with 
SlKU'idan, 208; reinforccmentH lor, 209, 213, 
220, 420, 421; fears of aiiotlier attempt to 
capturt! Washington by, 2i:t; i>laii to have 
Sheridan attack, 214; attempts to destroy 
tlie railroatlat Martinsburg, 21f;; defeated 
at Opcciuan Creek, 216, 420; ))ad f^eneral- 
ship, 210; retreats to Fisher's Hill, 2](;; 
fears of reinforcements for, 218; prepares 
to stiike Sheridan at Harrisonburg, 220 ; 
pursues Sheridan, 221 ; defeated at Fish- 
er's Hill, 221, 420 ; intention to crush Sheri- 
dan, 222; intrenches, 223; in battle of Cedar 
Creek, 222, 223, 420; defeated by Sheridan, 
224, 420 ; losses in the Valley, 224 ; defeated 
bv Sheridan between Staunton and Char- 
lottesville, 293 ; movement on Washington, 
381 ; defeated at Strasburg, 420 ; defeated 
by Sheridan at Waynesboro, 445 

East and West, possibility of bickerings 
between, IT, 319, 320; lack of concert be- 
tween Union armies of the, 397 ; the armies 
of the, compared, 460 

East Chickamauga Creek, II, 26 

Eastport, Miss., situation of affairs, opera- 
tions, (;tc., at, I, 233, 244, 268, 317, 498, 512, 
II, 274, 278, aOC, 439, 444 

East Tennessee and Virginia railroad, ex- 
peditions against the, II, 403, 411 

Eaton, John, organizes negro labor, I, *354 

Ebenezer Church, Ala., Wilson defeats For- 
rest near, II, 458 

Edgefield, Tenn., Buell at, I, 263 

Education, lack of facilities for, in the West, 
I, 4, 7 ; U. S. Grant's early, 8, 11, 13 

Edward's Station, Miss., operations at and 
near, I, 415, 420, 424, 427, 428, 431, 477 

Egan, T. W., carries bridge over the North 
.\una, II, 149 

Egypt, Miss., Grierson's raid at, II, 434 

Eighteenth Army-corps, in battle of Cold 
Harbor, II, 167 ; strength, 178; sent to But- 
ler, 178-180; in Meade's command, 201 : in 
Petersburg mine affair, 201 ; threatening 
movement against Richmond, 218, 219; 
Weitzel assigned to command, 219 ; re- 
lieved by the Second Corps, 415 ; captures 
Fort Harrison, 421 

Eighth U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, I, 

44 

Electricity, changes -wrought by the appli- 
cation of, I, 176 

Elections, of 18.56, I, 170, 171 ; of 1860, 171-173; 
of 1862. 4S1 ; of 1804, II, 94, 234 

Eleventh Army-corps, I, !503 

Elkins's Ferry, Ark., junction of Steele and 
Thaver at, II, 426 

Elk River, Sherman detained at, I, 517 

EUet, Charles R., commanding the Marine 
Brigade, I, 387 ; runs batteries at Grand 
Guif, 387 ; action on Bed River, 387 

Ely's Ford, Va., II, 98, 116, 404 

Emorv, W. H., commanding Nineteenth 
Corps, II, *197; in Washington, 199; in 
battle of Cedar Creek, 223 

Engineer Brigade, the, II, 182, 299 

Engineer Corps, at Cerro Gordo, I. 100. 101 ; 
at San Antonio, 110, 111 ; at Chumbusco, 
113 

England, attitude on the blockade, 11,388; 
share in the Mexican imperial scheme, 388 ; 
attitude toward the United States in the 
war, 391, 392; the true relations between 
the United States and, 391, 392 ; treatment 
of her colonies, 392 



476 



INDEX 



" Essex," the gunboat, in capture of Fort 
Heury, I, 236, 237, 23'.) ; narrow escape of 
Porter and (iraut on board of, 236, 237 ; 
explosion of boiler on the, 239 

Etowah River, movements on the, 11,151, 

423 

Europe, the soldiers of, compared with 
those of the United States, II, 376 ; how 
the war was regarded in, 388 

European troops, compared with Sherman's 
army after Atlanta, II, 236 

Eustis, Henry L., II, 99 

Ewell, Richard S., commanding at Jeffer- 
son Barracks, I, *28; character, 28; ar- 
rives near Mine Run, II, 106 ; ordered to 
attack via the Orange Turnpike, 106 ; posi- 
tion, noon. May 9, 1864, 127; attacks the 
Union right, 143, 406 ; defeat of, 143 ; sent 
to the VaUey, 181 ; taken prisoner, April 
6, 1865, 332 ; views on the hopelessness of 
the war, 332 ; losses. May 12, 1864, 405 

Ewing, H. B., at Trenton, I, *523 ; in assault 
on Missionary Ridge, II, 6 

Executive Mansion, Grant receives his 
commission as lieutenant-general at the, 

11. 44, 45 

Explosive musket-balls, use of, at Vicks- 
burg, I, 451 

Farming, Grant's early training in, I, 8, 9, 

12, 13; experiment at Fort Vancouver, 
161, 162 ; near St. Louis, 167, 168. 

Farmington, Miss., Pope's engagement at, 

I, 313 

Farmville, Va., Lee orders rations fi-om 
Danville to. II, 322, 323 ; the Richmond and 
Danville railroad at, 328; Read at, 330; 
movement of Wright and Crook west of, 
332; Ord's position between Burkesville 
Junction and, 332, 454; the Confederates 
run their trains olf at, 332 ; Grant at, 333, 
335, 454, 4.55 ; an incident of the war at, 335, 
350; Sheridan's plan to destroy the South 
Side railroad at, 445 ; the Sixth Corps at, 
454 ; Read's action at, 454 

Farragut, David G., passes the batteries at 
Port Hutlson, I, *387 ; visit from, 387 ; op- 
erations at Mobile, 11,400, 401, 427 

Fayetteville, N. C, movements at and near, 

II, 277, 284, 285, 441, 444 

Fernandina, Fla., in Federal possession, II, 
54, 398 

Ferrero, Edward, his command, II, 100, *143 ; 
guarding road from Spottsylvanla to 
Fredericksburg, 143, 144; crosses the 
Chickahominy, 181; in the Petersburg 
mine atfair, 202 

Fever and ague. Grant incapacitated by, I, 
168 

Fevers, outbreak of, before Vicksburg, I, 

;J82 
Field, C. W^., II, 101 
Field telegraph, the, II, 117, 118 
Fifteenth Army-corps, at the Yazoo River, 

I, 366; left wing of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, 390; at Bruinsburg, 401 ; at Cham- 
pion's Hill, 428; in operations west of 
Chattanooga, 11,7; commanded by Gen. 
Logan, 234 ; in right wing of Sherman's 
army, 234 

Fifth Army-corps, crosses Germanna Ford, 

II. 97, 98, 404 ; ordered to the South Anna, 
148, 406 ; position. May 26, 1864, 153 ; or- 
dered toward Hanover, 155 ; instructions 
to Meade for movement of the, 180; to 



seize Long Bridge, 180 ; in investment of 
Petersbm-g, 191, 413 ; captures the Weldon 
railroad, 211 ; in battle of White Oak Road, 
299; in advance on Five Forks, 304,452; 
Warren superseded by Grittin in command, 
306, 452 ; in pursuit at Five Forks, 307 ; sent 
across Hatcher's Run, 307, 422 ; intrenched 
near JetersvLlle, 323,454; movement via 
Prince Edward's Court House, 332,454; 
meets the enemy at Mine Run, 404 ; march 
toward Spottsylvanla Court House, 405; 
takes possession of the Weldon railroad, 
421; to move on the Vaughn road, 450; 
to reinforce Sheridan, 452 ; in pursuit to 
Appomattox, 454-456 ; designated to re- 
ceive paroles of Lee's anny, 457. See also 
Griffin; Warren 

Fifth U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, I, 44 

Finegan, Joseph, II, 102 

First Army-corps, Army of Northern Vir- 
ginia, organization of, II. 101 

First Army-corps (Union), Hancock ordered 
to organize the, II, 226 

First U. S. Dragoons, in Mexican war, I, 

105 

Fisher, Joseph W., II, 98 

Fisher's Hill, Va., Early's retreat to, II, 216 ; 
Sheridan routs Early's cavalry at, 221, 420 

Fish River, movement of the Sixteenth 
Corps to, II, 458 

Fitzhugh, R. H., II, 100 

Five Forks, Va., movements of Humphreys 
and Warren toward, 299 ; plan to capture, 
300, 301, 303 ; Sheridan's advance on, 303- 
300, 451 ; Pickett sent to reinforce, 304 ; 
battle of, 304, 306, 307, 451, 452 ; Merritt at, 
307 ; fears that Lee would attempt to re- 
capture, 308 

Five-Mile Creek, McClernand at, I, 413 

Flag Pond Battery, captiu-ed by Curtis's 
brigade, II, 265 

Flamingo Island, cholera hospitals on, I, 
156, 157 

Flat Rock, Ky., visit to, I, 10 

Florence, Ala., Sherman arrives at, I, 512; 
aarrisoned by Thomas, II, 238; Hood 
crosses the Tennessee at, 240, 432 ; Hood's 
base at, 240, 429 

Florence, Tenn., gunboats at, I, 244 

Florida, no claim to the right of secession, 
1,174; secession of , 183 ; Federal holdings 
in, II, 54, 398 

Florida, Mo., moving against Harris at, I, 
200, 201 

Floyd. John B., Secretary of War, I, *181; 
scatters the army and war material, I, 
181,253; commanding at Fort Donelson, 
*241 ; flight from Fort Donelson, 254, 257, 
258 ; character, 253, 254, 267 

Folly Island, S. C, Federal possession of, II, 
53, 398 

Foote, Andrew H., commanding gimboats 
on the Tennessee River, I, *235; coin- 
cides with Grant's plan of campaign, 235 ; 
in expedition against Fort Henry, 236; 
operations at Fort Donelson, 244, 247-250 ; 
wounded, 248; visit to, on the flagship, 
249, 250 ; congratulated by Halleck, 260 

Forage, policy regarding, 1, 304, 305 ; collect- 
in;;, 353 

Ford's Station, Va., Sheridan's movement 
toward Petersburg from, II, 453 

Ford's Theatre, Gen. and Mrs. Grant in- 
vited to accompany the President to, II, 
357 



INDEX 



477 



" Forest Queen," the, running the batteries 
at Vicksburn', I, 386 

Forrest, Nathan B., escape of, from Port 
Donelson, I, "255, is?; raid on (irjiut's 
cominunicatious, ;i(iO ; \V. Hooy Sir.itli sent 
against, II, 40; streuRth ami (iiiality of 
his cavalry, 40, 41 ; military ability, 41, 57, 
229, 278; defeats NV. Sooy Smith, 41 ; force 
in the West, 57 ; rai<I in Tennessee, C:s, -128, 
432 ; captures Fort Pillow, 63. 425 ; raid to 
Paducah, 63, 425; captiu'es Union City, G3, 
425; report of the capture of Fort Pillow, 
64 ; opinion conceruing negro soldiers, Oi ; 
defeats Sturgis, 197, 424; harasses Sher- 
man's rear, 197 ; defeated by A. J. Smith. 
198, 425; operations in Tennessee and 
Kentucky, 229, 236 ; capture of gunbonts 
by, 229, 432 ; danger of his crossing the 
Cumberland, 257; operations m Missis- 
sippi, 278, 399, 424 ; raids of, 354, 355 ; ex- 
hausted by his success, 424 ; crosses the 
Tennessee near Waterloo, 428; skirmish 
at Pulaski, 428 ; captures garrison at Sul- 
phur Branch trestle, 428; escapes to 
Corinth, Miss., 428; junction with Hood, 
432; captures at Johnsonville, 432; sur- 
prised by Grierson at Verona, 434 ; W ilson's 
raid against, 368, 458 ; defeated at Selma, 

Fort Anderson, N. C, Union occupation of, 

II, 441 ,^ ^^ 

Fort Blakely, Ala., carried by assault, II, 

367, 458 ^ -r ^. 

Fort Brown, Tex., building of, I, 63, 64; 

siege of, 66; relief of the gaiTison, 72 
Fort Caswell, N. C, blown up by the enemy, 

II, 270, 275, 439 . ^ „ .^, 

Fort de Russy, La., captured by A. J. Smith, 

II, 426 
Fort Donelson, Tenn., possible results of the 
capture of, I, 177 ; Confederate position 
at, 232 ; strategic value of, 233, 244 ; hinder- 
ing reinforcements to Ciiekner from, 233; 
proposal to capture, 241 ; situation, 212, 
243 ; investment of, 243 et seq. ; march from 
FortHeury to, 214; the gunboats :■!, 244- 
250 ; the National line at, 245 ; sufferings 
of the troops at, 245. 249; hospital ar- 
rangements at, 246 ; visit to Foote on the 
flag-ship at, 249, 2.-0; Confederate sortie 
at,' 250-252 ; Confederate couuiil of war at, 
254; surrender of , 254-258 ; escape of pris- 
oners at, 257 ; burying the dead at, 257 ; 
numbers of Confederate and National 
troops at, 258 ; rccei\iug reiuforcemcuta 
at, 258 ; Halleck's views on the capture of , 
260 ; effect of its fa! 1 , 260-262, 303, 304 ; John- 
ston's opinion concerning, 267 ; orders to 
leave a small garrison at, 268 ; garrisoned 
by Union troops, 317, 327 ; under Col. Ma- 
son's command, 330, 331 ; attempted cap- 
ture of, by the enemy, and repulse, 331 
Fort Fisher, N. C, proposed movemen 
against, II, 232 ; Grant's disbelief in But- 
ler's scheme, 249; expeditions against, 
249 261-270, 435-439; situation, 261, 264; 
captiu-e of English blockade-runners at, 
262; strength of, 204; Gen. Whiting com- 
manding at, 264; reinforcements from 
Kichmoiid for, 265. 266; extent of the 
works. 269, 270; captures, casualties, etc., 
at, 270; Secretary Stanton goes to, 270; 
capture of, 274, 277, 438, 439; Union forc^e 
at, 274; Sherman informed of the tall ot, 
277 ; Terry's services at, 384 ; importance 



of securing, 435 ; Schofleld sent to, 439 ; 
tU-ant visits, 440; Union garrison at, 441 
Fort Gaines, Ala., surrender of, II, 427; 
movement of the Sixteenth Corps from, 

■l''5H . ^ J. 

Fort Gilmer, Va., Lee reinforces troops 

about, II, 219 ; Union defeat at, 421 
Fort Gregg, Va., capture of, II, 311 
Fort Harrison, Va., capture of, II, 218, 219, 

■I'-^l 

Fort Heiman, Ky., operations at, and cap- 
ture of, I, 232, 234. 237, 239, 266, II. 432 

Fort Henry, Tcnn., location, I, 2;s2, 237 ; ad- 
vanta."-e of securing, 233; hindering leiii- 
Ibreements to Buckner from, 233; steps 
toward its captm-e, 234 ; proposal to cap- 
ture, 235; expedition against, 236--39; 
defenses of, 237; capture of, 239, 266; 
<4raut ordered to fortify. 244, 267 ; march 
to Fort Donelson ivom, 241; eUect ol cap- 
ture of, 262. 303, 304; (jrant ordered to 
move back to, and remain at, 268; pro- 
posed expeditions from, 268 ^ .„ , 

Fort Holt, Ky., moving agamst Belmont 
from, I, 219; meetings with rebel othcers 

Fort Jessup, La., troops ordered to I, 27 
Fort McAllister, Ga., capture ot, II, 248,431 
Fort Monroe, vVa., in Union hands, II, 53, 
:i9,s ; Gillinore ordered to, 59, 402 ; visits to 
Butler at. 60,404; Butler embarks at, 73; 
the Nineteenth Corps ordered to Wash- 
ingt<mfrom, 197; Butler returns to, 267 ; 
second Fort Fisher expedition sails Irom, 
267, "68, 43S; Sherman arrives at, from 
Savannah, 374; Butler to move from, si- 
multaneously "with Meade, 402 : siege train 
and reinlorcemeuts sent to Terry at, 438; 
Scliotield to communicate with, 440 
Fort Morgan, Ala., surrender of. II, 427 ; 
Graim-er moves on Spanish Fort from, 458 
Fort Pemberton, Miss., attacks on, I, 376 
Fort Pillow, Tenn., capture of, and mas- 
sacre at, II, 63, 64, 425 , , , ^ 
Fort Powell, Ala., blown up and abandoned, 

Fort Powhatan, Va., movements at and 

toward, II, ISO, 414 . „ 

Fort Pulaski, Ga., Federal possession of, 

II. 53. 3 ..X -ii, 04. 1 

Fort Smith, Thayer cooperates with Steele 

from, II, 426 
Fort Stedman, Va., capture and recaptiu-e 

of. II, 296-298. 448, 449, 451_ , . ^. ^ „ 
Fort Stevens, D. C, .skirmish in front ot, 

11,416, 417 , * f T 

Fort Sumter, firing on, and capture ot, 1, 

Fort Vancouver, Ore., the Fourth Infantry 
ordered to, 1, 161 ; farming experiment at, 
161, 162 ; Indians and Hudson Bay Com- 
pany post at, 162 f TT OT1 

Fort Whitworth, Va., capture ot, 11, 311 
Fort Wood. Ga., action at, 11,3, 4 
Foster, J. G., at Cerro Gordo, 1, 100; super- 
sedes Burnside, II, *32; sent to the rebef 
of Burnside, 32; commanding the Depart- 
ment of the Ohio, 34, 43 ; relieved by fecho- 
lield,43; advice from, concerniug Long- 
street, 43 ; commanding on the soutuern 
Atlantic seaboard, 248, 431 ; communicates 
with Sherman. 248, 249; Savannaa turned 
over to, 271; arranges with Sherman to 
seize points near Charleston, 273 ; garii- 
sons Charleston, 283; expedition to de- 



478 



INDEX 



stroy railroad between Savannah and 
Charleston, 4al ; expedition on Broad 
River, -tai ; position between the Coosaw- 
hatchic and Tulitinuy expedition, 432 
Foster, R. S., assaults Fort Gregg, 11, 311 
Fouke, Philip B., I, noi ^, ,„ 

Fourteen-Mile Creak, operations at, 1, 413- 

415,447 . ,.^. ,. 

Fourteenth Army-corps, in expedition to 
Brown's Ferry, I, 504; in action at Fort 
Wood, II, 3 ; iii operations on the west of 
Chattanooga, 8; commanded by Jefferson 
C. Davis, 234; in lett wing of Sherman's 
army, 234 
Fourth Army-corps, sent to reinforce 
Thomas, II, 238, 431; sent to Pulaski to 
watch Hood, 254 ; ordered to Bull Gap, 282 
Fourth U. S. Infantry, the. Grant appointed 
brevet second-lieutenant in, I, 22; Grant 
reports for duty, 25 ; ordered to Fort Jes- 
8up, 27 ; at Camp Salubrity, 31, 32, 34-36 ; 
promotion in tlie, 35 ; loss of Col. Voso, 
38 ; leaves New Orleans for Corpus Christi, 
39; at Corpus Christi, 44; Grant trans- 
ferred to the Seventh Infantry from, 
and back to, 53, 54; Grant appointed 
regimental quartermaster, 57, 83; Grant 
quartermaster and commissary, 77; sup- 
ports artillery against Black Fort, 82, 83; 
Grant acting adjutant, 84; losses at 
Monterey, 86; transferred from Twiggs's 
division to Gen. Worth's, 93 ; losses by 
steamboat explosions, 126 ; Grant promot- 
ed first lieutenant, vice Sidney Smith, 
killed at City of Mexico, 12G ; replenishing 
the regimental fund, 141, 142 ; in garrison 
at Sackett's Harbor, 153; in garrison at 
Detroit, 153 ; ordered to the Pacific Coast, 
153 ; embarks at New York, 153, 154 ; cross- 
ing the Isthmus, 154-157 ; outbreak of chol- 
era in, 156, 157 ; at Benicia Barracks, 161 ; 
ordered to Fort Vancouver, 161 ; Grant's 
resignation from, 167 ; Sheridan's service 
in the, 333 
Fox, G. v., calls upon Grantfor men forthe 

Fort Fisher expedition, II, 435 
France, the Mexican imperial scheme of, 
II, 388-390 ; requests the withdrawal of U. 
S. troops from Mexico, 390 ; value of the 
Franco-Prussianwarto, 390; the friend of 
the United States, 390 
Frank, Paul, II, 97 

Franklin, Tenn., strength of Schofield be- 
fore the battle of, 11,254; Hood's strength 
before, 254 ; Schofield retreats to, 255 ; bat- 
tle of, 255, 432, 433 ; policy of attacking af- 
ter Hood's repulse at, 257 ; Hood takes, 
260 ; Wheeler at, 424 
Frederick City, Md., approach of the enemy 

to, II, 416 
Fredericksburg, Va., base for the Army of 
the Potomac, II, 77 ; roads from Orange 
Court House to, 102 ; Lee's belief in Grant's 
retreat to, 121, 124; suspected movement 
toward, 127 ; changing base to Port Royal 
from, 142 
Fredericksburg and Richmond road, Lee'S 

position on the, II, 153 
Fredericksburg railroad, the. destruction of 
tracks on, II, 154 ; impossibility of hold- 
ing, 174 ; necessity of protecting, 409 
Freedman's Bureau, origin of the, I, 353 
Freedmen. See CoLORKD TROOPS ; Ne- 
groes. 
Free-Soil Democracy, the, I, 169 



Fremont, John C, information from, I, 214; 
exchanges prisoners fi'om Camp Jackson, 
216 ; moves against Price, * 218 ; superseded 
by Halleck, 231 ; nominated by the press as 
Grant's successor, 382; question of his 
restoration to duty, II, 48 

French, Grant's standing in, at West Point, 
1,20 

Frontiersmen, II, 395 

Front Royal, Va., Sheridan at. II, 222 

Fugitive Slave Law, the, II, 387 

Fuller, J. W., in battle of Atlanta, II, 89 

Fulton road, movement of troops via, I, 340, 
342, 343 

Furnace road, Va., Sheridan's actions on 
the, II, 111 

Gadsden, Ala., operations at, II, 429, 431 
Gaines, Edmund P., I, *90 
Galena, 111., Grant's removal to, I, 168; life 
in, 171-173; election excitement in, 172; 
volunteering at, 184 et seq. ; its company 
mustered into the U. S. service, 186 
Gambling, in Mexico, I, 140, 148 ; in Califor- 
nia, 161, 165, 166 
Garden's Battery, II, 103 
Gardiner, Gen., defeated by Stoneman at 

Salisbui-y, II, 458 
Gardner, Franklin, changed from the Sev- 
enth Infantry to the Fourth, and back, I, 
*o3. 54 ; surrenders Port Hudson, 475 
Garland, John, institutes night marches in 
Mexico, I, *70, 77 ; at Monterey, 84-86 ; at 
San Antonio, 109,110; at Churubusco, 112; 
wounded in City of Mexico, 126 
Garrard, K., cavalry raid by, II, *89, 424 
Garrett, Robert, meeting with, II, 215 
Gaston, N. C, operations near, II, 447, 449 
Gates's House, Va., II, 102, 126 
Gauley River, operations on the, II, 59,72, 195 
Geary, J. W., commanding division of 
Twelfth Coi-ps, I, *505 ; at Wauhatchie, 508, 
II, 8; in Lookout Valley, I, 519, II, 8; in 
battle of Lookout Mountain, 8, 9 ; serving 
under Hooker at Chattanooga, 20 
Georgetown, O., Jesse R. Grant mayor of, 
I, 5 ; the Grant family at, 7 ; Grant's 
school-days in, 11, 13 ; John Morgan's raid 
at, 17; remarkable war record of, 16-18; 
Jesse R. Grant removes fi-om, 21 ; visits 
to, 24 
Georgetown, S. C, possibility of Shennan's 

falling back toward, II, 444 
Georgia, secession of, I, 183 ; Johnston's 
army in, II, 48 ; Union holdings in, 53, 54, 
398; Sherman's campaign in, 151, 231, 240, 
375, 376, 399, 430, 431 ; Lee desii'cs to send 
troops to, 199; Pres. Davis's ai)peals to the 
people of, 228, 229 ; withdrawal of State 
troops from Hood, 229 ; Beam-egard's ap- 
peals to citizens of, 239; destroying the 
railroads in, 241, 242 ; living on the coun- 
try in, 241-244 ; capture of the archives of, 
244 ; the State militia opposed to Sherman, 
244, 245; views of the Southern press on 
Sherman's march through, 245; adding 
cadets and convicts to the militia, 245 ; 
the mock legislature of, 246; results of 
Sherman's march through, 272; Adm. 
Dahlgren commanding off the coast of, 
273; Thomas's orders for movement 
through, countermanded, 281 ; Bragg with- 
draws'troops from Wilmington to, 435 
Germanna Ford, Va., operations at, II, 97. 
98, 102, 114, 116, 404 



INDEX 



479 



Getty, G. W., his command, IT, 99; in bat- 
tle of tile Wildorneas, '106-108 ; womult'd, 
108 ; retreats to Miildletown, 222 ; iu battle 
of Cedar Creek, ■>->'i. 223 

Gettysburg, Pa., battle of, 1,475, 478, II, 47, 
54; effect of the liattle ou the couutry, I, 
475, 478; Haucoek wounded at, II, "l88; 
Southern view of the battle, 410 

Gibbon, John, his eouiniand, II, 97 ; in battle 
of the Wilderness, *111, 113; in battle of 
Spottsylvania, 129, 135, 143 ; recoiiinjended 
for niajor-freueralship, U. S. Vols., 13'.i; 
assaults at Cold Harbor, 166, 167 ; assaults 
Fort Gregg, 311, 453 ; designated to receive 
paroles of Lee's army, 347, 457 

Gillem, A. C. captures and disijerses Mor- 
gan's men, II, 425 ; operations in Tennes- 
see, 434 

Gillmore, Q. A., reinforces the Army of the 
James, II, *56, 58, 59, 62, 402, 40G ; sent to 
attack Petersburg, 410; returns to Ber- 
muda Himdred, 410 

Girard College, visit to, I, 19 

Goliad, Tex., niassaere at, I, 34, 48, 49 ; car- 
ing for Lieut. Augur at, 50,51; adventure 
with wolves near, 52, 53 

Gold, use of, in payment for cotton, 1, 331 

Gold-digging, in California, I, 159, 160 

Goldsboro, N. C, Sherman's movements to- 
ward, at, and near, II, 275, 277, 284, 285, 295, 
441, 442, 444, 446, 449 ; commuuications with 
points in Union possession, 2SO-282, 286; 
troops sent to, to cooperate with Sherman, 
II, 285, 439, 440; Sherman's march to Wash- 
ington from, 373,37,4; retreat of the enemy 
toward. 441 

Goochland, Va., Sheridan destroys the 
James Kiver canal near, II, 294, 445 

Gordon, James B., his command, II, 101 

Gordon, John B., his command, II, 101 ; re- 
liites anecdote of Lincoln to A. H. Ste- 
phens, *290; carries the picket-line at 
Petersbiu'g, 296 ; appointed to oversee the 
paroling of Lee's nrmy, 347 

Gordonsville, Va., operations at, II, 77, 106, 
221, 409, 411, 414 

Gore, John H., at captiU'e of the City of 
Mexico, I, 121 

Gorgona, crossing the Isthmus via, I, 154, 
155 

Governor's Island, N. V., the Fourth In- 
fantry at, I, 153 

Grahamsville, S. C, Hatch's movement 
toward, II, 432 

Grand Qampaign, opening of the, II, 71 

Grand Ecore, La., in camp near, I, 31, 35; 
Banks at, II, 420 

Grand Gulf, Miss., running the batteries at, 
1,387, 397, 398; land operations at. 388. 394- 

397, 401, 402, 409-413, 433, 440. 447, 481, II, 172 
Grand Junction, Tenn., operations at, 1,326, 

327, 329, 344, 352-355, 361, 362 
Granger, Gordon, ordered to Louisville, I, 
*332-334; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3; 
with Grant ou Orchard Kuo'o, 17 ; ordered 
to pursue at Missionary Kidge, 17, 18 ; or- 
dered to the relief of Burnside, 19, 24, 25 ; 
orders withholding, 25 ; dilatoriness of, 
26, 27 ; reinforces Burnside, 37 ; dilticnlty 
with Canby about assigning him to com- 
mand, 279; sent to coiiperate with Far- 
ragut at Mobile, 427 ; commands the 
Thirteenth Corps, 458; invests Simuish 
line Fort, 458 
Granger, R. S., reinforces Thomas, II, ''256 



Granny White road, Tenn., movements on 

the. IL 260 

Grant, Clara B., dies of consuniptiou, I, 23 

Grant, Frederick Dent, birth of, I, 167 ; tlrst 
t!.\pei-iences m the wai-, 199; at battle of 
I'ort Gibson, 406; at siege of Vicksburg, 
407 ; .sickness of, II, 42 ; at the White 
House, 44 

Grant, Hannah, I, 6 

Grant, Jesse R., l)irth of, I, 3; in family of 
Judge Tod, 3; learns trade in Mavsville, 
3; returns to Deertlchl, 4; thirst for edu- 
cation, 1. 5, 8; interest in (irant (estate iu 
Connecticut, 5 ; political views, 5; mayor 
of Georgetown, 5 ; marries Hannah Simp- 
sou, 7; social position. 8; parental control, 
14 ; difl'erence with Hamer, 15, 16 ; removes 
fi-om (^<!orgetown to Bethid,21 ; mayor of 
Betliel, 21 ; visit to, 153 

Grant, John, dies of consumption, I, 23 

Grant, Mrs. Julia D., returns to St. Louis, I, 
153; desires F. I), (jrant to accompany his 
father, 199; visits lyouisville with (ieneral 
Grant, 491 ; joins her husband in Washing- 
ton, II, 357 ; goes to Burlington, 358. See 
also Dent, Jiilia 

Grant, Lawson, I, 5 

Grant, Lewis A., II, 99 

Grant, Matthew, I, 1 

Grant, Noah, (^Teat-grand father of U. 8. 
Grant), I, 2 

Grant, Capt. Noah (grandfather of U. 8. 
Grant), settles iu Ohio, I, 2,3; settles iu 
Maysville, 3 

Grant, Noah (uncle of U. 8. Grant), dies of 
consumption, I, 23 

Grant, Orvil L., in business at Galena, I, 
*172 

Grant, Peter, settles in Pennsylvania, I, 2 ; 
settles in Maysville, Ky., 3; drowned, 3 

Grant, Priscilla, 1,1 

Grant, Rachel, 1,2,3 

Grant, Samuel, I, 1 

Grant, Samuel S., dies of consumption, I, 
23 ; in business at Galena, *172 

Grant, Solomon (5th generation), I, 2 

Grant, Solomon (uncle of U. S. Grant), emi- 
gnites to the West Indies, I, 2 

Grant, Ulysses Simpson, his ancestry, 1, 1-7 ; 
his mother's influence on his character, 
6 ; birth, 7 ; early life and education, 7-16 ; 
horse-trades, lo, 12; appointed to West 
Point, 14-16 ; journey to, and life at West 
Point, 18-22; an early presentiment, 22; 
enters the Fourth Infantry, 22 ; fears con- 
sumption, 23 ; first uniform, 23, 24 ; reports 
tor duty at Jeflersou Barracks, 25 ; garri- 
son life at St. Louis, 25-27 ; friendship with 
the Dent family, 26 ; discovers himself in 
love, 26, 27 ; ordered to Fort Jessuj), 27 ; 
leave of absence, 27-31 ; a dip in Gravois 
Creek, 28, 29 ; superstitious of, 29, 382 ; en- 
gaged to Julia Dent, 29, 30 ; contemplates a 
mathematical professorship, 30, 31 ; keeps 
a journal, 31 ; at Camp Salubrity, 31, 34-36 ; 
reviews the causes and conduct of the 
Mexican War, 32-34, 44-46, 88-93, 98, 105, 127- 
135 ; free from fears of consumption, 36 ; 
condemns dueling, 37 ; leaves New Orleans 
for Corpus Christi, 39 ; supiiresses a mu- 
tiny, 40; an involuntary bath in Corpus 
Chi-isti Bay, 40, 41 ; expedition from Cor- 
pus Christi to San Antonio, 47-53 ; a failure 
as a sportsman, 62; adventure with 
wolves, 52, 53; promoted full second lieu- 



480 



INDEX 



teuaut, 53; transferred from the Fourth 
to the iScv^euth Int'untry and back, 53, 54 ; 
purchase and loss of horses in Mexico, 57, 
£8 ; in advance frona Corpus Christi, 59-63 ; 
first iuipressious of war, 66; in hattle of 
Pah) Alto, 07-70; first command in the 
field, 70; in battle of Resaca de la Palma, 
70-72; expectations from T. L. Hamer, 
75, 76; quartermaster and commissary, 
Fourth Infantry, 77; iu battle of Mon- 
terey, 82 et seq., volunteered services at 
Monterey, 86, 87; transferred from Gen. 
Taylor's command to that of Geu. Worth, 
93, 94); at Vera Cruz, 96-98; in Ijattle of C!erro 
Gordo, 100, 101 ; in advance on the City of 
Mexico, 108 et seq. ; in battle of Molino 
del Rey, 118, 119 ; commanding vohmtecr 
force at San Cosme garita, 122-124 ; the 
jruu in the belfry, 123, 124 ; promoted, first 
lieutenant, 12<; ; demands truthful history, 
132 ; attends a Mexican bull-light, 137-139 ; 
condemns the sport, 137, 139, 140; regi- 
mental quartermaster, Foiu'th Infantry, 
140-142 ; on pleasure trips iu Mexico, 142- 
150 ; value of experience in the Mexican 
War to, 151, 152; ordered to Pascagoula, 
152; married to Julia Bent, 153; in garri- 
son at Sackett's Harbor, 153 ; iu gariisou 
at Detroit, 153 ; declines citizenship in 
Michigan, 153; ordered to the PacLflc 
coast, 153 ; labors and responsibilities iu 
the crossing of the Isthmus, 154-158 ; regi- 
mental quartermaster, Fourth lufantry, 
155 ; life on the Pacific coast, 159-167 ; 
agricultural experiment at Fort Vancou- 
ver, 161; promoted ca]>tain, 164; resigns 
fi-om the ariuy, 167 ; birth of children to, 
167 ; farming near St. Louis, 167, 168; fever 
and ague, 168; in real-estate business in 
St. Louis, 168; candidate for oflice of 
county engineer, 168 ; removes to Galena, 
168 ; joins the American Party, 169 ; opin- 
ions on sects and secret societies, 169, 170; 
votes for Buchanan, 171 ; position in Ga- 
lena, 171, 172 ; interest in election of 1860, 
172 et seq. ; on the rights of revolution 
and secession, 173 et seq. ; presides at 
meeting at Galena, 184; drills troops at 
Galena, 185 ; assists in office of the ad- 
jutant-general of Illinois, 186; musters 
troops into Illinois State service, 187; 
witnesses stirring scenes in St. Louis, 187- 
190; offers services to the government, 
192 ; fails to secure apiiointnient from 
McClellan, 193 ; appointed c(donel 21st Il- 
linois, 194; in camp at Springfield, 194; 
meets McCIernand and Logan, 195-197 ; 
disciplines his troops, 195, 200, 202 ; or- 
dered to Missouri, 198; at Palmyra, 199; 
sensations at leading a regiment into 
battle, 199; brushes up tactics, 203, 204; 
appointed brigadier-general, 205; selects 
aides, 205, 203; commanding District of 
Ironton, 207 ; moves against Price, 208 ; at 
Jefferson City, 209, 210; difference witl» 
Prentiss, 211-213; assumes command at 
Cairo, 213, 214; seizes Paducah, 214-216; 
attempt to capture, 217 ; movement against 
Belmont, 218-222 ; battle of Belmont, 222- 
229 ; narrow escapes at Belmont, 223-227 ; 
capture of Forts Heury and Heiman, 231- 
240; commanding Disti'ict of Caii'o, 233; 
sieffe of Port Donelson, 241-259; created 
major-general of volunteers, 260; goes to 
Nashville, 263 ; difQculties with Hajleck, 



267-270 ; threats of arrest, 269 ; relieved of 
conmiand, 269; restored to command, 270; 
at Pittsburg Lauding and ShiloU, 272-306; 
injured by fall with horse at Pifrsburg 
Lauding, 276 ; leads the final charge at 
Shiloh, 288; struck by a bullet, 291 ; nomi- 
nally commanding rightwiug of Halleck's 
aiTuy at Pittsburg Landing, 307; in ad- 
vance on Corinth, 307-314 : refuses to send 
iu report of battle or Shiloh, 308; anoma- 
lous position on march to, and at, Corintb. 
312-314; asks to be relieved from duty 
under Halleck, 313, 319; headquarters at 
Memphis, 319-326; difficulty with cotton- 
traders, 321, 322 ; iu danger of capture, 322, 
323; recalled to Corinth, 325, 326; com- 
manding District of West Tennessee, 326; 
ordered to Uvo upon the country, 329; 
operations against Van Dom and Price, 
335 et seq. ; battle of Iidia, 338-343 ; battle 
of Corinth, 315-349 ; commanding Depart- 
ment of the Tenuessee, 350; the campaign 
against Vicksburg, 351-482; strength at 
opening of Vicksburg campaign, 352 ; em- 
ploying freedmen, 353, 354; troubles with 
McCIernand, 355, 358-360, 367, 368, 404, 429, 
434, 435, 444, 457; at Holly Springs, 355, 365 ; 
ordered to divide his command into four 
army-corps, 3G0; assumes command at 
Youug's Point, 368; newspaper comments 
on his position before Vicksburg, 382; 
fancy for a cavalry commission, 383 ; sup- 
ported by the Presideut and Halleck, 383, 
384; visit to New Carthage, 389; issues 
Special Orders No. 10, 330-392 ; attack on 
Grand Gulf, 394-400; operations below 
Vicksburg, 400 et seq.; capture of Port 
Gibson, 405-407 ; lack of comforts, 406, 407, 
410; occupation of Grand Crulf, 409,410; cuts 
loose from base at Grand Gulf, 411; move- 
ment up the Big Black, 413^15; battle of 
Raymond, 414, 415; capture of Jackson, 
417^24 ; battle of Champion's HUl, 428-436; 
battle of Black River Bridge, 437-440; 
crossing the Big Black, 440, 441; invest- 
ment of Vicksburg, 441 et seq. ; assaulting 
the works, 4-11-445'; siege of Vicksburg, 446 
et seq. ; credited by Shennan with the 
Vicksburg camjiaign, 453, 454; surrender 
of Vickslmrg, 464-473; enters Vicksburg, 
473 ; reti-ospect of the Vicksbtu'g cam- 
paign, 478-482 ; proposes campaign against 
Mobile, 484; visits Banks, 4S6,' 487 ; acci- 
dent in New Orleans, 487 ; ordered to re- 
liort at Cairo, 489 ; meeting with Stanton, 
490, 491, 496, 497 ; commanding Military Di- 
vision of Mississippi, 491, 497; meeting 
with Andrew Johnson, 497 ; arrives at 
Chattanooga, 499; assumes command at 
Chattanooga, 501; opens the "cracker 
line," 501 et seq.; saluted bv the pickets 
of the enemy at Chattanooga Creek, 509, 
510; plans of the battle of Chatt.anooga, 
518 et seq. ; battle of Lookout Mountaiin, 
II, 1 et seq. ; battle of Chattanooga, 12 et 
seq.; note concerning his autobiographi- 
cal work, 23; congratulations from Pres. 
Lincoln on the raising of the sieue of 
Knoxville, 32 ; headquarters at Nashville, 
32-36; Congress votes a gold medal to, lor 
Vicksburg and Chattanooga, 33 ; present- 
ed with the " Chattanooga sword," 33 ; 
final depository of medals, swords, etc., 
presented to, 33 ; visit to Knoxville, 34, 35 ; 
difference with Stanton, 35-37 ; operations 



INDEX 



481 



m Mississippi, 39-41 ; commissioned licn- 
tenaut-seueral, 44, 45,97; lirst iutcrviow 
witli President Lineolii, 44, 50-5?; disin- 
cliuatiou to pulilic speiikiiiK, 45 ; visits tlie 
Army of the Potomac at Brandy .Station, 
45-5o"; relations witli Meade, 4(5, 47 ; plaeed 
in conimand ot all the armies, 47, !)7, aon ; 
headquarters at Ciilpeiier Court House, 
50,66; plans for the eampaisn, 5:{ et seq., 
397, 398 ; visits Butler at Fortress INlonroe, 
60; uarrow escape from capture by Mos- 
hy, 66, 67 ; interview with Lincoln, 67, 68; 
impleasant exiierienees with William 
Swiuton, 68-70; conuueucement of the 
Grand Campaign, 71 ct seq.; declining 
health, and hasty completion of his Me- 
moirs, 71 ; conimeudation of Butler by, 76 ; 
goes from Cincinnati to Washington, 81; 
approves Johnston's tactics in Atlanta 
campaign, 88; grand movement of the 
Array of the Potomac, 95 et seq.; leaves 
Culpeper Court House for the front, 105 ; 
battle of the Wilderness, 105 et seq.; plan 
of initiating attack, 107 ; uarrow escape 
from capture, 121 ; battle of Spottsylvauia, 
126 et seq.; aids a Uuion woman in Vir- 
ginia, 138 ; reduces the artillery, 144 ; battle 
of the North Anna, 149 ; an incident of the 
march, 152, 153 ; battle of Cold Harbor, 162 
etseq.; correspondence with Lee regard- 
ing dead and wounded at Cold Harbor, 
169-171; movement across the Chickahom- 
iny and James, 174-182; visits Butler at 
Bermuda Hundred, 185, 186, 412; move- 
ment on Petersburg, 186-191; defense of 
Washington, 196, 197; the Petersburg 
mine, 198-203; proposes to follow the en- 
emy to the death, 206; visits Hunter ou 
the Monocacy, 207, 208, 418, 419; revision 
of his orders by HaUeck and Stanton, 214; 
visit to Bheridan, 214, 215 : close of the 
campaign for the winter, 1864-65, 22.5 ; ap- 
proves J. E. Johnston's military policy, 
227, 228; criticism of Pres. Davis's military 
policy, 228, 236 ; invites Sherman's views, 
231, 232 ; authorizes Sherman to cut loose 
from his base, 238; definitely approves 
Sherman's campaign through Georgia. 
240, 430 ; credits Sherman with plans and 
execution of the march to the sea, 252, 
253; proposes to go to Nashville to over- 
see Thomas's movements, 258, 2.59, 433; 
threatens Thomas with removal, 259 ; ex- 
pedition against Fort Fisher, 261-270, 435, 
439,440; requests that Butler be relieved, 
439; approves Sherman's plan of march 
through the Caroliuas, 272, 441 ; goes to 
Washington, Jan. 21, 1865, 273 ; provisions 
for coJiperation with Sherman, 273-275; 
orders campaign against Mobile, 274. 275, 
277,279 ; consrralulatesThonias.276 ; makes 
tour of in.spection with Schotield, 280; 
holds Lee down at Richmond, 285 ; re- 
ceives the Peace Commissioners, 287, 288; 
refrains from discussing peace with the 
Commissioners, 288 ; refuses to ackuow- 
led"-e the Confederate government, 288; 
visited by Lincoln at City Point, 289, 290 ; 
fears a prolongation of the war, 291 ; anx- 
iety before Petersburg, 291, 295 ; impa- 
tience for the spring campaign of 1865, 
293; battle of White Oak Eoad, 29C; inter- 
view with Sheridan at Dabney's Mills, 
300-302 ; authorizes the removal of War- 
ren, 306; enters Petersburg, 314; state- 

VoL. II.— 31 



mcnt of a so-called engineer of the Army 
of Northern Virginia to, ;n4, 315; congrat- 
ulated by the I'resident at Petersburg, 
31k; plan lor Sherman to unite with, 318; 
fall of Kichmond, 320; pursuit of Lee, 321- 
336; a night ride to join Meade, 326; 
Ijattle of Sailor's Creek, 328 ; goes to Farm- 
ville, 333; correspondence i nd communi- 
calious wilh Lee, concerning surrender, 
333, 3:14,337-349; sickness belort' Leci's sur- 
render, 337, 338; dischnnis authority to 
treat for peace, 3:53; contrasted with Lee, 
341,342; acquaintance with Lee, 341,342; 
goes to Wasiiiiigton, 347, 357 : declines the 
President's invitation to attend Ford's 
Theater, 357; inl'ornied of the assa.ssiiia- 
tion of Ihe President, 358; views on re- 
construction and negro suli'rage, 359-361; 
goes to Norlli Carolina to adjust Sher- 
man's dillicuUies, 305; anxiety for cap- 
ture of Mobile, 307; feeling in regard to 
Jcll'erson Davis, 368, 369; the end ol the 
war, 373 et seq. ; grand review at Wash- 
ington, 378-380; estimates of his corps 
commanders, 382-385; opinion on slor 
verv, 386; conclusion of the Memoirs, 
386-396; his illness, 395; Con federate sym- 
pathy l'or,3'. 6 ; interview with Sheridan at 
Monocacy, 419 ; eorrespondence : wilh But- 
ler, 178, 435, 436 ; with Canl)y, 279, 280; with 
Halleck, 132, 133, 138, 141, 1.53. 174. 188, 205, 
206,411; with Hunter, 176, 418; with Lee, 
169-171, 333, 334, 337-339, :?.13-346, 454-457; 
with Lincoln. 206, 267; with Meade, 148, 
154, 159, 166. 168, 180, 200; with Sclioaeld, 
440; with Sheridan, 221, 222, 278, 324, 444, 
450, 451; with Sherman, 230-233, 249, 250, 
273-275. 429. 430, 453, 454; with Stautou, 
139 ; with Terry, 437, 438 ; with Thomas, 257, 

258. 442, 443, 446 „.,,,- ^.i. 

Grant, Ulysses Simpson, Jr. (" Buck ) , birth 

of, I, 107 . J , ^ -TT .,«- 

Gravelly Run, Va., Warren s delay at, 11, iOo 
Gravois Creek, Mo., Grant's mischance in 

the. 1, 28, 29 , ^ . TT 

Graysvilie, Ga., movements at and near, li, 

18 19 25 26 
Great Britain, insists on effective blockade, 

11,261 . ^ , 

Greensboro, N. C, operations at and near, 

11,4.54,458 ^ ^^r ■, r. 

Greensburg, Pa., settlement of Noah Grant 

near, I, 2 
Greenville, Miss., Steele's expedition to, I, 

392 
Greenville, Mo., movement against Hardee 

at, I, 207, 208 
Greenville, Tenn., Morgan killea near, 11, 

425 
Greenwood, Miss., fortifications at, I, 376 
Gref^i^ John, tights McPhersou at Raymond, 

I, '^415; in Army of Northern Virginia, 11, 

Gregp- D McM., engasementonthe Chicka- 
hominy, II, 79; crosses Ely's Ford 98 ; 
his conimand, 99 ; advances toward Chan- 
cellorsville, 103 ; in battle of the W ilder- 
ness, 109; movement toward Hanover, 
156; action at Hawes's Shop, 158; threat- 
ening movements against Richmond, 209, 
420; unsuccessful attempt to desti-oy the 
AVeldon railroad, 212 ; returns to the front 
of Petersburg, 421 ; defeated at Reams s 
Station, 421 ; attacked near Poplar Spring 
Church, 421 



482 



INDEX 



Gregg, J. I., II, 99 

Grenada, Miss., movements at and near, I, 

352, aSi", 365, 454, II, 434 
•' Grengos, Los," Mexican opinion of, I, 79 
Gresham, W. Q., wounded before Atlanta, 

TT ^'HH 
Grie'rson, B. H., raids in Mississippi, I, *408, 
II, 434 ; sent to command Canby's cavalry, 

27K 

Griffin, Charles, liis command, II, 98; traus- 
tcried to Hancock's corps, 138; at Jericlio 
Ford, 149 ; in battle of Five Forks, 305, 306 ; 
succeeds Warren in command of the Fifth 
Corps, 306, 452 ; Intrenched across the rail- 
road south of Jeters-ville, 323 ; movement, 
April 6, 18G5, 330 : movement via Pi-ince 
Edwai-d's Court House, 332 ; in ensase- 
ment at Appomattox Station, 336 ; desis- 
nated to receive the paroles of Lee's army, 
317. 457; military character, *385 ; action 
near the Quaker road, 451 

Griffin, Simon G., II, 100 

Griffith, James, I, 6 

Griffith, Louis, I, 6 

Griffith, Mary, I, 6 

Grimes's Brigade, II, 101 

Grindstone crossing, the, I, 409 

Groierty, Gen., I, 18 

Grose, 'William, operations at Lookout 
Creek, II, *8 

Guadalupe, the road to the City of Mexico 
thi'ouj^h, I, 128 

Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 1, 134, 137, 152 

Guadalupe River, I, 48, 209 

Guerrillas, raids by, I, 200, 318, 331, 332, 486, 
512, II, 308, oO'J, 425 

Guiney's Station, Va., movements at, II, 
146-148 

Gulf of Mexico, Cauby to operate in the in- 
terior from the, II, 275 

Gunboats, at Belmont, I, 210, 227 ; at Fort 
Henry, 236, 238-240; their value, 241; at 
Fort Donelsou, 244^250, 267 ; at Nashville, 
262; at Pittsburg Landing, 285, 288, .303; 
at Memphis, 317, 328; at Vicksburg, 357, 
386, 474; at Arkansas Post, 366; at Yazoo 
Pass, 376; at Fort Pemberton, 376; on the 
bayous, 377-379; at Grand Gulf, 396; at 
Haines's Bluff, 400; capture of, by For- 
rest's cavalrv, II, 229, 432 ; at Fort Fisher, 
265; at Plymouth, 407 ; in Red River, 426 

Guntown, Miss., defeat of Stui-gis by For- 
rest at, II, 424 

Gwin, William, at Pittsburg Landing, I, 
*285 

Hackleman, P. A., killed at Corinth, I, *348 

Hagerstown, Md., occupied by the enemy, 
II, 416 

Haines's Bluff, Miss., operations at, I, 371, 
398, 400, 401, 414, 448, 455, 456, 458. 482, 484 

Hains, Peter C, bridge-building by, I, 389, 
441 

Halleck, Henry W., supersedes Gen. Fre- 
mont, I, *231; visit to. at St. Louis, 234, 
235; orders movement against Fort 
Henry, 235; sends reinforcements to 
Grant at Fort Donelson, 243 ; attitude on 
subject of capturing Donelson, 244; con- 
gratulates Hunter, 260; credits C. F. 
Smith with captme, 260; Grant's diffi- 
culties with, 260, 261, 267-270, 305, 306, 319 ; 
caUs for more troops, 269; congratula- 
tory letter to Grant, 270; opinion of C. 
F. Smith, 270; Grant's letter to, after 



Shiloh, 305; assumes command in the 
field, 305, 307, 334 ; establishes headquar- 
ters at Pittsburg Landing, 305, 307 ; Grant's 
reasons for not reporting the battle of 
Shiloh to, 305, 306; his army at Pittsburg 
Landing, 307 ; orders Grant to send in 
report of Shiloh, 308; headquarters on 
road to Corinth, 313; frowns on a sug- 
gestion by Grant, 314 ; anticipates attack- 
at Corinth, 315; fortilies Corinth, 316; de- 
pletes his army, 317, 327 ; Grant asks per- 
mission to remove headquarters to Mem- 
phis, 319; appointed to command of all 
the annies, 325 ; boundaries of his district, 
326; orders the repair of the Mobile and 
Ohio railroad, 326 ; leaves Corinth for 
Washington, 326; advice from, as to the 
scattering of troops, 329; advises the re- 
inforcing of Buell, .329; relations with 
Sheridan, 333, 334 ; anxiety about Tennes- 
see, 337, 523, II, 11 ; correspondence with, 
concerning Roseci'ans's insubordination, 
I, 348; proposal to, to move against 
Vicksburg, 349 ; despatch to, announcing 
opening of the Vicksburg campaign', 352 ; 
gives fiill command to Grant, 355; orders 
reinforcements from Helena, 356 ; constd- 
tation with, as to movements against 
Vicksburg, 358 ; informed of the Duckport 
canal project, 381; supports Grant, 383; 
informed of successes at Grand Gidf, 410 ; 
character and peculiarities, 411, 485; ad- 
vices to, concerning reinforcements for 
J. E. Johnston, 419; notified of pending 
attack on Jackson, 421 ; orders Grant to 
return to Grand GitU and cooperate with 
Banks, 440; forwards reinforcements to 
Vicksburg, 449, 456 ; news of the surreuder 
of Vicksburg annoiuiccd to, 474; misun- 
derstanding about prisoners, 478, 479; 
trans-Mississippi campaign views of, 484; 
disapproves the MobUe project, 484, 485 : 
orders troops to Memphis and Tuscumbia, 
487; suggests that Sherman be sent to 
Memphis, 488; alarmed at residts of 
Chickamauga, 488; suggests that Grant 
go to Nash\'ille, 488, 491 ; Grant's sugges- 
tions to, concerning Rosecrans, 492; or- 
ders Rosecrans to inove against Bragg, 
492 ; informs Grant of results of Chicka- 
mauga, 494; notified of Grant's arrival at 
Chattanooga, 500; orders reinforcements 
for Rosecrans, 503 ; congratiUations from, 
on operations of Nov. 24, 1863, 11, 11 ; in- 
formed of the battle of Chattanooga, 19 ; 
letter from, concerning Foster and Scho- 
fleld, 43 ; invites views of campaign for the 
armies of the Military Division of the Mis- 
sissippi, 48; Grant writes to, concerning 
the spring campaign, 48; cautions Grant 
against contlding plans to the Presi- 
dent, 51; Grant's reticence with, 52; sug- 
gests Sheridan for command of cavalry, 
60; warned against holding Plymouth and 
Washington, N. C, 64; orders Banks to 
operate on the Red Ri\er, 64, 65; an- 
nounces Sigel's defeat and retreat, 72; 
letters and despatches from Grant to : 
(May 11, 1864) 132, (May 12) l.S8. (May 16) 
141, (May 20) 411, (May 25) 411, (May 26) 153, 
(June 5) 174, (June 17) 188, (Aug. 1) 205, 
206; inquiry addressed to, concerning 
Sigel, 142; asked to secure naval cooper- 
ation in changing base from Fredericks- 
burg to Port Royal, 142; orders sent to 



INDEX 



483 



Hirnter througli. 152; orders for Butler 
seut through, ioi ; orders to, Miiy 30, 1804, 
159; iinfoldiug of plau to, for loft-llank 
movement across tlie Cliickahoiuiuy uiid 
James, 174; ordered to send reinforce- 
ments to City Point, 178; uotitlcd of oper- 
ations'before Petersburg, 188; bad policy 
concerning the Shenandoah Valley, 205; 
distrust of Hunter, 208 ; informs Grant of 
resistance to the draft, 210; advises tak- 
ing in sail, 210 ; revision of Grant's or- 
ders by, 214 ; garbles an order to Sherid.m, 
221; Grant suggests movement against 
Mobile to, 233 ; bitter opposition to Sher- 
man's movements in Georgia, 253; inter- 
view with, 274; views as to movements 
about Petersburg and City I'oint, 302 ; seut 
to Richmond to command Virginia, 374 ; 
forbids Sherman's troops to obey him, 
374; Shei-man resents his indignities, 374; 
Sheridan ordered to report to, 418 

Halls of the Montezumas, the, I, 125, 127 

Halltown, Va., movement of troops to, II, 
207. 418 

Hamburg Landing^Tenn., operations at, I, 
273, 307 

Hamer,T. L., difference with.Tesse K. Grant, 
I, *15, It; ; procures (jraut's appointment 
to West Point, 15, 16; personal relations 
with, 75; major of Ohio volimteers in 
Mexico, 75 ; character, 75; death, 75 

Hamilton, C. S., promoted major-general, 
I, *350; commanding center of the Army 
of the Tennessee, 352 

Hampton, Wade, his command, II, 102 ; or- 
dered to the defense of the Valley, *193 ; 
defeated by Sheridan, 193 ; returns to 
Richmond, 194; ojiposes Sherman near 
Columbia, 282; abandons Columbia, 282; 
denies the firing of Colimibia, 282 ; escapes 
from Sherman at FayetteviUe, 284 ; cap- 
ture of cattle by, 290 

Hampton Roads,Va., interview between the 
President and the Peace Commissioners 
at, 289, 290, 363 ; arrival of the Nineteenth 
Corps at, 416 ; conference between Porter, 
Butler, and Grant at, 435; fonnation of 
the Fort Fisher expedition at, 435 

Hancock, W. S., commanding Second Army- 
corps, II, 97 ; crosses the Rapidan, 98, 103, 
104; orders for movements. May 5, 1864, 
106: in battle of the Wilderness, 107-114; 
ordered to take the right of line, 120 ; en- 
thusiasm of his corps, 120; expected at- 
tack on, 120; orders for. May 7, 120; at 
Todd's Tavern, 123-125. 127; ordered to 
support Warren, 123 ; relative positions 
of Warren and, 125 ; detained from battle 
of Spottsylvania, 125 ; on the Brock road, 
126; in battle of Spottsylvania, 127-131, 
134-137, 405 ; Griffin's division transferred 
to, 138; recommended for brigadier-gen- 
eralship, U. 8. A., 139; movement, May 
14-15, 1864, 140; assaults, May 18, 141 ; rein- 
forcements for, 142 ; comes to Tyler's as- 
sistance, 143 ; military and personal char- 
acteristics, 143, 148, 189, *383, 384; orders 
for his advance toward Richmond, 145 ; 
march to Milford, 146 ; attempts to get be- 
tween Lee and Richmond, 147 ; ordered to 
Chesterfield Ford, 148 ; crosses the North 
Anna, 149, 150 ; ordered to send troops to 
Ox Ford, 150; Burnside ordered to send 
troops to, 150; Potter joins, 150; crosses 
the North Anna at Chesterfield Ford, 153 ; 



supports for, 155 ; ordered to move toward 
Hanover Town, 155; movement, May 27, 
18(!4, 156; jtosition (ui lh(! Pamunkey,157; 
position. May 30, 158; advances toward To- 
topotomoy Creek, 158; to throw trooi)S 
across the Totopotomoy, 159; action. May 
30, 159, 161 ; attack on, June 1, 164 ; move- 
ment, .Iun(! 1-2, 104, 105; ordered to as- 
sault, June 3, 160, 108; opinion of situation 
at Col(i;Harl)or, 108; his left extended to 
the Chickahominy, 177; crosses tlK^Chick- 
ahominy at Long Bridge, 181 ; crosses the 
James, 182 ; at Charles City Court House, 
182; operations before I'l^tersburg, 186- 
190,413,421; wounded at (Gettysburg, 188; 
temporarily relic^vcd by Meade, 188; Bir- 
ney in command of his corps, 190; movo- 
nuijit via Deep Bottom, 199, 201 ; threaten- 
ing movements against Richmond. 2(i9; 
unsuccessful attempt to destroy the 
Weldon railroad, 212; relieved of com- 
mand of the Second Corps, 226; succeeded 
by Himiphreys, 220 ; ordered to organize 
the Fii'st Corps, 226 ; proposed plans for, 
for the spring campaign. 1865, 226; junc- 
tion of Warren and, 422 ; in action at Hat- 
cher's Run, 422; coiu'cntrates at Win- 
chester, 440 

Hankinson's Ferry, Miss., operations at, I, 
409-411, 413 

Hannibal & St. Joseph railroad, Grant or- 
dered to duty on the, I, 198 

Hanover Court House, Va., operations at, 
II, 158,161, 408 

Hanover Town, Va., movements at, II, 153- 
157, 408 

Hardee, ^V. J., his "Tactics," I, 64, 203; 
captured by Mexicans, 04; in camj) at 
Greenville, '*207 ; last battle before Atlan- 
ta, II, 93; abandons Atlanta, 93; raises 
troops to confront Shennan, 247 ; blows up 
the navy-yard and evacuates SavauTiah, 
251, 252; opposes Sherman's advance 
through the Cai-olinas, 280 ; escapes from 
Shennan at FayetteviUe, 284 

Hardeeville, S. C, movement of Sherman's 
left from, II, 277 

" Hard tack ! hard tack ! " I, 443 

Hard Times, Miss., assembling at, I, 394, 
395; MoPherson at, 4C0; ditliculty of bring- 
ing up the train to, 407 ; F. P. Blair at, 
412 

Hardwicksville, Va., destruction of bridge 
at, II, 445 

Harney, W. S., in Mexican war, I, -105 

Harper's Ferry, Va., John Brown's inviir 
siou of, 1.4 ; movements of troops at, II, 59, 
195, 207, 215, 416-419 

Harris, N. H., II, 102 

Harris, Thomas, Grant moves against, I, 
200, 201; reciprocity of feeling between 
Grant and. 201, II, 372 

Harrisburg, Pa., I, 18 

Harrisonburg, Va., Sheridan and Early at, 
II, 216, 220, 420 

Harris's Store, Va., movements at, II, 148, 
149 

Harrodsburg, Ky.,the Soldiers' Home in, I, 
133 

" Hartford," the, passes the batteries at 
Port Hudson, I. 387 

Hartranft, John F., his command, 11.100; in 
action before Petersburg, March 24, 1865, 
*298 

Hartsuff, G. L., II, *310, 311 



484 



INDEX 



Haslett, Lieut., 1, 31 . „. . . . _ ... 
Hatch, Edward, raid m Mississippi, I, '408 
Hatch, John P., to destroy Hardee's com- 

muiiii'atioiis at Savauiiab, II, 251 ; com- 

mandiug expt-dition on Broad River, 4^2; 

defeated at Honey Hill, 4^2 
Hatcher's Run. Va., movements, ena;a£re- 

nieilts. etc., OU, II, 293, 307, 309, 422, 447, 450, 

Hftc'hie River, operations on the, I. 329 ^^^5 
Hawes's Shop, Va., action at, II, 1;.8, 408 
Hawkins, John P., chief commissary, at fehi- 

lOh, I, 291 TT 1,Q 

Hawkins's Creek, troops ordered to, II, 148 

Haxall's L-anding, Va., camps at, II, 79, 40G 

Hayes, R. B., military career and charac- 
ter il *224 

Hays, Alexander, his command, II, 97 ; killed 
in the Wilderness, *108 

Hays, H.T., II, 101 

Hazen W. B., in expedition to Brown s 
Ferry. I. ^:J04,505 ; captures Fort McAllis- 
ter, il, 218 

Hebert, PaulO.,I, *151 

Heckman, C. A., succeeds Ord m command, 

II. *219 
Helena, Ark., movements, operations, etc., 

at, I, 345, 350, 358, 365, 375, 376, 473 
Henderson's Hill, La., battle of, II, 426 
" Henry Clay," the, riiiming the batteries 

at Vicksbur.a:, I, 386 
Herron, F. J., in siege of Vickshurg, I, 456, 

*458 
Heth. Henry, his comiiumd, II, 102; in the 

Wilderness, 108 ; cut ott' from Petersburg, 

*313 
Hickman, Ky., Confederate occupation of, 

I, 216; Union capture of, 304 
Hickman's Creek, Tenn., I, 242, 243, 245 
Hicks, S. G., repulses Forrest at Paducah, 

II. 425 ^ ., ^ ^ 
Hicksford, Va., destruction of railroad at, 

II, 200, 402, 422, 427 
High Bridge, Va., movements and opera- 
tions at, II, 328, 330, 333, 454 
Hill, A. P., ordered to attack via Orange 
plank road, II, *106; Longstreet to rein- 
force, 109 ; failure to pursue, after battle 
of the Wilderuess, 122 ; succeeded in com- 
mand by Early, 124 ; defeated b7 Kautz, 
133, 407 , attacks and is defeated by War- 
ren, 149; engages Crittenden at crossing 
of the North Anna, 150 
Hillyer, W. S., appointed aide-de-camp, I, 
*205 ; brings bad news at Fort Donelson, 
250; suggests that Grant exchange into 
Army of "the Potomac, 383 
Hilton Head, S. C, Union possession of, 

11,-53,248,398 , ,. 

Hinks, E. W^., commanding colored troops 
in movement- against Pctersbtu'g, II, 186 
History, the need of truthful, 1, 132 
Hoffman, V/illiam, at Churubusco, I. *112 
Hoke, R. F., his command, II, 101; in North 
Carolina, *144; reinforces Lee, 151 ; rein- 
forces Beauregard, 188; sent to Fort 
Fisher, 2i';5, 266; captures Plymouth, 407 
Holly Springs, Miss., Price at, I, 329; Pcni- 
berton at, 349, 352 ; Union capture of, 355 ; 
captuj-ed liy Van Dorn, 360, 361 ; reprehen- 
sible conduct of Col. Murphy at, 362 ; les- 
son of its capture, 362 ; Grant's return to, 
365 
Holmes, T. H., early acquaintance with, I, 
*54, 151 ; repulsed at Helena, 473 



Holston River, movements on, for relief of 
Burnside, H, 19, 24, 28, 29; Union holdings 
53 
Honey Hill, S. C, defeat of Hatch at, II, 432 
Hood, J. B., supersedes Johnston, II, *87, 
227, 236, 423; l)attles before Atlanta, 88-90; 
blows up works and evacuates Atlanta, 
93 ; assumes the otfensive, 227 ; military 
policy, 228 ; weakened by loss of Georgia 
State troops, 229; operations between 
Sherman and, in his retreat from Atlanta, 
229, 231-233, 236, 429-431; correspondence 
with Sherman, 233; strength after At- 
lanta, 236; Sherman's anticipation of his 
movements, 238; moves north, 238, 239, 
429-432; under Beaui-egard's supervising 
command, 239; crosses the Teunessee at 
Florence, 240, 254, 432 ; advances on Nash- 
ville, 250. 132; strength, 250, 254; turns 
Schotield's position, 254; defeated at 
Franklin, 255,432, 433; invests Nashville, 
256, 433, 410; Thomas prepares to receive, 
256; fears of his eluding Thomas, 256-258; 
fears of his getting north, 257, 258; de- 
feated at NashA-ille, 259, 200, 433, 440 ; gets 
possession of Franklin, 260; makes good 
his escape, 260; destroys bridges over 
Duck River, 260 ; recrosses the Tennessee, 
274, 276, 433 ; sluggish pursuit of, 274, 434 : 
remains of his army sent against Sher- 
man, 280, 283, 285, 443; fails to capture De- 
catur, 432; junction with Forrest, 432; 
demoralization of his army, 443 
Hooker, Joseph, commanding reinforce- 
ments at CUiattanooga, I, "503; expedi- 
tion to Brown's Ferry, 504, 505 ; supplies 
the troops at Chattanooga with full ra- 
tions. 506; strength, 508; in battle of 
Wauhatchie, 508, 509; plan of operations 
at Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga, and 
Missionary Ridge, 517, 519, 520; position 
iuLookout Valley, 521; change tu orders 
to, .521, 522, II, 4, 23 ; Osterhaus ordered to 
report to, 4; operations west of Chatta- 
nooga, 7 ; sends Geary up Lookout Creek, 
8; in battle of Lookout Mountain, 9, 10, 
3S3 ; orders to attaclt, Nov. 25, 1863, 12 ; In 
battle of Chattanooga, 14, 18, 383 ; crosses 
Chattanooga Creek, 19; operations at 
Rossville, 19; mingling of forces imder, 
at Chattanooga, 20; his work at Chatta- 
nooga planned beforehand, 23; move- 
ment from RossviUe toward Ringgold, 
25; operations at Ringgold, 26 ; battle be- 
fore Atlanta, 88; commanding Army of 
the Potomac, 382; military and personal 
characteristics, 383 ; drives the enemy to 
New Hoi>e Church, 423 
Horses, Grant's fondness for, I, 9, 10; inci- 
dents and accidents with, 10-12, 57, 58, 87, 
226 276, 291, 292,487 ; Mexican trade in, 47 ; 
wild, in Texas, 46, 47, 61; price of, in Cor- 
pus Christi, 57, .=^8, 61 ,, ^ ^ 
Hoskins, Charles, adjutant. Fourth Infan- 
try, I, *83 ; killed at Monterey, 84 
Hospitals, before Vicksburg, I, 382 ; service 
between Duckport and Milliken's Bend, 

391 

Hovey, A. P., cuts the road in Pemberton's 
rear, I, *35fi; at battle of Port Gibson, 
403 ; at Bolton, 426 ; in battle of Champi- 
on's Hill, 428, 429, 431-435 

Howard, B. B., speaks at meeting at Ga- 
lena, I, 184 . T T 

Howard, O. O., headquarters at Jasper, I, 



INDEX 



485 



*498 ; coramandinp: Eleventli Coinis, 503 ; 
ordered to reinforce Kosecraiis, rMi ; eiii)- 
tmes Browii'H Ferrv, SOf); ordered to 
Geary's relief at Waidiatchie, 508 ; plan of 
operations at Cbattanooj?a. 519 ; niarcli of, 
deceives the en(>my, 521, 525 ; in action at 
Fort Wood, II, 3 ; crosses Citico Creek, 7 ; 
junction with Slieriuau, 7; ordered to 
cross the Cliickamanga, 18; serviuK un- 
der Slierniau at Cliattanoosa. 20; eom- 
mauding right wing of Sherman's army, 
234; succeeds Logan in command, 235, 
423 ; marches to Jonesboro, 240 ; military 
ability, 423 
Hudson, Capt., mission to Sherman, II, 275 
Hudson Bay Co., Indian trade iu the North- 
west, I, 162, 1(54 
Humboldt, Tenn., Ord's command at, 1,335 
Humboldt Bay, Cal., the Fourth Infantry 

ordered to, 1, 164, 165 
Humphreys, A. A., put in special charge of 
■Warren's corps, II, *138; recommended 
for maior-geueralship, U. S. Vols., 139 ; 
chief of stall". Army of the Potomac, 226; 
assigned to command the Second Corps, 
226; in battle of White Oak Road, 299 ; at 
Five Forks, 303, 304. 452 ; in action of April 
2, 1865, 308, 309, 312, 313 ; at yutherlaud's 
Station, 312; goes to Miles's relief, 312, 
313; reinforces Sheridan, 316; out or ra- 
tions, 322, 324; reaches Jetersville, 325; 
confronts Lee, 331, 333; reinforced by 
Wright, 332 ; military character, 385 ; at 
Hatcher's Run, 450, 451. 453 
Humphreys, B. G., II, 101 . ^ tt ak- 

Hundred-days men. garrison duty for, 11,416 
Hunt, H. J., commanding artillery, Army 

of the Rotomac, II, *97, 100 
Hunter, David, sends reinforcements to 
Grant, I, *243 ; congratulated by Halleck 
on the fall of Donelson, 260 ; nominated by 
the press as Grant's successor, 382; suc- 
ceeds Sigel iu command. II, 142, 152, 195, 
411 ; to move up the Valley of Virginia, 
152 ; movements in aid of, 168 ; movements 
toward, at, and from Lynchburg. 175, 176, 
194, 195, 411. 412, 416; Lee's opportunity 
to attack, 175, 176 ; ordered to rejoin the 
Army of the Potomac, 176, 177, 192; letter 
to, June 6, 1864, 170: ordered to destroy 
the Virginia Central railroad, 176, 177; 
Sheridan sent to commuuicate with, 176, 
177; success at Staunton, 177, 181, 192; 
Lee sends troops against, 192, 193, 195,412; 
proposed iunction with Sheridan at Char- 
lottesville, 192, 194, 410; junction ^ylth 
Averell and Crook, 192, 195, 412 ; operations 
in the Shenandoah VaUey, 192, 194, 195, 
412. 417 ; takes the offensive, 195, 412 ; in- 
vests Lexington, 195; defeats the enemy 
at Piedmont, 195, 412 ; retreats to Harper s 
Ferry, 195, 416 ; difficulties of his march, 
195 412 ; commanding in the Valley, 206 ; 
instructions to, 207, 418 ; perplexed by con- 
tradictory orders, 207 ; Grant visits, on the 
Monocacy, 207, 418. 419 ; superseded by 
Sheridan, 207. 419 ; Halleck's distrust of, 
208; patriotism and military character, 
208 412 419; at meeting between Sheridan 
and Grant, 208 ; to live on the country, 
411- to move toward Gordonsville.Chai- 
lottesville, and Staunton, 411 ; criticism of 
his movements, 412 
Hunter, R. M. T., Confederate Peace Com- 
missioner. II, *287 



Huntley Corners, Va., Warren at, II, 158 

Hunton, Eppa, II, 101 

Huntsville, Ala., McPherson commanduig 
at, II, 82; McPherson's movement to 
Dalton from, 83, 84 ; Buford denmnds sur- 
render of, 428 ^ . . 

Hurlbut, S. A., coiiiuianding division of 
Army of the Telluess(^<^ I, *274 ; at Shl- 
loh, 279, 284, 288, 302; commanding at La 
Grange, Miss., 320; reinforces Koseerans 
at Corinth, 346; skirmish with Van Dom, 
346; .at Hatchie Bridge, 347; junction with 
Ord, 347; at Young's Point, 367; ordered 
to relievo Blair, 413; at Memplns, 413, 
488, II, 39 ; expulsion of alleged rebel from 
Memphis by, I, 425 ; sends reinforcements 
to Vicksburu-, 448, 455, 4.50 ; Halleck's or- 
ders to, 488;' cavalry strength, II, 40; to 
reinforce Sooy Smith, 40 

Illinois, mustering in volunteers, 1, 18.5-187, 
193-198; secession spirit in, 196; Grant ap- 
pointed brigatlier-gcneral from, 205; 
Grant's command iu southern, 211; 
Grant's strength in, 349 
Illinois River, transportation on the, 1, 198 
Indianapolis, Ind., meeting with Stanton at, 

I, 490 
" Indianola," the, capture of, I, 387, 388 
Indians, Mexican pi ecautious against raids 
by, I, 48 ; treatment by the Hudson Bay 
Company, 162; trade with, 162, 163; mor- 
tality among, 163, 164 ; Sheridan's services 
against, 333; kill Canby in Oregon, II, 377 
" Inevitable conflict," the, I, 170 
Ingalls, Rufus, administration of the quar- 
termaster's de])artiiicnt. Army of the Po- 
tomac, II, *'.: 4, 105, 411 
Interstate co.-.merce, efl'ect of the spread 

of, II, 387, 388 
Invalid Corps, on garrison duty, II, 416 
Iowa, traveling in, I, 177 , ^ ^ ^ 

Ironton, Mo., the 21st Illinois ordered to, I, 
193; Grant commanding the district of, 
207 
Irving, Washington, fondness for works of, 

I 20 

Irwinsville, Ga., capture of Jefferson Davis 
at, II. 368, 370 

Island No. lo, capture of, I, 307 

luka. Miss., Col. Murphy evacuates, I, 337, 
361 : entered bv Price, .337 ; Rosecrans 8 
headquarters at, 338 ; Price's predicament 
in, 340 ; Rosecrans's promise to reach, 341 ; 
capture of, 342, 343 ; orders sent to Sher- 
man at, 512 

Jacinto, Miss., troops and movements at, I, 
335, 340, 341 ^ - 

Jacinto road, Rosecrans s movements ana 
defeat on the, I, 340-342 

Tackson. Andrew, Jesse R. Grant supports, 
I, 5 : cause of dissension between Jesse 
R. Grant and Hamer, 15 

Tac'Kson, Claiborne F., governor of Missouri, 
ioius the rebels, I, *180, 187 ; death ot, 180 

Jackson, W. H., Grant's nan'ow escape fi-om 
capture by, I, *322, 323 

Jackson, Miss., strategic importance of, I, 
369 ; connection with Vicksburg, 401 ; the 
enemy's strength at, 401, 414. 417, 447, 449; 
advance on, 413, 414, 417. 420, 421 ; arrival 
of J. E. Johnston at, 419 ; flr.st capture of, 
401-423. 481, II, 172 ; destruction of stores 
at, I, 423, 424, 427, 446 ; Sherman's march to 



486 



INDEX 



Bolton from, 437 ; Federal losses at, 447 ; 
Johnstou falls back on, 482 ; Bhermau be- 
sieges, 482, 483 ; Joliuston evacuates, 483 ; 
casualties at second capture, 483 ; feeding 
the destitute at, 483; Sliemian enters, 11,41 

Jackson, Tenn., movements, commimica- 
tious. etc., at, I, 211, 212, 272, 326, 327, 332, 
335, 338, 344, 540 ; Grant leaves, to com- 
mand tlie Vicksburg campaign, 352 ; For- 
rest's raid near, 300 

Jackson and Vicksburg railroad. Grant's 
line ou the, I, 415 

Jacksonport, Ark., Price at, II, 427 

Jacksonville, Mo., troops ordered to, I, 211 

Jalapa, Mex., I, 98, 99, 102, 134, 132 

James River, the depot for exchange of 
prisoners on, I, 469, 477 ; country between 
the Rapidan aud the, II, 55, 96 ; Butler's 
operations on, 38, 59, 62, 65, 66, 73, 140, 185, 
225, 402, 403, 406, 407, 414, 422 ; Gillmore and 
Smith's operations ou, 58 ; base of supplies 
on, 62, 294, 401 ; plan of naval operations 
on, 63 ; the campaisu from the Rapidan to 
the, 66, 411 ; Butler's position between the 
Appomattox aud the, 74, 407 ; Sheridan's 
operations ou, 77-79, 293, 40G, 414, 445, 446 ; 
movements of the Army of the Potomac 
on, 153, 157, 174, 175, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185, 194, 
199, 200, 204,209,211, 212, 219, 220, 231, 299, 308, 
310, 403. 409, 410, 41 2, 415, 420, 421, 443, 448 ; Col. 
Comstook'smission to the, 180 ; preventiug 
Confederate gunboats from leaviug the, 
182, 185; coimtiy north of, held by the Army 
of the James, 191, 299 ; the whole army on, 
194 ; Lee'.s troops drawn to thenorth of, 199, 
204 ; the Union lines on, 219, 231 ; Confed- 
erate attacks on the north side, 225 ; 
proposition to transport Sherman's army 
from Savannah to the, 272 ; reinforce- 
ments for Gordon from the north side of 
the, 297 ; Lee's Troops on the iiorth side, 
304, 421 ; Lee orders Longstreet from the 
north side, 310 ; Union crossing of the, the 
deathlJlow to the Confederacy, 332 ; Sher- 
man's troops in camp at, 374; Union hold- 
ings ou, 398 ; defeat of Kautz on, 421, 422 

James River canal, destruction of, II, 175- 
117, 221, 222 278, 294 

Jasper, Tenn., Howard's headquarters at, I, 
498 

Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Grant reports for 
duty at, I, 2r. 

Jefferson City, Mo., Grant commanding at, 
I, 203; resttirins order, 209; employiug 
refugees, 209, 210 ; relieved by Jefferson C. 
Davis, 210 

Jenkins, Micah, killed in the Wilderness, II, 
112 

Jenkins's Ferry, Ark., battle of, II, 427 

jaricho Bridge, Va., troops ordered to, II, 
148-150, 406. 

Jerusalem plank road, Va., movements on 
the, II, 447, 451 

Jetersville, Va., movements, enaragemeuts, 
etc., at and near, II, 322, 323, 325, 453, 454 

Jo Daviess County, 111., citizens of, present 
:i swi>rd to Gen. Grant. II, 33 

" lohn Rain," the, transport steamer at 
xMasliville, I, 264 

Johnson, Andrew, first meeting with, I, *497; 
attitude toward the South,: H, 358-361, 369, 
370; supposed assassination of, 358; con- 
flict with Congress, 361 ; denounces Sher- 
man, 3G4, 365, 457 ; at the grand review in 
Washington, 378, 379 



Johnson, Edward, his command, II, 101; 

captured, 136, 138, 405 

Johnson, R. W., in action at Fort Wood, II, 
3 ; battle before Atlanta, *88 

Johnsonville, Tenn., Forrest's captures at, 
II, 432 ; Schotield readies, 432 

Johnston, A. S., early acquaintance with, I, 
151; Pillow's telegram from Fort Donel- 
80U to, 254 ; commanding in the West, *265; 
sti-ength of his command, 265, 266 ; de- 
f<'ated at Mill Springs, 266; awaiting the 
result of the siege of Fort Donelson, 266 ; 
fatal mistake of," 266, 267 ; opinion concern- 
ing Fort Donelson, 267 ; abandons Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga, 267 ; killed at Shi- 
loh, 267, 296, 297; fortifying at Corinth, 
273, 298; marches to Shiloh from Coriuth, 
275, 298; his cavah-y at Pitt8l>urg Land- 
ing, 275 ; letter from Pres. Davis to, 297 ; 
his personality, 297-299 ; plnn of campaign 
at Shiloh, 298; method of raising rein- 
forcements, 310 

Johnston, Joseph E., early acquaintance 
with, 1,151; arrives at Jackson, *419; di- 
rects Pemberton to attack Grant, 421 ; rein- 
forcements for, 421, 444, 448, 452, 492; evacu- 
ates Jackson, 423; plan to defeat Sher- 
man, 424 ; oommuuication between Pem- 
berton and, 424-427, 437, 456, 458, 462-464; 
fails to Join forces with Pen iberton, 437; 
expected to remforce Pemberton, 444 ; cav- 
alry watchiug. 448 ; crosses the Big Black, 
458; despairs of holding Vicksburg, 458; 
refrains from attack, 460 ; threatened at- 
tack from, 463; between Brownsville and 
the Big Black, 464; Pemberton proposes 
negotiations between Grant and, 465; 
Slieruian ordered to drive him from Mis- 
sissippi, 473, 475, 482; falls back on Jack- 
son, 482; evacuates Jackson, 483; super- 
sedes Bragg, II, 42; Thomas and Logan 
ordered to threaten, 42 ; moves toward 
Mobile, 42; ou the defensive in Georgia, 
48, 399 ; importance of attacking, 48, 49, 71, 
72; Sherman's campaign against, 49, 58, 
59, 61, 82, 83, 399, 422, 423 ; at Dalton, 57, 83, 

85. 140, 399; surprised by McPherson, 85; 
Newton engages his rear, 85 ; abandons 
Dalton, 85, 140; at Resaca, 85, 423; falls 
back to Marietta and Kenesaw Mountain, 

86, 423 ; abandons Allatoona, 86 ; abandons 
Kenesaw Mountain, 87 ; retreats across 
the Chattahoochee, 87 ; superseded by 
Hood, 87, 227, 236, 423; military policy, 
ability, and character, 87, 88, 227, 228, 236, 
280, 399; feeling between Pres. Davis and, 
228, 236, 280 ; put in command of all troops 
in North and South Carolina, 280, 284 ; con- 
fronts Sherman in North Carolina, 285, 301, 
362,442, 453, 457 ; at AverysboroaudBenton- 
ville, 285; demoralization of his army, 286; 
fears of Lee's junction with, 295, 316, 340, 
446, 449; hopeless position of, 362; Sher- 
man's difBcultv with the authorities about 
the terms granted to, 363-366, 374, 379, 457 ; 
surrender of, 306, 458 

Johnston, R. D., II, 101 

Johnston, W. P., estimate of Confederates 
at Fort Donelson, 1, 258 ; biographer of A. 
S. Johnston, 298 

Joliet, 111., imprisonment of rebels at, and 
their release, I, 330 

Jones, T. M., 11,101 

Jones, 'W. E., defeated and klUed at Staun- 
ton, II, *177 



INDEX 



487 



Jonesborc, Ga., Kilpatriclf's raid at, II, 92; 

Howard moA'cs to, 240; Sliermau defeats 

Hood near, II, 424 
Jonesboro, Miss., Kosecraus's pursuit 

through, I, US 
Jones's Bridge, Va., moveinents at, 11, 177, 

179-181 
Jones's Landing, Va., Sheridan crosses the 

Jamos near, II, 446 
Juarez, Benito, President of Mexico, 1,42; 

assistance ofi'ered to, II, 389 
Judah, Henry M., at capture of City of 

Mexico, 1, 121 



Kanawlia River, Peter Grant drowned in 
the, I, 3; niovenients on, in the rcliellion, 
II, 58, 192, 195, 403, 411, 412, 416 

Kansas, re:nl'oreenioutsfi-oua, 1,243; Price's 
raid toward, II, 427 

Kautz, A. v., enters West Point from 
Georgetown, O., I, *18; defeats Hill, II, 
133; operations against Virginia rail- 
roads, 133, 199, 405,' 407, 414; operations 
against Peterslnirg and Eiclimond, 133, 
186, 218, 410; defeated, Oct. 7, 1864,225, 421, 
422 ; forces the Black Water, 407 ; actions 
atStony Creek, 407, 415; crosses the James, 
415; action, Sept. 29, 1864, 421 

Kearny, Philip, wounded at Ohurubusco, 

I, *113 ; early acquaintance with, 152 
Kearny, Stephen, at Jefferson Barracks, I, 

*25 

Kelley, B. F., defeats McCausland, II, *204, 
417 

Kelly, Rachel, I, 2 

Kelly's Ferry, Tenn., operations, etc., at, I, 
.505, 506, 517, 523, II, 29 

Kenesav/ Mountain, Ga., operations on, II, 
86, 87, 423 

Kentucky, the Grants in, I, 3; Ulysses' 
schoollife in, 8; visit to, 16; represented 
in Confederate Congress, 180; fails to 
pass ordinance of secession, 180 ; at- 
tempted neutrality of, 216; Grant's cor- 
respondence with the legislature of, 216 ; 
Halleck commanding in, 231; the Con- 
federate line in, 232 ; the fate of, depend- 
ing on Fort Donelson, 266; Confederate 
disasters in, 297 ; possibilities of avoiding 
fighting for, 318; boundaries of Grant's 
district in, 326 ; fears of the invading line 
going beyond, 337 ; Grant's strength in, 
349 ; army of defense of, 359 ; the Ninth 
Corps returned to, 485; Forrest's and 
WTieeler's operations in, II, 229, 236; 
Thomas to hold, 238; Morgan's raids in, 
354, 425 ; activity of guerrillas in, 425 ; the 
enemy crosses the Cunilierland into, 433 

Kershaw, J. B., his command, II, 101 ; sent 
to reinforce Early. 421 

Key West, Fla., Federal possession of, II, 
54, 398 

Kilpatrick, H. J., raid on the Macon railroad, 

II, 92 

Kimball, Nathan, ordered to Mechanics- 
bur^, I. *455 

King, Maj., I, 18 

Kingston, Tenn., possibility of enemy 
breaking through at, I, 517 

Kingston, Ga., Sherman captures, II, 85, 151 

Kinston, N. C, occupation of, II, 441 

Kitching, J. H., II, 100, *143 

Know-nothing Party, Grant joins the, I, 
169 



Knoxville, Tenn., the Confederate line at, 

I, ;J04 ; possibilities of avoiding Burnside'H 
imprisonmeut in, 318; i)roposal t(tabanrlou 
terri tory soul baud west of, 516; Longstrcet 
threatens, 518 ; battle of, 623, II, 1 ; Bragg's 
designs concerning, 2; projected expedi- 
tions to, 19 ; reasons for the Confederate 
campaign against, 21 ; measures for le- 
lief of, 24 ; fears of Bragg's attacking, 25 ; 
relief expedilions to, 25-28, 38; destruc- 
tion of railroad between Dalton and, 27; 
Wilson and Dana's journey from Chatta- 
nooga to, 28; Buruside obtains supplies 
in, 28, 29; its value to Bragg, 29, 30; rais- 
ing of the siege, 31; (iraiit visits, 34; 
severe winter at, 34 ; Scholield command- 
ing at, 82 ; Sehotleld's movement from, 83 ; 
Thomas ordered to concentrate stoi'es at, 
282.446; Breckinridge defeats Gilleni at, 
434 

" Lafayette," the, running the batteries at 
Vieksburg, I, 386 

Lagow, C. B.,- appointed aide-de-camp, I, 
*205; solo statl-oflicer at Jefferson City, 
210 

La Grange, Miss., speech of .Tefferson Davis 
at, 1, 178; journey from Corinth to Mem- 
phis through, 320, 321; ahandoimient of, 
327; occupation of, 352; stoi'Cs at, 355; re- 
turn to, 361 ; Hatch arrives in, 408 ; Grier- 
son's raid from, 408 

Lake Chicot, , A. J. Smith's engagement 

near, II, 427 

Lake Pontchartrain, proposed movement 
against Mobile from, I, 484 

Lake Providence, La., operations at, I, 370, 
373-375, 380, 392, 464 

Lake St. Joseph, I, 394 

Lane, James H., II, 102 

Lauman, J. G., in siege of Vieksburg, I, 413, 
*448, 456 

Lava Beds, Ore., Gen. Canby killed in the, 

II, 372 

Law, E. M., II, 101 

Lawler, M. K., in battle of Black River 
Bridge, I, *439, 440 

Lawrence, Col., commanding at Columbus, 
Ky., II, 425 ; refuses to surrender the gar- 
rison, 425 

Leasure, Daniel, II, 100 

Ledlie, J. H., in the Petersburg mine affair, 
II, *202 ; incompetency of, 202, 203 

Lee,,-Fitz-Hugh, his command, II, 102; or- 
dered to defense of the Valley, 193 ; at 
Trevillian Station, 193 

Lee, Robert E.,atCerroGordo,I,100; Grant's 
acquaintance with, 151, 11,341, 342; per- 
sonal and military characteristics, 1, 152, 
II, 184, 185, 341, 342, 348, 399 ; plans of cam- 
paign against, 33, 61-63, 73, 121, 127, 145, 168, 
174, 199, 209, 218, 226, 275, 326, 327, 399, 401- 
403, 409, 440, 442, 449, 453; anticipations 
and fears of his movements, 62, 63, 66, 1I9, 
121, 127, 145, 218, 275, 291, 295, 308, 313-316, 
326, 327, 338-340, 442, 446, 449 ; commanding 
the Army of Northern Viri;inia, *55, 101, 
184, 399 ; situation on the Kapidan, 57, 399 ; 
capture of his army the great olijcct of 
the (;rand Campaign, 66, 71, 401, 440; Sher- 
idan's operations against, 76-80, 133, 181, 
333, 405, 450 ; surprised at the crossing of 
the Rapidan, 98 ; organization of bis army, 
101-104; headquarters at Oranae Court 
House, 102; ignorance of true import of 



488 



INDEX 



the Federal advance, 105, 124; orders Hill, 
Ewell, aud LoiiKstreet to attack, 106 ; or- 
ders his troops to intrenchments at Mlue 
Run, 106 ; endeavors to avoid battle on 
the right, 110 ; in the battle of the Wil- 
derness, 110-115, 184, 405; loss of Lons- 
street a severe blow to, 112 ; assumes 
command in pei'son, 112 ; withdi-aws with- 
in his intrenchments, 115; oi-ders for 
movement by the left flank, 119, 120, 405 ; 
informs his government of the assumed 
retreat of the Array of the Potomac, 121 ; 
beats Grant to Spottsylvania, 121, 122 ; or- 
ders to Early, 124; informs his govern- 
ment that he is on Grant's flank, 124; 
crosses the Po at Wooden Bridge, 126 ; on 
the Catharpin road, 126; in battle of 
Spottsylvania, 127-132, 134-145; Wright's 
operations against, 129, 141, 142, 147, 149; 
Warren's operations against, 129, 14T, 149, 
405; Burnside's operations against, 131, 
132, 147 ; Hancock's operations against, 
136, 137, 141, 147, 405 ; roads and telegraphs 
cut between Richmond and, 141 ; defeats 
Hancock and Wright, 141, 142 ; Staunton a 
source of supplies for, 142; Pickett at- 
tempts to reinforce, 146; his lost oppor- 
tunity, 147; attempts to get between 
Richmond and, 147, 152 et seq., 405; con- 
fronts Warren and Wright at Jericho 
Ford, 149; position on the North Anna, 
150, 151 ; reinforcements for, 151 ; inactiv- 
ity of, 151, 152 ; reported falling back on 
Richmond, 152; popular impression in the 
South concerning his operations, 152 ; po- 
sition. May 26, 1864, 153 ; virtually whipped, 
153, 154; feint of attack on left flank of, 
155 ; telegraphs belated news to Richmond, 
157 ; deceived by the movement from the 
North Anna, 157 ; endeavoring to find his 
position, 158 ; position. May 30, 161 ; extent 
of his lines at Cold Harbor, 165, 166 ; effect 
of the battle of the Wilderness on, 167, 
409, 410; correspondence with, regarding 
dead and wounded at Cold Harbor, 169- 
171 ; position near Richmond, 174 ; oppor- 
tunity to crush Butler, 175; facilities for 
anticipating news, 181 ; favorable condi- 
tions tor, 184; sends troops to Early aud 
the Valley, 192, 193, 195, 209, 213, 412, 417 ; 
threatened attack by, 199 ; delay in bring- 
ing up troops at Petersburg mine, 203; 
di-awing his troops to the north of the 
James, 204; importance of the Weldon 
railroad to, 211, 213 ; unsuccessful efforts 
to recapture the Weldon railroad, 211, 212; 
importance of the Shenandoah Valley to, 
214; measures to prevent his reinforcing 
Early, 218; strength of his lines, 218; rein- 
forces troops about Fort Gilmer, 219; 
Grant to watch him closely at Richmond, 
275; sends troops against Sherman, 275, 
280; held down by Grant at Richmond, 
285 ; impossibility of his strildng at Sher- 
man, 285, 286; desertions fTom, and de- 
moralization of, his army, 286, 291, 297, 320, 
321, 325, 334, 335, 350, 351 ; attempt to unite 
with Johnston and crush Sherman, 316, 
340; determines to assault the Union lines 
at Petersburg. 296'; agrees with Pros. 
Davis to abandon Richmond and Peters- 
burg, 296 ; plan of escape, 296 ; his avenue 
of escape, 315; loss in Gordon's attack. 
March 24, 1865, 298 ; menacing his right, 
303; importance of the South Side and 



Dan^nlle railroads to, 303, 304 ; personally 
superintends defense of his right flank, 
304 ; frantic efforts to recover lost ground, 
310, 311; attacks I'arke, 311 ; hopes of cap- 
turing his flying army, 314-316, 328, 327; 
plan to get ahead of, 315, 316, 32G, 327; 
abandons Richmond, 316; orders his 
troops to assemble at Amelia Court House, 
316 ; importance of koejiing up his army, 
320 ; orders rations from DauATlle to Farm- 
ville, 322, 323 ; intrenches at Amelia Com-t 
House, 323, 324, 453; in a Ufe-and-death 
struggle, 324,454; movement from Amelia 
Court House to Farmville, 328, 329; cuts 
oft" Washburn, 330; attempts to destroy 
bridge near High Bridge, 331 ; stopped by 
Washburn and Read, 331, 454; pui-sued by 
Humphreys, 331, 333; Ewell expresses 
hopes of his surrender, 333; correspon- 
dence and communications with, concern- 
ing surrender, 333, 334, 3S6, 337-349, 454-457 ; 
engagement at Appomattox Station, 336; 
chief of staft" to Gen. Scott in Blexico, 341 ; 
contrasted with Grant, 341, 342 ; sword 
presented to, by the State of Virginia, 
342 ; Grant's personal feelings toward, 342 ; 
preserves the fiction of two separate 
countries, 344; the fable of his sword at 
Appomattox, 346 ; paroling liis army, 346 ; 
starving condition of his troops, 346 ; in- 
terview with, April 10, 1865, 348; influence 
of, 348, 457; number of troops surren- 
dered by, 351 

Lee, S. D., with Hood at Franklin, II, *254 

Lee, W. H. P., 11,104 

Leggett, M. D., repulses the enemy at Bo- 
livar, I, *332; promoted brigadier-general, 
350 ; mining at Vicksburg, 460-462 

Leonard, Samuel H., II, 98 

" Let-alone policy," the; II, 398 

Lever, Charles, Grant's fondness for works 
of, I, 20 

Lewisburg, W. Va., Crook to take, II, 403 

Lexington, Ky., horseback journey from 
KnoxviUe to, II, 34; Burbridge returns 
to, 434 

Lexington, Mo., threatened by Price, I, 208 ; 
Grant ordered to secure cash from banks 
in, 209 

Lexington, Va., Hunter's movements near, 
II, 195, 412 

" Lexington," the, action on the Tennessee 
River, I, 240 ; at Pittsburg Landing, 285 

Lick Creek, its coui'se, and movements on, 
I, 279-281 

Lieutenant-General, the office restored by 
Congi-ess, II, 44 ; (xrant commissioned, 44, 
45; the military situation at time of 
Grant's commission, 53 et seq. 

Lincoln, Abraham, election of, I, 171- * 173; 
secret journey to Washington, 182; inau- 
guration, 183; calls for 75^000 troops, 183; 
anecdotes of, 186, II, 68, 246. 290, 377, 378 ; 
second call for troops, I, 194 ; constant 
hope for the Union, 337; congi'atiilates 
Grant on success at Corinth, 349 ; author- 
izes McClernand to command expedition 
against Vicksburg, 358 ; Mississippi River 
experience, 372 ; supports Grant, 383, 384; 
effect of Gettysburg and Vicksburg on, 
475; desires to gain foothold in Texas, 
484 ; alarmed at results of Chickamauga, 
488 ; concern for the loyalists of East Ten- 
nessee, 515; anxiety for Burnside and 
Knoxville, 515, 516, 523, U„ 11, 224, 32; con- 



INDEX 



489 



gi-atulations from, on operations of No- 
vember 24, 18G;i, 10, 11; uomiuates \V. F. 
Smith for promotion, 31; iut'ormert of 
the raising of tlie sioRc of Knoxville, 
31 ; letter of tbanks from, 32 ; presents 
Grant with comuiissiou as liouteuant- 
geueral, 44, 45; debatoH with Uonghis, 
50; Grant's lirst meeting with, 50 52; 
his military ability, 50-52; supports 
Sheridan for command of cavalry, GO; 
conferences with, 6G-U8; quaint phrase- 
ology of, 68; despatch to (irant, Aug. 
3, 1864, 206 ; anxiety for Sheridan's safety. 
217, 218; reassured by Grant, 218; asks 
for comfort from Grant, regarding Sher- 
man, 245, 246; sums np Sherman's i)0- 
sition, 246; anxiety as to propriety of 
Sherman's cutting loose from his base, 
253; Grant telegraphs failure of Fort 
Fisher expedition to, 267 ; notified of the 
aiTival of the Peace Commissioners, 28T ; 
interview with the Peace Commissioners, 
289, 290, 363 ; his terms of peace, 289, 363 ; 
personal characteristics, 289, 319, 358, 380, 
381; characterization of A. H. Stephens, 
290 ; at City Point, 289, 290, 308, 310, 317, 320, 
363 ; notified of success at Five Forks, 308 ; 
informed of capture of outer works of 
Petersburg, 310; invited to visit Peters- 
burg, 313, 318; congratulates Grant, 318; 
visits Petersburg, 318-320; visits Kich- 
mond, 355, 356, 363 ; interview with Weit- 
zel at Richmond. 355; diflfereuce with 
Stanton concerning the calling of the Vir- 
ginia legislatiu-e, 355, 356; invites Gen. 
and Mrs. Grant to attend Ford's Theater, 
357 ; the invitation declined, 357 ; assassi- 
nation of, 358, 369; efi'ects of his assassi- 
nation, 359; meeting with Sherman, 363; 
feeling in regard to Jefferson Davis, 369, 
378; his death a national loss, 369; con- 
trasted with Stanton, 380, 381 
Little Colorado River, crossing the, I, 62, 63 
Littlepage's Bridge and Ford, Va., II, 155, 

156 
Little River, movements at, II, 153, 155 
Little Rock, Ark., Steele at, II, 426, 427 
Logan, John A., Grant's first meeting with, 
I, 195-*197 ; personal characteristics, mil- 
itary ability, etc., *196, 416, 480, II, 235, 
259; his loyalty suspected, I, 196; pa- 
triotic speech by. 196; his district in Illi- 
nois, 196-198; addresses the 21.st Illinois, 
197; raises troops, 197; proposes to enter 
Corinth, 314; personnel of his command, 
393 ; at Briiinsburg, 401 ; in battle of Port 
Gibson, 403 ; to repairbridge atNorth Fork 
of Bayou Pierre, 406 ; reinforces McPher- 
son, 409 ; ordered toward Grand Gidf , 409 ; 
in battle of Raymond, 415; in battle of 
Jackson, 422; at Bolton, 426; in battle of 
Champion's Hill, 432, 433, 435; enlists a 
colored man in his service at Vicksbiirg, 
461 ; at meeting between Pemberton and 
Grant, 467; lus di^^sion first to enter 
Vicksburg, 472 ; ordered to threaten J. E. 
Johnston, II. 42 ; assigned to command the 
Fifteenth Corps, 46 ; succeeds McPherson 
in command of Army of the Tennessee, 
89, 235, 423; report of losses at Atlanta, 
89 ; assaults on. at Atlanta, 90 ; command- 
ing the Fifteenth Corps. 234; quits the 
field for political purposes. 234 ; dUatori- 
ness in returning to his command, 235 ; su- 
perseded by Howard, 235, 423; aggrieved 



at Howard's transfer, 235 ; visits Grant at 
City Point, 259 ; ordered conditionally to 
relieve Tliomiis, 2.')9 

Lomax, L. L., 11,102 

Long, A. L., 1[, 103 

Long Bridge, Va., movements at, II, 179- 
181, 410 

Longstreet, James, attack^ Geary at Wau- 
hatchie, I, *508; position on Chattanooga 
Creek, 510; moves ngiiinst Burnside. 515- 
518, II, 25,29, 30; at Loudon, I, 51H ; threat- 
ens Knoxville, 518; plan to cut him ort' 
fi"om the soutli, 518; ])erils environing, 
524, II, 30; reinforcements sent to, 2, 30, 
42, 43; Graut's personal accpiaintance 
with, 21 ; ditl'erenco between Bragg and, 
21; personal characteristics, 22; to b(^ 
driven from Knoxville, 24; information 
for, 28; puisuit of, by Burnside, 32: win- 
ters in J<^ast Tennessee, 32; ])roposal to 
drive him out of Tennessee, 37, 43; pur- 
suit of, abandoned, 43 ; checks Sehofleld's 
movements, 44; ordered to attack via the 
Orange plank road, 106; at Gordonsville, 
106; en route to reinforce Hill. 109; in the 
battle of the Wilderness, 110, 112; wounded, 
112; his loss a severe blow to Lee, 112; 
his corps (U'dered to Spottsylvania. 121 ; 
intention to join Early in crushing Sheri- 
dan, 222; supports Lee's riglit, 310; ap- 
pointed to oversee the paroling of Lee's 
army, 347 

Long Wharf, San Francisco, I, 159, 165 

Lookout Creek, I, 502, II, 8 

Lookout Mountain, Tenn., Rosecrans aban- 
dons, I, 494; Bragg's position on, 494, 495, 
502, 503, 508, II, 30; reconnoitering near, I, 
501 ; junction of the Tennessee with Chat- 
tanooga Creek at, 509; Hooker's op(!r- 
ations on, 517, 521, .522, II, 8-10, 23, 383; 
Sherman's crossing of the Tennessee in 
view of, 1, 524 ; deception of the enemy on, 
525 ; the clouds on, II, 6 ; physical features 
of, 8; battle of, S-lO; evacuated by the 
enemy, 14 

Lookout Valley, Confederate lines at, 1, 503 ; 
gaining a footing in, 505; the Tennessee 
opened from Bridgeijort to, 505 ; c(nni)ar- 
ative advantages of the Union and Con- 
federate forces ill. .508; losses in securing 
posses-sion of, 509; deceiving the enemy 
with regard to movements m, 517; to be 
defended by Geary, 519 ; plan of Hooker's 
movement to Chattanooga Valley from, 
520; key to the line of supplies, 521 ; com- 
manded by Missionary Ridge, 521 ; Hook- 
er's position in, 521 

Loomis, , excellence as an accountant, 

I, 187 

Loomis, John M., in battle of Chattanooga, 

II, *13 

Loring, W. V/., delayed at Port Gibson, I, 

* 402; effect of battle of Champion's Hill 

on, 435 
" Lost cause," the, 1, 132 
Lost Mountain, Ga., J. E. Johnston at, II, 

423 
Loudon, Colonel, I, 18 
Loudon, Tenn., Longstreet at, I. 516, 518 
Louisa Court House. Va., Sheridan destroys 

the railroad at, II, 414 
Louisiana, with the Armj' of Observation 

in, I. 30; secession of. 183 ; Union holdings 

in. II, 53, 398; Banks defeated m, 142; 

Grant proposes that troops in, move 



490 



INDEX 



against Mobile, 233 ; in the hands of the 

enemy, 398 , . . ^i. • v ^ 

Louisiana Purchase, no claim to the right 

of secession, I, 174 . 

Louisville, Ga., Sherman's movement via, 

Louisville, Ky., early visits to, I. 9, 16; Bii- 
ell's headiiuarters at, 233; National troops 
at, 265 ; Granger at, 332-334 ; Sheridan at, 
334 ; Buell's march to, 336 ; meeting with 
Stanton at, 490, 491, 496 ; Grant leaves, for 
the front, 497 ; Thomas advised to caU for 
a force to go to, II, 258 ; Stoneman in, 281 

" Louisville," the. at Fort Donelson, I, 247; 
running the batteries at Vicksburg, 386 

Lovejoy's, Ga., Sherman defeats Hood near, 
II, 424 

Lovell, Mansfield, commanding at New Or- 
leans, I, 142 ; excursion in Mexico, 142 et 
seq. ; joins Van Dorn in attacli on Corinth, 
345 

Luther, Roland A., wounded at Palo Alto, 
I, *69 

Lynchburg, plans for Ord's operations to- 
ward, 11, 61; Sheridan's operations to- 
ward, at, and near, 77, 278, 293, 294, 444, 445 ; 
Hunter's operations toward, at, and near, 
152, 168, 175, 176, 191, 195, 411, 412, 416 ; im- 
portance of, 176. 409 ; Early's movements 
at, 195, 420; proposed plan of campaign 
toward, for spring of 1865, 226 ; Tlioinas 
ordered to move toward, 281, 282, 446 ; road 
between Petersburg and, 328 ; Stoneman's 
movements against, 366, 367, 442, 446, 458 ; 
evacuation of, 367 ; Lee's troops beat Hun- 
ter to, 412 ; possibilities of Lee's falling 
back to, 442 ; destruction of raUroad near, 
445 

Lynchburg and Petersburg road, proposal 
to capture the, II, 231, 238. See also 
South Side Railroad 

Lyon, Nathaniel, energetic work by, at Bt. 
Louis and Camp Jackson, I, *188 

McAllister, Robert, II, 97 

Mc Arthur, John, at Corinth, I, 335; in battle 
of Champion's Hill, 433 ; in siege of Vicks- 
burg, *448 

McBirney, David B., II, 97 

McCall, George A., Grant's service in the 
company of. Fourth Infantry, I, *54 ; char- 
acter, 54; liindness rendered by, 60, 61 ; at 
Resaca de la Palma, 70 ; early acquain- 
tance with, 151 

McCandless, William, his command. II, 98; 
recommended for brigadier-generalship, 
U. S. Vols., 139 

McCausland, John, burns Chambersburg, 
II. 204 ; defeated by Gen. Kelley, 204 

McClellan, George B., at Cerro Gordo, I, 
100; Grant's acquaintance witli, *193; ap- 
pointed majjor-general, 193; orders from, 
233; delay in communication with, 268; 
correspondence with Halleck concerning 
operations in the West, 269 ; orders arrest 
of Grant, 269 ; nominated by the press as 
Grant's successor, 382 ; question of his res- 
toration to duty, II, 48 
McClellan, Moody, & Hillyer, I, 205 
McClernand, J. A., first meeting with, I, *195- 
197 ; addresses the 2l8t Illinois, 197 ; loy- 
alty of, 197 ; ordered into west Kentucky, 
234; commanding expedition on the Ten- 
nessee, 236 ; at Fort Donelson. 244-246, 250, 
251,258; promoted major-general of vol- 



unteers, 260; commanding division of 
Army of the Tennessee, 274 ; quality of his 
troops, 279; at Pittsburg Landing, 279; 
praises Sherman, 282 ; at Shiloh, 284, 288, 
302, 307 ; recruiting expedition at the 
Nortli, 349, 350; rumored separate com- 
mand for, 355; fears of his assuming com- 
mand of expedition against Vicksburg, 
358, 359; a command provided for, 360; 
faUm-e of Grant's despatch to reach, 364; 
assumes command of Sherman's troops, 
365, 366 ; reaches the mouth of the Yazoo, 
365; approves the attack on Arkansas 
Post, 366 ; returns to Napoleon, 366 ; diffi- 
culty about, 367; visit to, at Napoleon, 
367 ; ordered to Yoimg's Point, 367 ; insub- 
ordination of, 368; character and politi- 
cal affiliations, 368; excavation work at 
Young's Point, 372; nominated by the 
press as Grant's successor, 382; at New 
Carthage, 388, 389; discovers route from 
Smith's plantation to Perkins's planta- 
tion, 389; bridge-biulding by, 389; com- 
manding right wing of the Army of the 
Tennessee, 390; at Hard Times, 394; at 
Port Gibson, 402-404 ; to hold Hanklnson's 
Ferry, 409 ; plan to send him to Port Hud- 
son, 410 ; awaiting supplies, 412 ; orders to, 
for attack on Grand Gulf, 395, 396 ; lands 
at Bruiusburg, 400 ; commanding the Thii-- 
teeuth Corps. 401 ; on the Big Black, 412, 
414, 415 ; at Edward's Station, 420, 427, 428; 
at Big Sandy, Five MUe Creek, and Rocky 
Springs, 413; at Fourteen-Mile Creek, 
413-415; ordered to Clinton. Mississippi 
Springs, and Raymond, 420; joined by 
Blair. 423 ; moves on Bolton, 425, 426 ; 
Blair's command turned over to, 428 ; or- 
ders to. regariling movements of troops, 
428; in battle of Champion's Hill, 429, 431, 
432, 434, 435; in battle of Black River 
Bridge, 438 ; in siege of Vicksburg, 442-445, 
448, 456 ; complaints concerning his con- 
gi-atulatory order, 457 ; relieved from duty 
and ordered to Springfield, 457 

McCook, A. McD., at Shiloh, I, *287, 288, 
292 ; comment on article in " Century 
Magazine" regarding, 292; retreats to 
Chattanooga, 494 ; question of his restora- 
tion to duty, II, 48 

McCook, E. M., raid toward Macon, II, *9l, 
424 

McCook family, the, I, 292 

Macfeely, R., excused from engineer duty 
at Vicksburg, I, 450 

McGowan, Samuel, II. 102 

Mcintosh, J. S., wounded at Resaca de la 
Palma, I, *71 

Mackenzie, R. S., in battle of White Oak 
Road, II, 299 ; attacks the enemy near the 
Appomattox, 323; military career, *385; 
movement to Hatcher's Run. 450; at Din- 
widdle Court House. 452 ; designated to 
receive paroles of Lee's army, 457 

McKenzie, Samuel, commanding assault- 
ing column at Chapultepec, I, n20 

McLean, 'Wilmer, owner of house at Appo- 
mattox where Lee surrendered, II, 340, 
34,5, 348 

McMinnville, Tenn., 'UTieeler at, II, 424 

Macon, Tenn., Hatch destroys the railroad 
between Columbus and, I, 408 

Macon, Ga., Stoneman's raid toward, II. 90- 
92: Kilpatrick's raid toward. 92; Pres. 
Davis's speech at, 227-230, 428, 429 ; Sher- 



INDEX 



491 



man tbreatens, 231, 232, 424, 431 ; captured 

by Wilsou, 3(18, 459 
McPherson, J. B., report on question of m- 
trenchiufj, i\t I'ittslmrg Landing, I, *274, 
295 ; at Sllilob, 276, 278, 2<J1, 292, 295 ; I'Oiu- 
t'orces Rosecrans at Coriittli, ;uo; pro- 
moted inajor-geueral. 350; coniniaiulinK 
left wiug, Army ol' the Teiiucsscf, ar)2 ; 
pursues the euemy beyond Oxloid, ;J5(i; 
operations at Lake Providence, 370, 373- 
375; commandius center ot the Aruiy of 
the Tenuesseo, 390; advance upon New 
Cartlume, 392; cooperates witli JMcCU-r- 
naud lit Grand Gulf, 395; advances to 
Hard Times, 395, 400; at Bruinsbiir/j,-, 400, 
401 ; supports McClemaud at Port tiihson, 
402, 103; on the west bank of the Missis- 
sippi, 40(j ; seizes Hankiu.son's Kerry, 409 ; 
operations at the Bis Black River, 412, 413, 
439, 441; at Rooky Springs and Utica, 413; at 
Raymond, 413-415 ; moves on Jackson, 413, 
420'; in battle of Jackson, 421-423; moves 
on Clinton, 419, 420; moves on Bolton, 
425, 426; at Champion's Hill, 428, 429, 431- 
435; in siege of Vicksburg, 442, 443, 448; 
sacrifices in favor of McClernand, 445; 
complains of McClernand's congratula- 
tory order, 457 ; at meeting between Pem- 
berton and Grant, 467 ; ordered to Mem- 
phis, 488; sent to reinforce Roseorans, 
494 ; ordered to send locomotives to Dodge, 
514; commanding in Vicksburg, II, 39; 
commanding Department of the Tennes- 
see, 46, 54, si, 422 ; strength. 82 ; at Himts- 
viile, 82 ; movement from Chattanooga to 
Dalton, 83, 84, 422 ; sent around by Snake 
Creek Gap, 85, 422, 423 ; surprises Johnston, 
85; killed before Atlanta, 89, 423; suc- 
ceeded by Logan, 235 ; in battle of Dallas, 
423; unsuccessful assault on Kenesaw 
Mountain, 423 
McRae, D., II, 102 

Mahone, William, II, 102 ... ^^ 

Manchester, Eng., the cotton tamme m, 11, 

392 
Manchester, Va., Sherman's troops nicamp 

at, II, 374 ^. .^, ^, 

Manitou Springs, Colo., meetmg with Gen. 

W. H. Jackson at, I, 323 
Mansfield, J. K. F., examines defenses of 

Monterey, I, *80; early acquaintance 

with, 152 , . , 

Manual labor. Grant's early experience at, 

I 12 
March to the sea, commencement of the, 
II, 240. See also ATLANTA; Georgia; Sa- 
vannah ; Shkrman. 
Marcy, William L., Secretary of War under 
Polk, I, 90 ; difficulties concerning Scott a 
appointment, 90 ^ „ , , * tt op 

Marietta Ga., Johnston falls back to, II, 86 
Marin, Mex., Taylor's troops at, I, 79 
Marine Brigade, expedition to Harness 

Bluff, I, 455 
Marion, Va., defeat of Vaughn at, II, 434 
Markland, A. H., in charge of mads to Sher- 
man at Savannah, II, 249 
Mark's Mill, Ark., Steele's loss at, II, 427 
Marryatt, Capt., Grant' 8 fondness for works 

Marsh "c. C, commanding at Jackson, I, 
*211 ; promoted brigadier-general, 350 

Marshall, Col., I, 18 

Marshall, Charles, with Lee at Appomat- 
tox, II, *340 



Marshall, Elisha G., II, 100 ^ ^ , , „ , 

Martindale, J. H., in l)attle of Cold Harbor, 
II, 167 

Martinsburg, W. Va., Karly at, II, 21G, 416 

" Mary and John," tlu^ shij*, I, 2 

Maryland, represented in Confederate Con- 
gress, 1, 180; fails to pass ordinance of 
secession, isO; inva,ded by the Army of 
Mortliern Virginia, 336 ; fears of the in vad- 
ingline going north of, 337; e.xpo.sure to 
raids and incursions into, 11,205,403,416- 
419 ; trcv. from Confederate invasion, 208, 
209 . ^^ 

Maryland Heights, Md., Weber occupies, II, 
41 C „ 

" Mary Martin," the, the Confederate Peace 
Commissioners Unlged on, II, 287 

Mason, Rodney, supposed cowardice at 
Shiloh, I, "830 ; surrenders Clarksville, 330, 

331 , . X , 

Massachusetts, the Grant family m, l, i 

Mat River, t lie, II, 126 

Matamoras, Mex., movements toward, and 
operatiuns at, 1, 45, 63, 67, 72, 75-77 

Mathematics, Grant's fondness for. I, 20; 
preparing for a professorship in, 30. 31 

Mattapony, the river, Sheridan at, 11,79; 
its comiioiient streams, 126 

Mattoon, 111., mustering in the 21st Illinois 
at, I. 190 

Maynardville, Tenn., Willcox at. I, 524 

Maysville, Ky., Peter Grant settles m. 1.3; 
Jesse R. Grant in, 3 ; Grant's school Irfe 
in, 8; early visits to, 9 

Meade, George G., at battle of Monterey, I, 
"82; former acquaintance with, II. '46; 
commanding Army of the Potomac, 46, 
47, 61, 97, 399, 404 : visit to, at Brandy hta- 
tion,46, 47; patriotic oiler of, 46, 47 ; posi- 
tion after Grant's promotion, 47; per- 
sonal and military characteristics, 47, 
139, 323, 382, 383, 404 ; letters to : (Apr. 
9, 1864) 61-63. (May 7) 119, 120, (May 11) 
134, (May 18) 145, (May 22) 148, (May 25) 
154, (May 30) 159, (June 3) 166, 168, (June 11) 
180, (July 24)200, (Mar. 24, 1865) 447,448; 
Instructions to, for spring campaigii, 1864, 
61-63; ordered to advance, 65; Swinton s 
eavesdropping at private consultation 
between Grant and, 69, 70; onlers lor 
Sheridan's raid passed thrtuigh, 77 ; orders 
issued throunh, for advance on May 5, 
1864, 106; headquarters at Old Wilderness 
Tavern, 107; orders (ictty to attack in 
the Wilderness, 108 ; obtains modiheation 
of orders for May 6, 109; orders to, for 
movement by the left fiank, 119, 120 ; a 
night ride with, 120. 121 ; narrow escape 
from capture, 121 ; balks Sheridan's plans 
for capture of Spottsylvania, 122, 123; at 
battle of Spottsylvania, 130; orders to, tor 
attack May 12, 1864, 134 ; ordered to relieve 
Warren from command, 137 ; puts \\ iirren 
under Humphreys's orders, 138; recom- 
mended for major-generalship, L. ^•^•' 
139 ; orders to, for movement to draw Lee 
fi-om hisintrenchments, 145 ; orders to, toi 
movement of troops. May 23, 148 ; oi-- 
ders to, for movement of rigut ^^ln,^ 
from position south of the North Anna, 
154 ; orders to, for corps commanders to 
follow up advantages, 165; instructions 
to. concerning successful and misuceess- 
fiU assaults at Cold Harbor. 166 ; orders 
to, after assaults at Cold Harbor, 168; or- 



492 



INDEX 



dered to fort if r along tlie Chickaliominy, 
178; instriictious to, concerning move- 
ments across tlie Chickaliominy and 
James. 180; ordered to supply Hancock 
witli rations, 187 ; ordered to send Han- 
cock over tlie James, 187 ; informed of in- 
structions given to Butler, 187 ; succeeds 
Hancock in temporary command, 188; 
operations before Petersburg, 188, 190; 
approves the mine at Petersburg. 198; 
instructions to, concerning assault on 
Petersburg, 200; prepares orders for as- 
sault on Petersburg, 201 ; prohibits Burn- 
side's employing colored troops at the 
mine, 202; commanding operations at 
Petersburg, 209 ; enters the outer works, 
310 ; enters Petersbiu-g, 314 ; fails to cap- 
tiu'e the Weldon railroad, 190 ; orders raid 
on the Weldon railroad, 194 ; orders to, for 
the defense of Washington, 190 ; warned 
to expect attack from Lee, 199 ; instructed 
to raid the Weldon railroad, 204; the or- 
der rescinded, 204; instructed to feint on 
the extreme left, 219 ; to attack, 219 ; fails 
to capture the South Side railroad, 225 ; 
proposed plan of campaign for, in spring 
of 1865, 226; cut off from commuuication 
-with his headquarters, 297 ; tries to hasten 
tWarren, 305 ; statement of a so-called en- 
gineer of the Army of Northern Virginia 
to, 314, 315 ; misled by the statement, 315; 
to move out on the Danville road, 316 ; to 
make forced march, 322, 323 ; sick, 323, 325 ; 
Grant joins, 326, 455 ; progress of, 324 ; pre- 
vents Sheridan from attacking, 325; at 
Jetersville, 325, 454; mistaken plans of, 
326, 327 ; near High Bridge, 333 ; Lee asks 
him for suspension of hostilities, 338 ; or- 
dered to take the Armies of the James 
and the Potomac into camp at Burkes- 
ville, 362; receives letter from Gov. 
Smith, 377; in the grand review at Wash- 
ington, 378, 379; Lee's army his objective 
point, 401; to move from Culpeper in 
uuisou with Butler, 402; Grant's inten- 
tion to put him south of the James, 403 ; 
Burnside's corps added to his command, 
408 ; orders attack along the whole line at 
Hanover Court House, 408; reports of, 
410; sends out reconnaissance, Sept. 30, 
1864,421; instructions to, for spring cam- 
paign, March 24, 1865, 447, 448; action at 
Fort Stedman, 449; reports position on 
the Boydton road, 452; sends troops to 
Sutherland's Station, 453; reaches Ame- 
liLi Court House, 453; engagements with 
Lee's rear-guard, 455 

Meadow Bluffs, V/. Va., Crook and Averell 
at, ir, 73 

Maadow Bridge, Va., Sheridan barred at. II, 
78 ; road to Richmond via, 157 ; Sheridan 
crosses the Chickahominy at, 406 

Measles, fatality of. among Indians, 1, 103 

Mechanicsburg, Miss., Kimball's brigade 
sent to, I, 455 

Mechanicsville, Va., movements at, II, 78, 
157-159, 161 

Medon, Tenn., attackof guerrillas at, 1, 332; 
(>)1. Dennis defeats the enemy near, 332 

Memphis, Tenn., possibility of capture of, 
after the fall of FortDonelson, I, 261 ; rail- 
road communications with the South and 
East, 272 ; the Confederate line at, 304 ; na- 
val battle at, 317 ; Grant removes head- 
quarters to, 319-326, 365, 367 ; the journey 



from Corinth to, 319-323 ; Southern hospi- 
tality near, 321-323 ; Southern patriotism 
in, 323-325 ; a church in," defiled " by Union 
troops, 324 ; complaints and requests in, 
324, 325 ; troops at, 326 ; threatened by Van 
Dorn, 327 ; Van Dorn endeavors to strike 
the Mississippi above, 345 ; difficulties of 
reinforcing, 328; Shennan commanding 
at, 328, 335, 352, 357, II, 39 ; reinforcing Bo- 
livar from, I, 336; Grant's strength in, 
349 ; holding the Mississippi River at, 352 ; 
reinforcements for, 356; transportation 
for Sherman's army from, 357 ; proposed 
movements fi-om, 358 ; strategic value of, 
369 ; expulsion of alleged rebel from, 425 ; 
Sherman's proposed retreat to, 454 ; troops 
sent to, 487, 488 ; Sherman starts for Cor- 
inth from, 511; diihcultj' of procuring 
supplies at, 512; Hurlbut commanding in, 
II, 39 ; the limit of the right wing of the 
united armies, 56 ; Sturgis driven back to, 
by Forrest, 424 ; A. J. Smith at, 424, 425 ; 
troops sent against Price from, 427 ; Grier- 
son's expedition from, 434 

Memphis and Charleston railroad, at East- 
port, I, 233; positions, movements and 
operations on, I, 309. 314, 317, 318, 326, 337, 
338, 344, 345, 352, 367, 502, 512-514, II, 53, 429 

Memphis and Nashville railroad, A. J. 
Smith ordered to prevent Forrest from 
setting on the, II, 198. 

Memphis and Ohio railroad, destruction Of 
bridge over the Tennessee, I, 240; Sher- 
man's i)osition on the, 335 

Meridian, Miss., occupied by Polk, 11, 39, 
40; Sherman's movement against, 39-41 

Merritt, Wesley, his command, II, 99; or- 
dered away from the Po bridge by Meade, 
*122; chief of cavalry with Sheridan, 294 ; 
at Five Forks, 307 ; drives Confederate 
cavalry to the Appomattox, 312; strikes 
the enemy at Deep Bottom. 322 ; attacks 
the enemy in flank, 323; appointed to 
oversee the paroling of Lee's army, 347; 
crosses the Pamunkey. 408 

Mersy, Augustus, in battle of Atlanta, II, 89 

Mexican laws, origin of, I, 43 

Mexican war, its origiu, iniquity, conduct, 
and rcsidts, I, 32-34, 90, 115, 127, 130, 133, 
136, 170 ; personnel of the U. S. army in the, 
44, 72, 130 ; equipment, transportation, etc., 
in. 46, 68, 09; outbreak of, 62, 64. 66, 72; 
didiculty of obtaining troops for, 105 ; gen- 
eralship of, 128, 129; victories in, 130; per- 
sonnel of the Mexican army, 131 ; treaty 
of peace, 134, 137, 152 ; value of experience 
in, 151, 152; Pillow's pride in his service 
in, 254; old acquaintances in, II, 46; ac- 
quaintance with Lee iu, 341, 342; Sedg- 
wick in, 384 

Mexico, menacing, 1, 32 ; grants permission 
for colonization of Texas, 32, 33 ; slavery 
forbidden by constitution of, 33 ; war with 
Texas, 33, 49; non-recognition of Texan 
independence by, 33; smuggling In, 42; 
use of cigarettes in. 42 ; tobacco trade, 42 ; 
44; Spanish restrictions on trade of, 43; 
provoking the war with, 45; night- 
marches in, 76, 77 ; the array of, in 1848, 131 ; 
patriotism in, 131; the modern army of, 
131 ; celebration of national defeats in, 
131; Scott's preparations for prolonged 
occupation. 132, 133; temporary govern- 
ment at Queretaro, 134 ; treaty of peace 
with, 134, 137, 152 ; national amusements 



INDEX 



493 



137-140; gambling, 140, 148; trip to the 
great caves of, 14;)-150; tlu^ peoim of, 14H; 
evacuation of, by U. y. troops, ir>'2 ; service* 
witli Bragg and Longatreet in tlie, 11, '21 ; 
the Imperial scheme in, 388-3'.i0; tall ofthe 
Empii'e in, 3110; the territory ac(inire(l 
from, 393-395; ( 'out'ederate refugees in, 
459 

Mexico, City of, Mex., its situation and 
approaches, I, 70, 98, 108, no, in, r27, 128; 
Philip Kearny at the gates of, 113; viola- 
tions of truce in, 115; aqueducts of, 110, 
117, 121, 122; defenses, 117; Santa Anna 
evacuates, 124; ceded to Gen. Scott, 125; 
liberation of convicts in, 124, 120 ; entry 
into, 125-127 ; Gen. Scott's government of, 
127 ; prohibition of buU-tights near, 139 ; 
evacuation of, by U. S. troops, 152 

Mexico, Mo., Grant ordered to, I, 201 ; restor- 
ing order in, 202; Pope's headquarters 
at, 202; studying tactics in, 203, 204 

"Miami," the, disabled at PlymoutL, II, 
407 

Michigan, ratification of the Constitution 
of, 1, 153; question of Grant's citizenship 
in, 153 

Middle Department, necessity of a supreme 
commander in the, II, 417 ; merged in the 
Middle Military Division, 419 

Middle Military Division, formation of, II, 
419 ; Sheridan assigned to temporary com- 
mand of the, 419; dismounted cavalry 
from, to report to Benham, II, 447 

Middletown, Va., rallying of Sheridan's 
troops near, II, 420 

Miles, Nelson A., his command, II, 97 ; in 
battle of Sutherland's Station, *311-313, 
453; reinforces Sheridan at Five Forks, 
452 ; returned to Humphreys's command, 
453 

Milford, Va., operations at. II, 140-148 

Military Division of the Mississippi, crea- 
tion of the Department of the, 1, 491 ; G rant 
assumes command of, 497 ; W. F. Smith 
appointed chief engineer, II, 4; Sherman 
assumes command of the, 48, 54, 399 ; the 
proper plans for the, 48, 49; operations in, 
227; limits, 399; Cauby in command, 427 

"Military Orders," Lincoln's, II, 51 

Military tactics, change in, since the Mexi- 
can war, 1, 130 

Milledgeville, Ga., Sherman's operations 
against, II, 231, 233, 240, 241, 244 ; flight of 
the governor and legislature fi-om,244; 
mocii legislature sits at, 240; Sherman's 
march to Milieu from, 240, 247 

Millen, Ga., Shennan's march to, II, 246, 
247 

Milliken's Bend, La., McClernand ordered 
to, I, 307 ; new waterway project started 
at, 380, 381; concentration at, 384; Grant's 
return to, 389 ; issuance of Special Orders 
No. 110, from, 390-392 ; F. P. Blair at, 412 ; 
troops sent to, 413; Taylor's attack on, 
455 ; behavior of colored troops at, 456 

Mill Springs, Ky., battle of, I, 232, 234, 265, 
266 

Mine Run,Va., Lee's position at, II, 100, 399; 

Fifth Corps meets the enemy near, 404 
Mining, in the United States, II, 393, 394 
Minnesota, traveling in, 1, 177 
Missionary Ridge, Tenn., positions, move- 
ments, engagements, etc., on, I, 494, 502, 
603, 508, 515, 517, 518, 520-522, 525, II, 3, 4, 6, 
7, 9, 10, 12, 15-17, 23, 30 



Mississippi, secession of, T, 183 ; end of .Tolm 
ston's cai'cer in, 207; possibilities of IpIimkI- 
less c;ii)lurcs of points in, 318; jiroposals 
to si'ciiro, 35.S ; al>iinilan('(^ of jiriiiy siiji- 
plics in, 302; loiK>gi;iphy of, 402, 4(i3, 414; 
Gricrson's raid tliiougli, 408; .1. JO. .lolin- 
stoii art.siinies command in, 419; dcstruc- 
tioii ofthe cai>ital,440 (seealso.I acksoN) ; 
character of the country for military op- 
erations, 447; Sherman ordered to drive 
.loluiston from, 473, 475. 482; imporliiiico 
of expelling the enemy from, 48'2; a. p(,-aco 
feeling in, 480; Forrest in, IL 197, 278, 399, 
424; Thomas ordered to send a cavalry 
force into, 278 

Missis^ppi Central railroad, operations on 
the, I, 327, 335, 344, 345, 362, 356, 367, 11,431, 
434 

Mississippi River, its character, courses, 
vagaries, etc., I, 67, 368-375, 380, 382, 384, 
401 ; Union movements, positions, etc., on, 

211, 219, 317, 349, 350, 352, 357, 390, 447, 403, 
404, 475, 476, 478, 486, IT, 39, .53, 68, 232, 319, 

398, 400, 427, 429; Confederate raovenients, 
positions, etc., on, I, 216, 219, 231, 232, 345, 
374, 449, 463, 464, II, 398, 399; closed to Jiav- 
igation below Cairo, I, 235 ; capture of Is- 
land No, 10, 307 ; its importance, 317, 361, 
II, 49; Vicksburg the only obstacle to 
free navigation ot', I, 351 ; employing ne- 
groes as woodcutters on, 354; ruiiioi'(>d 
mov(Mnent by McClernand against Vicks- 
burg via, 355; McClernand assigned to 
command expedition on, 360; terrors of 
the lowlands, 382 ; the winter of 1802-03 on, 
370 ; fortiflcations and situation of Vicks- 
bm-g on, 371, 449; cutting the dam on the 
Moon Lake route, 375 ; illumination of, at 
passage of the gunboats. 386, 387; the de- 
struction of the " Indianola," on, 388; 
Johnston raises the question of Grant's 
supplies via, 426; gi'cat Union capture of 
cattle on, 485, 486, II, 290, 291; boundary 
of the Military Division of the Mississippi, 
1,491, II, 81, 399; guerrilla warfare on, 398; 
difficulty of keeping navigation open on, 
398 ; the" Confederate forces east of, 399 ; 
the Confederacy cut in two by Union vic- 
tories on, 430, 431; Pope's campai.im west 
of, 440; tliial surrender of Confederates 
east and west of, 459 

Mississippi Springs, Miss., movements at, 
I, 420, 426 

Mississippi Valley, railroad system of the, 

I, 272 ; operations of western armies in, 

II, 460 

Missouri, represented in Confederate Con- 
gress, I, 180; fails to pass ordinance of se- 
cession, 180; the rebellion spirit in, 180; 
dubious character of tlui State govern- 
ment, 188; Pope commanding in, 201, 202; 
Price's raids in, 208, 485, II, 427, 428; dan- 
gers to Union men in, I, 209; Grant as- 
signed to (-ommand district of Southeast, 
211; Jeff. Thompson's operations in, 211, 
213, 214 ; Grant assumes command of hia 
district, 213, 214 ; Fremont moves against 
Price, 218; Sheridan's service in, 333, 334 ; 
sending troops to Scholield in, 485 ; troops 
.sent to Banks from, II, 58, 400; A. J. 
Smith's operations in, 238; A. J. Smith re- 
inforces Thomas from, 250 ; guerrilla war- 
fare in, 398 

Missouri River, Price's operations on the, 
n, 427 



494 



INDEX 



Mitchell, Ortnsby M., arrives at Nasbville, 

I, *26:{ 

Mobile, Ala., Grant's favorite scheme of a 
canipai>!U aj^'aiust, I, 484, 485, 492, 493, II, 
33, 34, 4<», 210, 232-23t, 367, 426; Bra^g's 
nioveiiu'ut to C'liatt:uioo.t;a, via, I, 329; J. 
E. Johnston moves troojis toward, II, 42; 
Banks's iiiovenients agaiust,.'58, 61, 40(), 40i; 
Shorman to secure the railroad between 
Chattaiiooiia and, 61; Union control of 
harbor of, 230, 232; Cauby's movements 
against, 232. 234, 277, 279, 366, 367, 431, 442, 
443, 446, 458 ; proposed movement on, by 
Sherman, 233, 234 ; evacuation of, 367, 458 

Mobile and Ohio railroad, movements, po- 
sitions, etc., on the, I, 275, 289, 308, 309, 314, 
326, 327, 335, 345, 3.32, II, 429, 434 

Mobile Bay, Union possession of part of, II, 
230; Farragut's operations in, 427; CiHi- 
by'e movements against Mobile from, 
442-444, 458 

Modoc Indians, Gen. Canby killed by, II, 
372 

Molino delRey, Mex., situation, I, 116; bat- 
tle of, 117-120; Mexican celebration of the 
battle, 131 

Monocacy River, the, Wallace's defeat at 

II, 196, 197, 416 ; Grant visits Hunter at, 
207, 418, 419; meeting of Grant and Sheri- 
dan at, 208, 419 

Monopolies, in Mexico, I, 42-44 

Monte, a national game in Mexico, I, 140, 
148 

Monterey, Mex., its situation, approaches, 
and defenses, I, 76, 78, 80; advance on, 76, 
79; battle of, 82-88; after the siu-reuder, 
88, 89; relieving the post fund at, 141, 142 

Monterey, Tenn., movements at, 1.308, 313 

Montgomery, L. M., bearer of Pemberton's 
proposals at Vicksburg, I, 465 

Montgomery, Ala., the Confederate capital, 
I, 181; Canity's movements against, II, 
274, 277-279, 444 ; captured by Wilson, 368, 
459; Steele's raid toward, 458 

Montgomery Co., Pa., the Simpson family 
in, I, 5, 6 

Moon Lake, Miss., proposed route through, 

I, 375 

Morales, Gen., surrenders Vera Cruz, I, 97 
Morgan, J. D., ordered to Chattanooga and 

Nashville, II, *233 
Morgan. John H., raids of, I, 17, II. *354, 

425 ; killed, 425 
Morganzia, La., Banks reaches, II, 426 
Morris, Thoma:;, iuilnences apjtointment to 

West Point. I, *14-16 
Morris, W. H., II, 99 
Morris Island, S. C, Federal possession of, 

II, 53, 398 

Morrison, William, wounded at Fort Don- 
el-ion, I, *246 

Morristown, Tenn., Breckinridge defeats 
Gillem near, II, 434 

Morton, Miss., Sherman reaches, II, 41 

Mosby, John S., narrowly misses capturing 
Grant, II, *67 ; perscm.il characteristics, 
67; operations in rear of the Army of 
Potomac, 67; Sheridiin io look alter, 414 

Moscow, Pres. Davis likens Sherman's po- 
sition to Napoleon's retreat from, II, 
230 

Mott, Gershom, his command, IT, P7 ; in bat- 
tle of the Wilderness, 108, 112, 113; at 
Todd's Tavern, *128 ; in battle of Spott- 
sylvania, 129-132, 134, 135; skirmishing, 



May 13, 1864, 138 ; reduction of his divi- 
sion to a brigade, 139 ; his brigade assigned 
to Birney's command, 139 

Mound City, 111., proposal to send the gun- 
boats to, I, 250; Grant's strength south 
of, :;19 

"Mound City," the, running the batteries 
at Vickwiiiii'g, I, 386 

Mount Albans, Miss., I, 442 

Mount Crawford, Va., Sheridan secures 
bridge at. 11, -445 

Mount Jackson, Sheridan pursues Early to, 

II, 216. 420 

Mount Pleasant, Tenn., Forrest moves to- 
ward, II, 428 

Mower, J. A., promoted brigadier-general, 

I, 3.50 ; repulses Taylor's attack on Tensas 
Bavou, 456 

Mule's, Mexican, 1, 42, 46, 54-57, 77, 78 ; dearth 

of, on the Isthmus, 155, 156 
Mulligan, James A., commanding at Jeflfer- 

son City, 1, *208 
Murfreesboro, Tenn., Rosecrans confronts 

Bragg at, I, 412 ; garrisoned by Thomas, 

II, 238, 256 ; Wheeler at. 424 

Murphy, R. C, evacuates Inka, I, 337, 361; 

disgraceful surrender of Holl v Springs by, 

360, 361; dismissed fi-om the army, 360; 

treacherous conduct of, 361, 362 
Muscle Shoals, Ala., movements at, I, 233, 

512 ; II, 239, 2.54 
Muskets, superiority of Confederate, I, 479 
Mutiny, on board the "Suviah," I, 40 

Napoleon I., Pi^es. Davis likens Sherman to, 
II, 230 ; (irant's opinion of, 3S0, 391 

Napoleon III., his vanity and overthrow, 
II, 390, 391 

Napoleon, Ark., McClernand at, I, 366; visit 
to BlcClei-naud at, 367 

Nashville, Tenn., situation, approaches, 
etc., I, 233, 263; strategic importance, 233, 
262, 264, 495; A. S. Johnston at, 254, 266; 
escape of Floyd and Pillow to, 254; pro- 
posal to take, 262; Nelson's and Buell's 
advance on, 232; destruction of railroiid 
bridge at, 262, 266 ; arrival of Mitchell at, 
203; (Jrant at, 263, 'JGU II, 32-36; Buell's 
alarm concerning, 264, 265 ; abandoned by 
Johnston, 267; comidaints about Grant's 
visit to, 259; reasons for occui)ying, 269; 
Buell's advance to Pittsburg Lnnding 
from, 274; capture of, 304; garrisoned by 
Union troops, 317, 327 ; fears for, 336 ; Hal- 
leek sug.itests that Grant go to, 488, 491 ; 
meeting with Andrew Johnson at, 497; 
a trying time at, 407; fears of Confeder- 
ate movement toward, 512, 515 ; rebuilding 
the railroad from Decatur to, 513-515 ; rnil- 
road supplies sent to, 514, 515; trip to 
Chattanooi;a fi-om, II, 34 ; troubles of the 
■ telegraph operator at, 36, 37 ; Sherman or- 
dered to send troops to, 30 ; meetint!; with 
Sherman at, 47, 48; trip to Cincinnati 
from, 48; Shermnn assumes duties at, 81 ; 
recruits sent to Slierman at, 233; Thomiis 
at, 233, 239, 250, 2.56, 429. 431-433 ; Schofield 
at, 254-256. 433 ; guarding the road to Chat- 
tanooga from, 256; Hood's movement 
against, and .siege of, 256, 257, 430, 432, 433, 
440 ; freezing weather at, 256 ; Thomas ad- 
vised not to let Hood remnin about, 257; 
Grant proposes to go to, 258, 259 ; Logan 
ordered to, 259; b.nttle of, 259, 260, 433; 
Sherman advised of the battle of, 275 ; 



INDEX 



495 



Sherman anrl Grant disapprove Thomas's 
aetiou at, ■270; Bhcruuiu'sdepeudeiiocou, 
for supplies, 421; arrival o( A. J. Smitli 
at, 433 
Nashville and Chattanooga railroad,, juiic- 
tiou with till', M»'iiii)h!s and Cli;nli'sti>ii 
railroad, 1, 513 ; i'orrcst cuts the, 11, 4'28 
Natchez, Miss., UaiisDUi ordered to, 1, 485; 
houudary of aberuiau's ooiuiiumd, II, r>4 
Natchitoches, La., iu canip near, 1, 31, 3") 
Navy Department, eoucurs iu expedition 

aiiainst Fort Fisher, 11, 2G1 
Negley, J. S., question ot liis restoration to 

duty, II, 48 
Negroes, friemlly, I, 344; employuieut of, 
by Union armies, 353-355, 452; join Slieri- 
dan's eolumn, II, 294; their work in the 
Southdiu'ing the war, 352, 353 ; in tlie Kraud 
review at Washington, 380; the Sjinto Do- 
mingo question and the, 393 ; emploj niont 
as troops, see Colored Troops. See also 
Slavery. 
Negro question, the, in the United States, 

II, 392, 393 
Negro suffrage, the question of, II, 360, 3G1 
Neill, Thomas H., II, 99 
Nelson, William, reinforces Grant at Fort 
Donelson, I, *243; ordered to NashviUe, 
202; takes Nashville, 263; arrives at Sa- 
vannah, 276; at Shiloh, 286-288, 301 
Neuse River, crossed by Union troops, II, 

441, 442 
New Auburn, Miss., Blair reaches, I, 423 
New Berne, N. C, Union possession of, and 
forces at. II, 53, 274, 275, 277, 398, 439, 441, 
442 ; importance of, 04 ; Schofield sent to, 
275, 439, 441 ; cooperation with Sherman 
from, 275, 286, 444; communication vnth 
Raleigh, 280, 281; communications with 
Goldsboro, 280, 281, 286; expedition to- 
ward Goldsboro from, 441 ; disaster to ex- 
pedition from, 441 
New Bethel Church, Va., Burnside sent to, 

II, 148 
New Braunfels, Tex., I, 48 
New Carthage, La., the " Henry Clay " at, 
I, 386 ; McClemand at, 388, 389 ; Grant's 
visit to, 389 ; order of march fi-om MiUi- 
keu's Bend to, 390 
New Castle, Va., W. F. Smith hlunderingly 

ordered to, II, 163 
New Cold Harbor, II, 157, 166 
" New Era," the, Ellet's escape on, I, 387 
New Found River, II, 153 
New Hope Church, Ga., II, 86, 423 
New Inlet, N. C, II, 435. 436 
New Market, Va., Sigel's defeat at. II, 72, 
142. 144, 411 ; Sheridan's operations at and 
ni-ar, 216, 445 
New Market road, Va., operations on, II, 

415, 421 
New Mexico, boundary of Texas, I, 32; ne- 
gotiations for cession of, 115 ; purchase of, 
134 
New Orleans, La., the Fourth Infantry or- 
dered to, I, 37 ; an early-morning duel in. 
37 ; departure of Fourth Infantry from, 
39; Gen. Lo veil at, 142; fall of, 317; Banks 
at, 440, II, 58, 61, 400; proposal to make 
a base at, I, 481 ; leave of absence asked 
for visit to, 485 ; visit to Banks at, 486 ; se- 
rious accident at, 487; proposed expedi- 
tion from, against Mobile, II, 210, 400; 
concentration of stores about, 234 ; Canby 
commanding at, 277; Granger m, 279; 



Banks to return troops to, 400; guarding 

the Mississippi from Tort Hudson to. Kio 
New Orleans and Jackson railroad, broken 

l)\' (Irierson . 1, 40s 
New River, W. Va., Averell's o])eralionH 

at, II, 111 ; Stonenian's raid on, 45K 
New River Bridge, W. Va., breaking of the, 

II. 72, 140, 403, 411 
Newspapers, lighting battles iu the, I, 72. 

See a.lso PUKSS. 
Newton, John, battles before Atlanta, 11, 

*85, 88 

Newtown, Va., rallying of Sin lidan's troops 
between Middletown and. II. 420 

New York, early visit to, I. 10. 19; end)arka- 
tion of the Fourth Infantry from, 153, 1.54 ; 
Confederate attempts to captme, II, 95, 
410 

Nineteenth Army-corps, arrives at Hamp- 
ton Roads, II. 416; ordered from Fortress 
Monroe to defense of Washington, 197, 
410; ordered to reinforce the anuies be- 
fore Kiclimond, 197, 417, 427. See also Em- 
ory. W. II. 

Nineteenth Illinois Infantry, difticulty with 
its colonel, I, 194 ; relieves the 21st regi- 
ment at Palmyra, 199 

Ninth Army-corps, returned to Burnside, I, 
475,485; supports the Army of the Poto- 
mac, II, 56: mol)ility of, 57; organization, 
100: moves from Spottsylvania, 147; or- 
dered to .lericho Bridge, 148; (! rant's 
headquarters with, 148; position. May 26, 
1864, 153; ordered toward Hanover Town, 
155; incorporated with the main army, 
182, 408 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191, 
413,415: at crossing of the Rappahannock 
and the Alexandria railroad, 404 ; reaches 
the North Amia, 406; instructions for, 
March 24, 1805. 447, 448; attacked. 448, 449; 
moveiiients on the South Side road, 453. 
See also Burnside. 

Norfolk, Va., in Union hands, II, 53, 398 ; 
Suniuer to be reinforced from, 447 

North, the. sympathy with secession in. I, 
181 ; disadvantage in the personnel of its 
army. 230; exultation over the fall of Fort 
Donelson. 200: eftect of (Gettysburg and 
Vicksburg at, 475, 478 ; contrasted with the 
South as regards lii^ense of speech and 
press, II. 31,' 55 ; the copperhead press 
of, 353; weary of the war, 228, 300, 369; re- 
sistance to the draft in, 210 ; its resources 
and strength contrasted with those of the 
South, 228, 351-355, 397 ; anxiety about 
Shennan in, 245, 246 : exaggerations of re- 
ports of battles in, 351 ; Confederate plots 
in, 353; excitement in, over Sherman's 
terms to Johnston, 3G5 ; how slavery re- 
garded in, 386, 387 
North Anna, the, Sheridan's movements on, 
II, 78. 193, 295.414; march to C(dd Har- 
bor from 80: Hancock's operations on, 
149, 150, 406; Burnside moves to. 150. 153, 
406; Lee's position and strengtli on, 150. 
151,153,406, 408; impossibility of turning 
the enemy between the South Anna and, 
153 ; withdrawingto the i;orthside, 154, 155, 
408; movements on. May 27, 1S64, 156; Lee 
deceived by themovemeutH on, 157 ; battle 
of the, 183, 410 ; the Fifth and Sixth Corps 
at. 406 
North Atlantic Blockading Squadron, the, 

II, 437 
North Carolina, secession of, 1, 183 ; Union 



4:9G 



INDEX 



holdings in, n, 53, 54, 398; Hoke free to 
leave, 144; Hoke's reinforcements for Lee 
from, 151 ; the governor's call for defend- 
ers of Fort Fisher, 264 ; Shei-man proposes 
to march through, 272, 441; importance to 
the enemy, 273; J. E. Johnston put in 
command of all troops in, 280, 284 ; chang- 
ing the railroad gauge in, 281 ; Johnston's 
strength in, 285 ; fears of Lee getting into, 
295; conquest of the Confederacy fi-om 
the Mississippi to, 319: apprehended ap- 
proach of Jolmston to Appomattox fi'om, 
340; Johnston confi'ontiug Sherman in, 
362; Grant goes to, to ad,iu8t Sherman's 
difflculties, 365; withdrawal of troops 
from, 373; Sherman's march through, 376; 
exhaustion of the country. 376 ; constitu- 
ted a separate military departn)ent, 439 : 
Schotield to aid Sherman in, 439, 440; pi-o- 
posal that Thomas campaign in, 446 ; pro- 
posal that Sheridan invade, 450 

North Carolina railroad, Stoneman's raid 
on, II, 458 

North Chickamauga, the, course and junc- 
tion with the Tennessee,!, 520; flotiUaon, 
521, II, 2, 5 ; operations on, 4 ; Jefferson C. 
Davis at, 11 

Nottoway River, Wilson crosses the, II, 415 

Nottoway Station, Va., Wilson destroys the 
railroad at, II, 414 

Northwest, the feeling in, in 1860, I, 173, 177 

Nueces River, dispvited boundary of Texas, 
I, 33, 34; at Corpus Cliristi, 41; Indian 
massacres on the, 48 ; wild horses on the, 
61 

Ny River, movements on the, II, 119, 126 ; 
its course and character, 126, 127 



Oath-bound societies, I, 169 

Obstructionist, the fate of an, I, 45 

O'Fallon, John, I, 26 

Officers, the value of effective, II, 40, 41 

Oglesby, Richard, commanding at Cairo, I, 
*21& ; to command at Bird's Point, 214 ; to 
move on the St. Francis River, 219; or- 
dered to New Madrid, 219 ; predicament 
of, 229; wounded at Corinth, 348, 349 

Ohio, Noah Grant settles in, I, 2, 3 ; the 
Simpson family in, 6 ; birth of U. S. Grant 
in, 7 ; Grant's school life in, 8 ; Morgan's 
raid through, 17; visiting relations in, 
153 

" Ohio," the, a crowded passage on, 1, 154 

Ohio River, the, early steamboats on, 1, 18 ; 
threatened by the rebels, 261, II, 257, 258 ; 
National troops on, 1, 265 ; A. S. Johnston's 
plan to cross, 298 ; fears of being driven 
back to, 330 ; Bragg's march toward, 336 ; 
Sooy Smith's troops ice-bound in the, II, 
41 ; Forrest's raid on, 63 ; Hunter's re- 
treat via, 195; gunboats on the Tennessee 
near, 239 

Okalona, Miss., Hatch destroys the railroad 
at, I, 408 

Old Cold Harbor, Va., operjitions at, II, 157, 
162, 164, 166 

Old Court House, Va., orders for night 
march toward, II, 119, 120 

Old Wilderness Tavern, Va., intercepting 
Lee's sif-nals at, II, 105, 106 ; headquarters 
at, 107 

Oliver, W. S., master of transportation on 
the Mississippi, I, *393 

Opelika, Ala., Rousseau's raid near, II, 424 



Opequan Creek, Va., battle of, II, 216, 419, 
420 ; political effect of the victory at, 217 

Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, 
Burnside ordered to the, II, 120 

Orange Court House, Va., road to the Wil- 
derness from, 100, II, 100, 102 

Orange plank road, Va., movements on the, 
II, 100, 103, 107, 110 

Orange turnpike, Va., the, movements on 
the, 100, 107 

Orchard Knob, Tenn., viewing the battle 
of Lookout Mountain from, II, 9, 10; 
Grant and Thomas on, 12, 17 

Ord, E. O. C, commanding center of the 
Army of the Mississippi, I, *335; com- 
manding reinforcements for Corinth, 338 ; 
plan of his operations, 338, 340, 341; en- 
gagement near Bumsville, 341; attacks 
luka, 341-343; attacks Van Dorn at Hat- 
chie Bridge, 347 ; wounded, 347 ; assumes 
command at Corinth, 347 ; at meeting 
between Pemberton and Grant, 467; to 
reinforce Sherman, 473, 482; to reinforce 
Banks, 486 ; to move against the Virginia 
and Tennessee railroad, II, 58, 61, 403; 
strenglh, 59, 01; in operations at Peters- 
burg, 200-202 ; commanding the Eighteenth 
Corps, 201 ; movement against Richmond, 
218, 219 ; wounded, 219 ; in battle of White 
Oak Road, 299, 450 ; in action of April 2, 
1865, 308-311; troops at Fort Gregg, 311; 
marches toward Burkesville, 324, 453; 
Grant marches with his command, 324; 
ordered to seize roads between Burkes- 
ville and High Bridge, 330; becomes 
alarmed for Washburn, 330; movement 
via Prince Edward's Court House, 332; 
southerly movement of, 333 ; relieved at 
own request, 403; captures Fort Harri- 
son, 421; supersedes Butler, 439; com- 
manding Department of Virginia and 
North Carolina, 439 ; covers the crossing 
of the Chickahominy, 446; instructions 
to. Mar. 24, 1865, 447, 448; question of 
supplies for, 448; movement. Mar. 27, 
449, 450 ; proposed assault at Five Forks, 
451; in action at Hatcher's Run, 453; in 
battle of Sailor's Creek, 454 ; at Farm- 
ville, 454; reaches Appomattox Station, 
456 

Oregon, Lieut. Slaughter killed in, I, 158; 
the Fourth Infantry ordered to, 161 ; 
Washington Territory set off from, 161; 
Gen. Canby kiUed in, II, 372 

Orizaba, Mex., road to the City of Mexico 
throus;h, I, 98 ; occupation of," 134 

Osband, E. D., colonel 3d U. S. Colored 
Cavalry, II, 431 ; operations on Big Black 
River, 431 

Osterhaus, P. J., at battle of Port Gibson, 
I, *403; advance to Bolton, 426; at Cham- 
pion's Hill, 428, 429, 433^35 ; at Edward's 
Station, 435; in battle of Black River 
Bridge, 439 ; in siege of Vicksburg, 457 ; 
to report to Hooker, II, 4; at Brown's 
Ferry, 4, 8 ; in operations west of Chatta- 
nooga, 7; at Lookout Creek, 8; in battle 
of Lookout Mountain, 8, 9 ; serving under 
Hooker at Chattanooga, 20 ; commanding 
Logan's Fifteenth Corps, 234 

Owen, J. T., his command, II, 97 ; in battle 
of the Wilderness, *108 

Owl Creek, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march to- 
ward, I, 278 ; condition of, at time of Shi- 
loh, 280 ; bridged, 308 



INDEX 



497 



Oxen, uso of, in Moxican war, I, 08 
Oxford, Miss., opexations at aud near, I, 

351), 300, 3(U 
Ox Ford, Va., movements at, II, 150, 151, 153 
Ozumba, Mex., ascent of Popocatepetl 

fi-om, 1, 142 ; a niglit at, 144 



Pachuca, Mex., occupation of, I, 133; an 
unappreciated honor at, 1-10 

Pacific Coast, cost of living on, in 1849-1853, 
I, 161; Grant's fondness for the, 107; the 
opening up of the, II, 393-3i)5 

Paducah, Ky., seizure of, I, 214, 215; ad- 
di'ess to citizens of, 215 ; Tilshnian evac- 
uates, 216 ; bringing troops to Fort Henry 
from, 237; tekjgraphi(! communicaticm 
with Cairo, 268; Forrest's raid to, II, 03, 
425; Buford's unsuccessful attempt to 
capture, 425 

Page, John, mortally wounded at Palo Alto, 
I, *69 

Painesville, Va., Davles's captures at, II, 
324 

Palo Alto, Mex., battle of, I, 67-70, 72; Taj- 
lor's army at, 130 

Palmer, John M., commanding 14th Illinois, 

I, *19'J ; in expedition to Brov.ii's Ferry, 
504; plan of operations at Chattanooga, 
521 ; in action at Fort Wood, II, 3 ; at and 
near (jraysville, 19, 25, 26 ; question of re- 
sponsibility for failure of attack on rail- 
road at Atlanta, 92 ; disputed seniority 
between Scholield and, 92 ; instructed by 
Sherman as to supplies, 439, 410 

Palmer, W. J., pursuit of Hood by, II, 434 

Palmetto, Ga., Pres. Davis's speech at, II, 
227-230; Hood moves from, 430 

Palmyra, Mo., Grant ordered to, 1, 198; ser- 
vice at, 199 

Pamunkey River, movenicnts, etc., on the, 

II, 63, 79, 154, 156-159, 408, 445 
Panama, outbreak of cholera at, I, 150, 157 
Panama, Isthmus of, the rainy season on 

the, I, 154 
Panama Railroad, extent in 1852, I, 154 
Paris, Tenn., proposed exi)edition against, 

I, 208 
Parke, J. G., brings reinforcements to 
Haines's BlulT, I, *456; feinting move- 
ments by, II, 219 ; commanding the Ninth 
Corps, 297, 298; defeats Gordon's attack at 
Petersburg, 297, 298; to hold lines about 
Petersburg, 299; carries the enemy's main 
line at Petersburg, 308, 309, 453 ; desperate 
fighting by, 310 ; attacked by Lee, 311 ; fits 
the captured works for defense, 311 ; moves 
out on the Danville road, 316 ; ordered to 
the South Side railroad, 322, 323 : in com- 
niaud around Petersbui-g and City Point, 
447; position. Mar. 29, 18G5, 450; at Hatch- 
er's Run, 451 
Parker, Ely S., secretary of Grant's staff, at 

Lee's surrender, II, *343 
Parker's Store, Va., movements at, 11,103,106 
Pascagoula, Miss., the Fourth Infantry or- 
dered to, 1, 152 ; suggested as Banks's base 
in operations against Mobile, II, iOl 
Patterson, Robert, commands division in 
Scott's army, I, *99; advance toward Ja- 
lapa 99 
Patrick^M. R., II, 100 

Payne, , horse-trade with, T, 10 

Peace, the art of maintaining. II, 391 
Peace Commissioners, mission of the, II, 



287-290; meeting with Lincoln at Ilamp 
ton Roads, 363 

Peach Hill, La., defeat of Banks at, II, 426 

Pearl River, I, 422 

Pedee River, Sliernian crosses the, II, 284 

Pedregal, tlie, I, 109-111 

Peeble's Farm, Va., Warren captures camp 
at, II, 219 

Pegram. John, II, 101 

Pemberton, John, messenger from Gen. 
Worth to Lieut, (iraut, I, *124; comman<l- 
ing at Holly Springs, 349 ; fortiflc'd at the 
Tallahatchie, 352; estimated strength at 
op(Miiiig of and through Vickslmrg cam- 
paign, 352, 414, 417, 427, 428; driven fi'ora 
tlu! Tallahatchie, 350, 302; plan of opera- 
tions against, .359; commanding garrison 
of Vicksburg, 359 ; falls back, 361 ; returns 
to Vicksburg, 364 ; threatening, at Haines's 
Bluff, 398; his defenses against a siege 
from the south sidts 413, 414; preparing 
for an attack by, 420, 421 ; orders from, 
and correspondence with, Johnston, 421, 
424, 437, 458, 462^65; Johnston aiiiiouuces 
loss of Jackson to, 425, 420; ordered to 
join .Tohnston at Clinton, 427; soutliward 
"mar(^li of, from Edward's Station, 427; at 
Champion's Hill, 429, 431, 435, 437; falls 
back to the Big Black, 435 ; fails to join 
forces with Jolinston, 437 ; expected as- 
sistance from Johnston for, 444 ; commu- 
nication with Johnston cut oft", 450 ; plan 
of escape across the Mississippi, 403, 464 ; 
asks counsel of his division commanders, 
as to evacuation, 464, 465; meeting with 
Grant before Vicksburg, 406, 467 ; compo- 
sititm of his army, 469 ; proposes amend- 
ment to terms of capitulation, 470 ; accepts 
terms, 471 ; supposed reason for negotia- 
ting on the 3d of July, 471-473 ; appeals for 
assistance to compel his troops to sign 
paroles, 476 ; demoralization of his army, 
486 

Pendleton, W. N., his command, II, 103; 
appointed to oversee the paroling of Lee's 
army, *347 

Pennsylvania, the Grants in, I, 2; the Simp- 
son family in, 5, 6; the Army of North- 
ern Virginia driven from, 478 ; raids of the 
enemy into, II, 205, 417 ; free from Confed- 
erate invasion, 208, 209; Sigel protecting, 
403 ; exposure to attack, 416, 418, 419 

Pennypacker, G., in assault on Fort Fisher, 
II, 209 ; wounded, *270 

Peiion, El, I, 108, 109 

Pensacola, Fla., Federal possession of, II, 
54, 398; Steele moves against Mobile from, 
458 

Peons, Mexican, 1, 148 

Perkins's plantation, La., route from Smith's 
plantation to, I, 389; headciuarters at, 394; 
depot of supplies at, 400 

Perote. Mex.. road to the city of Mexico 
throuiih. I, 98, 127, 128; surrender of the 
castle of, 103 

Petersburg, Va., Butler's movements 
against, II, 59, 73, 179, 180, 412 ; defenseless 
condition of, 73 ; operations against rail- 
roads connecting with, 73,133,400; Kautz's 
operations against, 133, 408, 410 ; plans ot 
operations against, 185-187, 226, 300; pos- 
sibility of capturing, .Tune, 1804. 186, 187, 
189, 190; Confederate garrison in, and de- 
fenses of, 186, 187, 198, 203, 413; Han- 
cock's movements against, 186, 421; W. 



Vol. 11—32 



498 



INDEX 



F. Smith's movements against, 186, 187, 
412, 413 ; assaults on, 186-190, 200, 415, 453 ; 
bombardment of, 202, 313 ; investment of, 
188-191 ; Couicderate losses at, June, 
1804, 189; resting the troojis at, 190; 
strengtheuin.K the Union position at, 195; 
Union and Confederate lines at, 198 ; the 
mine at, 198-203, 415, 416 ; Grant's anxiety 
to capture, 199, 404, 410; consternation in, 
203; Meade commanding operations at, 
209 ; liringa saluteat, in honor of Sheridan, 
217; the "enemy reinforces, 219, 413, 451; 
close 01 active operations ai'ound, for ttie 
■winter, 225; arrival of the Peace Commis- 
sioners at, 2d7 ; anxiety of the last few 
■weeks before, 291 ; Lee determines to as- 
sault the Union liues at, 296; Davis and 
Lee agree to abandon, 296 ; I'arke to hold 
lines about, 299, 447; movement before, 
Mar. 29, 1865, 299; Sherman to cooperate 
in movements on, 301, 449; capture of the 
outer works, 310 ; Humphreys ordered to- 
ward, 312 ; evacuated, 313 ; entry into, 314 ; 
evacuated by the Union army, 318 ; Pres. 
Lincoln's visit to, 318-320 ; road to Lynch- 
burg li'om, 328 ; effect of the fall of, on the 
Union troops, 350; Gillmore sent against, 
410; the Army of the Potomac to move 
against, 412 ; fighting before, 413 ; Early 
reinforced from, 420, 421 ; Gregg's move- 
ments at, 421 ; improving facilities of 8ux>- 
plies liefore, 421 ; operations before, during 
winter of 1864-65, 422 ; the enemy witii- 
draws troops from, to protect Richmond, 
421; armies of the Potomac and of the 
James confronting, 446; fears that Lee 
would abandon, 446 ; purpose of turning 
the enemy at, 447 ; its capture imminent, 
450; Gibbon's assault on the south side 
of, 453 

Phelps, S. L., destroys bridge of the Mem- 
phis and Ohio railroad, over the Tennes- 
see, I, 240 

Philadelphia, Pa., early visit to, I, 16, 19 ; 
Confederate attempts to capture, II, 95; 
Grant informed of the President's assas- 
sination at, 358 ; transportation facilities 
in, in 1865, 358 

Phister, E. C, at school of Richeson and 
Rand, I, 8 

Phrases : 
" Hard tack ! hard tack ! " I, 443 
" If a man can't skin, he must hold a leg 

while somebody else does," II, 59, 68 
"I purpose to light it out on this line if 

it takes all summer," II, 133 
" If they cannot get out where they want 
to, they can crawl back by the hole 
they went in at," II, 246 

Pickett, George E., his command, II, 101 ; 
attempts to reinforce Lee, 146 ; encounters 
Hancock at Milford, 146, 147 ; reinforces 
Lee, *151 ; sent to Five Forks, 304 

Piedmont, Va., Hunter's success at, II, 
195, 412 

Pierce, B. R., carries bridge over the North 
Anna, II, *149 

Pierce, Franklin, a possible rival of, for the 
Presidency, I, 75; injured before Con- 
treras, 113, *1U; candidacy for the Presi- 
dency, 114, 136; his personal character, 
114 

Pillaging, opposed by Gen. Taylor in the 
Mexican war, I, 60; Grant's views as to, 
and punishment of, 304 



Pillow, Gideon J., at Cerro Gordo, I, *101; 

commands division in Scott's army, 105; 
advances from Puebla, 105 ; capt"m-e of 
Chapultepec assigned to, 120; hostility to 
Gen. Scott, 134, 135 ; placed under arrest, 
134 ; released from arrest, 135 ; personal 
character, 241, 254, 267 ; telegram sent to 
Johnston by, 254 ; flight from Fort Donel- 
soii, 254, 257, 258; report of killed and 
wounded at Donelson, 258 

Pilot Knob, Mo., Price drives the garrison 
from, II, 427 

Pine Mountain, Ga., Joseph E. Johnston at, 
II, 423 

Piney Branch Church, Va., II, 101, 119, 120; 
Grant's headquarters at, 123 

Pioneers, employment of, at Vlcksburg, I, 
452 

Pittsburg, Pa., I, 18 

" Pittsburg," the gunboat, at Fort Donel- 
son, 1, 247 ; running the batteries at Vlcks- 
burg, 386 

Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., position of troops 
at. I, 272 ; advance on, 273 ; question of 
intrenching at, 274; intention to remove 
headquarters to, 275 ; Grant's attendance 
at, 275; skirmishes at, 275, 276; battle of, 
277 et seq. (see also Shiloh) ; V/ebster's 
artillery at, 284, 285 ; bridge connecting 
Crump's Lauding and, 285; arrival of 
Halleck at, 305, 307 

Plains, crossing the, I, 160 

Plan del Rio, Mex., Twiggs and Patterson 
camp at. I, 99 

Pleasant Hill, La., battles at, II, 426 

Pleasanton, Alfred, superseded by Sheridan, 
II, 60 

Pleasants, Henry, suggests the mine at 
Petersburg, II, *198 

Plymouth, N. C, in Union hands, II, 53, 
398 ; capture of the Federal garrison at, 
64, 407 

Po River, Va., movements at, II, 122, 123, 
126-129, 132, 147 ; course and character, 
126-128 

Pocotaligo, S. C, Sherman at, II, 276, 277 

Point Coupee, La., Banks's army reaches, 
II, 426 

Point Isabel, Taylor's expedition to, I, 64- 
67; Scott arrives at, 93 

Point Pleasant, O., Jesse R. Grant settles 
at, I, 4 ; birth of U. S. Grant at, 7 

Political influence, eflect on personal re- 
sponsibility, I, 383 

Politics, effect of, on the Administration's 
conduct of the war, II, 217 

Polk, James K., President of the United 
States, attitude in Mexican war, I, 45, 90- 
92, 135 

Polk, Leonidas, at the battle of Belmont, I, 
228; occupies Meridian, II, *39, 40; re- 
treats toward Demopolis, 41 

" Poor ■whites," in the South, I, 178, 507 

Pope, John, U. S. mustering-otficer at 
Springfield, 111., 1, 191 ; acquaintance with, 
at West Point and in Mexico, 191 ; an un- 
accepted offer fi-om, 191 ; commanding in 
Missom'i, 201, 202 ; captures Island No. 10. 
307; at Hamburg Landing, 307; com- 
manding left wing of Halleck's army at 
Pittsburg Landing, 307 ; " gets loose " on 
the march to Corinth, 313'; sent in pur- 
suit from Corinth, 316 ; defeated by the 
Army of Northern Virginia, 336; to cam- 
paign west of the Mississippi, II, 446 



INDEX 



499 



Poplar Spring Church, Va., capture of the 

enomy's works ut, II, 421 
Popocatepetl, Mex., visit to, I, 142-145 
Portage County, O., Jesse K. Grant settles 

in, I, 4 
Porter, Andrew, excursion with, iu Mex- 
ico, I, 142 
Porter, D. D., to cooperate with Sherman 
against Vicksbiu'K, I,*357 ; withdraws irom 
the Yazoo, 36(J: distrusts McCIcrunncrs 
ability, 367 ; explorations on the bayous, 
377-379 ; cooperation of, 384; prepara'tions 
for running the batteries at Viclcsburg, 
385; sends the "Indianola" down the 
river, 387 ; cooperation in attack on (iiaud 
Gulf, 396-398, 409, 410; runs the batteries 
at Grand Gulf, 397, 398; goes to liaiiks's 
assistance, 419; supplies navy guns for 
the siege of Vicksburg, 450 ; expedition to 
Haines's Bluff, 455 ; notified of Peuiber- 
ton's plan of escape by the river, 463 ; no- 
tified of cessation of hostilities, 468 ; ser- 
vice at Vicksburg, 480, 481 ; at Cairo, 498 ; 
asked to assist Sherman, 498 ; operations 
against Fort Fisher, II, 249, 262, 265-270, 
435-437; complains bitterly of Butler's 
abandonment, 267; escorts Lincoln to 
Richniond, 355; present at interview be- 
tween Lincoln and Weitzel, 355 ; in Red 
River expedition, 426 ; confers with Grant 
and Butler at Hampton Roads, 435 ; com- 
manding North Atlantic blockading 
squadron, 437 ; personal and military 
qualities, 437; confers with Grant and 
Terry, at Fort Fisher, 440 ; cooperates in 
capture of Wilmington, 441 

Porter, Horace, mission to Sherman, II, *231, 
429 

Porter, Mary, I, 1 

Porter, Theodore, kUled by Mexicans, I, 64 

Porter, V/. D., commanding the ''Essex" 
at Fort Henry. I, 236 

Port Gibson. Miss., movements toward, 
battle at, and capture of, I, 398, 401-405, 
447 : II, 172 

Port Hudson, La., situation, importance, 
etc., I, 351, 374, 419, 464; Farragut rims 
the battei'ies at, 387 ; operations against, 
410, 440, 455, 481; surrender of, 475, 478; 
great Union capture of cattle near, 485, 
486, II, 290, 291 ; guarding the Mississippi 
between New Orleans and, 400 

Portland, Ore., Indians neai', 1, 162 

Port Royal, S. C, Federal possession of, II, 
53, 398 

Port Royal, Va., changing base from Fred- 
ericksburg to, II, 142 ; change of base to 
White House from, 154 

Portsmouth, Va., Sumner to be reinforced 
from, II, 447 

Potatoes, an experiment in raising, 1, 162 

Potomac River, as a source of supplies, II, 
62 ; movements on, 204, 416, 418 ; in Union 
possession, 398 

Potter. Robert B., his command, II, 100: in 
assault at Spottsylvania, *ia6; jimction 
with Hancock. 150: cajitures i-edan at Pe- 
tersburg, 189; in the Petersburg mine af- 

- fair. 202 

Pound Gap, Ky., Morgan's movements at, 
II, 425 

Powder-boat. See FORT Fishke. 

Powhatan, Va., Kautz's raid at, II, 407 

Prentiss, B. M., relieves Grant at Ironton, 
I, * 208 ; march from Ironton to Jackson, 



211, 212; question of seniority vrith, 212; 
character, 213; at sliiloh, 274, 279-281, 285, 
302; capture of his division, 280, 281, 302; 
ordered to send reinforcements to Vicks- 
burg, 448 ; defeats Holmes at Helena, 473 

Presentiment, a, I, 22 

Presidency of the United States, an exalted 
position, I, 93 ; etlects of hostility to candi- 
dates for the, i;i5, VM 

President of the United States, his respon- 
sibility in selecting commanders, I, .ms 

Press, the, the wonderful influence of, 1,72; 
in the South, :j70, II, 31, 54 ; in the North, 
55 ; Sherman as dejiicted by the Southern, 
245 ; the copperhead, 353 ; reveals secrets 
of Fort Fisher expedition, 435 

Price, Sterling, raids in Missouri, I, *2as, 
485,11,427,428; movements against, I, 218, 
II, 427, 428, 446: reinforcements for, I, 219; 
troops available to leiniorce Van Horn, 
327; at Holly Springs. :i29 ; advances upon 
Corinth, 3;i6 ; inii)ossibilit v of attacking, 
337; enters luka, 337 ; advancing to rein- 
force Van Dorn, 338; dangerous situation 
of, 340; joins Van Horn in attack on Cor- 
inth, 345; movements (if, II, 2:j2; at Jack- 
sonport, 427; attacks Pilot Knob, 427; 
moves toward Kansas, 427 ; defeated at 
the Big Blue, 428 

" Price," the, running the batteries at Vicks- 
burg, I, 386 

Prime, F. E., engineer work at Vicksburg, 

I, *450 

Prince Edward's Court House, Va., move- 
ments at, II, 331-3:33, 454 

Prisoners, matter of paroling, exchanging, 
etc., at Vicksburg, I, 469, 476, 477 

Profanity, justified, I, 78 

Professorship, Grant prepares for a, I, 30, 
31 ; the idea destroyed, 35 

Property, protection of, I, aOl 

Provost-Guard, Army of the Potomac, II. 
100 

Prussia, conquest of France by, II, 390 

Public office, the most efficient servants in. 

II, 47 

Puebla, Mex., Worth's advance to and oc- 
cupation of, I, 103, 104; route to the City 
of Mexico from, 108, 127, 128; Gen. Pierce 
joins the army at, 113; occupation of, 134; 
an unappreciated honor at, 140 

Pulaski, Tenn., movements at, II, 254, 432; 
Forrest's skii-mish at, 428 

Purdy, Tenn., Lew Wallace's march toward, 
I, 278 

Purdy Road, the, I, 289 

Quaker guns, at Corinth, 1,315 

Quaker road, Va., movements and fighting 
on, II, 180, 450, 451 

Quarles's Mills, Va.. headquarters at, II, 154 

'' Queen of fne V/est," the, attacks the " In- 
dianola," 1, 388 ; sunk in the Red River, 388 

Queretaro, Mex., temporal}- government at, 
I, 134 

Quinby, I. P., reconnoiteis Fort Pemberton, 
I, *376; reinforces MeClernand at Vicks- 
burg, 445 

Quincy, 111., Grant ordered to, 1, 198 

Quitman, John A., commands brigade at 
Monterey, I, 84; commands division in 
Scott's army, 105; advances from Puebla, 
105 ; in action against gaiita Belen, *120, 
121 ; appointed to take possession of the 
City of Mexico, 125 



500 



INDEX 



Raccoon Mountain, Ga., toposrapby, Con- 
federate positions, etc., on, I, 495, 502, 503, 

Railroad, Grant's tirst sight of a, 1, 19 

Railroad men, acuteuess of, I, 315 

Railroads, effect of the introduction of, II, 
387, 388 . ^. .^, ^^ 

Raleigh, N. C, coinniuuications with New 
Berne, AViluainston. and Goldsboro, II, 
"80 281; Sherman's movements toward 
and at, 441, 449, 457 ; meeting with Sher- 
man at, 365, 457, 458 .^, ^ ,, ,, 

Ralston, , horse-trade with, I, 11, 12 

Ramseur, S. D., II, 101 

Rand, , schoolmaster, I, 8 

Ransom, D.R., II, 100 _ 

Ransom, T. E. G., at Champion's Hill, I, 
*432, 447 ; bridges the Big Black, 441 ; mili- 
tary ability, 480 ; ordered to Natchez, 485 ; 
conimandiug Blair's Seventeenth Corps, 
II, 234 

Rapidan River, Union holdings on the, II, 
53,398; the country between the James 
and the, 55, 96, 102 ; positions, movements, 
etc., on, 55, 57, 62, 73, 95-98, 399 ; crossing 
the, 62. 103-103, 107, 114, 116, 401, 404; the 
campaign to the James River from, 66, 411 ; 
narrow' escape of closing the campaign 
soon after crossing the, 122 

Rapid transit, ideas in 1839, 1, 19; effect of, 
on the incUvidual States, II, 387, 388 

Rappahannock River, movements on the, 
II, 05, 142, 404 

Ravenna, O., Jesse R. Grant in business at, 
1,4 

Rawlins, John A., speaks at meeting at Ga- 
lena, 1, 184; appointed assistant adjutant- 
general, *206; Sherman writes to, concern- 
ing the Vicksburg campaign, 454 

Raymond, Miss., McPherson at, I, 413, 414; 
battle of, 415, 447; Sherman and McCler- 
nand ordered to, 419, 420; Osterhaus at, 
426; roads from, 431; feeding the destitute 
at, 483 ; success of the Army of the Tennes- 
see at, II, 172 

Read, Theodore, sent to TccaW Washburn, II, 
*330; attacks Lee near Farmville, 330, 331, 
451; kUled, 331, 454 

Reading, Grant's fondness for, I, 20, 31, 35 

Real-estate business, Grant in the, I, 168 

Reams's Station, Va., Hancock and Gregg 
defeated at, II, 212, 421; desti'uction of 
the Weldon railroad at, 414, 421 ; Wilson 
defeated at, 415 . 
Rebellion, the Mexican war the forerunner 
of the, I, 130, 170; "patriotic" writers on 
the, 132; political effects of, on partici- 
pants in, 136; the right to suppress, II, 
356, 357 ; necessity of breaking the military 
Ijower of the, 397, 403 
Rebel property, policy of destruction of, I, 

304, 305 
Reconstruction, a blow to, II, 358, 360; the 

period of, 370 
Recreations, boyish, I, 9 
Red River, the, the Fourth Infantry ordered 
up, I, 28; in camp betweeu the Sabine 
and, 31, 35, 36 ; possible route to Vicksburg 
via, 373; waterway for the enemy, 374; 
the enemy's holdings below, 374; Ellet's 
action on, 3S7 ; the ram " Webb" in, 388; 
Banks's operations on, 410, 419, II, .58, 61, 
64, 65, 72, 400, 426, 427 ; getting the gunboats 
over the rapids, 426 
Redwood, trade in, at Humboldt, 1, 165 



Refugees, employing, at Jefferson City, I, 

210. See also Nkgroes 

Regimental bands, maintenance of, I, 141 

Regimental funds, I, 141 

Reorganization of the armies, plans for, II, 
45 et seq. 

Republican Party, x-ise of the, I, 169; how 
viewed in the South, 170, 171 ; in Galena, 
173 ; disasters in the elections of 1862, 369 ; 
effect of Sherman's and Sheridan's suc- 
cesses on the campaign of 1864, 94 

Resaca, Ga., battle of, II, 85, 423; Wheeler 
cuts railroad between Dalton and, 92 

Resaca de la Palma, topography of, I, 67 ; 
l)attle or, 70-72 ; Taylor's army at, 130 

Revolution, the right of, I, 175 

Reynolds, Thomas C, lieutenant-governor 
of Missouri, joins the rebels, 1, 180 

Rice, James C, his command, II, 98; killed 
at Spottsylvaniai, *130 

Richardson, Anna, I, 2 

Richeson and Rand, school of, I, 8 

Richmond, La., projected waterway via, I, 
380 ; McClernand sent to New Carthage 
via, 388 

Richmond, Va., report of great Confederate 
victory at Fort Donelson sent to, I, 249, 
254 ; depression in, over fall of Fort Don- 
elson. 260; Johnston's despatch to, con- 
cerning Fort Douelsou, 267; one line of 
communication between the West and, 
317; battles near, II, 54; defenses of, 
and positions of the Confederate army 
around, 55, 66, 174, 399; Butler's oper- , 
ations against, 58, 62, 73, 75, 402-404 ; Gill- 
more and Smith to operate against, 58, 62 ; 
possibilities and fears of Lee's falling 
back to, 63, 66, 119, 121, 152, 168, 402 ; de- 
pendence on Lee, 66 ; exchange of news- 
papers with, 68, 181; leakage of news 
from the Union armies to, 08, 69; the ob- 
ject of the Grand Campaign, 71, 73, 401; 
operations against railroads and tele- 
graphs communicating with, 73, 77, 133, 
140, 141, 154, 177, 405, 406, 409, 414, 415, 443; 
Grant plans to light Lee between the Rapi- 
dan and, 73, 174, 402 ; Sheridan's operations 
against, 77-79, 133, 141, 294, 405, 406, 445? 
the grand movement of the Ai-my of the 
Potomac against, 95 et seq. ; hopes of get- 
ting between Lee and, 121, 122, 127, 147, 152 
et seq., 405; Beauregard's defensive oper- 
ations, 133, 144, 188; Hancock's operations 
against, 145, 147 ; movement by the left 
flank on, 142, 145 et seq. ; Lee reinforced 
from, 146, 151; Warren's movements 
against. 147; " Live Yankees" in, 151, 152; 
Lee telegraphs belated news to, 157; 
roads froiii Hanover to, 157; proposedsiege 
of, 174, 109; importance to the Confed- 
eracy, 176, 291,319, 320; consternation in, 
and desperate condition of, 181, 199, 280, 
291, 355 : Confederate gunboats at, 182, 185 ; 
importance of the Shenandoah Valley to, 
204, 205; movements to prevent Early's 
reinforcement fi-oin, 209; threatening, 
fi-om the north side of the James, 209, 
218, 219 , 409, 420 ; the President fears the 
reinforcement of Early from, 218; Con- 
federate troops from the Valley sent to, 
224 ; close of active operations around, for 
the winter, 225 ; plan of campaign against, 
for spring of 1865, 226, 446-448 ; length of 
lines before, 231; reinforcements for 
Fort Fisher from, 265, 266 ; proposed move- 



INDEX 



501 



ment by Sherman against, 272, 301, 441, 
449 ; Lee to be watched closely at, 275 ; 
frantic eflforts in, to retard Sherman's ad- 
vance, 280 ; Davis and Lee agree to aban- 
don, 296 ; plan for capturing, 300 ; Weitzel 
notified to be ready to enter, 308 , the Con- 
federate government abandons, 316 ; de- 
ceptions practised on the people of, 320 ; 
Weitzel enters, 320 ; found to be on fire, 320, 
321 ; Lincoln's visit to, 353, 356, 363 ; pro- 
posed meeting of the Virginia legislature 
after the fall of, 355, 356, 363 ; Halleck sent 
to, 374 ; Halleck invites Sherman to, 374; 
Gov. Smith's flight from, 377 ; junction 
of the Armies of the Potomac and of the 
James before, 402, 446 ; possibility of cap- 
turing, in 1864, 404; Kautz's expedition 
against the road south of, 406; recall of 
troops from Washington to, 417 ; Early's 
retreat toward, 417 ; weakness of the ene- 
my's lines before, 421, 451 ; operations be- 
fore, during winter 1864-65, 422; Canby 
ordered to send troops before, 427; fears 
that Lee would abandon, 446; possible 
plans of the enemy for the defense of, 
448; its capture imminent, 450; cavalry 
sent to Petersburg from, 451 

Richmond and Danville railroad, Va., II, 328 

Richmond and Fredericksburg road, Lee's 
position on the, II, 153 

Richmond and Petersburg railroad, why 
Butler could not cross the, II, 75 

Ricketts, J. B., his command, II, 99 ; at bat^ 
tie of the Monocacy, 196, 416 ; sent to Bal- 
timore, 416 

Rienzi, Miss., troops at, I, 327, 335, 340 

Riley, Bennett, at Contreras, I, ^111 

Ringgold, Samuel, killed at Palo Alto, I, *69 

Ringgold, Ga., njovements, engagements, 
etc., at, II, 25, 26, 83 

Rio Frio Mountain, the, I, 108, 128 

Rio Grande, the, boundary of Texas, I, 32, 
33, 134; preparing to advance toward, 
45, 54 ; wild horses on, 61 ; arrival of the 
U. 8. army at, 63 ; outlireak of the war on, 
66 ; course and characteristics, 67 ; move- 
ment of troops on, 76 ; Scott advises fall- 
ing back, to, 92 ; in camp on, 94 ; to Vera 
Cruz from, 95, 96 ; advantage of placing a 
garrison on, 484 ; in Union hands, II, 53, 
398; orders to Banks to hold the, 58,61, 
400; proposed use of colored troops on, 
400 ; Sherman sent to, 389, 459 

Ripley, O., school life in, I, 8, 14; Grant 
starts for West Point from, 18 

Ripley, Miss., Rosecrans's pursuit to, I, 318 

Rivanna River, Sheridan destroys bridges 
over, II, 445 

Roanoke River, the, proposed movements 
on, II, 301, 449 ; Wilson destroys the Dan- 
ville railroad at, 415 ; Sumner to destroy 
supplies south of. 448 

Robertson, J. M., II, 100 

Robinson, John C, II, 98 

Rockville, Md., Early at, II, 416 

Rockwell, William, I, 2 

Rockwell, the widow, I, 2 

Rocky Springs, Miss., McPherson and Mc- 
Clernaud at, I, 413 

Rodes, R. E., II, 101 

Rodney, Miss., contemplated landing at, I, 
396 

Rolling Fork, water communications of, I, 
377 

Rome, Ga., Bragg at, 1, 329; Sherman sends 



troops to, II, 232 ; captured by Jefferson C, 

Davis, 423 

Rosecrans, W. S., commanding left wing, 
Army of the Mississippi, I, 335 ; troops of, 
ordered into Corinth, 337 ; commanding 
District of Corinth, *338 ; plan of opera- 
tions for, 340 ; delay at Jacinto, 341 ; de- 
feated on the Jacinto road, 342; enters 
luka, 342 ; Grant's opinion of, 343 ; his in- 
subordination, dilatoriness, etc., 843, 349, 
492, 493; faint-hearted pursuit by, 343; 
Van Dorn's attempt to captm-e, 346; fail- 
m-e to pursue after victory at Corinth, 347, 
348 ; ordered back, 348 ; losses at Corinth, 
348 ; relieved from duty with Army of the 
Mississippi, .349; succeeds Buell hi com- 
mand, 349; denounces Murphy for sur- 
rendering luka, 361 ; confronted by Bragg 
in Tennessee, 448; di'iven Into Chattar 
nooga, 487, 488, 494 ; Grant ordered to co- 
operate with, 487, 494 ; C. A. Dana sent to, 
488 ; Halleck suggests that Grant relieve, 
491 ; superseded by Thomas, 491 ; ordered 
to move against Bragg, 492; confronted 
by Bragg at Murfreesboro, 492; Dana 
fears his retreat from Chattanooga, 492, 
493; assistance needed for, 493; his mis- 
take iu operations against Bragg, 493, 494 ; 
defeated at Chickamauga, 494; abandons 
Lookout Mountain, 494; difficulty of 
bringing supplies to, 495 ; advised of his 
supersession, 497 ; meeting with, at Ste- 
venson, 498; contemplated retrograde 
movement of, 499 ; reinforcements for, 503 ; 
operations in Missouri, II, 238, 427, 428; 
ordered to send A. J. Smith to Thomas, 433 

Ross, G. W., reports probability of captiu'- 
ing Fort Fisher, II, 4.37 

Ross, L. F., commanding at Bolivar, I, 
*328 ; reinforcements for, 329 ; enters the 
Yazoo Pass, *375, 376; retreat of, 376; 
anxiety for, 377 

Rosser, Thomas L., his command, II, 102 ; 
in battle of the Wilderness, 109 ; defeated 
by Sheridan at Fisher's Hill, * 221 

Rossville, Ga., Hooker's operations at, I, 
520, i52l, II, 12, 14, 19, 23, 25 

Rough-and-Ready, Ga., Sherman defeats 
Hood near, II, 424 

" Rough and Ready, Old," I, 73-75, 105-107. 
See also Taylor, Zacuart. 

Rousseau, Lovell H., makes raid into Ala- 
bama, II, *89; reinforces Sherman, 89, 424 

Rowley, W. R., sent to bring up Lew Wal- 
lace's division at Shiloh, I, 278 ; on Grant's 
staff, II, 69 ; instructions to, betrayed to 
Richmond, 69 

Russell, D. A., his command, II, 99; encoun- 
ters Barringer's brigade, *156 

Rust, Albert, joins Van Dorn in attack on 
Corinth, I, 345 



Sabine Cross Roads, La., defeat of Banks 

at, II, 426 
Sabine River, in camp between the Red 

River and, I, 31 ; boundary of Texas, 32 
Sackett's Harbor, N. Y., in garrison at, I, 

153 
Sacrificios, Mex., debarkation at, I, 96 
Sailor's Creek, Va., location and coarse, II, 

328 ; battle of, 329, 454 ; depressing effect 

of the battle on the Confederates, 350 
St. Augustine, Fla., in Union hands, II, 54, 

398 



502 



INDEX 



St. Francis River, niOTCraont against the 

eucmy on tlio, 219 
St. Louis, Mo., Grant reports for duty at, 
I, 25; vLsits to, 30, 36, 152, 153, 187-190, 
234,23.';, II, 42; farming near, I, 167, 168; 
in tho rcal-e.state business in, 168 ; a can- 
didate for office in, 168; danger to the 
U. S. arsenal at, 187; secession spirit in, 
189 ; hauling down the rebel flag in, 189, 
190; ollice in, 205; ordered to report at, 
210; (ien. Prentiss reports at, 212 ; visit to 
Halleck at, 234, 235 ; transportation for 
Sherman's army from, 357 ; collecting 
boats from, 386 ; sending supplies to Sher- 
man from, 512 ; visit to F. !>. Grant at, II, 
42 ; the Mississippi in Union hands from 
its mouth to, 398 ; " St. Louis," gunboat, 
at Fort Donelson, 247 
Saline River, Steele's battle on the, II, 427 
Salisbury, N. C, Stoneman's expedition 

against, II, 442, 458 
Salt River, service on the, 1, 199-201 
Saltillo, Mex., I, 80, 82 

Saltville, Va., Crook's operations at, II, 58, 
61, 403; Biu'bridge's expedition against, 
428; Stoneman's expedition against, 434 
San Augustin Tlalpan, Mex., occupation of , 

1, 109; feasts at, 140 
San Antonio, Tex., i>aying off troops at, I, 
47 ; trip f ro]u Coi-piis Christi to, 47-53 ; 
Mexican massacre at, 49; situation, 109; 
Garland's brigade at, 109, 110; battle of, 
111, 112 
San Antonio River, I, 48, 51, 52 
San Cosme garita, the, I, 116, 117 ; assault 
on, 120-123; the gun in the belfry at, 123, 
124 
Sanders, J. C. C, IT, 102 

Sanders, John, at battle of Monterey, I, *82 
Sand Mountain, Hood crosses, II, 431 
San Francisco, Cal., arrival of the Fourth 
Infantry at, I, 158; the city in 1852, 159- 
161 ; in 18.53, 165, 160; gambling in city lots 
in, 166 ; tlie city in 1854, 166 
Sanitary Association, the, atVicksburg, 1,452 
San Juan de UUoa, Mex., I, 96, 97 
San Patricio, Indian massacres at, I, 48; 

settlement at, 52 
Santa Anna, A. L. de, capture of, by Tex- 
ans, I, 33; ti-eaty with Texas, 33, 34; 
massacres by, 34; commanding Mexican 
forces at Cerro Gordo, 99; wonderful 
march by, 102 ; negotiations with, 114, 115 ; 
evacuates the City of Mexico, 124, 134 
Santo Domingo, the question of annexa- 
tion of, II, 393 
Savannah, Ga., preparations for campaign 
against, 11,33; movements to and from, 
proposed and executed, 230-233, 272, 276, 
429, 430, 441; Sherman's march to, 240, 247 ; 
torjiedoed roads near, 247, 248 ; investment 
of, 217-251; opening commimication with 
the Union fleet at, 248; strength, 250; im- 
portance of capture of, 250 ; topography, 

250, 251 ; evacuation of, 251 ; destruction of 
the navy-yard, and capture of stores at, 

251, 252 ; captT\re of a blockade-rvmner at, 
252 ; turned ov^er to (Jen. Foster, 271 ; news 
of the capture of, in the North, 271 ; Sim- 
eon Draper put in charge of abandoned 
and captured property at, 271 ; Sherman 
clears up in, 276; intrenching at, 276; 
distance of Goldsboro from, 282;" Sherman 
goes to, 374; troops sent to, 420; occupa- 
tion of, 431 ; Foster's expedition against 



the railroad between Charleston and, 43l 
anticipating Sherman's arrival at, 440 

Savannah, Tenn., Grant reassumescomma^d 
at, I, 271; C. F. Smith sick at, 271, 279, 
troops at, 272 ; advance on Pittsburg Land- 
ing ft-om, 273; headquarters at, 275; Nel- 
son arrives at, 276 ; Buell expected at, 277 , 
McCook's march to, 292 

Savannah River, Sherman's operations on 
the, II, 231, 276, 431 

Scale, Alfred M., II, 102 

Schenck, Capt., commanding the "Ohio," 
I, 154 

Schofield, John M., troops sent to, I, 485: 
commanding in East Tennessee, II, 43 ; 
relieves Foster, 43; unable to move for 
lack of supplies, 44 ; commanding depart- 
ment under Shei-man, 54 ; comnjanding the 
Department of the Ohio, 81, 422; com- 
manding at Knoxville, 82; strength, 82; 
Shernum's plan for his advance, 83 ; move- 
ment from Knoxville, 83; successes at 
Kenesaw, 87; blames Palmer for failure 
of operations, 92 ; disputed seniority be- 
tween Palmer and, 92; ordered to rein- 
force Thomas, 238 ; Thomas's orders to, 
before Franlilin, 254; Hood turns liis po- 
sition, 254; falls back to Columbia, 254; 
strength before Franklin, 254; retreats 
to Franklin, 255 ; defeats Hood at Frank- 
lin, 255, 432 ; retreats to Nashville, 255, 256, 
433; strength, 274 ; ordered to Annapolis, 
274; sent to Wilmington or New Berne, 
275, 441; arrives at Annapolis, 280; Grant 
makes tour of inspection with, 280, 440; 
sent to Cape Fear River, 280 ; to seize the 
Wilmington tind Charlotteville railroad, 
281; to land troops at Smithville, 281; at 
Cioldsboro, 285, 441, 442, 446 ; moves with 
Sherman against Johnston, 422 ; opera- 
tions against Buzzard's Roost, 423 ; or- 
dered to Chattanooga, 431 ; reaches John- 
sonville, 432; commanding at Pulaski, 432 ; 
ordered East, 439; reaches Washington, 
439; placed under Sherman's orders, 439; 
to command the Department of North 
Carolina, 439; sent to Fort Fisher and 
New Berne, 439; instructions as to coiiiv 
erationwith Sherman, 439, 440; to secure 
rolling-stock from Washingt(m, 440 ; cap- 
tures Wilmington, 441 ; to reinforce Sher- 
man, 441 ; commanding the Twenty-third 
Corps, 441; Sherman opens communica- 
tions with, 442 

Scott, Sir Walter, Grant's fondness for 
works of, I, 20 

Scott, 'Winfield, visits West Point, I, 22; 
poUtioal aspirations of, * 90, 91 ; difficulties 
concerning his appointment to command 
in Mexico, 90-93 ; sent to Mexico, 91-93 ; 
opposes Taylor's plan of the war, 02; 
deceived by the Administration, 92 ; with- 
draws regular troops from Taylor, 92-91; 
arrives at Camargo, 93; size of his army, 
98, 99; plans the capture of Cerro Gordo, 
100, 101; reduction of his army at Ja- 
lapa, 103; at Puebla, 104; handicapped by 
want of trooiis, 105; strength at Puebla, 
105; contrasted with Taylor, 105-107 ; per- 
sonal characteristics aiid jnilitary char- 
acter, 105-107, 135; position at Ayotla, 109; 
reconnoiters Contreras, 110: strategy and 
tactics at Churubusco, 112, 113 ; reasons for 
not entering City of Mexico, 114 ; declares 
armistice at an end, 115 ; occupies Tacuba- 



INDEX 



503 



ya,115; estrangement between Gen. Worth 
and, 117 ; iissiguw capture of Cliapiiltepoe 
to Pillow, 120; captures City of Mexico, 
125, 126; enters the city, 121;, 327; his suc- 
cesses an answer to criticisui, 12'J; his 
tactics couipared with Gen. Taykir's, 129 ; 
personnel of his army, 130; prepares for 
prolonsert oceiipation of Mexico, i:!2, 13:5 ; 
originator of the Soldiers' Hoiue, 133; 
attempts to remove him, 134; hostility 
of PiUow, Worth, and Duncan to, 134; 
hostility of the Administration to, 134, 135; 
relieved of command, 135 ; laLer years of, 
135; defeated for Presidency, 136; diHiculty 
of providing clothing for the army, 140; 
system of tactics taught at West Point, 
203 ; Lee his chief of staff in Mexico, II, 341 

Scottsborough, Ala., Logan at, II, 42 

Scottsville, Va., Sheridan destroys the 
James River canal at, II, 445 

Scout, device of a, II, 326 

Sea-coast defenses, importance of, II, 391 

Seasickness, a bad case of, I, 157, 158 

Secession, the approach of, I, 171, 173; the 
right of, 174-177 ; the clamor for, in the 
South, 177-181 ; Ix'giiining of, 179, 180 ; 
Northern sympathy with, 181 ; of eleven 
States, 183; repealing the ordinance of, 
in the mock legislature of Georgia, II, 
246 ; the hotbed of, 276 

Second Army-corps, Army of Northern Va., 
organization of, II, 101 

Second Army-corps, Army of the Potomac, 
organization of, II, 97 ; crosses Ely's 
Ford, 98, 404 ; indefatigable work by, 148 ; 
under command of Birney, ISO ; "move- 
ment against the Weldon railroad, 190; 
in investment of Petersburg, 191, 413 ; 
Hancock relieved of commainC 226 : Hum- 
phreys assigned to command, 226 ; in battle 
of White Oak Eoad, 299, 452 ; in advance on 
Five Forks, 304 ; in action of April 2, 1865, 
308. 310 ; confidence in Hancock, 384 ; in 
battle of Spotteylvania, 405 ; holds bridge 
at the North Anna, 406 ; crosses the James, 
412, 415 ; threatens Riclinioud, 420 ; de- 
feated at Eeams's Station , 421 ; in action at 
Hatcher's Run, 422 ; in action, March 25, 
1865, 449 ; movement toward Dinwiddie 
Court House, 450 ; piu'sucs Ia'c toward 
Danville, 453, 454; operations at High 
Bridge, 454 ; in battle of Sailor's C!rcek, 
454. See also Hancock; Hdmphrkys. 

Second Dragoons, at Fort .Tessup, T, 27; at 
Corpus Christi, 44 ; capture of companies 
of, by Mexicans, 64 ; in Mexican w;ir, 1, 105 

Second Michigan Cavalry, Sheridan ap- 
pointed colouel of the, I, 334 

Secret societies, I, 169 

Sects versus the state, I, 170 

Sedgwick, John, commanding Sixth Army- 
corps, II, 97, 99 ; crosses the Rapidau, 98, 
103, *105 ; closes on Warren's right, 106 ; 
in battle of the Wilderness, 109, 114, 115, 
405; orders for. May 7, 1864, 120; with- 
drawal of, 120 ; at Piuey Branch Church, 
123 ; ordered to support Warren at Spott- 
sylvania, 123 ; fails to support Warren, 
123, 124 ; military and personal character- 
istics, 124, 384 ; in reserve nt Spottsylvania, 
125 ; crosses the Ny at Catharpin Furnace, 
126 ; position, noon, Mav 9, 1864, 127 ; killed 
before Spottsylvania, 128, 384, 405 

Selma, Ala., movements against, II, 274,277- 
279, 443 ; captured by Wilson, 368, 459 



Semmes, Raphael, at capture of City of 
Mexico, I, ^121 

Seven-Mile Creek, Pope nt, I, 313 

Seventeenth Corps, position at Lake Provi- 
dence, I, 370; center of the Army of ilio 
Tennessee, 390: at Bruinslmrg, 4oi, 402; 
in assault on Vieksburg, 445 ; in right wing 
of Sherman's army, II, 234; comiiiiindcd 
by (Jen. Jilaii', 234; part of, sent from 
Vieksburg to Red River, 426 

Seventh Army-corps, in cooperation with 
Banks, II, 427 

Seventh U. S. Infantry, at Corpus Christi, 

I, 44; Grant promoted to full second 
lieutenant in the, .53; Grant transferred 
back to the Fourth Infantry from, 53, 54 ; 
Mil,). Bi'owu killed, 72 

Seward, W. H., views as to the duration of 
the war, I, -177 ; Grant informed of the 
attack on, II, 358 

Seymour, T., IT, 99 

Shady Grove Church, Va., movements near, 

II, 106, 158, 161 
Shaler, Alexander, II, 99 

Shelllsland, Tex., debark.'ition of the Fourth 

Infantry at, T, 39-41 

Shenandoah Valley, the, importance of, to 
the Confederates, II, 57, 204, 205, 207, 209, 
214, 220; plan for Ord's operations in, 
61 ; Sheridan's oiierations in, 94, 206, 213- 
217, 220-223, 278, 293, 445; possibility of 
reinforcing Lee from, 144 ; Ewell sent to, 
181 ; Early's operations in, 181, 213, 216, 420 ; 
left open to Early, 195, 416 ; Hunter's op- 
erations in, 192, 194, 195, 412, 417, 418 ; bad 
policy of Stanton and HaUeck concerning, 
205; moving troops toward, 207 ; visit to 
Sheridan in, 214, 215 ; Wright left in com- 
mand in, 222; Union troops withdrawn 
from, 224 ; virtual closing of the campiiign 
in, 224 ; Confederate troops sent to Rich- 
mond from. 224 ; proposed niovenieiits for 
Hancock in, for spring of 1865, 220 ; pro- 
posed plan of cami)iugn from, in spring 
of 1865, 226; Sheridan moves on the James 
from, 2;!3 ; Confederate force in, 399 ; 
Sigel's operations in, 403, 411 ; necessity 
of breaking railroad comnnmicatiou be- 
tween Richmond and, 409 ; engagement at 
Snicker's Ferry, 417; to be depleted, 418, 
420 ; the enemy's last attempt to invade 
the North via, 420; withdrawal of the 
enemy from, 443; Sheridan to move to- 
ward Sherman from, 443, 444 

Shepherdstown, Va., Sigel retreats across 
the Potomac at, II, 416 

Sheridan, P. H., brings news of Bragg to 
Corinth, I, 329 ; meeting with, at Corinth, 
*333 ; his early career, 333, 334 ; relations 
with Halleck, 333, 334; victory at Boon- 
ville, 334 ; promoted brigadier-general, 
334; reaches and fortifies Louisville, 334; 
in action at Fort Wood, II, 3: in battle of 
Chattanooga, 15-18; supersedes Gen. 
Pleasanton, 60; commanding Cavalry 
Corps, Army of the Potomac, 60. 97, 99 ; 
first raid on Lee's communications, 76-80, 
127, 133, 141, 153, 405, 406 ; crosses the North 
Anna, 78, 414; destroys railroad at Ash- 
laud, 78, 406 ; passes the outer defenses of 
Richmond, 78, 406 ; defeats Stiuut at Yel- 
low Tavern, 78, 406; crosses the Chicka- 
hominy, 78, 79, 406 ; at Ha xall's Landing, 
79, 406; crosses the Pamunkey, 79, 408; at 
White House, 79, 4U; campaign in the 



504 



INDEX 



Shenandoah Valley, U ; political eflfect of 
Ms victory, 94, 217 ; in battle of the Wilder- 
ness, 109, 111 ; at Todd's Tavern, 120, 122 ; 
his plans for capture of Spottsylvania 
balk'ed by Meade, 122, 123 ; movement to- 
ward Hanover, 156, 408 ; crosses the Pa- 
munkey, 156,408; action at Hawes's Shop, 
158; reconnaissance toward Mechauics- 
ville. 158, 159 ; to reconnoiter toward Cold 
Harbor, 159 ; to commtmicate with Smith, 
159; position near Cold Harbor, May 30, 
1864, 161, 408 ; repulses attack, 161 ; in bat- 
tle of Cold Harbor, 162, 163; reconnoiters 
on the Chiokahominy, 165; expedition 
asainst the Viri^luia Central railroad, 176, 
177, 181. 192-194, 409, 414 ; defeats Hampton, 
193 ; operations at Tre^-illian Station, 193, 
414 ; breaks up the depot at White Bouse, 
194 ; returns to the Army of the Potomac, 
194, 414 ; movement via Deep Bottom, 199, 
201, 415; Stanton's objection to giving 
command to, 205 ; sent to the Valley, 205, 
206, 418, 419; supersedes Hunter, 207, 419; 
inWashingtou, 207 ; strength, 208 ; meets 
Grant at the Monocacy, 208, 419 ; instruc- 
tions given to, 208 ; confronted by Early 
in the Valley, 208; Informed concerning 
reinforcements sent against him, 209; 
follows Early to Strasburg, 213 ; sending 
Information of Early's reinforcements 
to, 213, 214; difficulty of getting orders 
to, through Washington, 214, 221 ; thrown 
on the defensive, 214, 419; visit to, at 
Charlestown, 214, 215, 419; completeness 
of his plans, 214, 215, 419; at Harrison- 
biu-g, 216 ; defeats Early at the Opequan, 
216, 420; pursues Early to Fisher's Hill, 
216 ; despoils the Valley, 217. 221, 420 ; con- 
gratulations for, 217 ; the President's anxi- 
ety for, 217, 218 ; recommends a reduction 
of his force, 220 ; precautious to prevent 
the enemy getting in the rear of, 220 ; or- 
dered to cut the James Kiver canal and the 
Virginia Central railroad, 221, 278 ; com- 
mences retreatdowu the Valley,221, 420; de- 
feats Early's cavalry at Fisher's Hill, 221, 
420; Grant's telegraphed orders to, Oct. 
14, 1864, 221, 222 ; summoned to Washing- 
ton, 222 ; orders cavalry up the Valley, 222 ; 
return to Winchester from Washington, 
222, 223 ; at Front Royal hears of Early's 
movement to crush him, 222; the famous 
"ride," 223, 420; intrenches, 223; defeats 
Early, 224, 420 ; letter to, Feb. 20, 1865, 278, 
444 ; ordered to raid fi'oin Lynchburg, 278, 
444 ; defeats Early between Staunton and 
Charlottesville, 293, 445 ; hazardous march 
to White House, 293, 294, 445 ; moves toward 
Richmond, 294, 445; flne condition of his 
cavalrv, 294 ; crosses the Anna rivers, 295, 
445 ; reaches White House, 295, 445, 446 ; at- 
tacked at Ashland, 295; reaches City Point, 
300; instructions for his movements, 
March 29, 1865, 300-302, 447, 448; proposed 
cooperation with Sherman, 301. 443, 444, 
450 ; advance on Five Forks, 303-306, 451 ; 
moves back to Dinwiddle Court House, 
304, 452 ; driven back near Five Forks, 304 ; 
Warren ordered to his assistance, 305, 452 ; 
relieves Wan-en, 306; in battle of Five 
Forks, 306, 307, 452 ; comes in on the left, 
311 ; in battle of Sutherland's Station, 312, 
453; pursues from Sutherland's Station, 
312 ; ordered to move out on the Danville 
road, 316, 453 ; reinforced by Humphreys, 



316 ; plan to imite with Grant, 318 ; notified 
of Lee's route to Farmvllle, 322 ; hazard- 
ous position, 323; intercepts Lee's mes- 
sage for rations, 323 ; advised to attack, 
324 ; despatch to Grant, April 5, 1865, 324 ; 
reports Lee at Amelia Court House, 324 ; 
at Burkesville, 324; assists Meade, 325; 
prevented from attacking by Meade, 325 ; 
asks Grant to go to JetersvlUe, 325 ; con- 
sultation with, 326 ; takes the Sixth Corps 
under his command, 330; bivouacs at 
Prince Edward's Court House, 333 ; south- 
erly movement of, 333 ; pushes forward to 
capture Lee's trains at Appomattox, 333, 
335, 455, 456 ; vim Of his troops, 335 ; orders 
Custer south of Appomattox Station, 335; 
Lee asks him for suspension of hostilities, 
338; excitement among his troops, 340; 
sent to the Rio Grande, 389, 390, 459; 
crosses the Rapidan, 404; crosses the 
James near Fort Powhatan, 414 ; advances 
toward Gordonsville, 414; sent to Har- 
per's Ferry, 419; cavalry sent to, 419; 
promptness, 419 ; pursues Early through 
the Blue Ridge, 420 ; returns to Strasburg, 
420; takes position on north side of Ce- 
dar Creek, 420; defeats Early at Stras- 
burg, 420 ; reinforces the Anuy of the 
James, 420 ; ordered to send troops to Bal- 
timore, 438 ; moves from Winchester, Feb. 

27, 1865, 444 ; to look after Mosby, 444 ; se- 
cures bridge at Mt. Crawford, 445 ; enters 
Staunton, 445 ; defeats Early at Waynes- 
boro, 445; march to Charlottesville, 445; de- 
stroys bridges over the Rivanna,445; aban- 
dons idea of capturing Lynchburg, 445; 
destroys James River canal, 445; failure 
of expeditions to Duguidsville and Hard- 
wicksvllle, 445 ; concentrates at Columbia, 
Va., 445; threatens Richmond, 445; move- 
ments on the Pamunke.v, 445 ; moves from 
White House, 446; crosses James River, 
446 ; rejoins Army of Potomac in front of 
Peters'bm-g, 446; Instraotions to, March 

28, 1865, 450 ; position, March 29, 1865, 450 ; 
in battle of Sailor's Creek, 450 ; letter to, 
March 29, 1865, 451; reinforced by Miles, 
452 ; returns IMiles to his proper command, 
453; intrenches near Jetersville, 453; re- 
ports Lee's army demoralized, 453; pur- 
sues Lee toward Danville, 454 

Sherman, W. T., sent to Smithland, I, 258, 
*259; generous offer by, 259; expedition 
to Burusville, 273 ; commanding division 
In Army of the Tennessee, 273, 274 ; pm-- 
sues Johnston's cavalry, 275 ; quality of 
his troops and their commander, 279, 282 ; 
at Slliloh, 279, 280, 282, 284-286, 288, 302; 
wounded, 282; records gallantry of Mc- 
Cook's command at Shiloh, 292 ; accuracy 
of his reports of Shiloh, 305; action before 
Corinth,314 ; dissuades Grantfi-om leaving 
the Department of the Tennessee, 319; 
commanding at Memi)his, 328, 335, 357, 488, 
11,39; commanding right wing of the Army 
of the Mississippi, 1,335, 352 : meeting with, 
at Columbus, 355 ; personal and military 
abilitv and characteristics, 355,356,512,11, 
139, 230 ; instructions to, I, 357, 358 ; corre- 
spondence with Grant. I, 357, 358, 483, 488, 
II, 58, 230-233, 249, 250, 273-275, 429, 430, 453, 
454; sent to Memphis in charge of move- 
ment against Vicksburg, I. 358 ; coopera- 
tion between Grant and, 359 ; first attack 
on Vicksburg, 364; strength, 365; with- 



INDEX 



505 



draws from the Yazoo, ncO; distrusts Mc- 
Cleriiaud's ability, 3G7 ; cxiicditioii up 
Steele's Bayou, 378; ou KUuk Havoii, ;i7.s, 
379 ; commandiufT left wiug- ol Aiu'iy ol tlio 
Tennessee, o",)0; advauce"ui)(>u New Car- 
thage, 3i)'2; ordered to threaten Haines's 
Blult, 398; withdraws from Haines's 
Bluft", 400; atr!ruinsl)ur.i;-, 401; disiijiproves 
lilau of eattini; loose from base of sup- 
plies, 411; arrives at Grand Culf, 4V2; 
marehes froiu Grand Gulf to llankiuson's 
Perry, 413; at Bis Sandy and Anbuin, 
413; at Fourleen-Milo Creek, 413-415; at 
Raymond, 419, 420; to march on Jackson, 
420; at battle of Jackson, 421-423; John- 
ston's plan to defeat. 424 ; destroys Jack- 
son, 424, 427 ; march from Jackson to Bol- 
ton, 428, 437; goes to Bridgeport,437, 441.516- 
518; conversation with, on Walnut Hills, 
441, 442, 453 ; prophetic view of the Vlcks- 
burg campaign, 442, 453; in investment of 
Vicksburg, 443, 448 ; sacrtflces in favor of 
McClernaiid, 445 ; Northern visitors to, be- 
fore Vickshm-g, 453 ; credit due to, for the 
Vicksburg campaign, 453; disclaims tb.e 
credit, 453; loyal support from. 453, 454; re- 
monstrates against the plan of campaign, 
453, 454: complains of McClernand's con- 
gratulatory order, 457; assigned to com- 
mand of forces from Haines's Bluff to the 
Big Black, 458 ; ordered to drive Johnston 
from Mississiiipi, 473, 475, 482; command- 
ing at Haines's Blufi',482; on the Big Black, 
482 ; besieges Jackson, 482, 483 ; liiie from 
Haines's Bluff to tiie Big Black, 484 ; or- 
dered back to Vicksburg, 484; renders 
assistance during Grant's disablement, 
487; sent to reinforce Rosecrans, 494; 
passes Eastport, 498; assigned to com- 
mand the Army of the Tennessee, 500; 
leaves Memphis for Corinth, 511 ; repairs 
roads, 511, 512 ; ordeied to Stevenson, 512 ; 
at Florence, 512 ; notitJed of Confederate 
movement toward Nashville, 512; move- 
ments and positions on the Tennessee, 
512, 519-521, 524, II, 5, 30, 32, 38 ; to halt Gen. 
Dodge at Athens, I, 513; lu'ged forward, 
51G ; plan of movement for relief of Burn- 
side, 517 ; detaiued at Elk River, 517 ; meet- 
ing with Gr.!nt at Chattanooga, 518 ; to co- 
operate with Thomas, 519; plan of battle 
for, 520, 522; trip from Chattanooga to 
Briilgeport, 523 ; with the advance at 
Brown's Perry, 523; reaches his position 
imdiscovei-ed, 525 ; ready for action at 
Brown's Ferry, II, 4 ; in battles of Mission-., 
ary Ridge and Chattanooga, 6, 7, 10, 12, A 
13, 15, 10, 18, 20, 23, 30; at Graysville, 25, 
26 ; at Ringgold, 26 ; destroys railroad be- 
tween Daiton and KuoxviUe, 27 ; march 
to Knoxville, 27, 28, 38 ; jn-oposes to assist 
Birrnside in driving Longstreet out of 
Tennessee, 37 ; proceeds to clear the east 
bank of the IVIississippi, 39 ; sends scout- 
ing expeditions from Vicksburg, 40; 
moves against Polk at Meridian, 41; nar- 
rowly escapes capture at Decatur, 41; 
proposes to move against Shreveport, 
42; Thomas to coijperate with, 42, 43; 
cooperation with Banks, 42, 49, 58, 61, 65, 
84, 400, 425; recommended by Meade as 
Ms successor, 40 ; commandlnj^ the Mili- 
tary Division of the Mississippi, 46, 48, 54, 
399 ; meeting with, at Nashville, 47, 48 ; dis- 
cussion of the spring campaign, 48, 49; 



Buell declines (o serve under, 50; con 
fronted liy Johnston in (icorgia, 57, 59,61, 
399 ; movement against and eaiiture of At- 
lanta, 58, 82, 83, 89, 90, 92, 93, 210, 213, 423, 

424 ; semis troops iigainst Forrest, 63, 424, 

425 ; or<leicd to ;idvai;cc on May 5, 1864, CO; 
limits of his niililnry division, 81 ; assumes 
duties at Nashville, 81; his tliree arniieM 
fertile Atlanta caiiipaig-n, 82; accumulates 
sui>|ili(>s at Chattanooga, 82, 83; moves on 
IJalton, 84, 422; halts to bring up his sup 
plies, 85; ri'inforced by Blair, 86; gains 
possession of tiie Chattahoochee, 'J7 423; 
sends Stonemaii on raid, 90; nnsuceeseful 
attempt to capture railroad on tnc fight, 
92 ; blames Palmer for failure ot opera- 
tions, 92 ; Wlieeler cuts his comneimcur 
lions with the North, 92 ; value of his .lab- 
ordiniites, 93 ; regulates the sutlers, Jb, .t4 ; 
news of his success in tlu^ North, 94; mo738 
according to program of spring cam- 
paign, 106 ; encounter with Johnston. 119 ; 
ret'onnuended for major-generalship, U. 
S. A., 139; drives Johnston out of Daiton, 
140 ; ca])tures Kingston and crosses the 
Etowali, 151 ; anecdoteof the Atlanta cam- 
paign told by, 165; Forrest hamsses his 
rear, 197; hnrasses the enemy in Georgia, 
199; asks for raw reci'uits, 210 ; i)roposed 
plan of canipaignjfor. in spring of 1805, 
226 ; a source of weakness in liia army, 227- 
230; Ms march to the sea, 227 et seq., 237, 
240. 429-431; Pres. Davis's views of his 
position, 228-2.30; opposed by Hood, 229, 
•232, 233, 238, 429, 443; takes advantage of 
Davis's speeches. 230, 429 ; proposes to 
sweep the whole JState of Georgin, 231. 430 ; 
asked for views, 231, 232 ; sends troops to 
Thomas, 232, 431 ; eorresiiondeuce with 
Hood, 233 ; proposers movement agsiinst 
Milledgeville and Savannah, 233; Mobih; 
considered his objective point, 233 ; orders 
Thomas to Chattanooga and Nashville, 
233 ; movement on Mobile no longer neces- 
sary, 234; organization of his army, 234- 
236; sui>ersedes Logan by Howard, 235; 
views the battle of Allatoona, 237; au- 
thorized to cut loose from his base, 238; 
proposal that he destroy Hood before 
starting to the sea, 240; his campaign 
through Georgia delinitelv approved, 240, 
430 ; concentrates at Atlanta, 240, 428, 431 ; 
destroys Atlanta, 241; his "bummers," 
242-244; reaches Milledgeville, 244 : as de- 
picted ))y Southern nev.spapers, 245; anx- 
iety about, in the North, 245, 246; move- 
ment via Waynesboro and Louisville, 246; 
resumes march from Milledgeville, 246; 
advances j)risoners over torpedoed roads, 
248; communicates with Foster, 248, 249; 
Grant's confidence in, 249,250; invests and 
captures Savannah, 251, 431, 440; suggests 
destruction of raili-oad back to Chatta- 
nooga. 252; question of the credit due for 
his march to the'sea, 252, 253 ; the Presi- 
dent's anxiety concerning his cutting 
loose from his base, 253 ; proposed north- 
ward campaign, 271-273, 276, 429, 430, 440, 
441 ; news of Ills capture of Savannah in 
the North, 271; visitors to, at Savannah, 
271 ; results of his march through Georgia, 
272; commencement of the tiuid march, 
277, 441; arranges with ,\(lm. Dahlgren 
and Gen. Foster to seize points near 
Charleston, 273; provisions for coopera- 



506 



INDEX 



tion -witll, 273-275, 277, 279, 281, 441, 443, 444, 
450 ; Lee sends ti'oops asainst, 273, 280; ad- 
vised of the battle ol" Nashville, 275 ; clears 
up in Savauuub, 276; thanked by C'on- 
Krt!ss, 270; congratulates Thomas, 276; 
disapproves Thomas's action at Nash- 
ville, 276; his objective points, 277; iu- 
foriiuid of the fall of Fort Fisher, 277; to 
eat the vitals out of South Carolina, 278, 
444; march ti) and capture of Columbia, 
282, 283, 441 ; karus that Beauregard con- 
fronts him, 283 ; marches from Columbia 
to Cheraw, 234; crosses the Pedee, 284; 
learns of Johnston's restoration to com- 
mand, 284; ri'ceives supplies from Terry 
at Payetteville, 284 ; march from Fayette- 
Ville to GoLi:;boro, 284, 285. 440, 442, 444, 
446 ; confronted by Johnston, 285, 362, 442 ; 
impossibility of Lee's striMng at, 285, 286 ; 
arranging for Lis movement, 295; pro- 
posed cooperation of Sheridan with, 301 ; 
to cooperate iu movements on Petersburg 
and Richmond, 301, 449; Lee's attempt to 
unite with Johnston and crush, 316 ; in- 
formed of Lee's surrender, 363; meets the 
President at ( 'ity Point, 363; difficulty about 
his conditional terms to Johnston, 363- 
360, 374, 379, 457, 458 ; his populnrity, 364 ; his 
troops ordered not to obey Mm, a65, 374 ; 
meeting wit'.i Grant at Raleigh, 365, 457, 
458; his loyaltj', 366; secures Johnston's 
surrender, 366, 458: march to Washington, 
373, 374, 379; resents Halleck's indignities, 
374; ordered to Washin.gton, 374; achieve- 
ments and quality of his army, 374-376, 
379, 380; his operations in Georgia, 375, 
376; operations in South and North Caro- 
lina, 376; in t!ie grand review at Washing- 
ton, 378-380; resents Secretary Stanton's 
insults, 379; x'lan to i)revent Lee concen- 
trating against, 399; thorough under- 
standing of his instructions, 400; con- 
quests on the coast, 420; moves against 
AUatoona, 42:i; destroys the railroad to 
Augusta, 423; moves upon Dallas, 423 ; ac- 
tions at Rough-and-Ready, Jonesboro', 
and Lovejoy's, 424; reinforced by Rous- 
seau, 424; proposes to abandon Atlanta, 
429, 431; proposal that he turn Wilson 
loose, 430; to act independently of Grant, 
430; threatens Augusta and Macon, 431; 
Schotield placed under orders of, 439; 
weakness in the cavalry arm, 443; move- 
ment toward Raleigh, 444, 449, 457 ; vi^sits 
Grant at City Point, 449 
Sherman, Mrs. W. T., II, 250 
Shields, James, at Cliurubusco, I, *112 
Shiloh, Tenn., death of Johnston at, I, 267; 
the church at, 279; the Union lino, 279- 
281; capture of the Federal camp, 280; 
Confederate losses, 280; repulse of the 
National line on the night of the 6th of 
April, 280; contour of the battle-fleld, 
280; personnel of the Union army, 281, 
294; panic-stricken troops, 281, 282; consti- 
tutional cowardice, 282; stragglers, 283, 
284; the panic in the Confederate rear, 
284; use of cavalry, 282, 283; situation on 
the night of the 6th of April, 284-288; 
losses of the Army of the Tennessee on 
the lirst day, 286 ; a temporary hospital, 
287; the advance on the morning of the 
7th, 287; retreat of the Confederates, 288; 
positions of Union troops on the morning 
of the 7th, 288 ; the battle of the second 



day, 288 et seq. ; modiflcation of stric- 
tiu'eson Lew. Wallace's dilatoriness, 289; 
Grant's personal actions on the second 
day, 291; condition of roads, 292; gallan- 
tly of McCook's command, 292 ; reviewed 
in the " Century Magazine," 292 ; reasons 
for non-pursuit, 292, 293; severity of the 
battle, 293; the enemy's retreat, 293; 
burial of the dead, 294 ; question of in- 
trenching, 294, 295; Johnston's plan of 
camiiaign, 298; the Coniederate council 
of war before, 298 ; opening of the battle, 
298 ; question of surprise at, 299 ; the word 
"if," 299; W. P. Johnston's description of 
the battle, 299, 300; condition of the ar- 
mies at the end of the tirst day, 300; the 
aims of the two armies, 301; Confederate 
claims, 301; Union forces at, 302; losses 
of Union artillery, 302; Union ca])ture8, 
302; the Confederate forces, 302, 303; 
Union and Confederate losses, 302, 303 ; 
the gunboats at, 303 ; a much misundei'- 
slood battle, 305 ; how the reports were 
sent in, 308 ; the advance on Coiiutli fi'om, 
312; Col. Mason's supposed cowardice at, 
330. See also Pittsedi!g Landing. 

Shirk, James W., at Pittsburg Landing, I, 
*285 

Shreveport, La., railroad from Vicksburg 
to, 1, 351 ; operations against, II, 42, 58, 65, 
400 

Sibley, H. H., excursion in Mexico with, I, 
142 et seq. ; in the Egyptian service, 142 

Sierra Madre Mountains, entrance to Mex- 
ico through the, I, 76 

Sigel, Franz, plans for the spring cam- 
paign. 1864, II, 58, *59, 61, 403; com- 
manding in the VaUey of Virginia, 59, 403 ; 
ordered to advance fi'om Winchester, 66; 
defeated at New Market, 72, 142, 144, 411; 
retreat on Str.isburg, 72; superseded in 
command by Hunter, 142, 152, 195, 411 ; re- 
treats to Cedar Creek, 144; operations in 
the Kaiuiwha and Shenandoah Valleys, 
411; retires behind Cedar Creek, 411; at 
Martinsburg, 410 ; retreats across the Po- 
tomac at Shepherdstown, 416 

Sigfried, Joshua K., II, 100 

Signal corps, work in the Held, II, 119 

"Silver Wave," the, running the batteries 
at Vicksburg, I, 386 

Simpson, George, reports probability of 
capturing Fort Fisher, II, 437 

Simpson, Hannah, I, 6; marries Jesse R. 
Grant, 7 

Simpson, John, 1,5; settles in Clermont 
County, O., 6 

Simpson, Mary, I, 6 

Simpson, Samuel, I, 0, 7 

Simpson, Sarah, I, 6 

Simpson family, the, in Pennsylvania, 1, 6; 
in Ohio, 6, 7 

Sixteenth Army-corps, changes in the, II, 
234 ; ))ait of, sent from "Vicksburg to 
Red River, 425,426; moves against Mo- 
bile, 458; invests Spanish Fort, 458 

Sixth Army-corps, organization of, 11,99; 
crosses Germanna Ford, 98, 404; moves 
from Spottsylvania, 147 ; ordered to the 
South Anna, 148; position, May 26, 1864, 
153 ; ordered toward Hanover Town, 155, 
408; moves against the Wcldon railroad, 
190 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191 ; re- 
quest for Sheridan to command the, 206; 
movement April 6, 1865, 330 ; loses its 



INDEX 



507 



commander (Sertj^wick), 405; reaches the 
North Auua, 40(; ; in battle of Cold Harbor, 
408; ordered lo City I'oint, 4i;!; <n-dered 
to Baltimt)re and Washington, 416; or- 
dered to Harper's Ferry, 417 ; I'eturiied 
to Army of tiie I'otoinac, -I'id; in action. 
Mar. 25, 1805, 449; pursues l.ee toward 
Danville, 453, 454; in battle of Sailor's 
Creek, 454; at Farniville, 454, See also 
Sedgwick; Wjugiit. 

Slatersville, N.C., Stoneman's raid at. It, 
458 

Slaughter, W. A., trying experience of, I, 
157, 158 ; killed by Indians, 158 

Slavery, John Brown's attempt to over- 
throw, I, 4 ; supported by the church, 17 ; 
in Texas, 33; influence in the Texas an- 
nexation scheme, 33; influence in the 
Mexican war, 115; the burning issue of, 
170, 171 ; the divine institution of, 173 ; the 
influence of the cotton-gin on, 179; in 
the South, 179, ISO, 507, 508; Lincoln's de- 
termination to abolish, II, 289, 303 ; cause 
of the civil war, 38G, 387 

Slaves, liberation of the, 1, 171 ; dangers of 
an insurrection of, 508 

Slocum, Henry W., commanding Twelfth 
Corps, I, 503 ; ordered to reinforce Rose- 
crans, 503 ; occupies Atlanta, II, *93 ; com- 
manding left wing of Sherman's army, 
234 ; moves to Stone Mountain, 240 ; threat- 
ens Augusta, 240; attacked by Johnston 
at Beutouville. 442 

" Slugs," on the Pacific Coast, 1, 163 

Smallpox, fatality of, among Indians, 1, 163, 
164 

Smith, A. J., at battle of Port Gibson, I, 
403; borrowing a horse fi'oni,*407; ordered 
to Bolton, 425; near Auburn and Ray- 
mond, 420; in battle of Champion's Hill, 
428, 429, 432, 434; ordered to reinforce 
Sherman, 458 ; receives and confers with 
Gen. Boweu, 400, 407; at meeting between 
Pemberton and Grant, 467 ; his troops 
lent by Sherman to Banks, 05, 84, 198, 425, 
420: defeats Forrest, 198,425; ordered to 
reinforce Thomas, 238, 433 ; operations in 
Missouri, 238, 427 ; reinforces Thomas, 256 ; 
proposed movement for, 275; arrives at 
Memphis on his return fi-om Red River, 
424, 425 ; military character, 425 ; captures 
Fort de Russy, 426; at Alexandria, 420; 
in battle of Henderson's Hill, 420 ; defeats 
Taylor at Cane River, 420; engagement 
near Lake Chicot, 427 ; exi>ected to rein- 
force Schofleld, 432; arrives at Nashville, 
433; ordered to report to Canby, 439; 
moves against Mobile, 442, 443, 458 

Smith, C. F., commandant at West Point, 
I, 22 ; at Resaca de la Palma, 70 ; assigned 
to command at Paducah, *215 ; ordered to 
move against Columbus, 219 ; his district 
merged in the District of Cairo, 233; to 
threaten Forts Heiman and Henry, 234; 
in expedition against Fort Henry, 230, 238, 
239; ordered to guard Forts Henry and 
Heiman, 244, 245 ; in investment of Fort 
Donelson, 245, 251-253; receives proposal 
of surrender from Buckner, 255 ; promoted 
major-general of volunteers, 260 ; credited 
by Haileck with capture of Fort Donel- 
son, 260; Grant approves his promotion, 
261 ; finds Clarksville evacuated, 262 ; com- 
manding at Clarksville, 263; letter from 
Buell to, 203 ; criticism of Buell's order, 



264; goes to Buell's assistance, 205; per 
sonal characteristics, 270, 271; death of, 
271 ; ctinniianding divisiou of Army of the 
Tennessee, 274; sickness of, 274, 279; po- 
sition at Pittsburg Landing, 279 
Smith, Dr., a dangerous introduction to, I, 
322 

Smith, Dr., rejjorts conversation with Gen. 
Kwell, 11, 332, 333 

Smith, E. Kirby, comniaiuling Trans-Mis- 
si8sii)pi Department. II, '210; confronted 
by Steele, 210 ; surrend(!r of, 308, 459 ; Pope 
sent aiiainst, 446 

Smith, Giles A., mans boats on the North 
('hickamauga, 11, 5; wounded at Mission- 
ary Ridge, 7 

Smith, G. W., at Cerro Gordo, I, 100; com- 
maniliug Georgia- militia, II, *244 

Smith, John E., lu'omoled brigailier-gen- 
eral, I, 350; at battle of J'ort (Jibson, '403; 
(crosses the Tennessee, II, *5; in assault 
on Missionary Ridge, 6; in battle of Chat- 
tanooga, 13, 14 

Smith, Morgan L., sent to the North Chick- 
amauga, IT, *5; crosses the Tennessee, 5 ; 
in assaidt on Missionary Ridge, 6; in bat- 
tie of Chattanooga, 13, 18; ordered to re- 
coimoiter the tunnel, 18 

Smith, Sidney, humorous remark by, I, 95; 
mortally wounded, 95, 126 

Smith, Watson, commanding gunboats at 
Yazoo Pass, I, *376 

Smith, William, governor of Virginia, II, 
*377; flight froiii Richmond to Danville, 
377 ; anecdote of, 377, 378 ; not permitted 
to act as governor after the surrender, 
378 

Smith, W. P., chief engineer of the Army 
of the Cumberland, I, *499 ; his genius and 
Lugenuity, 499, 504 ; joins in inspection of 
situation at Chattanooga, .501; in expedi- 
tion to Brown's Ferry, 504, 505; losses at 
Lookout Valley, 509; reconnoitei'ing the 
line of Sherman's nmrch,522; apponited 
chief engineer of the Military Division of 
the Mississippi, II, 4; valuable services 
in Chattanooga campaign, 31 ; promoted 
majior-general, 31, GO; commanding But- 
ler's right wing, 58, 60, 402; opposition to 
his promotion, 60; at White House, 154, 
1.59, 408; Sheridan ordered to connauni- 
cate with, 159; strength, 103; in battle of 
Cold Harbor, 103, 164, 166-168, 408 : sent to 
reinforce Butler, 179, 181, 185, 186, 410; 
operations before Petersburg, 185-188, 412, 
413 ; brought from Bermuda Himdi-ed to 
join the Army of the Potomac, 408 

Smith, 'W. Sooy, brings reinforcements to 
Vicksbiu'g, I. 4.56; ordered to Haines's 
Blufl", 456 ; ordered to move against For- 
rest, n, 40; unsuccessful encounter with 
Forrest. 41 

Smithfield, N. C, J.E. Johnston retreats to, 

II, 442 

"Smithfield," the, sunk at Plymouth, II, 
407 

Smithland, Ky., occupation of, I, 215; Sher- 
man commauiling at, 259 ; commimication 
with Cairo, 268 

Smith's Island, N. C, capture of, II, 270, 
439 

Smith's Plantation, La., route to Perkins's 
l)lantatiou from, I, 389 

Smithville, N. C, Schofield to land troops 
at, II, 281 



508 



INDEX 



Smuggling, on Mexican frontier, I, 42 

Smyth, Thomas A., II, 97 

Snake Creek, its course, condition. Union 
positions on, etc., I, 278-281, 284, 285 

Snake Creek Gap, Ga., MePlierson's opera- 
tions at, IT, 8"), 423 

Snicker's Ferry, Va., engagement at, II, 
417 

Snicker's Gap, Va., getting information to 
Slieridan through, II, 214 

Snow-blindness, I, 144 

Soldiers, value of seasoned, II, 40 

Soldiers' Homes, oriirin of, 1, 133 

South, the, its real position, 1, 175 ; clamor 
for secession in, 177-181 ; slavery in, 179, 
n, 386, 387 ; the class of " divine right " in, 
I, 179; inconsistency in, 180; perils of 
Union sentiment in, 181; its military re- 
sources contrasted with those of the 
North, 230, II, 351-355 ; admiration for, I, 
370; heneflted by the war, 507, 508; con- 
trasted with the North as regards lieense 
of speech and press, II, 31; a military 
camp, 228, 523, 353 ; weary of the war, 22S ; 
Lincoln's generosity toward, 289; conscrip- 
tion in, 292, 352-354, 368, 399 ; exaggerations 
in reports of battles in the, 351 ; the press 
in, 352, 410 ; the negroes in, during the war, 
352, 353 ; Pres. Johnson's attitude toward, 
358-361, 370 ; the solid, 360, 361 ; the assas- 
sination of Lincoln a loss to, 369; garri- 
soning the, 373; the press of, on Sher- 
man's operations, 375 ; military despotism 
in, 399. See also Confedekate States. 

South Anna, movements on the, II, 148, 153, 
295, 408 

South Carolina, secession of, I, 179, 183; 
Union holdings in, II, 53, 398 ; Sherman's 
march through, 272, 278, 376, 439-441, 444 ; 
Admiral Dahlgren commanding off the 
coast of, 273 ; importance to the enemy, 
273 ; reasons for laying a heavy hand on, 
276, 277 ; Sherman to " eat the vitals out 
of," 278, 444; J. E. Johnston put in com- 
mand of all troops in, 280, 284 ; Stonenian's 
operations in, 281, 282, 442 ; the hotbed of 
secession, 283 ; destruction of railroads in, 
284; reinforcements for Butler fi-om, 402 ; 
Schofleld to aid Sherman in, 439, 440; 
Thomas ordered to raid, 442 

South Chickamauga River, its course, etc., 

I, 502, 520 ; operations on, 520, 521, II, 5, 6 
Southeast Missouri, Grant assigned to com- 
mand District of, I, 211, 213,' 214; chang- 
ing the name of the District of, 233 

South Side railroad, Va., its importance, 

II, 190. 303, 304 ; operations against, and 
movements on, 194, 225, 231, 299, 310, 312, 
313, 316, 317, 322-324, 407, 413, 414, 422, 449, 
450, 453 

Spain, imposes restrictions on Mexican 
trade, I, 43 ; share in the Mexican Impe- 
rial scheme, II, 388 

Spanish Fort, Ala., investment, evacuation, 
and capture of, II, 367, 458 

Sparta, Tenn., Thomas orders cavalry to, I, 
518 

Special Orders No. no, II, 390-392 

Spottsylvania, Va., General Anderson at, I, 
142,11,123,124; E.B.Washburneat,68; roads 
to, 101, 102; march to, 119, 121,405; Lee 
beats Grant to, 121, 122, 405 ; Meade balks 
Sheridan's plans to capture, 122, 123 ; War- 
ren's attack at, 123 ; Lee's mistaken notion 
concerning the captm-e of, 124 ; situation, 



126 ; battle of, 126-132 ; Sheridan's plan of 
occupation, 127; Upton's charge at, 130, 
131 ; Hancock detained from the battle, 
125; uncovering the road to Fredericks- 
burg from, 143 ; a lesson of the battle, 144 ; 
artillery sent to Washington from, 144; 
movement of troops from, 147 ; Bui'nside 
and Wright held at, 147 ; Union losses at. 
183 ; Sedgwick killed at, 384 ; effect of the 
battle on the enemy, 410 

Springfield, 111., Grant accompanies troops 
to, 1, 185 ; Gen. Pope musteriug-offlcer at, 
191; Grant ordered to Quincy fi-om, 198; 
McClemand at, 360 ; McClernand ordered 
back to, 457 

Spring Hill, Tenn., Cheatham camps at, II, 

255 

Stafford, L. A., II, 101 

Stager, Anson, head of the telegraphic de- 
partment of the War Office, II, *35, 36 

Stanard's Ford, Va., in Confederate hands, 
II, 147 

Stanley, D. S., in East Teuiit-ssee. II, 43 ; 
strength, *238; sent to reinf(;ne Thomas, 
238,431; falls back with Schotleld's train, 
255 ; Cheatham pursues, 255 ; wounded at 
Franklin, 255; ordered to BuU Gap, 282 

Stannard, G.J., captures Fort Harrison, II, 
218 ; wounded, -219 

Stanton, Edwin M., authorizes McClernand 
to command expedition against Vicks- 
burg, I, 358 ; orders Grant to Cairo, 489 ; 
meeting at Indianapolis with, *490; pre- 
monition of his death, 491 ; communica- 
tion from C. A. Dana to, 491, 492; anxiety 
concerning Eosecraus, 496, 497; anxiety 
for Burnside, 523; informed of the raising 
of the siege of Knoxville, II, 31 ; controls 
the telegraph lines, 35 ; difference with, 
concerning use of the cipher code, 36, 37 ; 
personal characteristics, 37, 356. 380, 381; 
promises to restore BuetTto dutyT^; 
acquaintance with, 51 ; cautions Grant 
against confiding plans to the President, 
51 ; Grant's reticence with, 52 ; conferences 
with, 66 ; letter to, recommending promo- 
tions, May 13, 1864, 139 ; objects to giving 
command to Sheridan, 205; bad policy 
concerning the Shenandoah Valley, 205; 
revision of Grant's orders by, 214; pro- / 
motes officers at Fort Fisher, 270 ; visits \/ 
Sherman at Savannah, 271 ; interview 
with, 274 ; notified of the arrival of the 
Peace Commissioners, 287 ; informed of 
Lee's surrender, 347 ; countermands the 
order calling the Virginia legislature, 
356; denounces Sherman, 364, 365; Sher- 
man resents his insults, 379; contrasted 
with Lincoln 3Sfl,.221: Grant's report to, 
July 22, 1865, 35^-460 

State, sects versus the, I, 170 / 

State sovereignty, inconsistency in the 
South's doctrine of, I, 180 

Staunton, Va., a source of supplies for Lee, 
II, 142, 411; proposition to send Sigel to, 
142 ; Hunter's operations at and near, 176, 
177, 181, 192, 195, 411, 412; Sheridan defeats 
Early between Charlottesville and, 293, 
445 ; pursuit of Early through, 420 

Steam, changes wrought by the introduc- 
tion of, I, 176, II, 387 

Steam-bath, the Indians', I, 163, 164 

Steamboats, early Ohio River, I, 18; effect 
of the introduction of, II, 387, 388 

Steam-propeller, an early, I, 95 



INDEX 



509 



Steedman, J. B., reinforces Thomas, IT, 

*256 

Steele, F., ordered to march on New Car- 
thage, 1, *392; moves to Bolton, 428; or- 
dered to reinforce Sherman, 473, 482; or- 
dered to Brandon, Miss., 483 ; in Arkansas, 
488, II, 65, 400; commanding department 
under Sherman, 54 ; Banks ordered to 
turn over defense of Ked River to, 58, 61, 
65; commanding the Trans-Mississippi 
Department, 81 ; confronting Kirliy Smitli, 
210; movement to cooperate with Banks, 
426; junction with Thayer at Elkius's 
Ferry, 426 ; occupies Camden, 427 ; loss at 
Mark's Mill, 427 ; falls back to the Arkan- 
sas, 427 ; engagement on the Saline River, 
427 ; to cut oflf Price's reti'eat, 427 ; moves 
from Pensacola against Mobile, 458; in- 
vests Fort Blakely, 458 
Steele's Bayou, Miss., water communica^ 
tions of, I, 377 ; Shei-man's expedition up, 
378; attempt to tind a passage through, 
377-379 
Stephens, Alexander H., Vice-President of 
the Confederate States, II, 287 ; Confeder- 
ate Peace Commissioner, 287, *288, 289; 
physical peeiiliarities, 288-290; Lincobi's 
characterization of, 290; capture of, 459 
Stevens, Aaron F., succeeds Burnham in 
command, II, 218; wounded in assault on 
Fort Harrison, 218 
Stevens, Isaac 1., at Cerro Gordo, I, *100 
Stevenson, Carter L., commanding Confed- 
erate forces on Lookout Creek, II, "8 
Stevenson, J. D., promoted brigadier-gen- 
eral, I, 350 ; at capture of Jackson, *423 
Stevenson, T. G., his command, II, 100; 

killed at Spottsylvania, 130 
Stevenson, Ala., meeting with Rosecraus 
at, I, 498; Sherman ordered to, 512, II, 39; 
railroad destruction at, I, 513 ; garrisoned 
by Thomas, II, 238, 2,56 
Stewart, A. P., with Hood at Franklm, II, 

*254 
Stewart, George H., Ms command, II, 101 ; 

captured, 136 
Stone, Charles P. ("Stone Pacha"), trip to 

Popocatepetl, 1, 142-145 
Stone, Roy, II, 98 

Stoneman. George, raid toward Macon, II, 
*90-92, 424 ; suiTender of, 91, 92, 424; raids 
in and from Tennessee, 278, 281, 434, 446; 
to support Sherman, 281; raids toward 
Lynchburg. 281, 366, 367, 442, 444, 446 ; raul 
in South Caioliua, 281, 282, 442; tardy 
movements of, 366 ; movements in North 
Carolina, 366, 442, 458 ; movement against 
the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, 366, 
367 ; moves against Breckinridge, 434 ; de- 
feats Vaughn, 434; destroys WytheviUe, 
434 ; destroys Saltville, 434 ; to release pris- 
oners at Salisbury, 442; captures Salis- 
bury, 450; at Slatersville, 458 
Stone Mountain, Ga., Slocum moves to, II, 

240 ...,.,. 

Stone River, Tenn., possibilities of avoiding 

the battle of, I. 318 
Stony Creek, Va., Kautz burns railroad 

bridge at, II, 407; Wilson's engagement 

at, 415 ; Sheridan's movements near, 447 
Strasburg, Va., movements, engagements, 

etc., at, II, 72, 204, 420 
Strawberry Plains, ride to Lexington, Ky., 

from, II, 34 ^ , 

Stuart, David, position at Pittsburg Land- 



ing, I, 279; expedition up Steele's Bayou, 

■378 
Stuart, J. E. B., defeated by Sheridan at 

Yi'llow ravcrii, and mortally womidcd, 

II, "78; in battle of the WilderncKs, 111 
Sturgis, S. D., defeated by Forrest, II, "197, 

424 
Suffolk, Va., Kautz's cavalry cxpoditifm 

from, against the Weldon railroad, II, 73, 

4()(;, 407 ' 

Sullivan, J. C, assignment to duty under 
Special Orders No. 110, I, *392 

Sulphur Branch Trestle, Forrest captures 
garrison at, II, 428 

Sumner, Colonel, operations against Hicks- 
ford and the Weldon road, II, 447 

Superstitions, firaiit's, I, 2'.», 382, 383 

Sutherland's Station, Va., battle of, II, 312, 
313,453; ti-oops halted :it, 321 

Sutlers, Sherman regulates the ti'ade of, II, 
93, 94 

"Suviah," the, mutiny on board of, I, 40 

Sweat-bath, the TndiaiiK', I, 163, 164 

Sweitzer, Jacob B., II. '.'8 

Swinton, William, unpleasant incident con- 
cerning, II, 68-70; sentenced to be shot, 
70; expelled from the lines, 70 

Ta River, the, II, 126 

Tactics, Grant's standing in, at West Point, 
I, 20, 203 ; brushing up, 21)3 

Tacubaya, Mex., the U. S. army at, I, 114, 
115, 119, 140 

Tallahatchie River, movements, etc., on the, 
I, 352, 355, 356, 358, 362. 375 

Tanning, Grant's detestation of the trade, 
1,9 

Taylor, Richard, attack on Milliken's Bend 
by, I, 455 ; expected to aid Pemberton in 
escape across the Mississippi, 4fi4 ; surren- 
der of, II, 368, 459 ; defeated at Cane River, 
42(> ; defends Mobile, 446 

Taylor, Gen. Zachary, in command of the 
Army of Occupation in Texas, I, 34, *44; 
personnel, size, eiiuipment, etc., of his 
army, 44, 59, 64, 67-69, 80, 130 ; provides duty 
for officers, 47 ; methods of moving troops 
piu'sued by, 59, 79; his tactics compared 
with General Scott's, 129 ; yn-obable views 
of the war, 60, 127 ; personal characteris- 
tics, 60,72-75, 10.5-107; expedition to Point 
Isabel, 64-67 ; speculations regartling his 
feelings at Palo Alto, 68 ; volunteers for, 
72; snters Mexico, 72; reviews his army 
at Corpus Chi'isti, 73 : actual rank in Mex- 
ican war, 73, 74; visit of Comiu. Connor 
to, 74, 75; encamped at Walnut Springs, 
79; establishes battery at Monterey, 82; 
a Presidential candidate, *9l; regular 
troops withdrawn from, 92-94; battle of 
Bueua Vista, I, 92, 93, 102 ; failure to meet 
Gen. Scott at Camargo, 93 ; elected Presi- 
dent, 93, 130 ; contrasted with Scott, 105- 
107; deserters from his army at Churu- 
busco, 112 
Taylor, Colonel, intercepted letter from, II, 

325 
Taylor's Ford, Va., II, 155, 156 
Telegraph, diiHculties with, in the Fort 
Douclson campaign, I, 268; effect of the 
introduction of the, II, 387, 388 
Telegraph corps, the, work in the field, II, 

117, 118 
Telegraph operator, a rebel, I, 268 
Telegraph road, II, 147, 150 



510 



INDEX 



Tennessee, secession of, T, 183 ; the fate of, 
deiiendiug ou Fort Douelson, 26G ; Cou- 
ferterate disasters in, 297 ; the enemy 
di'iven from West, 317; possibilities of 
avoidiuj^ lighting for, 318; boundaries of 
Grant's district in, 326; dangers in West, 
336; Confederate attempts to reinforce 
Bragg in, 33fi, 337 ; anxiety of the authori- 
ties about, 337, 515, II, 32; Eosecrans ac- 
quires a separate command in, I, 349; 
army of defense of, 359 ; Eragg confront- 
ing Eosecrans in, 448; Burnside draws 
supplies from East, 511, II, 29 ; movement 
of troops in West, I, 514 ; measures to re- 
lieve East, 524; the fate of East, II, 30; 
Confederate possession of, 32, 43, 399; 
loyal people in, 35; proposal to di-ive 
Longstreet out of, 37, 43 ; Schotield com- 
manding in East, 43 ; Thomas's operations 
in, 43, 238, 429, 443, 446; Union holdings in, 
53, 398 ; Forrest's raids in, 57, 63, 229, 236, 
424; McPherson guarding, 82; proposed 
plan of campaign from, for spring of 
1865, 226; Wheeler's operations in, 229, 
424; Stoneman's raids in and from, 278, 
281, 366, 446, 458 ; Morgan's raids in, 354 ; 
protecting East, 398; fears of Hood's in- 
vasion of, 429; pursuit of Hood stoiiped 
by rains in, 433, 434 ; Breckiuridge's oper- 
ations in East, 434 

Tennessee and Virginia railroad, raids on 
the, II, 403, 411 

Tennessee River, the, occupying positions 
on, I, 215; Confederate posts on, 232; its 
mouth included in the District of Cairo, 
233 ; C. F. Smith ordered up, 234 ; opera- 
tions on, planned or executed, 231-236, 
240, 268, 272 et seq., 304, 340, 501, 517-521, II, 
83 ; fortifications on, I, 265 ; the strategic 
center of, 272 ; the Natioual left on, 281 ; 
the gunboats ou, at Pittsbm-g Lauding, 
285, 303 ; A. S. Johnston's plan of crossing, 
298; in Union control from its mouth to 
East port, 317 ; Eosecrans puts Bragg south 
of, 493 ; position of National troops on, 494 ; 
situation of Cliattanooga on, 502 ; expedi- 
tion to Bro\vn's Ferry, 504,505; secui'ing 
the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's 
Ferry, 505; opened from Bridgeport to 
Lookout Valley, 505; navigation of, 505, 
506; junction of Chattanooga Creek with, 
509; junction of the North and Pouth 
Chickamauga with, 520; getting orders to 
Sherman via, 512 ; the' Memphis and 
Chai'leston railroad at, 512; Sliermau 
crosses, 512, 524, II, 5 ; high %ater in, I, 
522, 524, II, 4, 20; completion of bridge 
over, 6; Howard and Sherman meet in 
the middle of, 7 ; the Federal line ou, 
9 ; movements ou, for relief of Burnside, 
19, 24; Sheriiian's camp and movements 
on, 27, 30, 32, 38; a trip up, 34; Union 
holdings on, 53, 398; guuboiits on, 239; 
Hood's movements on, 239, 240, 254, 274, 
430, 432, 433 ; fears of Thomas's having to 
abandon the line of, 257 ; \V'heeler driven 
south of, 424; Forrest's movements on, 
428, 432; the line of, to be firmly lield, 431, 
432; Thomas stops pursuit of Hood at, 
434 

Tensas, Ala., Steele cuts raUi-oad to Mont- 
gomery from, II, 458 

Tensas Bayou, repidse of Taylor across 
the, I, 456; outlet of Lake Providence, 
373 ; a waterway for the enemy, 374 



Tenth Army-Corps, threatening movement 
against Eichmond, II, 209, 218 ; reinforces 
Butler, 406 ; at capture of Fort Harrison, 
421 

Terrett, John C, mortally wounded at Mon- 
terey, I, 87 

Terry,' A. H., captures blockade-runners at 
Fort Fisher, II, 262 ; selected to command 
second Fort Fisher expedition, *267, 437; 
cooperation of Porter and, 268. 269, 437 ; 
attacks and captures the fort, 268-270; 
reinforces Ames, 270; promoted major- 
general of volunteers, and brigadier- 
general U. S. A., 270; moves on Wilming- 
ton, 275 ; reinforced fi-om Thomas's com- 
mand, 281 ; sends supplies to Sherman 
at Fayetteville, 284 ; i-oinforces Sherman, 
285 ; services at Fort Fisher, 384 ; military 
and personal characteristics, 384; GJrant's 
instructions to, for second expedition, 
437,438; Grant confers with, 440 j bridges 
the Neuse River, 442 

Terry, William R., II, 101 

Texas, Jolm WaUcer's opinion of, I, 16 ; an- 
nexation of, 27, 30, 32-34, 36, 134 ; bound- 
aries of, 32-34, 134 ; early lustor\ of, 32-34 ; 
slavery in, 33 ; the Army of Occupation 
in, 34 ; the country between Matamoras 
and Corpus Christi, 46 ; wild horses in, 46, 
47, 62 ; hostilities between Mexico and, 49 ; 
negotiations tor cession of, 115 ; no claim 
to the right of secession, 174 ; secession of, 
183 ; Pemberton's conscripts from, 349 ; 
the President's desire to gain a foothold 
in, 484 ; Banlis ordered to abandon, II, 
58, 61, 400; in the hands of the enemy, 398 ; 
Sheridan goes to, 459 

Texcoco, Lake, I, 108, 128 

Thayer, John M., at Fort Donelson, T, *244, 
247, 251 ; junction of Steele and, at Elkins's 
Ferry, II, 426 

Third U. S. Dragoons, in Mexican war, I, 
105 

Third U. S. Infantry, in garrison at St. 
Louis, I, 25; ordered to Fort Jessup, 27, 
31 ; at Corpus Christi, 44 ; losses at Mon- 
terey, 86 

Thirteenth Army-corps, at the Yazoo River, 

I, 366 ; right wing of the Army of the Ten- 
nessee, 390; orders for attack ou Grand 
Gulf, 395, 396 ; at Bruinsburg, 401, 402 ; Mc- 
Clernand's congratiUatory order to, 457 ; 
MeClernand relieved of command of, 457 ; 
sent to Banks, 486 ; invests Spanish Fort, 

II, 458 

Thomas, E. L., II, 102 

Thomas, George H., wins battle of Mill 
Springs, I, 234, 266 ; absent fi'om Slilloh, 
302 ; commands right wing of the Army of 
the Tennessee, 307; positiou in front of 
Corinth, 314; ordered to reinforce Buell, 
344 ; Eosecrans superseded by, 491 ; his 
stand at Cbickamauga, 494; retreats to 
Chattanooga, 494; assigned to command 
of the Army of the Cumberland, 497 ; or- 
dered to hold Chattanooga at all hazards, 
497 ; advised to put wagon-road to Bridge- 
port in repair, 498 ; Grant's headquarters 
with, at Chattanooga, 499 ; joins in inspec- 
tion of situation at Chattanooga, 601 ; or- 
ders concentration of reinforcements at 
Bridsreport, 504; his military character, 
516, II, 43, 44, 256, 257, 274, 279, 281, 366, 371, 
433; ordered to attack, Nov. 7, 1863, 1, 516; 
plan for attack ou Missionary Ridge, 517, 



INDEX 



511 



618 ; orders cavalry to Sparta, 518 ; to co- 
operate with Sliermaii, r,i',); i)laii ol' oper- 
ations at Chattauoosa, 5'2(), 521; rccoum ti- 
ters the line of Slieniiuu's march, 522 ; or- 
dered to move on Nov. 23, 1863, 523, 524 ; in 
battle of Chattanooga, 11, 3, 5, 7, ',), i2, 14, 
15, 17 ; ordered to the relief of Burusidc, 
19, 24; ordered to start (irauser toward 
Knoxville, 25; ordered to hold back Gran- 
ger, 25 ; delays starting (irangt^, 2(i ; lt^lt 
in command at Chattanooga, 32, 82; or- 
dered to threaten J. E. Johnston, 42; co- 
operation with Sherman, 42, 422 ; ordered 
to send troops into East Tennessee, 43; 
ordered to capture Dalton, 43 ; coinphiins 
of his teams, 44 ; commanding department 
under Sherman, 54, 81, 422; commanding 
Department of the Cumberland, 81, 422; 
strength, 82 ; movement to Ringgold, 83 ; 
proposed plan of campaign for, iii spring 
of 1865, 226; ordered back to Chattanooga 
and Nashville, 233, 431 ; levies from the 
Northwest sent to, 238, 429; to hold Ten- 
nessee and Kentucky, 238. 429, 431 ; Sher- 
man reinforces, 238, 431, 433; strength and 
garrisons, 238, 239 ; Hood left to his care, 
240; strength compared with Hood, 250; 
retreats to Nashville, 250, 432 ; orders to 
Schofield before Franklin, 254 ; fails to re- 
inforce Schofleld at Franklin, 255, 432, 433 ; 
reinforcements for, 250; prepares to re- 
ceive Hood, 256; abandons Decatur, 256; 
strength of his position at Nashville, 256 ; 
fears of the enemy's eluding, 256-258; let- 
ters from Grant to, 257, 258 ; advis(>d to 
aiTU citizen employees, 257; lost oppor- 
tunity after Hood's repulse at Franklin, 
257; urged to attack Hood, 257-259; an- 
nounces his preparations to move, 258, 
259; threatened with removal, 259, 433; 
defeats Hood at Nashville, 259, 433, 434; 
proposed movement of, from the north, 
274; Shei-man asks to have him campaign 
in Alabama, 274 ; reinforcement of Canby 
from, 274, 279, 439 ; congratulated by Sher- 
man and Grant, 276; his action at Nash- 
ville disapproved by Sherman and Grant. 
276 ; ordered to send a cavalry force into 
Mississippi, 278; orders to, for soutliern 
movement, countermanded, 281 ; ordered 
to send Stoneman toward Lynchburg, 281, 
442; reinforcements sent to Terry from, 
281 ; contemplated movement of, toward 
Lynchburg, 282; ordered to send the 
Fourth Corps to Bull Gap, 282 ; operatiojis 
against Buzzard's Roost, 423 ; xmsuccess- 
ful assault on Kenesaw Mountain, 423; 
endeavors to destroy Forrest, 428 ; fears 
that he cannot prevent Hood's going 
north, 430; routs Hood's army, 430; de- 
lays at Nashville, 433; orders concen- 
tration of troops against Breckinridge, 
434; to coUect troops at Eastport, 439; 
to send Schofield east, 439; to raid South 
Carolina. 442 ; letters to, 442, 443, 446; in- 
formed of Canby 's expedition, 442, 443; 
defeats Hood in Tennessee, 443; advised 
to send a cavalry expedition south, 443; 
to repair railroads in Tennessee, 446 ; base 
of supplies at Knoxville, 446 ; to occupy 
East Tennessee, 446; proposal that he 
campaign in North Carolina, 446 
Thomas, Henry G., II, 100 
Thomas, Lorenzo, adjutant-general, U. ». 
A., letter to, 1, 191, * 192 



Thompson, Jacob, voyage of espionage, T, 

385 

Thompson, M.Jeff., (irant ordei'cd against, 
I, '211; ope la lions ill iMissouri, 211, 213, 214 

Thompson's Hill. See I'our (iinsoN. 

Thompson's plantation, Miss., action at, I, 
402 

Thornton, Seth B., captured by Mexicans, 
I, *(;4 

Tidball, John C, his command, II, 97 ; in ac- 
tion at Petersburg, .Mareli 24, 1805, -298 

Tilghman, Lloyd, evacuates I'aducah, I, 
*216 ; defcuse of Fort Henry, 239 ; capture 
of, 239 

Tobacco, ac(iuiring the habit, I, 42 ; rcNtric- 
tions on use of, at West Point, 42 ; Mexi- 
can trade in, 42-44 

Tod, George, I, 3, i 

Tod, Gov., I, 3 

Tod, Mrs., I, 3 

Todd's Tavern, Va., Gregg ordered to, IF, 
109; Hancock's movements towai'd and 
at, 111, 123-125, 127; Sheridan's actions 
at, 111, 120, 122 ; Custer drives the enemy 
from Catharpin Furnace to, 115; orders 
for night march to, 119, 120; a night ride 
to, 120, 121 ; Early at, 124, 125; MoU at, 128 

Toluca, Me.x., occupation of, 1, 133 

Tompkins, C. H., II, 99 

Tompkins, J. A., II, 100 

Torbert, A. T.. commanding rear-giiard, 
nortli of the Rapidan, II, *98; his com- 
mand, 99; movement toward Hanover, 
156; crosses the Pamunkey, 408; sent to 
Sheridan at Harper's Ferry, 419 

Torpedoes, Confederate use of, on roads, II, 
247,248 

Totopotomoy River, the. movements and 
engagements on, II, 158, 161, 106, 183 

Toucey, Isaac, Secretary of the Navy, scat- 
ters the navy, I, *181 

Townsend, E. D., discovers a missing letter, 
I, n92 

Tower, Z. B., at Cerro Gordo, 1, 100; excur- 
sion in Mexico, 142 ct seq.; .supervises for- 
tifications of Nashville, If, 256 

Towson, Nathan, on court of inquiry in 
Gen. Scott's case, 1, 135 

Traders, the nuisance of, within the lines, 
I, 331 

Trans-Mississippi Department, surrender 
of the, II, 368 

Treason, open, in the South, 1, 171 ; question 
of punishment for, II, 217 ; in the Chicago 
Convention, 217 ; Pres. Johnson's denun- 
ciations of, 359 

Trenton. Ga., plan for Sherman's march 
from \Vhitesides to, I, 517 

Trevillian Station, Va., Sheridan's opera- 
tions at, II, 193, 194, 414, 415 • . 

Trist, Nicholas P., commissioner to negoti- 
ate with Mexico, I, *1U; negotiations 
with Mexico, 114, 115, 134; recalled to 
Washington, 134 

Tulifinny River, Foster's position on the, 
II, 432 

Tullahoma, Miss., reinforcements for J. E. 
Johnston fi'om, I, 419; Forrest cuts the 
railroad at, II, 428 

Tupelo, Miss., troops ordered to Chatta- 
nooga from, I, 332 ; Hatch destroys the 
railroad at, 408 
Turkey-hunt, a, I. 51, 52 " 

Tuscaloosa, Ala., proposed raids toward, II, 
278, 443, 444 ; captured by Wilson, 3C8, 459 



512 



INDEX 



Tuscumbia, Ala., Halleck orders troops to, 

I, -187 

" Tuscumbia," the, ruuulng the hatteries 
iit Vicksbur^, I, 386 

Tuscumbia River, I, o09 

Tuttle, J. M., lit battle of Jackson, I, *i22, 
42;i 

Twelfth Army-corps, ordered to reiuforce 
Rosecrans, I, 503; in operations wet-;t of 
Cliattauoo.ua, II, 8 

Twentieth Army-corps, in left "wing of Sher- 
man's army, II, 234 ; commanded by A. S. 
Williams, 234; Sherman holds Atlanta 
with the, 430 

Twenty-first Illinois Infantry, mustered in 
at Mattoon, I, 190 ; Grant appointed col- 
onel, 194; personnel of the res?imeut, 194, 
195; addressed by McClcrnand and Lo- 
gan, 197: ordered to Quincy, 111., 198; or- 
dered to Irontou, Mo., 198, 207 ; relieved by 
the 19th Illinois at Palmyra, 199; drilling 
in battalion, 203, 204 ; appointment of 
aide-de-camp from, 205 

Twenty-fifth Army-corps, movement to- 
ward Hatcher's Kim, II, 450 

Twenty-fourth Army-corps, assaults Fort 
Gregg, II, 311, 450 

Twenty-third Army-corps, sent to Pulaski 
to watch Hood, II, 254; sent to Chatta- 
nooga, 431 ; fichotield commanding, 441 ; 
ordered to reinforce Sherman, 441 

Twiggs, David E., his command, I, * 59 ; dif- 
ficulty with Worth concerning litevet 
rank, 73, 74 ; " Memorial to Congress," 
74; commands division at Monterey, 80; 
operations at Monterey, 82, 85-87; ad- 
vances toward Jalapa, 99 ; encounters the 
enemy at Cerro Gordo, 99; commands di- 
vision in vScott's army, 99, 105 ; advances 
from Puebla, 105 

Tyler, Pres. John, seeks annexation of 
Texas, I, 27 ; approves annexation-bill, 36 

Tyler, Robert O., brings up reinforcements, 

II, *142; steady behavior of his raw 
troops, 143 

Tyler, Mrs., anecdote of, II, 151, 152 
"Tyler," the, action on the Tennessee 

Pkiver, I, 240; at Fort Donelson, 247; at 

Pittsburg Landing, 285 
" Tyler's grip," I, 23, 36 

Uniform, Grant's first, I, 23, 24 ; Grant's dis- 
like of, 24 ; Gen. Taylor's dislike of, 73, 74, 
105 ; Gen. Scott's fondness for, 100 ; provid- 
ing, for Illinois' volunteers, 185 ; Grant's 
lack of , at Cairo, 213; Grant's simplicity 
of, at Appomattox, II, 341, 342 

Union, the, the President's constant hope 
for, I, 337 ; despair of saving. 837, 369 ; Lin- 
coln's love for, II, 289 

Union, W.Va., Junction of Crook andAver- 
ell at, II, 411 

Union army, mode of estimating strength 
of, II, 183, 184 

Union City, Tenn., captured by Forrest, II, 
63, 425 

United States, the, the foundation of, 1, 174, 
176 ; the right to suppress rebellion in, II, 
356, 357 ; position of the President, 359 ; the 
soldiers of Europe compared v\'ith tbose 
of, 37G, 377 ; canse of the civil war, 386, 387 ; 
condition of the separate States before 
the era of rapid transit. 387; the experi- 
ment of republican institutions in, 388 ; 
relation of the Mexican imperial scheme 



to, 389 ; feeling in, toward England, 391 ; 
forgetting the lessons of the svai-, 391; the 
true feeling between England and, 391, 
392 ; the negTO ipiestion, 392, 393 ; develop- 
ment of, 393-395 ; a new era in, 395 

U. S. Army, scheme for disbanding the, I, 
231 

U. S. Commissioner of Education, the, I, 334 

U. S. Congress, dilatoriusss in providing for 
the Mexican War, 1, 105 ; convened in ex- 
tra session, 183 ; passes vote of thanks to 
Grant for Chattanooga, II, 33 ; votes a gold 
medal to Grant for Vicksburg and Chat- 
tanooga, 33 ; restores the gi-ade of lieuten- 
ant-general, 44 ; thanks Sherman and his 
army, 276 : loyalty of, 356 ; Pres. Johnson's 
conflict with. 361 

U. S. Constitution, the, effect of the amend- 
ments. I, 174 ; the nation bound to uphfild 
it, 175, 176 ; the world's chan'^es since the 
framing of, 176 ; Confederatesdcbar them- 
selves of rights under, 183 ; Mr. Stanton's 
elastic views of, II, 356; question of its 
autlioiity in time of war, 336, 357 

U. S. Military Academy. See West POINT. 

U. S. Navy, atSluloh, I, 303 ; battle at Mem- 
phis. 317; at Arkansas Post, 366; with- 
dr;iwH from the Yazoo, 366 ; cooperation at 
Vicksburg, 384-388, 392-394, 446. 474, 479- 
481 ; cooperation at Grand Gulf. 395-397 ; 
proposed expedition against Mobile, 485, 
11,49; convoying supplies on the Missis- 
sippi, I, 512 ; Banks ordered to turn over 
defense of Red River to Steele and the, II, 
58, 61, 400 ; plan of operations on the James 
River, 63 ; cooperation asked, in changing 
base from Fredericksburg to Port Royal, 
142 ; guards change of base from Port 
Royal to White House, 154; operations 
against Fort Fisher, 232. 265-270. 436, 437 ; 
Sherman opens communication with, at 
Savannah, 248; need of maintaining the, 
391 ; blockades the coast, 398 ; operations 
on Broad River, 432 ; unsuccessful efforts 
to close Wilminston. 435; cooperates in 
capture of Wilmington, 441 

U. S. Senate, confirms Grant's appointment 
as brigadier-general I, 203 ; rejects W. F. 
Smith's nomiiiation for promotion, II, 31 ; 
conllrms Grant's nomination as lieuten- 
ant-general. 44 

Uniten.Va., Sumner's movements at. II. 447 

Upton, Emory, his command, II, 99; in bat- 
tle of SpotLs^ ivania, *130, 131, 140 ; wound- 
ed. 131; promoted on the field, 131. 139; 
recommended for brigadier-generalship, 
U. S. Vols., 139 

Utica, Miss., McPherson moves to, I, 413 

Valley of Virginia, the, Sigel commanding 
in, II, 59; Hunter ordered to move up, 
152 

Van Buren, Martin, visits West Point, I, 22 

Vance. Z. B., governor of North Carolina, 
calls for defenders of Fort Fisher, II, 264 

Van Dorn, Earl, operations.at and near Cor- 
inth. I, *310, 336, 338, 345, 346, 348 ; confront- 
iug the Army of the Tennessee, 327 ; Price's 
reinforcements for, 327 ; Grant prepares 
for, 341 ; endeavors to strike the Mi ssissippi 
above Memphis, 345 ; skirmish with Hurl- 
but, 346; dashing attack by, 346; defeat 
of, at Hatchie Bridge, 347 ; captures Holly 
Springs, 360, 361 : sending cavalry against, 
361, 362 



INDEX 



513 



Vaqueria, tbo, at ropocatepetl, 1, 142, Hn 
Varioloid, aclvautascs of an attack of, 1, 18G 
Vaughn, J. C, defeated at Marion, H, 4^4 
Vaughn Road, Va., niovenionts ou the, II, 

450 
Vera Cruz, Mex., sieRe and capture of, I, 91, 
94-97; size of Scott's army at, 98; roada 
to the City of Mexico from, 98 ; the vomito 
in, 98, 152 ; occupation of, 134 
Verona, Miss., surprise of Fori-cst by Gricr- 

son at, II, 434 
Vicksburg, Miss., possibility of capture of, 
after the fall of Fort JJouelHou, I, 2(il; 
communications of, 317, 351, 402, 457 ; pos- 
sibilities of a bloodless advance to, 318 ; 
plans of campaign against, their execu- 
tion, ordej-s in relation thereto, etc., 349, 
351, 357-359, 308, 370, 379, 384, 390, 410, 413, 
414, 417, 440; its importance, 351, 419, 448; 
rumored movement by McClernand 
against, 355 ; naval operations at, 357, 384- 
388, 392-394, 446, 474, 479-481; Peiubertou 
commanding at, 359, 3CA ; vagaries of the 
Mississippi at, 371 ; hardships of the win- 
ter before, 381, 382 ; coufusion in, concern- 
ing threatened attack on Haines's Bluff, 
398; retreat of the enemy fi-om Grand 
Gulf to, 409 ; estimate of Pemberton's 
movable force at, 414 ; plan to bring Banks 
against, 440 ; advance from Bridgeport ou, 
441 ; investment of, 442, 443, 446 ; skimiish- 
ing around, 443 ; the cry for bread at. 443 ; 
assaults ou the M^orks, 443-445 ; enthusiasm 
of the troops, 444 ; McClernand's reported 
successes in assault on, 444, 445 ; regiHar 
siege of, 446, 448; successes of the early 
part of the campaign against, 446, 447; 
Confederate strength at, 447 ; the Union 
and Confederate lines at, 4-48, 451, 452, 456, 
460,462,464; natural defenses of . 449 ; lack 
of siege-artillery and use of navy guns at, 
450 ; need of miUtary engineers at, 450 ; 
sharpshooters at, 451 ; use of explosive 
musket-balls at, 451 ; a superfluity of poul- 
try at, 452; wooden coehorns at, 452; 
Northern visitors at, 452, 453 ; strength of 
the besieging army, 456; Johnston de-' 
spairs of holding, 458 ; twofold aspect of 
the besieging force, 460; pleasantries ))e- 
tween the opposing troops, 460, 471 ; min- 
ing at, 460-462 ; use of hand-gi-enades at, 
460, 462 ; a colored man's aerial trip, 461 ; 
plan for the garrison's escape across the 
river, 463 ; preparations for assault on 
July 6, 464; negotiations for surrender, 
capitulation, and evacuation, 404-472, 476, 
477, 479 ; the historic oak-tree at, 467 ; ex- 
pected assault on the 4th of July, 471 ; the 
last Confederate newspaper published in, 
471; fraternization of opposing troops, 
472, 477 ; last effort of the Confederacy to 
raise the siege of, 473; Grant's entrance 
into, 473 ; bomb-proofs in the hills, 474 ; ef- 
fect of the surrender throughout the coim- 
try, 475, 478 ; paroling prisoners of war at, 
476, 477 ; captures at, 479 ; personnel of the 
Union army after caiiture of, 479, 480; 
suggestion and development of the cam- 
paign, 481 ; cleaning up around, 484; Sher- 
man at, 484, II, 39-41 ; minor expeditions 
around, I, 486, II, 40; Grant's removal 
from New Orleans to, I, 487 ; effect of the 
siege of, on Bragg's army, 492; troops 
sent to reinforce Rosecrans from, 494 ; lo- 
comotives sent to Gen. Dodge from, 514 ; 

Vol. II.— 33 



McPherson conimimdingin,lT,39; assault 
on, May 22, 1803, <onip:ire(l with last as- 
sault at Cold Harbor, 172, 173; troojts sent 
to Ued llivcr Ironi, 420; Canby's expedi- 
tion from, 431; Griersou arrivos at, 434; 
cavalry sent to Cauby via, 443; cavalry 
raid from, 444 

Vicksburg and Meridian railroad, broken 
by (.iriersoii, I, lOs 

Villepigue, J. B.,. joins Van Doru in attack 
on Corinlli, I, 345 

Virginia, se(!essi(ni of, 1, 1H3 ; tlie I'rcsideufs 
warmap of, 11,51; lTnioiiholdingsin,.53, 54, 
39K;mililarysnrveyiiigin,140; J.ee'sadvan- 
tageiu(^;imi)aigningin,l84;exhaustedeon- 
dition, 272, 323, 376; the railroad gauge in, 
281 ; (piic^ksands in, 303; sword presented to 
Lee by the State, ;M2; diHiculty about the 
meeting of the legislature after the fall 
of Kichniond, 355, 3.56, 303; question of the 
legislature recalling the troo]iH of, from 
the Conl'ederate armies, 3r)0; withdrawal 
of troops from, 373 ; Halleck military gov- 
ernor of, 374; Confederate holdings in, 
398, 399; Lee reinforced from Western, 408; 
Breckinridge driven into, 434 ; Stonemau's 
raids in, 434, 446 

Virginia and Tennessee railroad, the, exjie- 
ditious against, II, 58, 01, 62, 72, 140, 306, 
307 

Virginia Central railroad, the, Sheridan's 
operations on, II, 78, 176, 177, 192-194, 221, 
409, 414 ; Wright's operations on, 150, 154 ; 
Wilson damages, 165; plans to destroy, 
170-177, 199 ; Lee's position on, 161 ; a chan- 
nel of supply for the Army of Northern 
Virginia, 177; imi>ortauce of obtaining 
possession of, 200 

Volunteering, effectiveness of, after the fall 
of Fort Donelson, I, 201 ; falling off in, 309, 

481 

Volunteers, value of, in wat, I, 44 ; in the 
Mexican war, 130; call for 75,000, 183; rais- 
ing troops at Jefferson City, 208, 209; 
scheme for treating the regular army as, 
231; superahiuidance of, in Illinois, 185; 
drilling the Galena company, 185; early 
enlistments in Illinois, 195 ; efficiency of, 
for special work, 393 

Vomito, the, in Vera Cruz, I, 98, 152 

Vose, Col., death of, I, *S8 



Wadsworth, J., his command, II, 98 ; in bat- 
tle of the Wilderness, 108-110 ; Idlled, 
* 112 ; succeeded in command by Cutler, 
123 

Wadsworth, W. H., I, 8 

Wainwright, C. S., II, 98 

Waldron's Ridge, I, 498; II, 34 

Walke, Henry, operations at Fort Donel- 
son, I, *246 

Walker, H. H., IL 102 

Walker, J. A., II, 101 

Walker, John, opinion of Texas, I, 16 

Walker. R. L., II. 104 

W^alker's Church, Va., tyrant at, II, 339 

Wallace, Lew.,commandingat Forts Henry 
and Heiman, I, *245; in siege of Fort 
Donelson, 247, 251, 256 ; promoted major- 
general of vohinteers, 260 ; commanding 
division of Army of the Tennessee, 274; 
position at Crump's Landing, 275 ; posi- 
tion on morning of April 0, 1862, 290; 
Grant's meeting with, at Cnmip's Land- 



514 



INDEX 



ing, 277; ordorod to Pittsburg Landing, 
277 ; delay on tlie tiist day of 81iiloli, 278 ; 
arrival at the battle-fleld, 285, 286 ; posi- 
tion on the morning of tlie 7th, 288 ; modi- 
fication of stri(!tiires concerning his dila^ 
toriuess at Shiloh. 289 ; letter to \V. H. L. 
Wallace from, bearing on the former's 
dilatorincss, 289; strength at Shiloh, 302 ; 
commanding at Baltimore, II, 196; pro- 
tects tlie capital by his defeat at the Mo- 
uocacy. 196, 197, 416 
Wallace, W. H. L., ordered to New Madrid, 
I, *219 ; commanding Smith's division, 274, 
279 ; reports from the front at Pittsburg 
Landing, 27G ; mortally woimded, 279; 
characteristics and military service, 279 ; 
condition of his di\asion on the night of 
April G, 1862, 284 ; letter from Lew. Wallace 
to, bearing on the latter's dilatoriness, 

28!) 

Wallace, Mrs. W. H. L., forwards letter 
to (ioneral Grant, bearing on the dila- 
toriness of Lew. Wallace, I, 289 

\A^allen, H. D., woimded at Palo Alto, I, *69 

Walling, W. H., rejiorte probability of cap- 
turing Fort Fisher, II, 437 

Walnut Hills, Miss., Sherman's repulse at, 
I, 441 ; conversation with Sherman on, 
441, 442, 453 

AA^alnut Springs, Mex., troops at, I, 79, 80, 
85 

W^ar, a pitiful side to, I, 88, 436 ; a funda- 
mental principle in, 370; not an unmixed 
evil, II, 394 

Ward, J. H. H., his command, II, 97 ; in bat- 
tle of the Wilderness, * 113 

War Department, orders reinforcements for 
Grant at Fort Donelsou, 1, 243 ; telegraph- 
ic communication with the, 490; regula- 
tions concerning telegi-aph lines, II, 35, 
36; places Grant in command of all the 
armies, 47 ; ignorance of Burnside's desti- 
nation, 57 ; electioneering actions of the, 
234, 235 

War of the rebellion, its cost and benefit, 
I, 508 

Warren, G. K., commanding Fifth Army- 
corps, II, *97, 98; crosses Gernianna Ford, 
97, 98; reaches Wilderness Tavern, 103; 
in battle of the Wilderness, 106-109, 114, 
115 ; withdrawal of, 120; orders for May 7, 
1864, 120 ; assaults Anderson's position at 
Spottsylvania, 123 ; Sedgwick ordered to 
his support, 123 ; possibilities of his rein- 
forcing Wilson at Spottsylvania, 123; per- 
sonal characteristics and military quali- 
ties, 124, 125, 137, 163-165, 305-307; failure 
of attack on Anderson, 124 ; in battle of 
Spottsylvania, 125-127, 129-131, 134, 135, 137, 
405; threatened with relief from com- 
mand, 137 ; temporary breaking up of his 
corps, 138 ; movemeiit to Buraside's left, 
140; allows Ewell to escape, 143; Lee's 
policy to attack Hancock and, 147; 
marches to Guiney's Station, 147; at- 
tempts to get between Lee and Ri(!hmond, 
14T ; pushed to Harris's Store, 148 ; ordered 
to the South Anna, 148; reinforced by 
Wright, 149; defeats Hill on the Korth 
Anna, 149, 406 ; ordered to send troops to 
Ox Ford, 150; position. May 24, 1861, 150; 
jimction with Crittenden, 150 ; ordered to 
cross the North Anna, 154; movement. 
May 27, 156; position onthe Pamunkey,157; 
at Himtley Corners, 158; defeats Early, 



158, 150 ; on Shady Grove road, 161 ; posi- 
tion, May, 30, 161; ordered to attack Ander- 
son, 163 ; repulses the enemy three times 
successively, 164 ; attack on, June 2,165 ; or- 
ders for June 3, 166 ; in battle of Cold Har- 
bor, 167 ; opinion of the situation, 108 ; 
withdraws to Cold Harbor, 177; crosses 
the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, 181; 
covers the crossing of the Chickahominy, 
182 ; in investment of Petersburg, 191 ; in 
the Petersburg mine affair, 201, 202 ; cap- 
tures the Weldon railroad, 211 ; captures 
camp at Peeble's farm, 219 ; advances on 
the Weldon railroad, 220; in battle of 
White Oak Road, 299, 450, 452 ; in battle of 
Five Forks, 303-306, 451 ; reports to Sher- 
idan, 305, 452; dissatisfaction with, at 
White Oak Road, 306 ; succeeded in com- 
mand by Ciriffln, 306. 452 ; engagement at 
Mine Run, 404 ; at Hatcher's Run, 422. See 
also Fifth Coups. 

W^arrenton, Miss., McClernand's position 
near, I, 443, 448; the highlands at, 371; 
batteries at, bombard the fleet, 386; 
Grant's line at, 448 

Warrenton Junction, Va., Grant's narrow 
escape ft-om Mosby at, II, 67 ; Burnside 
guards the railroad at, 99 

Warriors, two classes of, I, 66, 67 

Washburn, C. C, cuts the road in Pem- 
bertou's rear, I, *356; commanding at 
Haines's Bluff, 456 ; commandins; in West 
Tennessee, II, 424 ; sends Sturgls against 
Forrest, 424 

Washburn, Francis, ordered to destroy 
High Bridge, II, *330; confronts Lee's ad- 
vance, 330 ; killed, 331 

Washburne, E. B., speaks at meeting at Ga- 
lena, I, *184; Grant's first meeting with, 
191 ; visits Grant at Culpeper Court 
House, II, 68; campaigning experiences 
of, 68 

W^ashington, D. C, origin of the Soldiers' 
Home at, I, 133 ; Lincoln's secret journey 
to, 182 ; Halleck ordered to, 325 ; Grant's 
visits to, II, 44, 45, 47, 50. 66, 81, 207, 259, 
273, 290; the place for headquarters, 45, 
46; collecting reinforcements in, 66; dan- 
ger of Lee's moving on, 66 ; Confederate 
attflmpts to capture, 95, 195-197, 410,416; 
transportation of wounded from the Wil- 
derness to, 116; sending artillery to, 144, 
183 ; jiontoons ordered to City Point fi-om, 
159 ; troops ordered to, 204, 206, 220, 416 ; 
policy of Halleck and Stanton concerning 
the defense of, 205; Sheridan in, 207, 222; 
fears of another attempt by Early to 
capture, 213; difficulty of getting orders 
to Sheridan through, 214, 221 ; Sheridan's 
return to Winchester from, 222, 223 ; 
proposed plan of campaign from, for 
sprinii- of 1885, 226; Hancock ordered to 
organize the First Corps in, 226; a city 
of mourning, 359; Sherman ordered to, 
374; arrival of the troops at, 376; Sher- 
man's march to, 373, 374, 379; the grand 
review at, 378-380; covered by the Ai-my 
of the Potomac, 401, 409 ; awaiting rein- 
forcements from, 405; interruption of 
communication between City Point and, 
417; fears of exposina:, 418; Schofield 
reaches, 439 ; Schofield to secure rolling- 
stock from, 440 

^A^ashington, N. C, in Union hands, II, 53, 
398 ; abandoned by the Federals, 64 



INDEX 



515 



■Washington Territory, set off from Oregon, 
I, 101; ludiiins in, UV> 

Washita River, oiitlot of Ijiiko I'rovidouco, 
I, :!7y; waterway lor the enoiiiy, :!7t 

Waterloo, Ala., Forrest crosses theTeuues- 
see near, II, 4'28 

"Watts, N. G., Confederate comniissiouer 
for excliau^e of i)risoiiers, I, -179 

Wauhatchie, Tenn., llooUer's movements 
via, I, 504 ; battle of, 50S, 501); (4ear.v at, 11, K 

Wayne, Henry C, eonimaiidiufr Geoi-f;i:i mi- 
litia, II, 244; harasses 81iirman, *247 

Waynesboro, Ga., Sherman's luovomeut 
via, II, 24(; 

Waynesboro, Va., Karly's retreat to, II, 44.'j 

\A^ebb, Alexander S., II, 97 

" Webb," the, iu action against the " In- 
dianola," I, 388 

W^eber, Max. at Harper's Ferry, TT, 416 

Webster, J. D., iu action at Foit Donelson, 
I, *252 ; places artillery at Pittsburs Land- 
ins, '^Sl. 285 

W^eir, Rebecca, I, 5 

■Weitzel, G., assigned to ('(nnmand the 18tli 
Corps, II, 219 ; selected to command the 
Fort Fislier expedition, *2G2, 435, 436; ad- 
vises Bntler against an assault, 265; to 
hold Bermuda Hnndved, 209 ; notified to 
be ready to enter Richmond, 308 ; ordered 
to close up, 310; takes possession of Ilicli- 
mond, 320; interview with the President 
at Richmond, 355 ; difticulty about the- 
meeting of the Virginia legislature, 355, 
356 ; commanding the Arm.y of the .lames, 
447 ; proposed movements tor, 448 

Weldon railroad, the, raids on, II, 73, 190, 
194, 200, 204, 211, 212, 220, 414, 421, 422, 447 ; 
importance of capturing, 190, 211, 213 ; ex- 
tent of tlie Union lines on, 231, 421 

■Welles, Gideon, suggests a second attempt 
to capture Kort Fislier, II. 437 

■Wellsville, 'Va., Kantz's raid at, II, 407 

Wessells, Henry, defeated at Plymouth, II, 
407 

■West and East, possibility of bickerings 
between, II, 319, 320; lack of concerted 
action between tlie armies of, 397 ; the ar- 
mies of, compared, 460 
■Western armies, successful campaig-uing by 

the, II, 319 
■Western Reserve, the, lack of educational 

facilities in, I, i : early visit to, 16 
West Indies, Solomon Grant settles in the, 

1,2 
Westmoreland County, Pa., the Grants m, 

I, 2 

■West Point, Ga., captured by Wilson, II, 
368, 459 

■West Point, N. Y., Grant at, I, 7, 14-16, 18- 
23 ; proposal to abolish the Military Acad- 
emy at, 20; Capt. Smith's regime at, 22; 
Gen. Scott and Pres. Van Buren at. 22; 
use of tobacco at, 42 : important classes 
at, 151; onus on graduates of, 192; pre- 
sumption of a graduate of, 202; tactics 
taught at, 203; graduates iu the war, 230, 
231 ; Grant's comrades at, 2.56, II, 21, 371 

West Point, Va., Butler sends cavalry to, 

II, 406 

West Virginia, in Federal possession, II, 
53, 398; Crook and Averell's operations 
in, 72 ; Sisel protecting, 403 

■Wheaton, Frank, II, 99 

Wheeler, Joseph, moves against Burnsiae_, 
I, 515 ; cuts railroad between Dalton and 



Resaca, II, 92; o])eratioiis in 'reniiessoe 
and Kentucky. 229, 121; <-onfi<inls Sher- 
man at Milltdgcville, 216, ■in; driven 
toward .\n;;n--ta, 217 ; oppn.sin;,' Sherman's 
advance lliroiigh Ihe Carolina,-*, 2ho ; d«i- 
fealed at Dalton, 424 
Wheeling, Va., early visit to, I, 16 
Whig Party, the, indorses 'I'aylor for the 
I'resideney and elects him, 1. 91, 93 ; death 
of, 136, 169; <'iiaiit a meuiliei- of the, 169 

White, Chilton, 1, 11, 12 

Whita. Col., I, is 

White, John D., schoolmaster, I, 11,13 

White Haven, Mo., residence of the Dent 
family. I. 26 

White House. See EXECHTIVK MANSION. 

White House, Va., a base of supplies, II, 63, 
1,57, 294; Butler reinforces the Army of the 
Potomac at, 75; Sheridan's movements at 
and near, 70. 194, 29:i-295, 414, 415, 440 ; 
Smith's movements at and near, 15!. 1.59, 
179-181, 185, 186, 406, 410; change of base 
from Port Royal to, 154; Abererorahie 
commanding at, 177; movement of the 
Eighleenth Corps via, 179, ISO 

White Oak Road, battle of, II, 209, 306, 451, 
452; Miles's entragement at, 311-313 

White Oak Swamp, Va., Wilson moves to, 
IT, 410 

■White River, reported Confederate move- 
ment on till', I, 219 

Whitesides, Tenn., Hooker's movements 
via, 1,504; Sherman's movement from, 517 

White's Station, Va., Kantz's raid at, II, 
407 

Whiting, W. H. C, commanding at Fort 
Fisher, II. "264 

Wickham, W. C, II, 102 

Wide-awakes, the. I, 173 

Wilcox, Cadmus M., his command, II, 102; 
cut otflTom Petersbnrg, 313 

Wilcox's Landing, Va., movements at, II, 
410, 412, 413 

Wilderness, the, Va., E. B. Washburne in, 
II, 68; character of the country, '.6, 90- 
102; battle of, 106-116, 405: liurning of the 
woods in, 113, 114; effect of the lia'ttle on 
the enemy, 187, 409,410 

■Wilderness campaign, the, an incident of, 

II, 68-70; a lesson of, 144 ; strength of the 
Army of the Potomac at ojjcning ol, ls2; 
Union losses iu, 183 ; Lee's strength at 
opening of, 184 

Wilderness Tavern, movements at, II, 103, 

III, 405 ; source of the Ny near, 126 
■Willamette River, mortality among Indians 

on the, I, 163 

Willcox, Orlando B., at Maynardville, I, 
-.524 ; threateneil from the lOast, 524, II, 1 ; 
enconragement for Burnside through, 
12; despatch to, announcing battle of 
Chattaniioiia, 19; his command, 100; 
drive> oil' the enemy at the Xy, 126 ; in the 
Petersburg mine affair, 202 ; in action be- 
fore Petersbnrg, March 24, 1865. 298 

Williams, A. S., commanding the Twen- 
tieth Corps. II 231 

Williams, Thomas, cuts a canal across 
Yonu'JT's Point, I, *372 ^ , 

"Williams, William G., mortally wounded 
at Monterey, I, 87 

'Williamsburg road, Va., Butler attacks on 
the, II, 422 ^ . 

Willow Springs, Miss., McPherson orderea 
to hold road to, I, 409 



516 



INDEX 



'Wilmington, N. C, contemplated raove- 
meut aj^aiuHt, II, 232, i.ir, ; Brafrj,' leaves, 
249, 435 ; attempts to captTire, 2i9, 2G7, 275, 
437-439; defensi's of, 2Ul; iiuportauce of, 
261, 434,435; Bra^rs coiiiniumliug at, 264; 
proposal to scud Hcboticlil to, 275, 439, 441 ; 
proposed cooperation with Sbeniian from, 
275, 429, 444; Jail of, 277, 281, 2S3, 441 ; com- 
munication with (ioldsboro and Kaleisjh, 
280, 281, 286; operations in the vicimty 
of, 281 ; Sherman's ccnniiiunications with, 
286; blockade-running at, 435; expedition 
toward GoldsOoro Irom, 441; junction of 
column from, with that from New Berne, 
442 

Wilmington and Charlotteville railroad, 
Schofiild to seize the, II, 281 

Wilson, James H., sent to examine Moon 
Lake and Ya7/>o Pass Route. I * 375 ; con- 
structs bridf:;e over Nortli Fork of Bayou 
Pierre, 405, 40ii ; takes message from Chatr 
tanooga to Burnside, U, 28 ; on the Chicka- 
hominy, 79, 410; crosses Geruianna Ford, 
98; his command, 99; advances to Parker's 
Store, 103 : ordered from Parker's 8tore to 
Craig's Meeting-house, 106; in battle of 
the Wilderuess, 109 ; seizes Spottsylviinia, 
122; fails to hold it, 123; nu)venient to 
Little River, 155; movement. May 27, 
1864,156; captures Hanover Court House, 
161; raids on railroads, 161, li;5. 194, 414, 
415; reports the enemy's position, 182; 
Sheridan sent to his aid, 194; at Nashville, 
239 ; sent to Pulaski to watch Hood, 254 ; 
raid from Kastport, 366-308; luilitary 
character, 367, :<i;8; captures Howell Cobb 
and .Tetfersou Davis, 368, 459; receives 
news of Jolinston's surrender, 368; state- 
ment about the capture of .Jetl'erson Davis, 
370; operations on the Houth Anna, 408; 
moves to White Oak Swamp, 410; en- 
gagement at Stony Creek. 415; crosses the 
Nottaway River, 415; sent to Sheridan at 
Harper's Ferry, 419; proposal that Sher- 
man turn him loose, 430; raids in Ala- 
bama, 446. 4').s; deftats Forrest at Ebe- 
nezer Church, 458; captures Macon, 
Montgoraerv, Selma, Tuscaloosa, and 
West Point. 459 

Wilson's Station, Va., Grant at, 11,324,453; 
Kautz's raid at, 407 

Winchester. Va., Sigel ordered to advance 
from, 11,06; Karly drives Crook from. 204; 
Sheridan's cauip at, 215 ; Sheridan's return 
from Wa8hingW)n to, 222, 223, 420; use of 
cavalrv at, '222, 223 ; Averell's victory at, 
417; com-eut ration of the enemy at, 418, 
419; defeat of Early at, 420; Sheridan 
moves from, Feb. 27, 1865, 444 ; jirisoners 
sent to, 445 ; Hancock concentrates at, 446 

■Window Shades, Va., Ferrero crosses the 
Chickahomiuv at, 181 

Wmdsor, Conn., tlie Grants in. I, 1. 5. 6 

\Vinona, Miss., Grierson's raid at, II, 434 

Winslow, E. P., sent from Memphis against 
Price, II, 427 

■Wisconsin, traveling in. I, 177 

Wise's Forks, N. C, actions at, II, 441 

Wofford, W. T., II, 101 

Wolves, noisy, I. 52, 53; resemblance to 
disappoiuttMl politicians, 53 

■Wood, T. J., !it Shiloh, I, 302; in action at 
Fort Wood. II, *3; in battle of Chatta- 
nooga, 15. 16, 18 

Wooden coehorns, used at Vicksburg, I, 452 



^Vooden Bridge, Va., movements at, 11,126- 
129, 150; course of the Po at, 128 

"■Woodford," the, transport steamer at 
Nashville, I, 264 

" World." the New York, Buell replies to 
(irant in the. I, 296 

^Vorth, W.J., servicein Mexican war, I, '^73, 
74 ; dilliculty with Twiggs concerning bre- 
vet rank, 73, 74 ; commands division at 
Monterey, 80. 82, 84, 85, 88 ; the Fourth In- 
fantry transferred to his division, 93; 
forced marches made by, 94; pei-sonal 
characteristics, 94, 104; leaves Vera Cruz 
for Jalapa, 99; commands division in 
Scott's army, 99, 105, 109; marches to Pc- 
rote, 103; advances to Puebla, 103, 104; oc- 
cupies Tacnbaya, 115 ; in battle of Molino 
del Rey, 117, 118; estrangement between 
Gen. Scott ;ind, 117, 134, 135; atgarita San 
Cosine, 121,123,124 ; acknowledgesserviccs 
rendered by Grant with the gun in the 
belfry, 124 ; placed under arrest, 134 ; re- 
leased from arrest, 135 

Wright, A. R., 11, 102 

Wright, H. G., his command, II, 99; in battle 
of tlie Wilderness, 100; succeeds Sedgwick 
in coniniand of the Sixth Coriis. *128, 405; 
in batllc of Spottsylvania. 129-132, 134, 137, 
140, 141; wounded, 137; Cutler's division 
sent to, 138 ; recommended for miijor-gen- 
eralsliip, U. S. Vols., 139; recommended 
for command of the Sixth Army-corps, 
139; orders for his movement to draw Lee 
from his intreiuhments, 145; moves from 
Spottsylvania, 147; attacks on, 147; at 
(iuiney's Station, 148; ordered to the South 
Anna,'l48; moves from Harris's Ston' to 
Jericho Ford. 149; n-inforces Warren, 149 ; 
position. May 21, 1864, 150; ordered to 
cross the North Anna, 154; ordered to- 
ward Hanover Town, 154, 155 ; movement. 
May 27, 156: on the Paniunkey, 157; ad- 
vances to Hanover Court House. 158, 159 ; 
position, May 30, 161 ; ordered to Cold Har- 
bor, 102 ; comes to assistance of Sheridan, 
163; ordered to attack Anderson, 163; re- 
<'ouuoiters at Cold Harbor. 164; assaults, 
Jun(! 1, 164; ordered to assault, June 3, 
166; in battle of Cold Harbor, 167; orders 
for, Jum^ 3. 168; opinion of situation at 
Cold IIarl)or, 108; ordered to send troops 
to Bottom's Bridge, 177 ; crosses the 
Chickahominy, 181, 182 ; movement against 
the Weldon railroad, 190; in investment of 
Petersburg. 191 ; defense of Wa.shington, 
196, 197, 199,410, 417; pursues Early from 
Washington, 197, 204, 417 ; ordered back to 
the James, 220; in command in the Val- 
ley, 222; informs Sheridan of Early's in- 
tention to crush him, 222 ; orders retreat 
to Winchester, 222 ; sent back to the Army 
of the Potomac, 224; in battle of Five 
Forks. 303, 304, 451 ; in action at Hatcher's 
Rnn, 308-310, 452, 453 ; destroys the South 
Side railroad, 310; hungry march of his 
troops. 322, 324 ; movement, April 6, 1865, 
330; reinforces Humphreys, 332; ordered 
to Bermuda Hundred, 413; reinforces But- 
ler. 414 : i)osition. March 29, 1865, 450 

■Wytheville, Va., Averell at, II, 411 ; pursuit 
of Vaughn to, 434 ; destruction of, 434 ; 
Stonemau's raid at, 458 



Xochimilco Lake, Mex., I, 108 



INDEX 



517 



Yadkin River, the, Stoneman's raid on, 11, 

YaUbusha River, the, proposed operations 
oij, 1, -i'fi, '.iO'J; stratCKic importance, 369; 
former water route via, 375 

Yates, Richard, war goveruor of Illinois, I, 
•185; Grant's meetiut; with, 186; assljois 
Grant to work in the adjutautr^rcueral's 
otlke, 180; acqmiiutance witli, 191; com- 
iiiis»loua Grunt colonel of the 21.st Illinois 
Infantry, 194; vi-its (Irant at New Car- 
thage, 3*94; visits Vieksburp. 453 

Yazoo Pass, prf)i)<)s<(l route through, 1,375; 
<>t)stniitii)U of, 375; iriinboats at, 376 

Yazoo River, the, prnposed movements 
atainst VIekstiurK' with forces south of, 
I, :i6^, 3.'>9 ; rebel posit ions on, 364 ; McCler- 
nand reaches the mouth of, 365 ; providing 
for the navigation of, 3i;^; Sherman ana 
Porter withdraw from, 366; tlie country 
north of, 371 ; water communications of, 
377; Shenuan ordered to move up, 398; 



anxiety to secure a base of supplies on, 
441 ; road-making on, 443, 448 ; Blair's raid 
up, 454, 455 ; troops on, 456 
Yellow fever, at New Orleans, I, 37. See 

also VOMITO. 

Yellow Tavern, Va., battle of, II, 78, 406 
York River, the, question of securing base 
of supi)lies on, II, 62, 401 ; Butler's move- 
ments on, 73 
York River railroad, the, Abercrombie di- 
rected to strip, U, 177, 178 ; Butler attacks 
on, 422 
Yorktown, Va.. Capt. Noah Grant at. I, 2 
Young, P. M. B., his command, II, 102; de- 
feated at Hanover Court House, 161 
Young's Point, Miss., McClemand ordered 
to, I, 367; Grant assumes command at, 
368 ; the Mississippi at, 371 ; canal schemes 
at, 372, 373, 380, 381 ; the tliought upper- 
nu)8t in Grant's mind on assuming com- 
nuind at, 370 



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